{ "id": 2505670, "name": "MICHELLE K. HARRIS, through her guardian ad litem, DAVID B. FREEDMAN, DAVID A. HARRIS, and ELLEN E. HARRIS v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Harris v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance", "decision_date": "1992-09-04", "docket_number": "No. 305A91", "first_page": "184", "last_page": "204", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 N.C. 184" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519696 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 ALR4th 13", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511313, 2508242, 2508118, 2508667, 2510653 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0193-01", "/nc/330/0193-05", "/nc/330/0193-02", "/nc/330/0193-04", "/nc/330/0193-03" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522609 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695400, 4696174, 4696632, 4699005, 4702879 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0731-02", "/nc/316/0731-05", "/nc/316/0731-04", "/nc/316/0731-03", "/nc/316/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521993 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Crowder v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551, 554, 340 S.E.2d 127, 129, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 731, 345 S.E.2d 387 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2506105 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Crowder v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551, 554, 340 S.E.2d 127, 129, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 731, 345 S.E.2d 387 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565135 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561065 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" }, { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737744 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" }, { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528056 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537537, 2539785, 2542308, 2540999 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0577-01", "/nc/328/0577-02", "/nc/328/0577-03", "/nc/328/0577-04" ] }, { "cite": "294 N.W.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 Mich. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1949218 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/409/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" }, { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542714 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148-49" }, { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphases in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491072, 2489257, 2490993, 2488279, 2491871 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0437-04", "/nc/325/0437-01", "/nc/325/0437-02", "/nc/325/0437-05", "/nc/325/0437-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" }, { "page": "763" }, { "page": "762" }, { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492574 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" }, { "page": "265" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553443, 2555141, 2552921, 2556123, 2555932 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0788-04", "/nc/329/0788-05", "/nc/329/0788-01", "/nc/329/0788-02", "/nc/329/0788-03" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519696 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2485985 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" }, { "page": "49" }, { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542714 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151-52" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491072, 2489257, 2490993, 2488279, 2491871 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0437-04", "/nc/325/0437-01", "/nc/325/0437-02", "/nc/325/0437-05", "/nc/325/0437-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" }, { "page": "763", "parenthetical": "statute allows stacking of coverages and policies" }, { "page": "764", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492574 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261-62" }, { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "Greene, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519696 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107", "parenthetical": "Greene, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0101-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1237, "char_count": 48666, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.042299738661741e-07, "percentile": 0.9738036850797093 }, "sha256": "890b2a83aa820c1425807a868a6df5329c8cba6aee9fb72ec089ae107ed9c875", "simhash": "1:f9c8a2f6556e349a", "word_count": 7719 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:54:56.199642+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice LAKE joins in this dissenting opinion.", "Justice LAKE joins in this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "MICHELLE K. HARRIS, through her guardian ad litem, DAVID B. FREEDMAN, DAVID A. HARRIS, and ELLEN E. HARRIS v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nDefendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) presents two distinct issues on this appeal: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that intrapolicy stacking is permitted in determining an insurer\u2019s limit of liability when the injured party is the minor daughter of the named insured; and (2) whether the tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle in which the minor plaintiff was riding when injured was an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle,\u201d even though the liability coverage on the vehicle was equal to the liability limit under the Nationwide policy issued to the minor\u2019s parents. As to the first issue, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err. We answer the second question in the affirmative, thus agreeing with the implicit holding of both the trial court and Court of Appeals.