{ "id": 2504523, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRYAN CAMPBELL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Campbell", "decision_date": "1992-07-17", "docket_number": "No. 268A90", "first_page": "116", "last_page": "123", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 N.C. 116" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "321 N.C. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2571592 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567497 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492416, 2492358, 2491983, 2490036, 2492763 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0276-05", "/nc/325/0276-04", "/nc/325/0276-01", "/nc/325/0276-03", "/nc/325/0276-02" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "253-54" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528521 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 L. Ed. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 865", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6401817 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0865-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "\"It is immaterial,\" when deciding whether a defendant is guilty of first-degree murder in the perpetration of a sex offense, \"whether the felony occurred prior to or immediately after the killing so long as it is part of a series of incidents which form one continuous transaction.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4709664 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "sex offense" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554806 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "sex offense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "armed robbery" }, { "page": "525", "parenthetical": "\"When . . . the death and the taking are so connected as to form a continuous chain of events, a taking from the body of the dead victim is a taking 'from the person.' \"" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719180 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "armed robbery" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "armed robbery" }, { "page": "325", "parenthetical": "\"A homicide victim is still a 'person,' within the meaning of a robbery statute, when the interval between the fatal blow and the taking of property is short.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4739096 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "armed robbery" }, { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "armed robbery" }, { "page": "597" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512329 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "armed robbery" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564637 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 75, 77, 248 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497633 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 75, 77, 248 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 554", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" }, { "page": "559", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "656-60" }, { "page": "558-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2571592 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0650-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 739, "char_count": 15720, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.610681196562745e-08, "percentile": 0.5266947995809794 }, "sha256": "04454489b2cc993082359725544fd01450c5342dae1720a1fc624e91e16687c8", "simhash": "1:213c4c76203da7de", "word_count": 2647 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:54:56.199642+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRYAN CAMPBELL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nThe State concedes that defendant James Bryan Campbell must receive a new trial on all charges because the trial court refused to allow both of his defense attorneys to argue during the final closing argument. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-14 (1985); State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 365 S.E.2d 554 (1988). This opinion will therefore be limited to that issue and one other: whether to apply the continuous transaction doctrine to murder-arson cases.\nI.\nDefendant was indicted by a Graham County grand jury on 12 June 1989 for first-degree murder and assorted other crimes stemming from a one-day crime spree which left one man dead and another seriously injured. According to testimony at defendant\u2019s trial, defendant, his girlfriend Alice Crisp, his girlfriend\u2019s son Lamar Ledford, and Ledford\u2019s girlfriend Wendy Keller, came to North Carolina from Georgia in January or February 1989. In need of money, defendant asked Crisp for the name of someone to rob. Crisp supplied defendant with the name of fifty-nine-year-old Donald Allen, who lived near Robbinsville, North Carolina. On the evening of 18 March 1989, the two couples went to Allen\u2019s home, where they found Allen with his friend Tony Phillips. Shortly thereafter, defendant, Ledford, Crisp and Keller went to Phillips\u2019 home, also located on the outskirts of Robbinsville. After a period of drinking, dancing and socializing, defendant attacked Phillips with a hammer. Defendant then beat Phillips repeatedly with a baseball bat until the bat broke. Defendant took $13 from Phillips\u2019 pockets and searched the house in vain for valuables. Finally, defendant set the house on fire. Phillips managed to escape his burning home and testified at trial against defendant.\nDefendant and his three companions then went back to Allen\u2019s house. Defendant ordered Ledford, then sixteen years old, to hit Allen in the head. Ledford hit Allen once in the back of the head with a crowbar. Defendant then struck Allen seven or eight times with the crowbar. Defendant and Ledford looked around the house for valuables and took a shotgun, jewelry and a pill bottle. Defendant then went into the kitchen, turned on the gas stove, poured gasoline around Allen\u2019s body, left a gasoline trail from the living room to the outside of the house and lit the trail. According to Ledford\u2019s testimony, \u201cflames just blew out the door.\u201d\nDr. J.D. Butts, who performed the autopsy on Allen, testified that Allen died of blunt force trauma to the head. Butts testified that, in his opinion, Allen was dead when the fire was set.\nDefendant did not testify. Defendant\u2019s two trial attorneys requested that they both be permitted to address the jury during the final closing argument. The trial judge denied defendant\u2019s request and allowed only one of defendant\u2019s attorneys to address the jury during the final closing argument in the guilt-innocence phase. The trial judge did allow both defense attorneys to address the jury during the final closing argument in the sentencing phase.