{ "id": 2499459, "name": "JOANN W. WADDLE and JACQUELINE E. SIMPSON v. JACK SPARKS AND GUILFORD MILLS, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Waddle v. Sparks", "decision_date": "1992-03-05", "docket_number": "No. 476A90", "first_page": "73", "last_page": "88", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 N.C. 73" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526398 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 ALR4th 853", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4780326, 4777709, 4778478, 4779983, 4776954 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0334-03", "/nc/317/0334-02", "/nc/317/0334-05", "/nc/317/0334-01", "/nc/317/0334-04" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521761 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626774 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 S.E.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569803 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725743 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Colum. L. Rev. 42", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Colum. L. Rev.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.W.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 12035933 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/330/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 F.2d 190", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10544718 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying Michigan law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/801/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "881 F.2d 309", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11288582 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying Ohio law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/881/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497698, 2494955, 2493783 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0644-02", "/nc/327/0644-01", "/nc/327/0644-03" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497384 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568312 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725019 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "858", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512874 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342-43", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Lewis, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526398 ], "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Lewis, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0129-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1262, "char_count": 33577, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.588344424373199e-07, "percentile": 0.9768600408749699 }, "sha256": "b9f1ce3654867a89b29480f20c00f69db058f3cbdb9c3e764cb3cf13a787dc25", "simhash": "1:60931eb8265b2256", "word_count": 5411 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:05:46.767853+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice LAKE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "JOANN W. WADDLE and JACQUELINE E. SIMPSON v. JACK SPARKS AND GUILFORD MILLS, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EXUM, Chief Justice.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint, filed 20 April 1988, alleges intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress against defendant Jack Sparks and negligent hiring and retention of Sparks by defendant Guilford Mills, Inc. On 24 April and 26 April 1989, defendants, respectively, filed motions for summary judgment as to all plaintiffs\u2019 claims. The trial court granted these motions on 15 June 1989. Plaintiffs appealed the summary judgments entered against them on their intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Sparks and their negligent retention claims against Guilford Mills to the Court of Appeals. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgments entered in favor of both defendants as to plaintiff Waddle. 100 N.C. App. 129, 394 S.E.2d 683 (1990) (Lewis, J., dissenting). The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the summary judgments entered in favor of both defendants as to plaintiff Simpson. Id. Defendants appealed to this Court on the basis of Judge Lewis\u2019 dissent. Both defendants petitioned for discretionary review of additional issues which were raised in, but not addressed by, the Court of Appeals. Plaintiff Simpson also petitioned for discretionary review. The Court allowed all petitions on 10 January 1991.\nThe questions before us are, on defendants\u2019 appeal, whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing summary judgments in their favor on plaintiff Waddle\u2019s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Sparks and negligent retention against Guilford Mills; and on plaintiff Simpson\u2019s petition for discretionary review, whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming summary judgments for both defendants on her claims resting on these same torts. We conclude the Court of Appeals should have affirmed summary judgments entered for defendants as to both plaintiffs on both claims. Because of this conclusion we need not address the various additional issues raised by the parties in their petitions for discretionary review.