{ "id": 2505309, "name": "ANNER F. EVANS, Employee, Plaintiff v. AT&T TECHNOLOGIES, INC., SELF-INSURED, Employer, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Evans v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.", "decision_date": "1992-07-17", "docket_number": "No. 294PA91", "first_page": "78", "last_page": "90", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 N.C. 78" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519429 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.Y.S.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "571" }, { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 A.D.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3456449 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/114/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 C.B. 34", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "C.B.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Treas. Reg. \u00a7 1.104", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "Treas. Reg.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 U.S.C. \u00a7 31", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 U.S.C. \u00a7 104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 U.S.C. \u00a7 105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "496 N.E.2d 1332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11033518 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/496/1332-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 S.W.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10130496 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/529/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 So.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9623248 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/371/0864-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.W.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9974442 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/619/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "782 S.W.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10009304 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/782/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737744 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "673", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4728157 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0113-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 835, "char_count": 28983, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.964115761944491e-07, "percentile": 0.8498090043087454 }, "sha256": "d0a60e815c7ab6408a9c73d2dfb14440d5b8ea1738b191687bd9e266e8aa501c", "simhash": "1:a8f0ed4254d91012", "word_count": 4715 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:54:56.199642+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice WEBB did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "ANNER F. EVANS, Employee, Plaintiff v. AT&T TECHNOLOGIES, INC., SELF-INSURED, Employer, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MITCHELL, Justice.\nThe defendant AT&T Technologies, Inc. (\u201cAT&T\u201d) has brought forward only two issues for review by this Court. The first is whether the deduction allowed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 from amounts to be paid as workers\u2019 compensation entitles the defendant-employer AT&T to full credit for all disability benefits paid to the plaintiff-employee under AT&T\u2019s Sickness and Accident Disability Plan. A second issue \u2014 properly raised in, but not addressed by, the Court of Appeals \u2014 is whether the amount of any deduction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 is to be based on the gross before-tax amount paid by the defendant\u2019s disability plan or the net after-tax amount received by the employee. We conclude that AT&T must receive full credit under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 for the disability benefits paid by its disability plan and that the amount of such credit must be based on the gross before-tax amount of disability benefits paid under its disability plan for the benefit of the plaintiff-employee.\nCertain relevant facts are not disputed before this Court. \u00d3n 20 February 1986 the plaintiff Anner F. Evans was injured while she was working for AT&T at its plant in Winston-Salem. The defendant AT&T provides a Sickness and Accident Disability Plan (\u201cPlan\u201d) which compensates its employees when they are absent from work due to injury or disability, regardless of the cause. Under that Plan, the plaintiff was paid $474.25 per week during her first two-week period of temporary total disability in 1986 and $495.88 per week during a second period of temporary total disability from 8 February 1987 to 2 August 1987. The plaintiff received no benefits under the defendant\u2019s Plan after 2 August 1987. The plaintiff received a total of $13,290.50 in benefits under the Plan. All payments to the plaintiff under the Plan were made during a time when the defendant-employer had not accepted the plaintiff\u2019s injuries as compensable by workers\u2019 compensation benefits and when no determination of compensability had been made by the Industrial Commission.\nOn 3 April 1986 the plaintiff filed a claim with the North Carolina Industrial Commission seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits. A deputy commissioner entered an Opinion and Award on 23 June 1988 finding and concluding that the plaintiff had been temporarily totally disabled during two different periods. First, the plaintiff was disabled from 21 February 1986 to 3 March 1986. Later, she was disabled from 6 February 1987 through 23 November 1987 (approximately forty weeks) at which time she returned to work part-time. The deputy commissioner held that the plaintiff was entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits of $294 per week for both of her periods of temporary total disability, less a deduction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 for some, but not all, of the payments she had received under the defendant\u2019s Plan.