\nPlaintiff Michelle K. Harris, the minor daughter of plaintiffs David and Ellen Harris, was injured in an automobile accident while traveling as a passenger in a vehicle owned by George Wayne Faust and operated by his daughter, Mary Elizabeth Faust, on 25 September 1989. The Faust vehicle was insured under a State Farm Insurance Company policy having liability limits of $100,000/$300,000. Michelle\u2019s medical expenses alone exceeded $102,000. At the time of the accident, Michelle\u2019s parents owned three vehicles insured under a single policy issued by Nationwide. This policy provided uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage of $100,000 per person for each vehicle insured. Plaintiffs paid to defendant separate premiums on each vehicle for UM/UIM coverage.\nPlaintiffs filed this action for declaratory judgment on 2 March 1990, requesting that the trial court determine whether Michelle was entitled to stack the UIM coverages of three separate vehicles covered under the single policy issued by Nationwide. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, summary judgment. Nationwide also made a motion for summary judgment pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(b). In a judgment dated 14 June 1990, the trial court granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment and denied Nationwide\u2019s motion. The trial court\u2019s judgment included the following significant \u201cfindings of fact\u201d:\n2. That the coverage for the three vehicles listed in the insurance policy referred to in the Complaint and issued by the defendant to the plaintiffs David A. Harris and Ellen E. Harris can be stacked so as to provide underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $300,000 for injuries and damages sustained by the plaintiffs arising out of the accident described in the Complaint, and that the underinsured motorist coverage available to Michelle Harris is identical to the coverage available to David A. Harris and Ellen E. Harris under the insurance policy issued by defendant;\n3. That the defendant\u2019s limit of liability to the plaintiff shall be $300,000, less the primary coverage paid to the plaintiffs pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4).\nThe Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s decision, with Judge Greene dissenting. Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.C. App. 101, 404 S.E.2d 499 (1991). Nationwide appealed to this Court based on Judge Greene\u2019s dissent, and we granted its petition for discretionary review as to additional issues. Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.C. 788, 408 S.E.2d 521 (1991).\nWe address Nationwide\u2019s second issue first. Nationwide contends that the Faust vehicle in which the minor plaintiff was riding when injured was not an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d because the $100,000 per person liability limit on the Faust vehicle was equal to the per person liability/UIM limit of $100,000 in plaintiffs\u2019 Nationwide policy. UIM coverage is deemed to apply when \u201call liability bonds or insurance policies providing coverage for bodily injury caused by the ownership, maintenance or use of the \u00edmderinsured highway vehicle have been exhausted.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989) (emphasis added). Therefore, the determination of whether the tortfeasor\u2019s (Faust) vehicle is an underinsured highway vehicle is crucial in determining if UIM coverage is available under the Nationwide policy.\nThe threshhold question, then, is whether the tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d as the term is used in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). An \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d is defined as\na highway vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which, the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the owner\u2019s policy ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989) (emphasis added). In essence, defendant\u2019s second issue can be divided into two subissues: first, whether the proper comparison outlined in the statute above is between the tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage and plaintiffs liability coverage or between the tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage and the plaintiff\u2019s UIM coverage; and second, if the proper comparison is to plaintiff\u2019s UIM coverage, whether the UIM coverage limits can be stacked to determine if the tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle.\u201d\nThe resolution of these subissues hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase \u201capplicable limits of liability under the owner\u2019s policy.