\nI.\nThe trial judge considered several documents propounded by the parties in determining that defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment on all claims should be granted. Among these were the pleadings, the depositions of each plaintiff and of defendant Jack Sparks, defendants\u2019 responses to requests for admissions and, finally, a summarized version of an attitude survey of employees working under defendant Sparks taken by defendant Guilford Mills. Taken in the light most favorable to each plaintiff, the following facts can be gleaned from these documents.\nJoann Waddle began working for defendant Guilford Mills, Inc. in 1970. In early 1983, defendant Jack Sparks became the third-shift supervisor of the Knitting Department in Guilford Mills\u2019 Wendover plant. In this position Sparks was plaintiff Waddle\u2019s direct supervisor.\nIn 1984, defendant Guilford Mills took an attitude survey of the employees under defendant Sparks\u2019 supervision. The survey tended to show that Sparks was not well liked by the employees working on his shift. A report of the survey stated that\n[s]ome employees feel Sparks is vicious and \u201clikes to stir people up,\u201d while others think it\u2019s his idea of \u201chumor.\u201d In any event, its [sic] causing problems and largely of this supervisor\u2019s own making. The mix, particularly among women, ranges from fear to anger, with Sparks viewed as \u201cthe most vindictive egocentric person in the plant.\u201d Even when things are \u201cmentioned to Jack that he can and should correct, he gets so profane and angry that we\u2019re afraid to mention anything that needs attention.\u201d . . . The situation in this department would be radically improved if Sparks were reclaimed, recycled or removed.\nQuotations from the above survey are apparently direct quotes of department employees.\nWaddle\u2019s deposition was taken on 16 August 1988. During her deposition Waddle testified that sometime in 1983 Sparks brushed his arm against her breast while she was working on a clipboard. Although Waddle initially felt the brushing incident was an accident, she stated that a similar occurrence happened the next week and she began to suspect it was deliberate. The actual touching occurred only twice; however, Waddle testified that she had to step away from Sparks on several more occasions in order to avoid similar attempts. The last time she had to avoid these attempts \u201cwas about 1984.\u201d Plaintiff acknowledged, \u201cI wasn\u2019t worried about his brushing up against me because I knew I could get away from him if he tried anything.\u201d She further acknowledged in her deposition that any acts of a sexual nature, except \u201cdirty talk,\u201d occurred within the first six months or a year that Sparks supervised her (i.e., in 1983 and 1984).\nIn its opinion, the Court of Appeals outlined specific allegations of Waddle against Sparks which it gleaned from Waddle\u2019s deposition. It believed the following allegations could potentially support her claim of intentional infliction of mental distress (paraphrased except where quoted from the Waddle deposition):\n1. In 1983 Sparks brushed up against plaintiff\u2019s breast; however, Waddle acknowledged she was not worried about these attempts because of her ability to dodge them.\n2. In March, 1985, a male employee was cleaning and greasing a knitting machine. A female employee approached the machine and said \u201cBill, you have not greased the balls.\u201d Another female employee present at the scene then said to Sparks \u201cJack, listen over here. Frances is worried about whether Bill\u2019s greased his balls or not.\u201d Sparks responded to her \u201cWhat are you worrying about Bill\u2019s balls for?\u201d Waddle was not involved in this exchange, although she did overhear the conversation.\n3. Sometime in either March or April, 1985, Waddle and Sparks were examining some fabric together. Waddle commented to Sparks that the fabric \u201chas four holes the way its [sic] supposed to.\u201d According to Waddle, Sparks responded by asking, \u201c[D]o you have four holes? I bet you know how to use all four of them don\u2019t you?\u201d\n4. In the fall of 1985, Waddle approached Sparks for some medicine for an infected cut on her finger which was oozing pus. Sparks asked Waddle how she knew it was infected. Waddle stated \u201cit\u2019s red and it\u2019s swollen and it\u2019s got pus in it.\u201d Sparks started laughing and asked another employee to take care of plaintiff. Sparks then said \u201cYeah, Joann\u2019s got a pussy finger. Walt\u2019s going to have to work on Joann\u2019s pussy.\u201d Sparks then got up from his desk laughing even harder and said \u201cI\u2019d better leave on this one. I can\u2019t stand it anymore.\u201d As Sparks was leaving, another employee approached the office. Sparks stopped him and Waddle allegedly overheard Sparks tell the person \u201cYou can\u2019t go in there. Walt\u2019s working on Joann\u2019s pussy finger.\u201d Waddle stated that Sparks paused between the words \u201cpussy\u201d and \u201cfinger.