{ "id": 2500204, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RALPH MAYNOR", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Maynor", "decision_date": "1992-06-25", "docket_number": "No. 67A91", "first_page": "695", "last_page": "702", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 N.C. 695" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "88 ALR4th 209", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "73 ALR4th 993", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561289 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 222, 297 S.E.2d 574, 579 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542427 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 222, 297 S.E.2d 574, 579 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523456 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E. 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N.C. 757", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11272284 ], "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573459 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2481966 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 S.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570499 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 S.E.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617272 ], "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562949 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561834 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4693753 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574148 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 530, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572-73 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 530, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572-73 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 P.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Wash. 2d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1379124 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/115/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.W.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9935944 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/597/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Tenn. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8529214 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/209/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.Y.S.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Misc. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1946300 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/105/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 So. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7545363 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/542/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Kan. 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 1469340 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/226/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Cal. Rptr. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Cal. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2193045 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/181/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ariz. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 737538 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/135/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 P.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10572860 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/463/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 So. 2d 1348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9695391 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/342/1348-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 786, "char_count": 16401, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2854685359382294e-07, "percentile": 0.7856514028424051 }, "sha256": "35ffd9b173a246ebe796888c750404d6fd35d86c5a05877e6c4214185f164392", "simhash": "1:375ace2f545f1bc9", "word_count": 2785 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:05:46.767853+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RALPH MAYNOR" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MITCHELL, Justice.\nThe defendant was tried upon proper indictments charging him with three counts of murder. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on all three counts under the theory that the defendant committed the murders during the perpetration of a felony committed with a deadly weapon. At the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended sentences of life imprisonment for the defendant. The trial court sentenced the defendant to three consecutive sentences of life imprisonment.\nThe defendant presents three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court\u2019s jury instructions on self-defense constituted plain error. Next, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of specific acts of misconduct by the defendant to rebut the defendant\u2019s character evidence. Finally, the defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the prosecutors\u2019 closing arguments which expressed their personal disbelief in the testimony of a key defense witness.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on 9 October 1985, the defendant Ralph Maynor drove Theresa Oxendine and her seven-year-old daughter to Pembroke, North Carolina in Oxendine\u2019s 1979 Ford LTD. After they ran some errands in Pembroke, they left to go to the mobile home they lived in together three or four miles out of town. While driving, the defendant kept his loaded .44 caliber automatic rifle at his side.\nAs the defendant drove toward their mobile home, he told Oxendine that he believed they were being followed. She turned around and saw a car, but it was about a mile behind them. As they neared a bridge, the defendant repeated that they were being followed. Oxendine again looked around and saw a car, but it was doing nothing unusual. As they drove onto the bridge, the defendant \u201cgot ready to stop\u201d and told Oxendine to get down. After they crossed the bridge, the defendant pulled the car to a stop on the right shoulder of the road. Oxendine told her daughter sitting in the back seat to get down. After she had done this, a small blue car swerved in front of them.\nOxendine saw the defendant get out of her car with the rifle, walk up to the blue car, and begin to shoot. At this point the blue car had gone down an embankment. The defendant began to shoot the people in the blue car. Oxendine heard six or seven shots. After the defendant had finished shooting, he got back into Oxendine\u2019s car and they left \u201cin a hurry.\u201d Oxendine never saw any weapon other than the defendant\u2019s gun. Oxendine asked the defendant whether he had killed \u201call of them,\u201d and he replied that he had.\nDawn Maynor testified at trial that she was married to the defendant. Prior to their marriage, the defendant had told her about killing the three victims in question in this case. The defendant told her that the three victims had been trying to kill him, and he had shot them before they could shoot him. He told her that he had then gone up to the blue car and shot the last man who was still breathing.