\u201d We note that this language is found in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4), which deals exclusively with underinsured motorist coverage. While it may be argued that \u201climits of liability\u201d refers to the limits under the plaintiff\u2019s liability coverage, we are convinced that the limits referred to are the limits of liability under plaintiff\u2019s UIM coverage. Following an automobile accident, a tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage is called upon to compensate the injured plaintiff, who then turns to his own UIM coverage when the tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage is exhausted. In this situation, the injured plaintiff\u2019s liability coverages are not applicable to the accident and a comparison to the plaintiff\u2019s liability coverage is inappropriate. Taken in context with the surrounding subsection on underinsured motorist coverage, the \u201cliability limits\u201d referred to are clearly those under the UIM coverage portion of the owners\u2019 policy. Therefore, the limits of liability in the instant case are the limits of liability under the UIM coverage portion of the minor plaintiff\u2019s parents\u2019 policy and not under the liability portion of their policy.\nThe Financial Responsibility Act, of which N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) is a part, is a \u201cremedial statute to be liberally construed so that the beneficial purpose intended by its enactment may be accomplished.\u201d Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 325 N.C. 259, 265, 382 S.E.2d 759, 763, reh\u2019g denied, 325 N.C. 437, 384 S.E.2d 546 (1989). A treatise on North Carolina automobile insurance law discusses the concept of UIM coverage and concludes that it \u201callows the insured to recover when the tortfeasor has insurance, but his coverage is in an amount insufficient to compensate the injured party for his full damages.\u201d J. Snyder, Jr., North Carolina Automobile Insurance Law \u00a7 30-1 (1988). Our interpretation of the statute is in accord with this approach.\nAnother noted treatise on automobile insurance has evaluated the various legislative definitions of an \u201cunderinsured motor vehicle\u201d and has classified them in three categories which demonstrate the different approaches used by the various states for determining whether a tortfeasor is underinsured. 2 A. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance \u00a7 35.2 (2d ed. 1990). \u201cThere are three primary types of comparisons which are defined in these statutes: determinations based on comparisons of the tortfeasor\u2019s liability insurance (1) with the amount of underinsured motorist insurance, (2) with the amount of uninsured motorist insurance, or (3) with the damages or injuries sustained by the insured.\u201d Id. (emphases in original). Noticeably absent from these categories is any comparison of the tortfeasor\u2019s liability insurance with the amount of a plaintiff\u2019s liability insurance. We have found no authority which leads us to believe that the determination of whether a tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d requires a comparison between the tortfeasor\u2019s liability insurance and the plaintiff\u2019s liability coverage. \u201c[T]he obligation to provide uninsured motorist coverage was tied to liability coverage to facilitate its purchase and to determine the persons who must be provided with uninsured motorist coverage, and not to provide insurers a means of limiting the coverage to situations in which liability coverage would be in effect.\u201d Smith v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 328 N.C. 139, 148-49, 400 S.E.2d 44, 50 (quoting Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 1, 35-36, 294 N.W.2d 141, 151 (1980)), reh\u2019g denied, 328 N.C. 577, 403 S.E.2d 514 (1991).\nHaving decided the proper comparison in determining whether a tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle,\u201d we now address the question of whether UIM coverages may be stacked when making this determination. Anticipating this Court\u2019s rejection of a liability to liability comparison argument, Nationwide contends that, even under a liability to UIM coverage comparison, the automobile owned and operated by Faust (the tortfeasor) is not an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d as defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). Nationwide argues that, as a threshold issue, plaintiffs must show that the limits of UIM coverage under their policy with Nationwide exceed the limits of liability coverage under Faust\u2019s policy with State Farm. Thus, Nationwide contends that the comparison between the tortfeasor\u2019s liability limit and the plaintiff\u2019s UIM limit must occur prior to the stacking of any UIM coverage. As such, Nationwide argues that in cases like the instant case, where the tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage is equal to the plaintiff\u2019s UIM limit before stacking, the plaintiff fails to meet the \u201cthreshold\u201d definition of an underinsured highway vehicle, and there is no underinsured motorist coverage to stack. We reject this contention.