\u201d\nPlaintiff has also alleged in her complaint that defendant Sparks \u201cfrequently and constantly used dirty or obscene language of a sexual nature.\u201d During her deposition, Waddle was pressed for details about incidents at which Sparks used such sexually suggestive comments. Waddle responded that she bought a watch for her father around Christmas 1984 and that one day she brought the watch with her to work. When she showed the watch to Sparks, he responded \u201cWell, that\u2019s nice.\u201d Sparks then turned around and commented to another employee \u201cYeah, I guess one of her boyfriends gave it to her.\u201d This incident and those already mentioned are the only specific, sexually suggestive comments made by Sparks, as recounted in Waddle\u2019s deposition. Waddle did say during her deposition that, throughout her employment on Sparks\u2019 shift, he frequently used offensive and vulgar language. She stated that defendant \u201calways threw cuss words in every sentence he said.\u201d\nIn \u201cthe early part of the fall\u201d of 1985, Waddle complained to plant manager John Moffitt and assistant plant manager Ed Gray regarding Sparks\u2019 alleged unfair treatment of her as compared to other employees. During the meeting Moffitt left to go to another meeting. After Moffitt left, she told Gray about Sparks\u2019 excessive use of dirty language, saying that Sparks \u201cused G.D. all the time and the T word.\u201d She acknowledged not telling Gray about the touching incidents in 1983 and 1984, and she did not tell Gray about any incidents where Sparks had used sexually suggestive remarks.\n\u201c[I]n the later part of the fall\u201d of 1985, Waddle complained to personnel manager Brenda Shelton about Sparks. The thrust of her complaints involved Sparks giving other employees special treatment at her expense. Waddle also mentioned that Sparks had a \u201cfilthy mouth.\u201d When Shelton asked if Waddle had ever spoken to Sparks about his language, plaintiff told Shelton that she had but that \u201cyou can\u2019t talk to him. The man\u2019s crazy. . . . Every time you try to talk to him, he makes something dirty out of it or he uses cuss words \u2014dirty words. . . . You can\u2019t talk to him. It\u2019s impossible.\u201d Waddle testified that Shelton replied \u201cWell, sex should never enter into the workplace.\u201d When pressed for details about those incidents when Sparks had \u201ctalked dirty,\u201d Waddle testified that she could not \u201cremember telling her [Shelton] anything specific.\u201d\nWaddle attempted to persuade Shelton to go to the plant and speak to other employees to verify Waddle\u2019s complaints. Shelton thought it would be a bad idea because it \u201cwould be too obvious\u201d to Sparks what was going on. Instead Shelton encouraged plaintiff to get some of her co-workers to bring their complaints directly to Shelton\u2019s office. Shelton attempted to assure Waddle that she would see \u201canybody that wants to talk.\u201d Waddle, however, was apprehensive about getting into trouble if she encouraged others to talk to Shelton. Waddle also begged Shelton to keep Waddle\u2019s name out of any conversations Shelton might have with Moffitt, Gray or Sparks, fearing that the three would retaliate against her.\nDefendant Jack Sparks\u2019 deposition was taken on 9 December 1987 during the discovery period of another case not involving the present plaintiffs. In that deposition, which Judge Walker (now a member of the Court of Appeals) had before him at the summary judgment hearing in this case, Sparks acknowledged that he was verbally reprimanded by Moffitt for use of offensive language. Moffitt warned Sparks that if Sparks \u201cwas found guilty of vulgar language . . . [he] would be terminated.\u201d\nFrom the record and the deposition testimony of Waddle, it appears that none of the above-cited incidents of inappropriate language about which Waddle testified occurred after plaintiff Waddle complained to Gray or Shelton. In February 1986, Waddle requested a transfer to the second shift. Guilford Mills granted the request on 24 February 1986. Thereafter, she was not supervised by defendant Sparks. On 22 October 1987 plaintiff Waddle voluntarily quit her job at Guilford Mills. She then complained that she was being unfairly accused of incorrectly measuring a set of beams, and she refused to sign a \u201cwrite-up sheet\u201d acknowledging the mistake. Apparently, at a later date, Guilford Mills determined that the mistake was not the fault of Waddle. Defendant Sparks was not involved in this final incident.\nPlaintiff Jacqueline Simpson was also deposed on 16 August 1988. During her deposition, Simpson testified that on several occasions Sparks brushed his elbow against her breast while walking by her. She also stated that he frequently used dirty language and that, if someone talked to him about it, \u201che tried to turn it into something sexual.\u201d For example, when pressed by defendants\u2019 counsel for details of Sparks\u2019 \u201cdirty talk,\u201d Simpson testified as follows:\nHe said lots of dirty talk. If you had any \u2014 lots of people used lotion out there in dealing with the yarn. And they put lotion in your hand. If you had lotion in your hand and he came by he would say, \u201cWho you been messing with?