\nDefendant was convicted by a Graham County jury on 18 May 1990 of first-degree murder on the theory of premeditation and deliberation, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious bodily injury, two counts of first-degree arson, and two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon. After a capital sentencing proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000, the jury recommended and the trial judge imposed the sentence of death for the first-degree murder conviction. Judge Ferrell then imposed two consecutive life sentences for the two first-degree arson convictions, two consecutive fourteen-year sentences for the two armed robbery convictions, and a consecutive nine-year sentence for the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious bodily injury conviction.\nII.\nSection 84-14 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides, in pertinent part:\n[I]n capital felonies, the time of argument of counsel may not be limited otherwise than by consent, except that the court may limit the number of those who may address the jury to three counsel on each side.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-14 (1985). In State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 365 S.E.2d 554, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder and related noncapital offenses. The defendant requested that both his trial attorneys be allowed to address the jury during the final closing arguments in both the guilt-innocence and sentencing phases of his trial. The trial judge in Mitchell denied the request, allowing only one defense attorney to address the jury during each of the final closing arguments. After reviewing applicable case law, we said:\nTherefore, we hold that the trial court\u2019s refusal to permit both counsel to address the jury during defendant\u2019s final arguments constituted prejudicial error per se in both the guilt-innocence and sentencing phases. Such error in the guilt-innocence phase entitles the defendant to a new trial as to the capital felony. Further, the foregoing principles of law require us to hold in cases where a capital felony has been joined for trial with noncapital charges \u2018that the failure of the trial judge to allow both of defendant\u2019s counsel to make the closing argument was prejudicial error in the noncapital as well as the capital charges.\u2019 State v. Eury, 317 N.C. [511,] 518, 346 S.E.2d [447,] 451 [(1986)]. Therefore, the defendant is also entitled to a new trial as to the noncapital charges in the present case.\nId. at 659, 365 S.E.2d at 559 (emphasis added); see generally id. at 656-60, 365 S.E.2d at 558-59.\nAs the State forthrightly concedes, Mitchell is indistinguishable from this case. Defendant requested that both his attorneys be allowed to address the jury during the final closing argument in the guilt-innocence phase of his trial. Although the trial judge recognized that the rule enunciated in Mitchell applied to the sentencing phase, he was under the misconception that the rule did not apply to the guilt-innocence phase. Therefore, as in Mitchell, this case must be remanded for a new trial on all charges.\nIII.\nBecause defendant must receive a new trial, it is not necessary to address each of his assignments of error; however, both sides urge this Court to decide whether the continuous transaction doctrine applies to murder-arson cases. We hold it does.\nSection 14-58 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides:\nThere shall be two degrees of arson as defined at the common law. If the dwelling burned was occupied at the time of the burning, the offense is arson in the first degree and is punishable as a Class C felony. If the dwelling burned was unoccupied at the time of the burning, the offense is arson in the second degree and is punishable as a Class D felony.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-58 (1986). A Class C felony carries a maximum prison sentence of fifty years or life imprisonment and a presumptive sentence of fifteen years; a Class D felony carries a maximum prison sentence of forty years and a presumptive sentence of twelve years. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-1.1(3), (4) (1986); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(f)(l), (2) (Supp. 1991). The difference in punishment based on occupancy of the dwelling stems from the legislative recognition that \u201c \u2018the main purpose of common law arson is to protect against danger to those persons who might be in the dwelling house which is burned.\u2019 \u201d State v. Pigott, 331 N.C. 199, 207, 415 S.E.2d 555, 560 (1992) (quoting State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 75, 77, 248 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1978)). Thus, argues defendant, the trial judge erred by submitting to the jury the charge of first-degree arson as it related to Allen\u2019s house, because the undisputed medical evidence at trial was that Allen was already dead from multiple blows to the head when defendant set the house on fire. The State urges this Court to apply the continuous transaction doctrine to cases such as this and find that \u201ca dwelling is \u2018occupied\u2019 for purposes of the arson statute when the interval between the mortal blow and the burning is short, and the murder and the arson constitute parts of a continuous transaction.\u201d We adopt the State\u2019s position.\nAlthough this is the first time we have applied the continuous transaction doctrine to a murder-arson situation, we have applied the doctrine to murders involving armed robberies and sex offenses. State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 411 S.E.2d 592 (1992) (armed robbery); State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 356 S.E.2d 319 (1987) (armed robbery); State v. Fields, 315 N.C. 191, 337 S.E.2d 518 (1985) (armed robbery); State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 407 S.E.2d 141 (1991) (sex offense); State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 301 S.E.2d 335 (sex offense), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1983). In Olson, we held that where the armed robbery and murder are part of a continuous transaction, \u201cthe temporal order of the threat or use of a dangerous weapon and the taking is immaterial.\u201d Id. at 566, 411 S.E.2d at 597. \u201cTo be found guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon, the defendant\u2019s threatened use or use of a dangerous weapon must precede or be concomitant with the taking, or he so joined by time and circumstances with the taking as to be part of one continuous transaction.\u201d Id. (emphasis added); see also Pakulski, 319 N.C. at 572, 356 S.E.2d at 325 (\u201cA homicide victim is still a \u2018person,\u2019 within the meaning of a robbery statute, when the interval between the fatal blow and the taking of property is short.