\nWhen examining cases to determine whether insurance coverage is provided by a particular automobile insurance policy, careful attention must be given to the type of coverage, the terms of the policy, and the relevant statutory provisions. Smith, 328 N.C. at 142, 400 S.E.2d at 47. In the present case, the type of coverage sought by plaintiffs is UIM coverage. The policy in question is a personal automobile insurance policy issued to the parents of the minor plaintiff. This Nationwide policy includes UIM coverage, but Nationwide argues that the policy prohibits \u201cstacking\u201d in determining whether a vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured motor vehicle.\u201d\nThe Nationwide policy in question defines an underinsured motor vehicle in the \u201cuninsured/underinsured motorists coverage\u201d endorsement as follows:\nA land motor vehicle ... of any type . . . [t]o which . . . the sum of the limits of liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is:\na. equal to or greater than the minimum limit specified by the financial responsibility law of North Carolina; and\nb. less than the limit of liability for this coverage.\n(Emphasis added.) Nationwide notes that the word \u201climit\u201d in this definition is singular, and therefore argues that the policy refers to a singular limit. As such, Nationwide contends that \u201cthe singular limit of the policy with defendant ($100,000) must be greater than the liability coverage of the tortfeasor in order for the tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle to qualify as underinsured.\u201d We recognize that our Court of Appeals has treated similar language in the medical payments provision of automobile insurance policies as prohibiting stacking of medical payments. See, e.g., Tyler v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 101 N.C. App. 713, 401 S.E.2d 80 (1991). Assuming, arguendo, that the provision in the Nationwide policy would prohibit stacking to determine the \u201climit of liability,\u201d we must then consider the statutory provisions relevant to this issue.\nAs discussed above, the statute provides that an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d is\na highway vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which, the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the owner\u2019s policy.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (emphasis added). The statute does not define \u201cthe applicable limits of liability under the owner\u2019s policy.\u201d While Nationwide interprets \u201cthe applicable limits of liability\u201d as meaning a single limit of UIM coverage under the owner\u2019s policy, this language may also be interpreted to mean the sum of all UIM limits under the policy which are applicable to the particular claim.\nWhen interpreting a statute, the cardinal principle is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature is accomplished. Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Electrical Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991). Accordingly, \u201ca court must consider the act as a whole, weighing the language of the statute, its spirit, and that which the statute seeks to accomplish.\u201d Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hospital, 318 N.C. 76, 82, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986). Also, \u201c[i]t is presumed that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and that it did not intend an unjust or absurd result\u201d when it enacted the particular legislation. King v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 316, 325, 172 S.E.2d 12, 18 (1970) (citations omitted). Furthermore, \u201cthe statute\u2019s words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless the context requires them to be construed differently.\u201d Shelton, 318 N.C. at 82, 347 S.E.2d at 828.\nApplying these rules to the language \u201capplicable limits of liability,\u201d we are convinced that the \u201capplicable limits\u201d are the sum of all UIM coverages provided in the Nationwide policy which are applicable to the plaintiff\u2019s claim. Initially, we note that the statute refers to \u201capplicable limits of liability.\u201d Given the natural and ordinary meaning of the plural form of the word limit, we are convinced that, with reference to a single policy, \u201capplicable limits\u201d refers to all available UIM limits under the policy. Furthermore, we find that this result is consistent with our previous decision in Sutton. In Sutton, we held that stacking is required by the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) when determining an insured\u2019s recovery under the UIM provisions of an automobile insurance policy. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 265, 382 S.E.2d at 763. To deny an insured access to the recovery approved in Sutton by prohibiting stacking of UIM coverages in determining whether the tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d would be inconsistent with the rationale of Sutton and the purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act.\nThus, we conclude that the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) allows the stacking of an insured\u2019s UIM coverages in determining whether a tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle.\u201d The statute compares the aggregate liability coverage of the tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle to the applicable limits of liability under the owner\u2019s policy, meaning the aggregate or stacked UIM \u201climits\u201d under the policy. To the extent that the provisions of a statute and the terms of the policy conflict, the provisions of the statute will prevail. Id. at 263, 382 S.E.2d at 762; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 293 N.C. 431, 441, 238 S.E.2d 597, 604 (1977). Because the tortfeasor\u2019s aggregate liability coverage is less than the aggregate limits of liability under the UIM provisions of the Nationwide policy, the tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle in this case qualifies as an underinsured highway vehicle. In the language of the statute, the Faust vehicle was an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d because it was \u201ca highway vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which, the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds [$0] and insurance policies [$100,000] applicable at the time of the accident [was] less than the applicable limits of liability under the owner\u2019s policy [$300,000].\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989).\nNationwide next argues that even if this Court rejects its \u201cthreshold\u201d argument and allows stacking in determining whether a vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle,\u201d the Court of Appeals nevertheless erred in holding that a nonowner family member is entitled to such stacking. Nationwide relies upon the following portion of the statute:\nIn any event, the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to any claim is determined to be the difference between the amount paid to the claimant pursuant to the exhausted liability policy and the total limits of the owner\u2019s underinsured motorist coverages provided in the owner\u2019s policies of insurance; it being the intent of this paragraph to provide to the owner, in instances where more than one policy may apply, the benefits of all limits of liability of underinsured motorist coverage under all such policies ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) .(emphasis added). Nationwide contends that the statute\u2019s repeated references to \u201cowner\u201d and \u201cowner\u2019s policy\u201d demonstrate that only the owners of the policy or vehicle may avail themselves of benefits under the statute, such as the intrapolicy stacking approved in Sutton. Thus, Nationwide argues, because Michelle is not the owner of the policy or vehicle, she is not entitled to stack UIM coverages.\nAssuming, without deciding, that Nationwide is correct in interpreting the statute to mean that only \u201cowners\u201d are intended to benefit from the stacking of UIM coverages, there is no factual dispute that Mr. and Mrs. Harris \u201cbenefit\u201d when their child Michelle is allowed to stack. To accept Nationwide\u2019s argument would be to say that the legislature intended for Michelle\u2019s parents, the policy owners, to benefit financially from their UIM coverage when they are injured by an underinsured motorist, but did not intend for them to benefit financially when their minor daughter, a member of their household, is injured by an underinsured motorist. Clearly, the legislature \u201cdid not intend [such] an unjust or absurd result.\u201d See King, 276 N.C. at 325, 172 S.E.2d at 18.\nWhen one member of a household purchases first-party UIM coverage, it may fairly be said that he or she intends to protect all members of the family unit within the household. The legislature recognized this family unit for purposes of UIM coverage when it defined \u201cpersons insured\u201d of the first class as \u201cthe named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of any named insured and relatives of either . . . .\u201d See Bass v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 109, 418 S.E.2d 221 (1992) (quoting Crowder v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551, 554, 340 S.E.2d 127, 129, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 731, 345 S.E.2d 387 (1986)). These persons insured of the first class are protected, based on their relationship, whether they are injured while riding in one of the covered vehicles or otherwise. See id. Certainly, the policy owner \u201cbenefits\u201d when a spouse or family member residing in his or her household' can stack UIM coverages. We conclude that the principles enumerated in Sutton which allow intrapolicy stacking when the owner is injured also allow intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverages when the injured party is a person insured of the first class.\nThe facts of this case demonstrate perfectly the logical reasoning behind allowing a member of the family unit and a person insured of the first class to stack UIM coverages. Because of her minority status, Michelle was under no duty to honor any contract of insurance she might have purchased on her own. 3 Robert E. Lee, North Carolina Family Law \u00a7 270 (4th ed. 1981). Therefore, Michelle was dependent on her parents for insurance coverage. Also, since Michelle was a minor at the time of the accident, it was her parents\u2019 duty to support her to the best of their abilities. See id. \u00a7 229; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.4(b) (1989). Purchasing insurance to benefit their daughter Michelle is an example of such support. By discharging their duty of support and protecting their daughter, the Harrises plainly \u201cbenefit\u201d by limiting their out-of-pocket expenses, as well as increasing their peace of mind. Therefore, we hold that Michelle, as a nonowner family member living in the same household as the named insured, is entitled to stack UIM coverages under her parents\u2019 policy with Nationwide.