\nThe deputy commissioner also ordered that the defendant pay the plaintiff weekly benefits for permanent partial disability at a weekly rate of $294 for seventy weeks commencing 24 November 1987. Neither party before this Court disputes the award to the plaintiff on account of her permanent partial disability, and the defendant seeks no deduction from the payment of those benefits.\nIn an Order and Award filed 14 March 1989, the Industrial Commission, relying on Foster v. Western-Electric Co., 320 N.C. 113, 357 S.E.2d 670 (1987), amended the deputy commissioner\u2019s award and granted the defendant AT&T full credit for all payments made to the plaintiff under AT&T\u2019s Plan. The Commission otherwise adopted as its own the Opinion and Award of the deputy commissioner. Upon a motion to clarify filed by the defendant, the Commission entered an Order on 30 March 1989 amending its Opinion and Award of 14 March 1989 by inserting therein a directive that the credit the defendant was to receive \u201cshall be based on net after-tax wages paid plaintiff.\u201d\nThe plaintiff-employee Evans appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned as error the Commission\u2019s holding that AT&T was entitled to full credit for all payments made to her under its Plan. The defendant AT&T cross-assigned as error, inter alia, (1) the conclusion by the Industrial Commission that the plaintiff\u2019s injury was a compensable injury under Article I of Chapter 97 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and (2) the Commission\u2019s conclusion that the credit the defendant received for payments under its Plan should be based on net after-tax wages paid to the plaintiff.\nAlthough the Court of Appeals did not expressly affirm or reverse that part of the Commission\u2019s Award holding that the plaintiff was entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits for her injury, it seems to have agreed with the Commission\u2019s ruling in that regard. The defendant has not brought the issue forward on appeal to this Court, and that part of the Commission\u2019s Award must be and is left in full effect. The Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant AT&T was only entitled to partial credit under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 for the payments made under its Plan to the plaintiff, not full credit as ordered by the Commission. For that reason, the Court of Appeals reversed that part of the Opinion and Award of the Commission.\nThe defendant AT&T petitioned this Court seeking our discretionary review of the Court of Appeals\u2019 conclusion that for purposes of the deduction authorized by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42, AT&T could only receive credit for part of the payments made under its Plan. AT&T contended that the Court of Appeals had erred in its resulting holding reversing in part the Commission\u2019s Award. AT&T also requested that this Court resolve one of the issues properly presented to, but not resolved by, the Court of Appeals \u2014 whether the amount AT&T is entitled to deduct from the plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits is the gross before-tax payment made under AT&T\u2019s Plan or the net after-tax payment received by the plaintiff. The defendant AT&T did not seek our review of any other issues. We allowed AT&T\u2019s petition, thereby granting review limited to the two issues it sought to raise.\nIn the present appeal, the plaintiff-employee argues that the defendant AT&T should only receive what the parties and the Court of Appeals have denominated as a \u201cweek-for-week credit\u201d for payments made on her behalf under AT&T\u2019s Plan. She specifically argues that under such a \u201cweek-for-week credit\u201d AT&T may only receive credit for \u2014 and, thus, deduct from the plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits for temporary total disability \u2014 an amount calculated by subtracting \u201cfrom the total number of weeks during which [workers\u2019] compensation was found otherwise due, the total number of weeks during which the Defendant [AT&T] had made wage continuation payments of at least the compensation rate.\u201d Specifically, to apply the \u201cweek-for-week credit\u201d advocated by the plaintiff-employee, one would first calculate the total number of weeks in which an employer had paid its employee as much or more than the weekly rate the employee was awarded as workers\u2019 compensation benefits. The employer would then be entitled to deduct only an amount equal to the weekly workers\u2019 compensation benefits the employee was awarded for each such week. An employer would receive no credit whatsoever for any amounts it paid during weeks in which it paid the employee less than the weekly workers\u2019 compensation rate. Nor would an employer receive credit for any amounts it paid during any week in excess of the weekly rate of workers\u2019 compensation benefits awarded to the employee.