{ "id": 2498595, "name": "SHARON AMOS, KATHY HALL and EARLINE MARSHALL v. OAKDALE KNITTING COMPANY AND WALTER MOONEY, III", "name_abbreviation": "Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co.", "decision_date": "1992-05-08", "docket_number": "No. 278A91", "first_page": "348", "last_page": "360", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 N.C. 348" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525773 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488329 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491716, 2492262, 2491956, 2491610, 2489499 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0546-05", "/nc/325/0546-02", "/nc/325/0546-04", "/nc/325/0546-01", "/nc/325/0546-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520544 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "767 F. Supp. 735", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3726469 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/767/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 N.C. L. Rev. 1178", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.C. L. Rev.", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1192", "parenthetical": "\"The language regarding bad faith was not necessary to the court's holding and may be weakened in future cases.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "774 F. Supp. 959", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3706345 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "allowing claim for bad faith discharge" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/774/0959-01" ] }, { "cite": "759 F. Supp. 293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4092972 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "disallowing tort claim for bad faith discharge" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/759/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "765 F. Supp. 293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7383199 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "disallowing tort claim for bad faith discharge" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/765/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499683, 2502026, 2498378, 2501299, 2501692 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0119-05", "/nc/331/0119-03", "/nc/331/0119-01", "/nc/331/0119-04", "/nc/331/0119-02" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "disallowing tort claim for bad faith discharge" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523555 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "disallowing tort claim for bad faith discharge" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.C. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8698543 ], "year": 1874, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/70/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562647 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "621 P.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10443033 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the FLSA does not preempt state law claims" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/621/0890-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "vitality of common law actions for nuisance and continuing trespass dependent upon federal preemption and whether state Clean Water Act precludes common law civil actions" }, { "page": "720", "parenthetical": "state Clean Water Act does not abrogate common law" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526547 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "vitality of common law actions for nuisance and continuing trespass dependent upon federal preemption and whether state Clean Water Act precludes common law civil actions" }, { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 72", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12121785 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 F. Supp. 1185", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Fourth Circuit, interpreting post-Coman North Carolina law, reversed district court's limitation of wrongful discharge claims to instances in which there was no alternative remedy, stating that it found \"no North Carolina authority\" for the addition of this limitation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "924 F.2d 530", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10543278 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/924/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Or. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 2183196 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/298/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "767 P.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1526761 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/159/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ariz. App. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz. App.", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "588 F. Supp. 27", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 6048212 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "wrongful discharge action recognized \"in order to fill [a] legislative gap. When a statutory remedy is available, there is no gap, and the justification for judicial creativity is absent.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/588/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Md. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2037324, 2037311 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" }, { "page": "180", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/316/0603-02", "/md/316/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201-219", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "619 F.2d 276", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1376855 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/619/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 F. Supp. 1052", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3959337 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1055" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/438/1052-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 S.E.2d 731", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525496 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 P.