\nNationwide also contends that our decision in Smith supports its argument that intrapolicy stacking should not be allowed in the instant case. We find this argument unconvincing. Nationwide argues that this Court in Smith rejected intrapolicy stacking for nonowner family members and allowed only interpolicy stacking. We disagree. Whether intrapolicy stacking is permissible for a nonowner family member was not at issue in Smith, and we confined our decision to the interpolicy stacking issue presented on appeal. Therefore, Smith should not be read to reject intrapolicy stacking, an issue not before the Court in that case.\nNationwide further argues that stacking multiple vehicles on one policy by a nonowner is \u201cexcess\u201d or \u201cadditional\u201d coverage within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(g), and therefore not subject to the compulsory provisions of the Financial Responsibility Act. We rejected this argument in Sutton-, we reject it again today. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 268, 382 S.E.2d at 765.\nWe hold that intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverages is permissible when determining whether the tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle.\u201d We further hold that the tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle in this case qualifies as an underinsured highway vehicle, since the plaintiff\u2019s aggregate UIM coverages exceed the aggregate liability coverage of the tortfeasor. We also hold that the minor plaintiff, as a nonowner family member living in the same household as the named insured, is entitled to stack UIM coverages in her parents\u2019 policy in determining Nationwide\u2019s limit of liability. For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\n. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4), as it existed at the time of the accident, the UIM limits in any given policy were identical to the liability limits. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21 was amended by the General Assembly in 1991. 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws eh. 646, \u00a7\u00a7 1-4. However, the amendments do not affect claims arising or litigation pending prior to the amendments. Id. \u00a7 4. Unless otherwise noted, any citation to or discussion of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21 in this opinion will be with respect to that version of the statute in effect at the time of the accident.\n. This same issue is before us in another case, Amos v. N.C. Farm Bureau, Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.C. App. 629, 406 S.E.2d 652, disc. rev. allowed, 330 N.C. 193, 412 S.E.2d 52 (1991). Because this issue affects both of these cases, and is implicit in all UIM cases, we will decide it here.\n. This is North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company\u2019s contention in Amos v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.C. App. 629, 406 S.E.2d 652.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice Meyer\ndissenting.\nThe majority errs in two major respects. First, it errs in holding that the tort-feasor\u2019s vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d within the meaning of the statute and the language of the policy of insurance in question. It further errs in holding that the minor plaintiff, a nonowner, is entitled to intrapolicy stack UIM coverages in determining Nationwide\u2019s limit of liability under the policy.\nI.\nI disagree with the majority\u2019s adoption of Judge Greene\u2019s conclusion, in part I of his dissent below, that the tort-feasor\u2019s vehicle here qualifies as an underinsured vehicle. I concur completely with the dissent of Justice Webb, in which he' concludes that the plain language of the statute requires a comparison of liability coverages to determine whether there is underinsured motorist coverage.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) requires insurers to provide insureds with UIM coverage, affording their insureds additional compensation when injured by an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle.\u201d \u201cUnderinsured highway vehicle\u201d is defined by that same section as \u201ca highway vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which, the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the owner\u2019s policy.\" N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989) (subsequently amended 1991) (emphasis added). Thus, in determining whether a \u201cperson insured\u201d is entitled to UIM benefits, it must first be determined whether the vehicle at fault for the insured\u2019s injuries was \u201cunderinsured.\u201dN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) provides that this determination is to be made by comparing \u201cthe sum of the limits of liability\u201d insurance for the at-fault vehicle with the \u201capplicable limits of liability under the owner\u2019s policy.\u201d Only if the at-fault vehicle\u2019s liability insurance is less than the applicable limits of the liability insurance under the owner\u2019s policy is the injured insured entitled to UIM benefits. This interpretation fully comports with the General Assembly\u2019s purpose of offering the added protection of UIM coverage only to insureds who have provided to third persons protection greater than that required by law.