\nApplying a \u201cweek-for-week credit,\u201d according to the plaintiff, the defendant AT&T should receive a credit in the present case only for an amount equal to the weekly benefits the Commission awarded her for the weeks between 21 February 1986 and 3 March 1986 and for the weeks between 6 February 1987 and 2 August 1987. The plaintiff says AT&T is entitled to such credit because the plaintiff received benefits under AT&T\u2019s Plan for each of those weeks in excess of the $294 weekly amount later awarded by the Industrial Commission for the plaintiff\u2019s temporary total disability. The AT&T Plan did not pay the plaintiff any benefits after 2 August 1987; therefore, the plaintiff argues AT&T should receive no deduction from the workers\u2019 compensation benefits awarded the plaintiff for the weeks after 2 August 1987. The plaintiff argues the defendant AT&T must pay her full workers\u2019 compensation benefits of $294 per week for the weeks beginning 2 August 1987 through 23 November 1987 when, under the Award of the Industrial Commission, the plaintiff was still entitled to temporary total disability benefits but received no payments under AT&T\u2019s Plan.\nThe defendant AT&T on the other hand argues, relying on N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 and Foster v. Western-Electric Co., 320 N.C. 113, 357 S.E.2d 670 (1987), that it should receive what the parties and the Court of Appeals denominated as a \u201cfull dollar-for-dollar\u201d credit for all payments made under its Plan to the plaintiff, including all payments made in any weeks in excess of the weekly workers\u2019 compensation award. In other words, the defendant AT&T argues that it is entitled to deduct from the amounts to be paid the plaintiff as workers\u2019 compensation all dollars paid to the plaintiff under the AT&T Plan which were not \u201cdue and payable\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 when payment was made. Like the Industrial Commission, we conclude that the defendant\u2019s argument in this regard is correct. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, which concluded that the defendant AT&T was only entitled to a week-for-week credit under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 and reversed the modified Award of the Commission.\nThe parties do not dispute whether the defendant is entitled to a \u201ccredit\u201d or deduction; they simply dispute the type and amount of deduction. The controlling statute provides that:\nAny payments made by the employer to the injured employee during the period of his disability, or to his dependents, which by terms of this Article were not due and payable when made, may, subject to the approval of the Industrial Commission be deducted from the amount to be paid as compensation. Provided, that in the case of disability such deductions shall be made by shortening the period during which compensation must be paid, and not by reducing the amount of the weekly payment.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 (1991).\nThe statute states that, subject to approval by the Industrial Commission, any payments made by the employer to the injured employee that were not due and payable when made may be deducted from the employee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation award. The term \u201cany\u201d as used in the statute carries a broad meaning and clearly was intended to include all payments made by an employer on account of its employee\u2019s disability which the Commission had not determined was owed under Article I of Chapter 97 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. Furthermore, the proviso at the end of the statute states that \u201csuch deductions shall be made by shortening the period during which compensation must be paid, and not by reducing the amount of the weekly payment.\u201d The defendant, through its Plan, followed the proviso. The Plan paid the plaintiff her full wages for approximately six months after her injury. The Plan discontinued these full wage benefits on 2 August 1987. At that time the plaintiff had received payments from the Plan that exceeded the total amount of the workers\u2019 compensation benefits to which she was later determined to be entitled for her temporary total disability. The Plan, in effect, paid the plaintiff a higher weekly benefit than she was entitled to under our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, but shortened the payout period. The defendant AT&T was entitled to deduct the full amount of all payments its Plan made to the plaintiff for her temporary total disability which were not \u201cdue and payable when made\u201d to her.\nOur interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 in Foster v. Western-Electric Co., 320 N.C. 113, 357 S.E.2d 670 (1987), supports our conclusion and holding in the case at bar. Foster involved the very same Sickness and Accident Disability Plan before us in the present case; Western-Electric Company, the defendant in Foster, was the predecessor corporation to the present defendant AT&T. In Foster, the plaintiff-employee was injured when an automobile exiting the defendant\u2019s parking lot struck the plaintiff as the plaintiff crossed the road in front of the defendant\u2019s plant. Id. at 114, 357 S.E.2d at 671. The plaintiff in Foster received weekly benefits totaling $7,598.16 under the Plan, which included \u201cfull pay\u201d of $342.26 per week for approximately twelve weeks and \u201chalf pay\u201d of $171.13 per week for approximately fourteen weeks. Id. As in the present case, the plaintiff-employee in Foster was paid those benefits under the Plan at a time when the employer had not accepted the employee\u2019s injuries as compensable under our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and when the Industrial Commission had not determined compensability. The Ind\u00fastrial Commission subsequently ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to temporary total disability benefits of $6,741.96. This Court held under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 that, on the facts presented by Foster, the defendant-employer was entitled to a full credit for all of the benefits paid to its employee under the Plan and that the defendant-employer could deduct all such payments from the workers\u2019 compensation benefits awarded to the plaintiff after such payments had been made. Id. at 117, 357 S.E.2d at 673.