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Cal. App. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4387121 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/174/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686660, 4695653, 4695471, 4689718, 4689592 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0331-03", "/nc/314/0331-01", "/nc/314/0331-05", "/nc/314/0331-02", "/nc/314/0331-04" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" }, { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524570 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" }, { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732963 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 14, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" }, { "page": "446", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "448", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" }, { "page": "568" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "568" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "568" }, { "page": "567-68" }, { "page": "566" }, { "page": "567-68", "parenthetical": "\"The legislature having expressed its intent, however, we decline to extend the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine to afford a cause of action in addition to that provided by statute.\"" }, { "page": "567" }, { "parenthetical": "plaintiffs had two options: continue working and seek backpay or refuse to work and be fired" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525773 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" }, { "page": "785" }, { "page": "787" }, { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786-87" }, { "page": "784" }, { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488329 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" }, { "page": "174" }, { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0172-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1118, "char_count": 31228, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.627824536170822e-07, "percentile": 0.9814384931322251 }, "sha256": "880838ec836cd85dbc4ab8f25590bbb5080d2daad8b2ca21bde964a0ef717120", "simhash": "1:ec39f5f824ef3c9e", "word_count": 5111 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:05:46.767853+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SHARON AMOS, KATHY HALL and EARLINE MARSHALL v. OAKDALE KNITTING COMPANY AND WALTER MOONEY, III" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nFor the first time since our decision in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989), we examine the contours of the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Three issues are presented: (1) does firing an employee for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum wage violate the public policy of North Carolina? (2) does the availability of alternative remedies prevent a plaintiff from seeking tort remedies for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine? and (3) did Coman recognize a separate and distinct exception to the employment-at-will doctrine based on \u201cbad faith\u201d termination?\nFor the reasons outlined below, we hold that firing an employee for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum wage violates the public policy of North Carolina. Furthermore, we hold that absent (a) federal preemption or (b) the intent of our state legislature to supplant the common law with exclusive statutory remedies, the availability of alternative federal or state remedies does not prevent a plaintiff from seeking tort remedies for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception. Based on these two holdings, we conclude that plaintiffs in this case have stated a valid claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Finally, we hold that Coman did not recognize a separate and distinct \u201cbad faith\u201d exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.\nOn 27 January 1989, plaintiffs Amos, Hall, and Marshall filed a complaint in Surry County Superior Court alleging the following facts. In February 1988, plaintiffs, employees at defendant Oakdale Knitting Company, learned that their pay had been reduced to $2.18 per hour, below the statutory minimum wage. When they inquired of their supervisor, Herbert Bowman, as to why their pay had been reduced below the minimum wage, they were instructed to talk with defendant Walter Mooney, III, one of the owners of Oakdale Knitting. When Mooney arrived at the plant, he told the plaintiffs that they either had to work for the reduced pay or they were fired. Plaintiffs refused to work for $2.18 per hour and were terminated.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that their firing violates the public policy of North Carolina as set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.3 \u2014 the minimum wage section of the state\u2019s Wage and Hour Act. Plaintiffs sought actual damages, including lost wages, and special damages for \u201cgreat worry, embarrassment, humiliation, anxiety and mental and emotional distress.\u201d Plaintiffs also sought punitive damages.\nDefendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On 6 April 1989, Judge Morgan granted defendants\u2019 motion and dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court, holding that plaintiffs had not stated a valid claim for wrongful discharge. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 102 N.C. App. 782, 403 S.E.2d 565 (1991). Judge Johnson dissented on the narrow ground that plaintiffs\u2019 complaint had stated a claim pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.22 (recovery of unpaid wages under the Wage and Hour Act). Plaintiffs appealed to this Court based on the dissenting opinion; on 14 August 1991 we allowed plaintiffs\u2019 petition for discretionary review as to additional issues. We now reverse the Court of Appeals.