\u201d or \u201cHave you been messing with yourself?\u201d or \u201cWe know what you\u2019ve been doing.\u201d If the yarn was pulled apart in the middle, \u201cWhat did you do, get your titty in that?\u201d If there was a wet spot on the floor, \u201cDid you pee on the floor?\u201d If there was a wet spot on your pants, \u201cWhat have you been doing?\u201d\nIf your legs were sore from walking and you\u2019d say, \u201cMy legs are sore.\u201d\nHe\u2019d say, \u201cWell, I know why they\u2019re sore.\u201d\nOn several occasions, Sparks also made lewd gestures to Simpson with his hands where he would turn his palm up and wiggle his middle finger.\nWhen asked during her deposition to recount when any of these episodes took place, Simpson largely could not. She could not specify when any of these statements by Sparks occurred\u2014 even within a single year. Her responses were generally vague and apparently the majority of these incidents took place on a sporadic basis.\n\u25a0 II.\nCivil Procedure Rule 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is properly granted \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (1983). The procedures and guidelines by which summary judgment is properly allowed have oft been recited by this Court, but they bear repeating here.\nBy making a motion for summary judgment, a defendant may force a plaintiff to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff will be able to make out at least a prima facie case at trial.... The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue. . . . The movant may meet this burden by proving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cam not produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim or cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim. . . . All inferences of fact from the proofs offered at the hearing must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion. . . .\nBoudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 342-43, 368 S.E.2d 849, 858 (1988) (citations omitted).\nRule 56(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure states:\n[w]hen a motion' for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (1983). We have previously held that summary judgment is properly entered in the movant\u2019s favor if the movant establishes that an essential part or element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent. Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355 (1985). Therefore, in order to overcome defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs must have forecast sufficient evidence of all essential elements of their claims.\nThe essential elements of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are \u201cD extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant 2) which is intended to and does in fact cause 3) severe emotional distress.\u201d Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46(1) (1965). Defendant contends, among other points, that plaintiff Waddle has failed to forecast sufficient evidence of \u201csevere emotional distress.\u201d We agree. Because we believe plaintiff Waddle has failed to produce a sufficient forecast of evidence on this essential element of her claim, we need not, and therefore do not, address the remaining elements of this tort.\nThis Court first discussed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979). In Stanback we stated that, in order to show severe emotional distress, the plaintiff must show she was suffering \u201cemotional distress of a very serious kind.\u201d Id. at 196, 254 S.E.2d at 622 (citing William L. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts \u00a7 12, at 56 (4th ed. 1971)) (emphasis added). We reaffirmed the validity of an independent claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Dickens, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325. In Dickens, however, we failed to address in any detail the severe emotional distress element of this tort, having focused instead on the \u201cextreme and outrageous\u201d element. Today we focus on the crucial issue of what level of evidence is sufficient to show severe emotional distress in the context of an action for intentional infliction of mental distress.\nThis is not the first time we have broached a definition of the element of severe emotional distress. In the context of a claim for negligent infliction of mental distress, we stated:\nthe term \u201csevere emotional distress\u201d means any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.\nJohnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., 327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97, reh\u2019g denied, 327 N.C. 644, 399 S.E.2d 133 (1990) (emphasis added). We see no reason not to adopt the same standard for a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. At a minimum, applying the same standard to both torts promotes a symmetry desirable in this area of the law.\nSupport for a high standard of proof on the severe emotional distress element can also be found in the second Restatement of Torts, from which we have derived most of our present standards for the remaining elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nThe rule stated in this section applies only where the emotional distress has in fact resulted, and where it is severe. Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price, of living among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity. ... It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed.\nRestatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46 cmt. j (1965) (emphasis added). See also Gagne v. Northwestern Nat\u2019l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying Ohio law); Polk v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 801 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying Michigan law); and Hubbard v. United Press Internat\u2019l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).\nAs the drafters of the Restatement point out, the rationale for limiting or restricting liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress is simple:\nThe rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someone\u2019s feelings are hurt.\nRestatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46 cmt. d (1965). The majority of jurisdictions having adopted the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress have done so based on the standards enunciated in the Restatement. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 42, 43 n.9 (1982).\nIII.\nIn the present action, plaintiff Waddle\u2019s forecast of evidence, taken in the light most favorable to her, fails to show that she has suffered the requisite degree of emotional distress necessary to maintain her cause of action. When questioned during her deposition about having ever seen a psychiatrist or psychologist, Waddle stated that she had not been to a psychiatrist since the early 1970\u2019s. This was well before the events comprising this lawsuit against defendants. Although Waddle did state that her doctor had prescribed \u201cnerve pills\u201d in March 1986 during a spate of family-related problems, she stated that she has only once taken the medication on a regular basis for any protracted period of time. This was during episodes of family-related stress due to problems with her mother and daughter. She stated that the only time she missed work during her employment with Guilford Mills was when her mother was hospitalized and again when her teenage daughter eloped. Waddle also alleged in her unverified complaint that she was continually upset and frequently cried; but, as Judge Lewis pointed out in his dissent below, she testified during her deposition to only one such incident and that did not involve defendant Sparks.\nThere is no forecast of any medical documentation of plaintiff\u2019s alleged \u201csevere emotional distress\u201d nor any other forecast of evidence of \u201csevere and disabling\u201d psychological problems within the meaning of the test laid down in Johnson v. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. Consequently, we conclude that plaintiff Waddle has failed to forecast sufficient evidence of the \u201csevere emotional distress\u201d element of the tort to survive defendant Sparks\u2019 motion for summary judgment on this claim. We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision to the contrary as to this plaintiff.\nIV.\nPlaintiff Simpson has also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendant Sparks. We are persuaded that the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that plaintiff Simpson\u2019s forecast of evidence failed to show that any conduct of defendant Sparks occurred within the applicable statute of limitations.\nThe statute of limitations for intentional infliction of mental distress is three years. Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 442, 276 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1981). \u201cOnce a defendant has properly pleaded the statute of limitations, the burden is then placed upon the plaintiff to offer a forecast of evidence showing that the action was instituted within the permissible period after the accrual of the cause of action.\u201d Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 491, 329 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1985); see also Little v. Rose, 285 N.C. 724, 208 S.E.2d 666 (1974). Defendants pleaded the statute of limitations as a defense to plaintiff Simpson\u2019s claim and relied on it in their separate motions for summary judgment. In order to sustain her claim over defendants\u2019 summary judgment motions, plaintiff Simpson was required to produce a forecast of evidence of \u201cspecific facts\u201d which took place after 20 April 1985, three years prior to the filing of her complaint. See N.C. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(e). This she has not done.\nDuring her deposition, Simpson was unable to recount any one, specific instance which would sustain her claim over each defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Her testimony is replete with vague responses to opposing counsel\u2019s repeated questions as to when any of the events she has alleged took place. Not only could she not remember a day or month when any of defendant\u2019s alleged comments of a sexually suggestive nature occurred, but she also failed to recall the year they occurred. For example, the following exchange took place between Simpson and counsel for defendants:\nQ. So are you [Simpson] testifying that you can\u2019t tell us any specific things that happened to you in either 1985 or 1986?