\u201d); Fields, 315 N.C. at 202, 337 S.E.2d at 525 (\u201cWhen . . . the death and the taking are so connected as to form a continuous chain of events, a taking from the body of the dead victim is a taking \u2018from the person.\u2019 \u201d); Williams, 308 N.C. at 67, 301 S.E.2d at 348 (\u201cIt is immaterial,\u201d when deciding whether a defendant is guilty of first-degree murder in the perpetration of a sex offense, \u201cwhether the felony occurred prior to or immediately after the killing so long as it is part of a series of incidents which form one continuous transaction.\u201d).\nTo accept defendant\u2019s argument would be to say that he is less morally culpable \u2014 and hence deserves less punishment \u2014 because of his success in killing the victim prior to setting the house on fire. We do not believe this to be the intent of the legislature in enacting the arson statute, nor do we believe it to be sound public policy. As we said in rejecting a similar argument in the murder-armed robbery context: \u201cTo accept defendant\u2019s argument would be to say that the use of force that leaves its victim alive to be dispossessed falls under N.C.G.S. 14-87 [armed robbery], whereas the use of force that leaves him dead puts the robber beyond the statute\u2019s reach.\u201d Fields, 315 N.C. at 201, 337 S.E.2d at 524. We rejected this argument in Fields-, we reject it again today.\nWe hold that if the murder and arson are so joined by time and circumstances as to be part of one continuous transaction, the temporal order of the murder and arson is immaterial. Stated differently, for purposes of the arson statute, a dwelling is \u201coccupied\u201d if the interval between the mortal blow and the arson is short, and the murder and arson constitute parts of a continuous transaction. In this case, the undisputed evidence is that defendant beat Allen to death with a crowbar, searched the house for valuables and then set the house on fire. The murder and arson were clearly part of one continuous transaction. The trial court did not err, therefore, in submitting to the jury the charge of first-degree arson for the burning of Allen\u2019s house.\nDefendant suggests that a decision by this Court contrary to his position would be inconsistent with the decision of the Court of Appeals in State v. Ward, 93 N.C. App. 682, 379 S.E.2d 251, disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 276, 384 S.E.2d 251 (1989). We disagree. In Ward, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree arson. Id. at 683, 379 S.E.2d at 252. The evidence at trial showed that Lori Mayse hired defendant to kill her husband. Id. After completing the job, defendant disposed of the victim\u2019s body in a trash dumpster and left the state for several days. Id. Mayse vacated the trailer where she had lived with her husband and disconnected the power. Id. at 686, 379 S.E.2d at 253. When defendant returned to North Carolina, Mayse paid him an additional $50 to burn the trailer. Id. at 683, 379 S.E.2d at 252.\nThe Court of Appeals agreed with defendant that his second-degree arson conviction must be reversed because the trailer was not \u201cinhabited\u201d at the time of the fire, as required by our common-law definition of arson. Id. at 685-87, 379 S.E.2d at 253-54. Although a temporary absence from a dwelling does not affect its status as inhabited, see State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 100, 291 S.E.2d 599, 606 (1982), the Court of Appeals held that the trailer was not inhabited at the time of the arson because the victim was dead and his wife had permanently vacated the premises. Ward, 93 N.C. App. at 686, 379 S.E.2d at 254.\nThis holding is not inconsistent with our decision in this case; in fact, it is consistent. In Ward, the victim had been dead for several days \u2014and his body deposited in a trash dumpster \u2014 when the fire was set; Mayse, after disconnecting the power, had permanently vacated the premises. Only after the defendant returned from out of state and was paid an additional sum of money did he burn the trailer. On these facts, it cannot seriously be argued that the murder and arson were \u201cso joined by time and circumstances as to be part of one continuous transaction.\u201d There is no reason why Ward and our decision today cannot peacefully coexist.\nFor the reasons stated in this opinion, this case is remanded to Superior Court, Graham County, for a new trial.\nNew trial.\n. Section 14-58 divides arson into two degrees for purposes of punishment, but maintains the common-law definition of arson. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-58 (1986); State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 291 S.E.2d 599 (1982).", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Ellen B. Scouten, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Daniel R. Pollitt, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRYAN CAMPBELL\nNo. 268A90\n(Filed 17 July 1992)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 414 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014closing arguments \u2014 only one defense counsel allowed to argue \u2014error\nA murder prosecution was remanded for a new trial where defendant requested that both of his attorneys be allowed to address the jury during the final closing argument in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial and the trial judge, while recognizing that the rule enunciated in State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, applied to the sentencing phase, was under the misconception that the rule did not apply to the guilt-innocence phase. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-14.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 555.\n2. Arson and Other Burnings \u00a7 6 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder and arson\u2014 victim dead before arson \u2014 continuous transaction\nThe trial court did not err by submitting to the jury the charge of first degree arson where the undisputed medical evidence was that the victim was already dead from multiple blows to the head when defendant set the house on fire. A dwelling is \u201coccupied\u201d if the interval between the mortal blow and the arson is short and the murder and arson constitute parts of a continuous transaction. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-58.\nAm Jur 2d, Arson \u00a7 5.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Ferrell, J., at the 14 May 1990 Criminal Session of Superior Court, GRAHAM County. Defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to additional judgment was allowed by the Supreme Court on 30 December 1991. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 May 1992.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Ellen B. Scouten, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Daniel R. Pollitt, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0116-01", "first_page_order": 144, "last_page_order": 151 }