\nI.\nThis case comes to us, via the Court of Appeals, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For purposes of this appeal, therefore, all allegations of fact are taken as true. Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172,174-75, 347 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1986).\nIn Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445, plaintiff Coman alleged that he was discharged from his job as a long-distance truck driver after refusing to violate federal transportation regulations. Coman brought suit for wrongful discharge. This Court reversed the Court of Appeals, which had agreed with the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the action, and allowed Coman\u2019s suit to proceed. In so doing, we explicitly recognized a public policy exception to the well-entrenched employment-at-will doctrine, quoting with approval the following language from the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion in Sides v. Duke Hospital, 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985):\n\u201c[W]hile there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. A different interpretation would encourage and sanction lawlessness, which law by its very nature is designed to discourage and prevent.\u201d\nComan, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826). We then said that public policy \u201chas been defined as the principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.\u201d Id. at 175 n.2, 381 S.E.2d at 447 n.2 (citing Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959)).\nThe first issue in this case, then, is whether defendants\u2019 alleged decision to fire plaintiffs for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum wage is injurious to the public or against the public good. Stated differently, has defendants\u2019 conduct as alleged by plaintiffs violated the public policy of North Carolina? We note at the outset that both courts below indicated that defendants had, indeed, violated this state\u2019s stated public policy that employees such as plaintiffs be paid at least the statutory minimum wage. Judge Morgan, in his order granting defendants\u2019 12(b)(6) motion, said defendants\u2019 conduct \u201coffends this Court, and also appears to violate the public policy of this State as set out in N.C.G.S. 95-25.3.\u201d Judge Morgan, however, felt constrained by the Court of Appeals' decision in Coman, which had yet to be reversed by this Court. See Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 91 N.C. App. 327, 371 S.E.2d 731 (1988), rev\u2019d, 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989). Under Coman, as decided by the Court of Appeals and interpreted by Judge Morgan, the public policy exception was limited to instances in which an employer attempted to interfere with an employee\u2019s testimony in a legal proceeding. The Court of Appeals in this case also expressed its strong disapproval of defendants\u2019 alleged conduct: \u201cBy this opinion we do not in any way condone an employer\u2019s violation of the minimum wage law with the resultant hardship and inconvenience to its employees, and we expressly denounce such unlawful coercive attempts to deprive employees of the wages to which they are lawfully entitled.\u201d Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 786, 403 S.E.2d at 567. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, holding that in order to state a valid claim for wrongful discharge, there must be no other remedy available. Id. at 787, 403 S.E.2d at 568. We address this issue later in the opinion.\nDefendants argue in their brief that they did not violate public policy, as that term is defined in Coman, because the \u201calleged acts are peculiar to the plaintiff, are not injurious to the public, and do not in any way affect the public good.\u201d Defendants then suggest that in order to state a valid claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy an employee must either be required to engage in unlawful conduct or the employer\u2019s conduct must threaten public safety. Defendants read Coman too narrowly. Although the definition of \u201cpublic policy\u201d approved by this Court does not include a laundry list of what is or is not \u201cinjurious to the public or against the public good,\u201d at the very least public policy is violated when an employee is fired in contravention of express policy declarations contained in the North Carolina General Statutes.\nArticle 2A of Chapter 95 of the North Carolina General Statutes, the Wage and Hour Act, provides:\n(b) The public policy of this State is declared as follows: The wage levels of employees, hours of labor, payment of earned wages, and the well-being of minors are subjects of concern requiring legislation to promote the general welfare of the people of the State without jeopardizing the competitive position of North Carolina business and industry. The General Assembly declares that the general welfare of the State requires the enactment of this law under the police power of the State.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.1(b) (1989). Accordingly, the legislature' set a minimum wage of $3.35 per hour effective 1 January 1983, with subsequent increases through 1 June 1989 to coincide with those of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) up to a maximum hourly wage of $4.00. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.3. Businesses covered by the FLSA are exempt from the state Wage and Hour Act. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.14(a)(l). Remedies under the FLSA are similar to those provided in the state statute. Thus, as recognized by the Court of Appeals, \u201c[without question, payment of the minimum wage is the public policy of North Carolina.