{ "id": 2499934, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVIE LOCKLEAR", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Locklear", "decision_date": "1992-06-25", "docket_number": "No. 19A92", "first_page": "720", "last_page": "725", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 N.C. 720" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 582, "char_count": 10977, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.456583025697791e-08, "percentile": 0.2792334611014001 }, "sha256": "0a55abea84ad15f9c955582e2728e48919bb523546ff02a91c8f5e3423e700ff", "simhash": "1:53fe232c772f8708", "word_count": 1837 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:05:46.767853+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVIE LOCKLEAR" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nThis case presents the question of whether the trial court committed reversible error in delivering to the jury in writing during its deliberations certain portions of the court\u2019s instructions. We conclude that it did not and that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nA detailed presentation of the facts is unnecessary to an understanding of the legal issue involved. In summary, the State presented evidence tending to prove the following: At about nine p.m. on 12 March 1991, the victim, Jadell Locklear, drove with Johnny Troublefield and Curtis Locklear to defendant\u2019s residence. Defendant\u2019s girlfriend, Karen Williams, came out onto the trailer porch and saw Jadell Locklear back the car out of the yard, pull it onto the road, and sit in the car with the engine running. Williams yelled at him to drive back into the yard, but Jadell Locklear responded by saying that if defendant were a man, he would come out into the yard. Defendant then came out of the front door of the trailer, yelled something, and shot his .38 caliber pistol into the car, killing Jadell Locklear with a single bullet through the neck.\nDefendant presented evidence tending to show that Jadell Locklear had had previous violent altercations with defendant\u2019s sister, who was the mother of Jadell\u2019s daughter. Wilbert Locklear testified that he was visiting defendant on the night of the killing and he heard Jadell tell defendant that he should \u201ccome out and talk to him like a man before he cut loose.\u201d Defendant testified that he had previously told Jadell to stay away from his house. When defendant heard Jadell say that he should come outside like a man, defendant went to the bedroom and got his pistol. Defendant shot towards the road, hoping to scare Jadell away. Defendant testified that he had known Jadell to shoot several people and he was afraid Jadell and his friends were going to shoot him.\nDefendant was indicted on one count of first-degree murder. In a noncapital trial, the State proceeded solely on the basis of the felony murder rule, with the underlying felony being shooting into an occupied vehicle. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment.\nDefendant brings forward one assignment of error. He contends that the trial court erred when, in response to a jury request for a written list of the criteria for first- and second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, the court submitted the written form of its earlier oral charge. Defendant acknowledges that he made no objection to the written instructions, and he does not contest their accuracy. He argues, instead, that the trial court erred because the instructions were illegible, unintelligible, and confusing. The instructions were typewritten, with certain paragraphs, sentences, or phrases marked through with ink, and with several handwritten additions in the margins. Defendant further contends that because the written instructions dealt with only a part of the entire oral instruction, they had the potential to emphasize elements unduly prejudicial to defendant.\nThe trial court\u2019s decision to submit the written instructions to the jury occurred in the following context:\nThe COURT: Gentlemen, the jury has passed out a note which reads, \u201cWe would like to know if it is possible for us to have a written list of the criteria for first, second and voluntary manslaughter. We have questions on the differences between the various charges. . . .\u201d\nI have my charge here that I put together. Does anyone have any objection to sending it in?\n[The State]: State doesn\u2019t have any objections.\nPefense Counsel]: I don\u2019t have any objection to either part of it.\nThe COURT: Let me have a black magic marker so I can\u2014 some of this is surplusage ....\nPefense Counsel]: Might just be more prudent to call them in here and give it to them again.\nTHE COURT: I can read it or \u2014 they\u2019ve asked for the \u2014 to have it in there. It\u2019s my understanding there wasn\u2019t any objection to passing it to them.\nPEFENSE Counsel]: I\u2019ve got some concern, though, about \u2014 well, let\u2019s look at it when you get done.\nThe COURT: One of the last times I gave it to the jury, they still wanted to see it because they had difficulties comprehending it so I \u2014I did scratch out the parts that were objected to that were not \u2014 that were surplusages. If you have objection to it, though, I will bring them back and just read it to them again.\nPEFENSE Counsel]: I don\u2019t have any inherent \u2014 I want to see it, see what it\u2019s going to look like.\nThe COURT: Yes. Okay. Y\u2019all step up here and take a\u2014 just take a look.\n(Counsel approached the bench and viewed the charge.)\nPEFENSE Counsel]: John and I can make it all out as you have fixed it up for them. If I \u2014 if I didn\u2019t know what you were saying, I would have trouble making out some of those inserted portions.\n[The State]: Could you maybe write that in again with your ink pen, Judge, so it will be more legible.\nThe COURT: I\u2019m not sure writing it in will make it more legible with my handwriting, but I\u2019ll go over it again.