\nIn Foster we relied upon the public policy set out in our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act in reaching our conclusion. Specifically, we said that the Act is \u201cdesigned to relieve against hardship,\u201d and \u201cto provide payments based upon the actual loss of wages,\u201d and \u201cdisfavors duplicative payments.\u201d Id. at 116-17, 357 S.E.2d at 673. We also stated,\nThese policy considerations dictate that an employer such as defendant in this case, who has paid an employee wage-replacement benefits at the time of that employee\u2019s greatest need, should not be penalized by being denied full credit for the amount paid as against the amount which was subsequently determined to be due the employee under workers\u2019 compensation. To do so would inevitably cause employers to be less generous and the result would be that the employee would lose his full salary at the very moment he needs it most.\nId. at 117, 357 S.E.2d at 673 (emphasis added). In order to meet the policy goals clearly outlined in the statute and explained in Foster, we must conclude that, subject to the Commission\u2019s approval, employers receive a full dollar-for-dollar credit under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 for all payments made under a voluntary sickness and accident disability plan such as AT&T\u2019s Plan in the present case, so long as such payments were not \u201cdue and payable when made\u201d within the meaning of the statute.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 encourages an employer to voluntarily compensate an employee with amounts equal to full pay early during his time of disability. By giving the disabled employee full pay, an employer\u2019s disability plan operates as a wage replacement program. In the case at bar, the Commission awarded the plaintiff-employee $294 per week of workers\u2019 compensation benefits for approximately forty-seven weeks of temporary total disability; effectively, this was an award of $12,639.48 in total. The plaintiff had already been paid a total of $13,290.50 over approximately twenty-seven weeks under the defendant\u2019s Plan. The Plan, therefore, had already paid the plaintiff total benefits greater than the total benefits she was ultimately determined to be entitled to receive under our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. The legislature clearly anticipated and provided for such a result when it adopted N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42.\nGiving the defendant AT&T full dollar-for-dollar credit avoids duplicative payment of benefits. The plaintiff argues that its proposed week-for-week credit does not allow for duplication. We disagree. The defendant\u2019s Plan paid the plaintiff more than the total amount she was eventually determined to be- entitled to as workers\u2019 compensation for her temporary total disability. The payment of an additional $4,578 under our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act for that same disability would reach the same practical result as a duplication of benefits. Applying the \u201cweek-for-week\u201d credit argued for by the plaintiff, rather than a full dollar-for-dollar credit, would allow the plaintiff, in effect, to recover twice for the same temporary total disability.\nThe plaintiff argues that a full dollar-for-dollar credit is inconsistent with the intent and objectives of the entire Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Citing several provisions of the Act, the plaintiff contends that a primary policy of the Act is to provide for compensation \u201con a constant, periodic, weekly basis\u201d to workers injured on the job. According to the plaintiff,, alio wing a full dollar-for-dollar deduction of payments which were not due and payable when made violates this statutory intent. We do not agree.\nIn resolving the issue presented, we apply the traditional rules of statutory construction.\nLegislative intent controls the meaning of a statute; and in ascertaining this intent, a court must consider the act as a whole, weighing the language of the statute, its spirit, and that which the statute, seeks to accomplish. The statute\u2019s words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless the context requires them to be construed differently.\nShelton v. Morehead Memorial Hospital, 318 N.C. 76, 82, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986) (citations omitted); see Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Electrical Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656-57, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294-95 (1991). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 is part of the same Workers\u2019 Compensation Act as the more general provisions cited by the plaintiff. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 specifically addresses deductions from workers\u2019 compensation benefits and expressly allows an employer to deduct \u201cany payments made by the employer to the injured employee . . . not due and payable when made,\u201d subject to the approval of the Commission. We conclude that the ordinary meaning of the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 allows an employer, subject to Commission approval, to receive a full dollar-for-dollar credit for all such payments; this interpretation is not inconsistent with the overall intent of the statute to provide compensation to employees for work-related injuries. Even though a full dollar-for-dollar deduction may decrease the number of weekly payments an employee receives, it will never decrease the total amount the employee actually receives to an amount less than that employee would have received under the Act alone.