\u201d Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 785, 403 S.E.2d at 567. We hold therefore that, taking plaintiffs\u2019 allegations as true, defendants violated the public policy of North Carolina by firing plaintiffs for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum wage.\nII.\nDefendants argue that, even if their conduct violates public policy, plaintiffs have alternative remedies available and therefore should not be permitted to proceed under the common law theory of wrongful discharge. Defendants ask this Court to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeals, which established a two-part test for employees wishing to proceed under a theory of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Quoting a federal district court from Pennsylvania, the Court of Appeals held that the \u201c \u2018application of the public policy exception requires two factors: (1) that the discharge violate some well-established public policy; and (2) that there be no remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or society.\u2019 \u201d Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 787, 403 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff\u2019d as modified, 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980)). On the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals held that the state legislature had provided plaintiffs an adequate statutory remedy:\nPlaintiffs thus had two options: (i) to continue working and pursue their remedy [for backpay] under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.22, which would have made them whole, or (ii) to refuse to work and be fired. Plaintiffs chose the latter. They were not terminated in retaliation for filing a complaint. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.20(a), therefore, has no applicability.\nAmos, 102 N.C. App. at 786, 403 S.E.2d at 567. The Court of Appeals then held that because plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at their disposal, they could not proceed under a theory of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Id. at 787, 403 S.E.2d at 568.\nAlthough the Court of Appeals decided this case on the basis of a state statutory remedy, both parties now assert that the applicable statutory scheme may be the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201-219 (1978), not the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. If, as the parties now believe, defendant Oakdale Knitting is covered by the FLSA, it would be exempt from the state statute. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.14(a)(l). Because the record on appeal in this case does not contain sufficient information to determine whether Oakdale Knitting is covered by the FLSA or the state Wage and Hour Act, we will address both statutory schemes.\nIn Coman, we held that an employee who has been fired in violation of public policy has a claim for wrongful discharge notwithstanding this state\u2019s allegiance to the employment-at-will doctrine. The issue now before this Court is whether Coman is limited to situations in which the fired employee has no other available remedy. The Court of Appeals added this limitation. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 786-87, 403 S.E.2d at 567-68. Several courts in other jurisdictions have also limited the public policy exception, arguing that the rationale behind the exception is to provide a remedy for discharges in violation of public policy \u201cwhich otherwise would not be vindicated by a civil remedy.\u201d Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 605, 561 A.2d 179, 180 (1989) (and cases cited therein); see also Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27, 29 (D. Mass. 1984) (wrongful discharge action recognized \u201cin order to fill [a] legislative gap. When a statutory remedy is available, there is no gap, and the justification for judicial creativity is absent.\u201d) (citation omitted). Other courts have chosen not to add this limitation. See Broomfield v. Lundell, 159 Ariz. App. 349, 767 P.2d 697 (1988); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984); see also Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 533 (4th Cir. 1991), rev\u2019g 724 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (Fourth Circuit, interpreting post-Coman North Carolina law, reversed district court\u2019s limitation of wrongful discharge claims to instances in which there was no alternative remedy, stating that it found \u201cno North Carolina authority\u201d for the addition of this limitation).\nIf the sole rationale for the adoption of the public policy exception in Coman was to provide a remedy where no other remedy existed, then the reasoning of the Court of Appeals would be persuasive. Coman, however, was not predicated on the \u201cno alternative remedy\u201d theory. Indeed, we noted in Coman that the fired employee arguably had an \u201cadditional remedy in the federal courts.\u201d Coman, 325 N.C. at 174, 381 S.E.2d at 446 (footnote omitted). Whether the plaintiff in Coman was without an additional state remedy was not the key factor behind this Court\u2019s adoption of the public policy exception. The underlying rationale was the recognition that the judicially created employment-at-will doctrine had its limits and it was the role of this Court to define those limits. See id. at 177 n.3, 381 S.E.2d at 448 n.3 (\u201c[t]his Court, not the legislature, adopted the employee-at-will doctrine in the first instance, [and thus] it is entirely appropriate for this Court to further interpret the rule.\u201d). Accordingly, we held that although \u201c \u2018there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826). The public policy exception adopted by this Court in Coman is not just a remedial gap-filler. It is a judicially recognized outer limit to a judicially created doctrine, designed to vindicate the rights of employees fired for reasons offensive to the public policy of this State. The existence of other remedies, therefore, does not render the public policy exception moot.