\nThe court retraced the handwritten portions of the instructions and had the jury return to the courtroom. The court then addressed the jury as follows:\nYa\u2019ll have first requested that \u2014 to have the instructions that I read to you. I have prepared those. Let me explain to you what \u2014 how to use them. There\u2019s certain portions of the pages that have been drawn through with a magic marker. They have nothing to do with the case and that part you should disregard. The part that you have requested is typed out and there are certain portions that are in my handwriting. You may have difficulty reading my handwriting. If you have any questions, cannot decipher what I say, if you\u2019ll come back in with another question, I will try to decipher what I have written in; but I think that it will be explanatory to you when you look at it. But if you do have difficulties reading my writing, let me know.\nThe trial court gave the jury the written instructions and sent the jury to resume deliberations. The court then asked counsel for the State and for defendant if there were any objections \u201cto the instructions I just gave the jury.\u201d Both counsel expressly stated that they had no objections. The written instructions which the jury requested regarding the charged offenses were identical to the oral instructions previously given to the jury.\nHaving failed to object to the submission of the written instructions to the jury, defendant may not assign such instructions as error. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2). Upon such failure to object to jury instructions, defendant\u2019s contention is subject to review only under the plain error standard. State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983). Plain error is\n\u201cfundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,\u201d or \u201cwhere [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused,\u201d or the error has \u201c \u2018resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial\u2019 \u201d or where the error is such as to \u201cseriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings\u201d or where it can be fairly said \u201cthe instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u201d\nId. (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)) (alteration in original).\nWe conclude that there was no plain error. The trial court acted with great caution in responding to the jury\u2019s request. It discussed at length with counsel its proposal to submit the written instructions from which it had earlier instructed orally. The substance of the submitted instructions included the elements of each of the charged offenses and defendant\u2019s theory of defense. The court\u2019s instructions did not include matters upon which it had instructed earlier, but which were not responsive to the jury\u2019s query. There was little danger that, as a result of the form of the written instructions, the jury would place undue emphasis on any particular aspect of the submitted instructions.\nThe court recognized the possibility of confusion arising from numerous strike-outs and handwritten additions, but again took pains to prevent such confusion. The court offered to bring the jury back into the courtroom and repeat the oral instructions. The court also, in advance of actually giving the jury the written instructions, orally instructed it regarding use of the instructions and encouraged it to make the court aware if it had any difficulty understanding the modified instructions. Defendant has failed to show that the jury actually was confused by the written instructions or that it gave undue emphasis to matters prejudicial to him.\nWe are confident that the court\u2019s efforts to minimize the risk of confusion and misinterpretation were successful. The written instructions served fairly and adequately to answer the jury\u2019s inquiry. We cannot conclude that the form in which they were submitted had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that defendant was guilty. Id. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is thus without merit.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Valerie B. Spalding, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "John Wishart Campbell for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVIE LOCKLEAR\nNo. 19A92\n(Filed 25 June 1992)\nCriminal Law \u00a7 693 (NCI4th)\u2014 jury\u2019s request for instructions \u2014 written form of oral instructions \u2014handwritten strike-outs and additions \u2014no plain error\nThe trial court did not commit plain error when, in response to a jury request for a written list of the criteria for first degree murder, second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, and without objection from defendant, the court submitted the typewritten form of its earlier oral charge, with certain paragraphs, sentences and phrases marked through with ink, and with several handwritten additions in the margins, where the court attempted to prevent the possibility of confusion from the strike-outs and handwritten additions by orally instructing the jury regarding use of the instructions and encouraging the jury to make the court aware if it had any difficulty understanding the modified instructions; the court offered to bring the jury back into the courtroom and repeat \u25a0 the oral instructions; and defendant failed to show that the jury actually was confused by the written instructions or that it gave undue emphasis to matters prejudicial to him.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7 813; Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1154, 1155.\nAppeal of right by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Ellis, J., at the 10 September 1991 Criminal Session of Superior Court, ROBESON County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of one count of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 May 1992.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Valerie B. Spalding, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nJohn Wishart Campbell for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0720-01", "first_page_order": 762, "last_page_order": 767 }