\nBoth parties rely on cases from other jurisdictions in support of their respective arguments. Because each of those cases was decided on the basis of the language of the particular plan or statute involved, we do not find any one case particularly persuasive. Speaking generally, however, the cases allowing a dollar-for-dollar credit are more persuasive because they tend to rely on and support the public policy of encouraging employers to compensate employees voluntarily early during any period of disability. See, e.g., Triangle Insulation & Sheet Metal Co. v. Stratemeyer, 782 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Ky. 1990); Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Adkins, 619 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Ky Ct. App. 1981); Western Electric, Inc. v. Ferguson, 371 So.2d 864, 868 (Miss. 1979); Cowan v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 529 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). Also, they tend to avoid payments amounting to duplicative recovery for the same injury. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. Brown, 496 N.E.2d 1332, 1336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). It is clear that our legislature also intended to promote such public policies when it adopted N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42.\nIf employers cannot receive credit for benefits voluntarily paid to their employees, then they will be less likely to pay such benefits. Not allowing a full dollar-for-dollar credit would discourage employers from voluntarily paying benefits to employees as soon as possible. Encouraging early voluntary payment of benefits by employers to employees serves the public interest as clearly established by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42. The Commission\u2019s Order allowing the defendant AT&T a full dollar-for-dollar deduction from the total amount its Plan paid to the plaintiff was correct under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42. Therefore, the holding of the Court of Appeals to the contrary was error and must be reversed.\nThe Court of Appeals failed in its opinion to address an additional issue, properly preserved and presented by the defendant, regarding the amount of the payments for which the defendant should receive credit under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42. In its 30 March 1989 Order amending its prior Opinion and Award in this case, the Industrial Commission ordered that the credit the defendant was to receive for payments made from its Plan to the plaintiff \u201cshall be based on the net after-tax\u201d amounts paid the plaintiff. The defendant-employer AT&T argued in the Court of Appeals that the amount of the deduction it should be allowed must be based on the gross before-tax amount of payments made under the Plan. The plaintiff on the other hand argued in the Court of Appeals that the amount of the deduction for which the defendant should receive credit must only be based on the net after-tax amount of the payments she actually received and that the Commission\u2019s Award was correct on that point. The Court of Appeals simply left this issue unaddressed \u25a0 and unresolved. We allowed discretionary review and now address this issue.\nIn resolving this issue, we again turn to the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 and our past interpretation of that statute in Foster. The statute provides that any voluntary payments by the employer may be deducted from the amount of a subsequent workers\u2019 compensation award. In Foster, we interpreted the statute to allow a \u201cfull credit\u201d for all payments not due and payable when made. 320 N.C. at 117, 357 S.E.2d at 673. We now conclude that, in order for an employer to receive full credit for voluntary payments made to an injured employee, the statute must be interpreted to mean that the amount of the deduction to which an employer, subject to the approval of the Commission, is entitled under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 is the amount of the gross before-tax payments.\nOur interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 with regard to this issue prevents the possibility of an essentially duplicative recovery by an injured employee. Payments made to employees under a voluntary employer-financed wage continuation plan are generally included in the gross income of the employee for purposes of taxation. 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 105 (1988). As a result, the employer is required to withhold federal and state income taxes and other taxes from these payments. 26 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3102, 3402 (1988); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-163.2 (1989). Payments received under workers\u2019 compensation acts for personal injuries or sickness are generally excluded from the gross income of the employee. 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 104(a)(1) (1988). When an employee, as in the present case, successfully disputes an employers\u2019 denial of compensability of the employee\u2019s injury through workers\u2019 compensation benefits, that employee is entitled to a refund of taxes withheld from payments the employee has received under a wage continuation plan. 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 31 (1988); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-163.2 (1989). An employee may seek a refund of taxes withheld from payments made under a disability plan to the extent that such payments are not in excess of the amount provided in the applicable workers\u2019 compensation act or acts. See Treas. Reg. \u00a7 1.104-l(b) (1991); Rev. Rul. 72-45, 1972-1 C.B. 34. If an employer were only entitled to a credit equal to the net after-tax amount it paid to the employee, then the employee could obtain what would amount to a double recovery for his injuries by obtaining a refund of taxes previously withheld. The employee in effect would receive the tax refund in addition to any award made under a workers\u2019 compensation act or the wage continuation plan.