\nHaving compared the liability coverage of the two vehicles at issue here, it is evident to me that plaintiff was not injured by an underinsured highway vehicle within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4), and plaintiff is therefore not entitled to the UIM benefits under the Nationwide policy. To say, as does the majority, that plaintiff is entitled to UIM benefits as a result of this accident completely ignores the fact that the applicable limits of liability under the Nationwide policy are equal to the liability insurance on the at-fault vehicle, and therefore the at-fault vehicle is not underinsured within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4),\nEven if the statute is read to require a comparison of the owner\u2019s UIM coverage (before stacking) to the tort-feasor\u2019s threshold liability coverage for one person under the policies in question here, the coverages are equal. Since the tort-feasor\u2019s limit of liability insurance is equal to (not less than) the Nationwide underinsured limit before stacking, the plaintiff here fails to meet the threshold definition of an underinsured highway vehicle, and there is no underinsured motorist coverage to stack.\nII.\nEven if I agreed with the majority that the tort-feasor\u2019s vehicle here was an underinsured vehicle, both the language of the policy and the statute prohibit Michelle K. Harris from intrapolicy stacking the UIM coverages to determine Nationwide\u2019s limit of liability. This was the conclusion reached by Judge Greene in part II of his dissent below. With only minor changes in his language, I reiterate his reasoning with regard to both the provision of the policy and the statute.\nPolicy\nThe \u201cUninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage\u201d endorsement in the insurance policy provides in pertinent part:\nIf this policy and any other auto insurance policy issued to you apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of liability for your or a family member\u2019s injuries shall be the sum of the limits of liability for this coverage under all such policies.\nIn Smith v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 328 N.C. 139, 400 S.E.2d 44 (1991), this Court read this policy language to allow \u201cthe stacking of UIM coverages for a family member when the family member is covered by more than one policy issued to the named insured.\u201d Id. at 146, 400 S.E.2d at 49. However, the unambiguous language of the policy suh judice prevents stacking of the UIM coverages contained in it.\nThe above endorsement language requires two or more policies before stacking is allowed by a family member. Here, Michelle Harris was covered by only one policy. This interpretation becomes irrefutable in light of the policy definition of \u201climit of liability,\u201d which limits the defendant\u2019s liability for UIM coverage to $100,000 \u201cregardless of the number of . . . [v]ehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations.\u201d Therefore, the endorsement language, read in connection with the \u201climit of liability\u201d provision, prohibits the stacking by a family member of multiple UIM coverages contained in a single policy.\nStatute\nWhether under the statute a nonnamed insured, such as Michelle Harris, is entitled to stack UIM coverages to determine the insurer\u2019s limit of liability is an issue that has not been addressed by this Court. In Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the plaintiff injured party was the policyholder (owner) and named insured of all of the policies of insurance that the Court allowed to be stacked. Sutton, 325 N.C. 259, 261-62, 382 S.E.2d 759, 761, reh\u2019g denied, 325 N.C. 437, 384 S.E.2d 546 (1989). When presented with a case where the injured party was not the policyholder, this Court refused to apply the statutory analysis used in Sutton to determine the issue of stacking of UIM coverages. Smith, 328 N.C. at 151-52, 400 S.E.2d at 52. Instead, in Smith, this Court allowed stacking, not under the provisions of the statute, but under the terms of the policy. Id.\nThe UIM statute provides in pertinent part:\nIn any event, the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to any claim is determined to be the difference between the amount paid to the claimant pursuant to the exhausted liability policy and the total limits of the owner\u2019s underinsured motorist coverages provided in the owner\u2019s policies of insurance; it being the intent of this paragraph to provide to the owner, in instances where more than one policy may apply, the benefit of all limits of liability of underinsured motorist coverage under all such policies: Provided that this paragraph shall apply only to nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle insurance as defined in G.S. 58-40-15(9) and (10).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (emphasis added). The statute is unambiguous in its language that only the \u201cowner\u201d is allowed \u201cthe benefit of all limits of liability of underinsured motorist coverage under all such policies.\u201d In other words, only the \u201cowner\u201d can stack underinsured motorist\u2019s \u201ccoverages and policies.