\nAlthough we now hold that the existence of an alternative remedy does not automatically preclude a claim for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception, we also hold that under certain circumstances a legislative remedy may be deemed exclusive. If federal legislation preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, then state claims, such as one for wrongful discharge, will be precluded. See English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 110 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1990). Additionally, if our state legislature has expressed its intent to supplant the common law with exclusive statutory remedies, then common law actions, such as wrongful discharge, will be precluded. See Biddix v. Henredon Furniture Industries, 76 N.C. App. 30, 331 S.E.2d 717 (1985) (vitality of common law actions for nuisance and continuing trespass dependent upon federal preemption and whether state Clean Water Act precludes common law civil actions). We hold therefore that absent (a) federal preemption or (b) the intent of our state legislature to supplant the common law with exclusive statutory remedies, the availability of alternative remedies does not prevent a plaintiff from seeking tort remedies for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception. The availability of alternative common law and statutory remedies, we believe, supplements rather than hinders the ultimate goal of protecting employees who have been fired in violation of public policy.\nAs mentioned previously, the record on appeal does not contain sufficient information to determine whether Oakdale Knitting is covered by the FLSA or the state Wage and Hour Act. We therefore address both statutory schemes.\nDefendants argued before the Court of Appeals that the FLSA preempted state law and that the remedies contained in the state Wage and Hour Act were intended to be exclusive. In response to the federal preemption argument, plaintiffs argued that Congress, in adopting the FLSA, did not intend to \u201coccupy the field,\u201d and therefore an action for wrongful discharge was not precluded. See Webster v. Bechtel, 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980) (the FLSA does not preempt state law claims). The Court of Appeals, however, did not pass upon defendants\u2019 federal preemption argument, noting that defendants had failed to raise the issue before the trial court. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 784, 403 S.E.2d at 566. The issue of federal preemption is a constitutional question and therefore will not be reviewed by this Court unless it affirmatively appears from the record that the issue was raised and passed upon in the court below. Coman, 325 N.C. at 171 n.1, 381 S.E.2d at 446 n.1; Comr. of Insurance v. Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 428, 269 S.E.2d 547, 577 (1980). Because this issue was not passed upon by either the Court of Appeals or the trial court, it is not properly before this Court.\nThe Court of Appeals did, however, suggest that our state legislature intended the remedies in the Wage and Hour Act to be exclusive in all instances where an employer refuses to pay the minimum wage. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 786, 403 S.E.2d at 567-68 (\u201cThe legislature having expressed its intent, however, we decline to extend the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine to afford a cause of action in addition to that provided by statute.\u201d). We will therefore address the issue of whether our state legislature intended the Wage and Hour Act to supplant the common law with exclusive statutory remedies. We hold it did not.\nIn determining whether the state legislature intended to preclude common law actions, we first look to the words of the statute to see if the legislature expressly precluded common law remedies. The Wage and Hour Act, unlike the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, does not expressly preclude common law remedies. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-10.1 (1991) (common law rights and remedies precluded under Workers\u2019 Compensation Act). Because the legislature did not expressly preclude common law remedies, we \u201clook to the purpose and spirit of the statute and what the enactment sought to accomplish, considering both the history and circumstances surrounding the legislation and the reason for its enactment.\u201d Biddix, 76 N.C. App. at 34, 331 S.E.2d at 720 (state Clean Water Act does not abrogate common law).\nIn February 1988, when defendants allegedly reduced plaintiffs\u2019 wages below the statutory minimum wage, plaintiffs\u2019 remedies under the Wage and Hour Act were as follows. Plaintiffs could have stayed on the job, working for $2.18 per hour, and pursued an action to recover unpaid wages. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.22. In its discretion, the court could have awarded exemplary damages in an amount \u201cnot in excess of the amount found to be due as provided above.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.22(a). Plaintiffs, in the discretion of the court, also could have recovered reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.22(d). An employee who has been discharged in retaliation for filing a complaint or participating in an investigation under the Wage and Hour Act also has a statutory right to be reinstated. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.20(a). Because plaintiffs in this case did not file a complaint, this section presumably has no application. See Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 786, 403 S.E.2d at 567 (N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.20(a) not applicable to this case). Judging from these statutory remedies, it seems apparent that the intent of the legislature was to provide an employee an avenue to recover back wages while remaining employed. The statute, as recognized by the Court of Appeals, provides no remedy for an employee who is discharged for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum wage. See id. (plaintiffs had two options: continue working and seek backpay or refuse to work and be fired).