\nA. Just what I\u2019ve already told you. Like a [sic] said, I don\u2019t know any dates. I just know the stuff happened. That\u2019s why I left.\nQ. But you don\u2019t know when any of it happened?\nA. No.\nThis exchange is typical of plaintiff Simpson\u2019s answers to defendants\u2019 repeated inquiries as to when any of the alleged incidents took place. Her forecast of evidence has failed to place any of Sparks\u2019 conduct within the applicable statute of limitations for claims of intentional infliction of mental distress.\nWe are cognizant of the fact that Simpson stated during her deposition that some or all of defendant Sparks\u2019 questionable conduct occurred throughout her employment at Guilford Mills. For example, at one point, Simpson testified as follows:\nQ. (by Mr. Farran) When did you quit Guilford Mills?\nA. In February of \u201986.\nQ. And why did you quit?\nA. Because all this stuff was still going on. It continued until the time I left. And I waited to see improvements and there was none.\nQ. Now when you say \u201call this stuff,\u201d what are you referring to?\nA. Cussing, the favoritism and the sexual harassment.\n(Emphasis added.) If plaintiff Simpson could have testified that any of the specific incidents with Sparks occurred as late as February of 1986, her evidentiary forecast of Sparks\u2019 conduct would have been sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion based on the statute of limitations. Simpson, however, was not able to state a date \u2014even within a year \u2014 when any one of the various specific incidents she alleges against Sparks occurred. As such, she has failed to meet the requirements of Civil Procedure Rule 56(e) which mandate that the non-movant \u201cmay not rest upon the mere allegations of [her] pleading,\u201d but must instead \u201cset forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.\u201d This plaintiff Simpson has not done. We, therefore, affirm the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision that summary judgment was properly entered ag\u00e1inst plaintiff Simpson on her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against defendant Sparks.\nV.\nAn essential element of a claim for negligent retention of an employee is that the employee committed a tortious act resulting in plaintiffs\u2019 injuries. Pleasants v. Barnes, 221 N.C. 173, 177, 19 S.E.2d 627, 629 (1942). See also Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 141 (1986). Because we hold that summary judgment in Sparks\u2019 favor was proper on both plaintiffs\u2019 intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, the only tort at issue against Sparks, we likewise hold that both plaintiffs\u2019 negligent retention claims against Guilford Mills cannot survive its motion for summary judgment as to these claims.\nVI.\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals as to plaintiff Waddle is reversed and the judgments of the Superior Court, Guilford County, are reinstated. The decision of the Court of Appeals as to plaintiff Simpson is affirmed.\nReversed as to Plaintiff Waddle.\nAffirmed as to Plaintiff Simpson.\nJustice LAKE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. Plaintiffs did not challenge in the Court of Appeals the summary judgments against them on their negligent infliction of mental distress and negligent hiring claims. They further acknowledged during oral arguments here that they had abandoned their claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff Simpson also failed to present these issues in her petition for discretionary review. Pursuant to Appellate Procedure Rule 28(a) assignments of error relating to these claims have not been preserved on appeal and are therefore deemed abandoned.", "type": "majority", "author": "EXUM, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ling & Parran, by Jeffrey P. Farran, for plaintiff-appellee Joann W. Waddle and plaintiff-appellant Jacqueline E. Simpson.", "Haines, Short, Campbell & Ferguson, by W. Marcus Short, for defendant Jack Sparks.", "Smith, Helms, Mull\u00eds & Moore, by Martin N. Erwin and Michael A. Gil\u00edes, for defendant Guilford Mills, Inc.", "Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOANN W. WADDLE and JACQUELINE E. SIMPSON v. JACK SPARKS AND GUILFORD MILLS, INC.\nNo. 476A90\n(Filed 5 March 1992)\n1. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 56.3 (NCI3d)\u2014 summary judgment\u2014 proof of nonexistence of essential element\nSummary judgment is properly entered in the movant\u2019s favor if the movant establishes that an essential part or element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent. Therefore, in order to overcome defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs must forecast sufficient evidence of all essential elements of their claims.\nAm Jur 2d, Summary Judgment \u00a7 26.