\nAnother appellate court reached a similar conclusion in Graham v. Lipe Rollway Corporation, 114 A.D.2d 570, 494 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1985). In that case, the issue was \u201cwhether the employer was entitled [as a credit] to the full amount of the disability award paid by the employer, $95 per week, or the amount of the award actually received by the claimant, $95 per week less FICA (Social Security) taxes withheld by the employer and paid to the Federal government as required by Federal statute.\u201d Id. at 570, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 431. The workers\u2019 compensation board ruled in that case that an employer was entitled to a credit for the full amount it had paid the employee. Id. The court noted that the FICA withholdings were overpayment of taxes and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to a refund. Id. at 571, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 432. The plaintiff argued that the refund procedure is complicated and expensive and, therefore, its expense should be borne by the employer. Id. The court disagreed and pointed out that \u201c[t]he refund procedure is no more complicated and expensive for claimant than it is for any other person seeking a refund.\u201d Id. We find the New York court\u2019s reasoning persuasive.\nIn addition, if employers were allowed a deduction equal to the net after-tax amount ultimately received by the employee, administration of this part of our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act would be almost impossible for the Industrial Commission. The withholding of taxes by the employer is based on an estimate of the employee\u2019s ultimate tax liability; an employee\u2019s tax liability is not established until the employee files a tax return for the particular tax year. The actual tax liability may vary depending on numerous factors, such as, the amount of any itemized deductions, the number of the taxpayer\u2019s dependents, and the amount of any other income. If the credit given employers should be held to be equal to the net after-tax amount ultimately retained by the employee, the Industrial Commission would be required to calculate the tax liability of each recipient in order to credit the employer with the proper after-tax amount. Allowing a credit equal to the amount of gross before-tax payments made to the employee avoids these complexities and facilitates the efficient administration of the Act.\nAs to this issue which the Court of Appeals failed to resolve, we conclude that the Commission erred. The defendant was entitled to deduct the gross before-tax payments made under its Plan to the plaintiff employee. Upon the remand of this case to the Commission, it will be required to enter an order to such effect.\nFor the reasons stated herein, we reverse the partial opinion of the Court of Appeals which reversed the Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award of 14 March 1989 (as modified by the Commission\u2019s Order of 30 March 1989) holding that the defendant employer must be given full dollar-for-dollar credit. We remand this case to the Court of Appeals for its further remand to the Industrial Commission for entry of additional orders consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nJustice WEBB did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "MITCHELL, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Walden & Walden, by Margaret D. Walden and Daniel S. Walden, for the plaintiff-appellee.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Richard T. Rice and Clayton M. Custer, for the defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANNER F. EVANS, Employee, Plaintiff v. AT&T TECHNOLOGIES, INC., SELF-INSURED, Employer, Defendant\nNo. 294PA91\n(Filed 17 July 1992)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 69 (NCI3d)\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 voluntary disability payments \u2014dollar-for-dollar deduction\nThe deduction allowed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 from amounts paid as workers\u2019 compensation entitles defendant employer, subject to Commission approval, to full dollar-for-dollar rather than week-to-week credit for disability benefits voluntarily paid to plaintiff employee under the employer\u2019s sickness and accident disability plan.\nAm Jur 2d, Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 365.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 69 (NCI3d)\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation-disability payments \u2014deduction of before-tax amount\nThe amount of the deduction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 for disability payments is the gross before-tax amount paid by the employer\u2019s disability plan rather than the net after-tax amount received by the employee.\nAm Jur 2d, Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 365.\nJustice WEBB did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 103 N.C. App. 45, 404 S.E.2d 183 (1991), reversing in part an order filed on 14 March 1989 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission (as modified by an order of the Commission entered on 30 March 1989). Heard in the Supreme Court on 9 March 1992.\nWalden & Walden, by Margaret D. Walden and Daniel S. Walden, for the plaintiff-appellee.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Richard T. Rice and Clayton M. Custer, for the defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0078-01", "first_page_order": 106, "last_page_order": 118 }