\nThe strongest argument, however, that the legislature did not intend by its adoption of the Wage and Hour Act to supplant the common law claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is also the most obvious: at the time section 95-25.22 was enacted in 1959 and 95-25.20 was enacted in 1979, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals had recognized the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. As the Supreme Court of Oregon succinctly stated in Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 298 Or. at 96, 689 P.2d at 1303: \u201cIt seems elementary that before a legislative body can intend to eliminate certain forms of remedy it must be aware that such remedies exist.\u201d (Footnote omitted). We hold that the legislature, by enacting the Wage and Hour Act, did not intend to preclude wrongful discharge actions based on violation of the state\u2019s public policy requiring employers to pay their employees at least the statutory minimum wage.\nIII.\nThe final issue before the Court is whether Coman recognized a separate and distinct claim for bad faith discharge. We hold it did not.\nIn Coman, we noted that this Court \u201chas never held that an employee at will could be discharged in bad faith.\u201d Coman, 325 N.C. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 448 (citing Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C. 601 (1874)). We then recognized that courts in other states \u201chave recognized wrongful discharge theories characterized either as the bad faith exception to the at-will doctrine or under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.\u201d Id. at 177, 381 S.E.2d at 448 (citations omitted). Finally, we added, \u201c[b]ad faith conduct should not be tolerated in employment relations, just as it is not accepted in other commercial relationships.\u201d Id. These statements were dicta; they were not relied upon for our ultimate holding that plaintiff had stated a valid claim for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.\nMost courts interpreting Coman have recognized that our discussion of bad faith discharge was dicta, but have come to differing conclusions. Compare Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 652, 412 S.E.2d 97 (1991) (disallowing tort claim for bad faith discharge), cert. denied, 331 N.C. 119, 415 S.E.2d 200 (1992); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 765 F. Supp. 293 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (disallowing tort claim for bad faith discharge); and Haburjak v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 293 (W.D.N.C. 1991) (disallowing tort claim for bad faith discharge) with Iturbe v. Wandel & Goltermann Technologies, 774 F. Supp. 959 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (allowing claim for bad faith discharge); see also, Duncan Alford, Note, Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co.: Recognizing a Public Policy Exception to the At-Will Employment Doctrine, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 1178, 1192 (1990) (\u201cThe language regarding bad faith was not necessary to the court\u2019s holding and may be weakened in future cases.\u201d). A few courts have not characterized our bad faith discussion as dicta and have indicated that Coman did recognize a distinct tort for bad faith discharge. Riley v. Dow Corning Corp., 767 F. Supp. 735 (M.D.N.C. 1991); McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp., 95 N.C. App. 301, 382 S.E.2d 836, disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 546, 385 S.E.2d 498 (1989).\nTo repeat: our discussion of bad faith discharge in Coman was dicta. The issue in Coman was whether to adopt a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. In setting out the issue presented, we said: \u201cOur present task is to determine whether we should adopt a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.\u201d Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 (footnote omitted). We did. We did not recognize a separate claim for wrongful discharge in bad faith.\nIV.\nTo summarize: Firing an employee for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum wage violates the public policy of North Carolina. Absent federal preemption or the intent of our legislature to supplant the common law with exclusive statutory remedies, the availability of alternative federal or state remedies does not prevent a plaintiff from seeking tort remedies for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. The issue of federal preemption is not properly before this Court and we decline to address the merits; however, we hold that the state legislature did not intend to preclude common law remedies when it adopted the Wage and Hour Act. Because plaintiffs\u2019 claim has not been determined to be preempted by federal law or supplanted by state legislation, the complaint was improperly dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finally, Coman did not recognize a separate and distinct claim for bad faith discharge.\nWe reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for further remand to Superior Court, Surry County, for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\n. Although it may be tempting to refine the definition of \u201cpublic policy\u201d in order to formulate a more precise and exact definition, we decline to do so. Any attempt to make the definition more precise would inevitably lead to at least as many questions as answers. True to the common law tradition, we allow this still evolving area of the law to mature slowly, deciding each case on the facts before us.