\n2. Trespass \u00a7 2 (NCI3d)\u2014 intentional infliction of emotional distress \u2014 elements\nThe essential elements of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant (2) which is intended to and does in fact cause (3) severe emotional distress.\nAm Jur 2d, Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance \u00a7\u00a7 4-7.\n3.Trespass \u00a7 2 (NCI3d)\u2014 intentional infliction of emotional distress \u2014meaning of severe emotional distress\nThe standards for determining the element of severe emotional distress in actions for the intentional infliction of emotional distress and the negligent infliction of emotional distress are the same. Therefore, the term \u201csevere emotional distress\u201d in an action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress means any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.\nAm Jur 2d, Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance \u00a7\u00a7 3, 4, 47, 51.\n4. Trespass \u00a7 2 (NCI3d| \u2014 intentional infliction of emotional distress \u2014 insufficient forecast of evidence of severe emotional distress\nPlaintiff\u2019s forecast of evidence failed to show that she has suffered the severe emotional distress necessary to maintain her cause of action against her former supervisor for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on sexually suggestive comments and offensive actions where plaintiff stated during her deposition that she had not seen a psychiatrist or psychologist since well before the events comprising her lawsuit; plaintiff stated that the only time she had taken \u201cnerve pills\u201d prescribed by her doctor for a protracted period of time was during episodes of family-related stress due to problems with her mother and daughter; plaintiff stated that the only time she missed work was when her mother was hospitalized and again when her teenage daughter eloped; and there was no forecast of any medical documentation of plaintiff\u2019s alleged \u201csevere emotional distress\u201d and no forecast of evidence of \u201csevere and disabling\u201d psychological problems.\nAm Jur 2d, Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance \u00a7\u00a7 8-10, 12.\n5. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 56.4 (NCI3d)\u2014 statute of limitations \u2014defendants\u2019 summary judgment motions \u2014 burden on plaintiff\nWhere defendants pleaded the statute of limitations as a defense to plaintiff\u2019s claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress and relied on it in their separate motions for summary judgment, plaintiff was required to produce a forecast of evidence of specific acts which took place within three years prior to the filing of her complaint in order to sustain her claim over defendants\u2019 summary judgment motions.\nAm Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions \u00a7 470; Summary Judgment \u00a7\u00a7 26, 27.\n6. Trespass \u00a7 2 (NCI3d|\u2014 intentional infliction of emotional distress \u2014summary judgment \u2014statute of limitations\nSummary judgment was properly entered against the second plaintiff on her claim against her former supervisor for intentional infliction of emotional distress because her forecast of evidence failed to show that any conduct of defendant occurred within the applicable three-year statute of limitations where she was unable to state during her deposition a date, even within a year, when any one of the various specific incidents she alleged against defendant occurred.\nAm Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions \u00a7 470; Summary Judgment \u00a7\u00a7 26, 27.\n7. Master and Servant \u00a7 29 (NCI3d) \u2014 negligent retention of supervisor \u2014 insufficient forecast of evidence\nSummary judgment in favor of defendant employer was proper on plaintiffs\u2019 claims for negligent retention of their former supervisor where the only tort at issue against the supervisor was intentional infliction of emotional distress, and plaintiffs\u2019 forecasts of evidence were insufficient to sustain their claims against the supervisor for this tort.\nAm Jur 2d, Summary Judgment \u00a7\u00a7 26, 27.\nLiability of employer, supervisor, or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress. 52 ALR4th 853.\nJustice LAKE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn appeal of right by defendants pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) and on discretionary review of additional issues pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31(a), from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 100 N.C. App. 129, 394 S.E.2d 683, reversing summary judgment against plaintiff Waddle and affirming summary judgment against plaintiff Simpson, the judgments having been rendered on 15 June 1989 in Superior Court, GUILFORD County, Walker (Ralph A.), J., presiding. Heard in the Supreme Court on 8 April 1991.\nLing & Parran, by Jeffrey P. Farran, for plaintiff-appellee Joann W. Waddle and plaintiff-appellant Jacqueline E. Simpson.\nHaines, Short, Campbell & Ferguson, by W. Marcus Short, for defendant Jack Sparks.\nSmith, Helms, Mull\u00eds & Moore, by Martin N. Erwin and Michael A. Gil\u00edes, for defendant Guilford Mills, Inc.\nHarvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae." }, "file_name": "0073-01", "first_page_order": 115, "last_page_order": 130 }