\nState Bureau of Investigation Special Agent James Bowman testified that he and a detective had interviewed the defendant on 16 July 1988. The defendant made a statement to them, during which he gave his version of the events of 9 October 1985. He said he had thought the blue car with three men was following him. He stated that the blue car had bumped the car he was driving in the rear going about fifty-five miles per hour. He said he had seen what he thought was a gun being passed from the back seat to the front. He had pulled over to the side of the road, and the car with the three men had then swerved in front of him and blocked him from leaving. He had seen the gun being passed around in the blue car and had gotten out and shot into the blue car before the men could shoot him. He stated that he had feared for his life and had believed that had he not shot the men they would have killed him and the others with him.\nThe defendant gave testimony at trial substantially the same as the statement he had made to law enforcement officers. The defendant also testified that prior to the events of 9 October 1985, nothing had ever happened with any of the three victims to cause him to believe that any of them wanted to hurt him.\nThe defendant also introduced the testimony of Crystal Oxendine, the daughter of Theresa Oxendine. At the time of the defendant\u2019s trial in 1989, Crystal was ten-years-old. Crystal testified that on 9 October 1985, she was in the back seat of the car the defendant was driving. She saw two people in a blue car, and what looked like a stick coming out of the car on the passenger side. She further stated that this \u201cstick\u201d resembled the top of a gun. On cross-examination, Crystal stated that she had heard about seven to thirteen shots and that the entire incident had lasted about thirty minutes. She testified that the car the defendant had been driving had not been bumped by the blue car.\nBy his first assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court gave erroneous instructions on self-defense to the jury. Specifically, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that if it found that he killed the victims due to an honest but unreasonable belief it- was necessary to do so to protect himself from death or great bodily harm, the jury must conclude that he was engaged in acts of imperfect self-defense when he killed the victims and was not guilty of first-degree murder. We note here that the defendant has properly notified this Court that he did not object to the trial court\u2019s instructions on this ground. Therefore, our review is for \u201cplain error.\u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 378 (1983). We conclude that the trial court committed no such error when instructing, the jury on the doctrine of self-defense as a defense to a charge of murder.\nIn the present case, the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder solely on the basis of the felony murder theory. At the outset, we assume arguendo but do not decide that in certain circumstances, some instruction on the doctrine of self-defense as a defense to first-degree murder under the felony murder theory may be proper. But see, e.g., Rainer v. State, 342 So. 2d 1348 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1970); State v. Celaya, 135 Ariz. 248, 660 P.2d 849 (1983); People v. Loustunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986); State v. Marks, 226 Kan. 704, 602 P.2d 1344 (1979); Layne v. State, 542 So. 2d 237 (Miss. 1989); People v. Guraj, 105 Misc. 2d 176, 431 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Smith v. State, 209 Tenn. 499, 354 S.W.2d 450 (1961); Dank v. State, 597 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Dennison, 115 Wash. 2d 609, 801 P.2d 193 (1990) (en banc).\nIt is well settled that perfect self-defense which excuses a killing altogether arises where, at the time of the killing:\n(1) it appeared to defendant and he believed it to be necessary to kill the deceased in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm; and\n(2) defendant\u2019s belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness; and\n(3) defendant was not the aggressor in bringing on the affray, i.e., he did not aggressively and willingly enter into the fight without legal excuse or provocation; and\n(4) defendant did not use excessive force, i.e., did not use more force than was necessary or reasonably appeared to him to be necessary under the circumstances to protect himself from death or great bodily harm.\nState v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 158, 297 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1982) (quoting State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 530, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572-73 (1981)). Our cases also recognize an imperfect right of self-defense which arises when both elements (1) and (2) in the preceding quotation exist, but elements (3) and/or (4) do not exist. State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 340 S.E.2d 439 (1986); State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 297 S.E.2d 563 (1982); State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 279 S.E.2d 570 (1981); State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 244 S.E.2d 397 (1978); State v. Deck, 285 N.C. 209, 203 S.E.2d 830 (1974); State v. Ellerbe, 223 N.C. 770, 28 S.E.2d 519 (1944). Elements (1) and (2) \u201care common to both perfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense.\u201d State v. Wilson, 304 N.C. 689, 695, 285 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1982) (emphasis added). Therefore, a trial court is not required to instruct on either perfect or imperfect self-defense with regard to a charge of murder \u201cunless evidence was introduced tending to show that at the time of the killing, the defendant reasonably believed\u201d it necessary to kill the victim in order to save himself from imminent death or great bodily harm. State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 260, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1989).\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not commit plain error in the present case by failing to instruct the jury that it should find that the defendant acted in the exercise of imperfect self-defense if it found that he killed the victims due to an honest but unreasonable belief that it was necessary to save himself from imminent death or great bodily harm. To the extent that some prior decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals may tend to imply that a contrary holding is required, they are disapproved. E.g., State v. Jones, 299 N.C. 103, 261 S.E.2d 1 (1980); State v. Thomas, 184 N.C. 757, 114 S.E. 834 (1922); State v. Best, 79 N.C. App. 734, 340 S.E.2d 524 (1986).\nIn his next assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce evidence of specific acts of misconduct by the defendant to rebut his character evidence. In the case sub judice, the defendant called Clara Chavis who testified to his non-violent character. The trial court erroneously sustained the defendant\u2019s objection when the State attempted to cross-examine Chavis about her knowledge of several incidents of violence by the defendant against Theresa Oxendine. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 405(a). (1991). Thereafter, the State called Oxendine to testify concerning the acts of violence by the defendant against her. The State indicated to the trial court on voir dire that it sought to introduce Oxendine\u2019s testimony in order to rebut Chavis\u2019 testimony as to the defendant\u2019s non-violent character. The trial court then permitted Oxendine to testify about specific instances of violence by the defendant, including one occasion on which the defendant threatened to blow up Oxendine\u2019s mother\u2019s house in order to get Oxendine to visit him. Oxendine further testified that on another occasion the defendant shot at her inside their mobile home three or four times as she was lying on the bed.\nAssuming arguendo that Oxendine\u2019s testimony was not admissible under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) or any other of our Rules of Evidence, the defendant has not carried his burden of showing that there is a \u201creasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at trial.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1988). Uncontradicted evidence at trial was to the effect that the defendant shot each of the three victims in the back two or more times, stopping at one point to reload his rifle before continuing to shoot them. Numerous witnesses testified that before, during, and after the killings there was no gun in the victims\u2019 car. The defendant testified that nothing had ever happened previously to cause him to believe that any of the three victims wanted to harm him. Further, the defendant himself testified at trial to prior acts of violence he had committed, including cutting Oxendine\u2019s husband. We therefore conclude that if the admission of the testimony of Oxendine complained of here was error, it was. harmless. Id. This assignment of error is overruled.\nBy his next assignment of error the defendant contends that he was prejudiced by the prosecutors\u2019 repeated assertions during their closing arguments to the jury that they personally disbelieved a key defense witness. On four separate occasions during closing arguments, the prosecutors interjected their personal opinions concerning the testimony of Crystal Oxendine. After each such statement, the defendant\u2019s counsel entered an objection which was sustained by the trial court. After the second statement, the trial court also instructed the jury, \u201cDon\u2019t consider what the D.A. believes.\u201d The defendant argues that despite the trial court\u2019s remedial actions, the prosecutors were still able to place their personal beliefs before the jury, thereby violating the defendant\u2019s right to due process of law. We do not agree. We have said that: \u201cWhere immediately upon a defendant\u2019s objection to an improper remark made by the prosecutor in his closing argument, the trial court instructs the jury to disregard the offending statement, the impropriety is cured.\u201d E.g., State v. Small, 328 N.C. 175, 185, 400 S.E.2d 413, 418 (1991) (quoting State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 222, 297 S.E.2d 574, 579 (1982)). In the present case, the trial court cured the impropriety of the prosecutors\u2019 arguments when it sustained the defendant\u2019s objections and instructed the jury to disregard such arguments.\nWe hold that the defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "MITCHELL, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Valerie B. Spalding, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Staples Hughes, Assistant Appellate Defender, for the defendant-appellant Maynor." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RALPH MAYNOR\nNo. 67A91\n(Filed 25 June 1992)\n1. Homicide \u00a7 588 (NCI4th)\u2014 necessity for killing \u2014 honest but unreasonable belief\u2014 imperfect self-defense instruction inappropriate\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a first degree murder case by failing to instruct the jury that it should find that the defendant acted in the exercise of imperfect self-defense and was thus not guilty of first degree murder if it found that he killed the victims due to an honest but unreasonable belief that it was necessary to save himself from imminent death or great bodily harm. To the extent that some prior decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may tend to imply that a contrary holding is required, they are disapproved.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 152-155.\nStandard for determination of reasonableness of criminal defendant\u2019s belief, for purposes of self-defense claim, that physical force is necessary \u2014 modern cases. 73 ALR4th 993.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 282 (NCI4th)\u2014 character evidence\u2014 rebuttal by acts of misconduct \u2014 harmless error\nAssuming arguendo that a witness\u2019s testimony about defendant\u2019s acts of violence toward her was not admissible to rebut defendant\u2019s evidence of his nonviolent character, the admission of such testimony in defendant\u2019s trial for three first degree murders was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of defendant\u2019s testimony about prior acts of violence he had committed and the uncontradicted evidence at trial that defendant shot each of the three victims in the back two or more times, stopping at one point to reload his rifle before continuing to shoot them, that there was no gun in the victims\u2019 car before, during or after the killings, and that nothing had ever happened previously to cause defendant to believe that any of the victims wanted to harm him. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b).\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 517, 797 et seq.; Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 339-343.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 445 (NCI4tfa) \u2014 jury arguments \u2014personal disbelief of witness \u2014curative instruction\nImpropriety in the prosecutors\u2019 closing arguments which expressed their personal disbelief in the testimony of a key defense witness was cured when the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objections thereto and instructed the jury to disregard such arguments.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7 807.\nPropriety and prejudicial effect of counsel\u2019s negative characterization or description of witness during summation of criminal trial \u2014modern cases. 88 ALR4th 209.\nAPPEAL of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment entered by Ellis, J., on 11 December 1989 in the Superior Court, ROBESON County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 February 1992.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Valerie B. Spalding, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Staples Hughes, Assistant Appellate Defender, for the defendant-appellant Maynor." }, "file_name": "0695-01", "first_page_order": 737, "last_page_order": 744 }