\n. Various sections of the Wage and Hour Act have been amended since the filing of this lawsuit. All references to the Wage and Hour Act in this opinion are to the version in force at the time plaintiffs were allegedly fired for refusing to work for less than the minimum wage.\n. The North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Foundation, in an amicus curiae brief, argued that defendant Thomas Manufacturing Company had violated both state and federal statutory law when it discharged plaintiff Coman. Thomas Manufacturing responded in its brief that, assuming state law applied, Coman not only had a federal remedy available, but also a state statutory remedy pursuant to the state Occupational Safety & Health Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-130(8), (9) (1989). Thus, Thomas Manufacturing argued, given the statutory remedies available, there was no need for this Court to create an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. This is essentially the same argument defendant Oakdale Knitting makes in this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, by Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, 111, for plaintiff-appellants.", "Allman Spry Humphreys Leggett & Howington, P.A., by W. Thomas White, David C. Smith and W. Rickert Hinnant, for defendant-appellees.", "J. Wilson Parker, Deborah Leonard Parker, J. Michael McGuinness, Lisa A. Parlagreco, Gayle C. Wintjen and McGuiness S. Parlagreco for North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers; and Elliot, Pishko, Gelbin & Morgan, by Robert M. Elliot, for North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation, amici curiae.", "Pamela R. DiStefano and Maureen A. Sweeney for Farmworkers Legal Services of North Carolina, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SHARON AMOS, KATHY HALL and EARLINE MARSHALL v. OAKDALE KNITTING COMPANY AND WALTER MOONEY, III\nNo. 278A91\n(Filed 8 May 1992)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 8.1 (NCI3d) \u2014 minimum wage \u2014 employees required to work for less \u2014 violation of public policy\nDefendants violated the public policy of North Carolina by firing plaintiffs for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum wage. Although the definition of \u201cpublic policy\u201d approved by the Supreme Court does not include a laundry list of what is or is not \u201cinjurious to the public or against the public good,\u201d at the very least public policy is violated when an employee is fired in contravention of express policy declarations contained in the North Carolina General Statutes.\nAm Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations \u00a7\u00a7 2559, 2567, 2571.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 10.2 (NCI3d)\u2014 wrongful discharge \u2014 refusal to accept less than minimum wage \u2014 alternative remedies\nThe availability of alternative remedies does not prevent a plaintiff from seeking tort remedies for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine, absent federal preemption or the intent of our state legislature to supplant the common law with exclusive statutory remedies. The availability of alternative common law and statutory remedies supplements rather than hinders the ultimate goal of protecting employees who have been fired .in violation of public policy.\nAm Jur 2d, Master and Servant \u00a7\u00a7 48.7, 60.\n3. Master and Servant \u00a7 10.2 (NCI3d)\u2014 wrongful discharge \u2014 public policy exception \u2014federal preemption \u2014state statutory preclusion\nThe issue of whether the federal Fair Labor Standards Act preempted a state action for wrongful discharge for refusal to work for less than minimum wage was a constitutional question which was not passed upon by the trial court or the Court of Appeals and was not properly before the Supreme Court. Moreover, the North Carolina legislature, by enacting the Wage and Hour Act, did not intend to preclude wrongful discharge actions based on violation of the state\u2019s public policy requiring employers to pay their employees at least the statutory minimum wage.\nAm Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations \u00a7\u00a7 2545, 2546, 2559; Master and Servant \u00a7\u00a7 48.7, 66.\n4. Master and Servant \u00a7 10.2 (NCI3d)\u2014 wrongful discharge\u2014 separate claim for bad faith discharge \u2014 not recognized\nThe discussion of bad faith discharge by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, was dicta. The issue in Coman was whether to adopt a public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine and the Court did not recognize a separate claim for wrongful discharge in bad faith.\nAm Jur 2d, Master and Servant \u00a7 48.7.\nOn appeal by plaintiffs pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from a decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 102 N.C. App. 782, 403 S.E.2d 565 (1991), affirming an order of Morgan, J., at the 3 April 1989 Session of Superior Court, SURRY County, dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 complaint pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs\u2019 petition for discretionary review as to additional issues was allowed by the Supreme Court on 14 August 1991. Heard in the Supreme Court 13 February 1992.\nKennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, by Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, 111, for plaintiff-appellants.\nAllman Spry Humphreys Leggett & Howington, P.A., by W. Thomas White, David C. Smith and W. Rickert Hinnant, for defendant-appellees.\nJ. Wilson Parker, Deborah Leonard Parker, J. Michael McGuinness, Lisa A. Parlagreco, Gayle C. Wintjen and McGuiness S. Parlagreco for North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers; and Elliot, Pishko, Gelbin & Morgan, by Robert M. Elliot, for North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation, amici curiae.\nPamela R. DiStefano and Maureen A. Sweeney for Farmworkers Legal Services of North Carolina, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0348-01", "first_page_order": 390, "last_page_order": 402 }