\u201d See Sutton, 325 N.C. at 265, 382 S.E.2d at 763 (statute allows stacking of coverages and policies). Unlike the case at bar, in Sutton, the plaintiff was the owner of both the policies of insurance and the insured vehicles. The statute reference to \u201cowner,\u201d in context, refers to the owner of the policies or policy of insurance containing underinsured motorist coverages. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-4.01(26) (Supp. 1991) (unless context of statute requires a different definition, definition of words in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-4.01 applies to statute). Therefore, under the statute, Michelle Harris, who is not the owner of the policy in question, is not allowed to stack the underinsured motorist coverages available on the policy of insurance issued by the defendant Nationwide to Michelle\u2019s parents. I find this reasoning entirely convincing.\nThe statute requires UIM stacking for owners only. However, it also makes an express provision for coverage \u201cin excess of or in addition to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy and such excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of this Article.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(g) (1989). Hence, if a policy provided nonrequired coverage for nonowners, such as intrapolicy stacking, such coverage would be \u201cadditional coverage\u201d as that term is contemplated by the Financial Responsibility Act. While stacking for owners is required, nonowners obtain more coverage as \u201cadditional\u201d or \u201cexcess\u201d coverage, which is allowed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(g).To the extent that a nonowner has additional or excess coverage, the excess amounts represent voluntary coverage that is not subject to the compulsory provisions of the statute. Id. Stacking multiple vehicles on one policy by a nonowner is \u201cin addition to\u201d the coverage required by the terms of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4).\nIn the case sub judice, Michelle Harris is neither the owner of the policy at issue nor of the vehicles on the policy. The UIM statute does not change the antistacking language of the policy to require that Michelle be allowed to intrapolicy stack the coverages on her parents\u2019 policy.\nThe explicit language of the statute is: \u201cIt being the intent of this paragraph to provide to the owner . . . the benefit of all limits of liability . . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (emphasis added). Disregarding completely the explicit language of the statute and the policy as to who is an \u201cowner\u201d of the policy, the majority permits a nonowner to intrapolicy stack UIM coverage because, by doing so, the owners would \u201cbenefit financially when their minor daughter, a member of their household, is injured by an underinsured motorist.\u201d Resorting to the question of which interpretation of a statute or contract of insurance will result in the greater financial benefit as opposed to the plain words of the statute and the policy is completely unacceptable to me.\nI now address two other matters that I believe merit consideration: the majority\u2019s disregard of the recent legislative amendment to the statute in question, prohibiting intrapolicy stacking, and the public policy reasons for not allowing stacking under the facts of this case.\nThis Court should not read the present subsection (b)(4) expansively to allow intrapolicy stacking in light of the recent legislative amendment to the statute. See 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 646, \u00a7 2. The amended statute contains the following provision:\nThe underinsured motorist limits applicable to any one motor vehicle under a policy shall not be combined with or added to the limits applicable to any other motor vehicle under that policy.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1991). Although the amendment to the statute is inapplicable to this case by reason of its effective date, it should nevertheless be considered by this Court as support for the proposition that the legislature never intended intrapolicy stacking even under the present statute. Unless they expressly say so, amendments to statutes are not necessarily clarifications of legislative intent. Nevertheless, the fact that the legislature has amended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) since the accident in this case to eliminate intrapolicy stacking is some additional evidence that the statute\u2019s general purpose, which has not been changed, is best served when the statute is interpreted so as not to extend stacking privileges to all covered or insured persons. See Proctor v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 221, 225, 376 S.E.2d 761, 765 (1989). This recent amendment, at the very least, should-serve to curb any further expansion of the category of persons who are allowed to stack coverages of multiple vehicles on a single policy under the present statute.\nThe majority makes the point that separate UIM premiums are charged for each vehicle covered under a single policy. A premium is charged for each covered vehicle because of the increased risk of all of the insured vehicles being involved in an accident or accidents during the same policy term. Several motor vehicles belonging to one household can be, and frequently are, on the road at the same time, thereby justifying separate premiums for coverage on each vehicle due to the increased exposure of the several vehicles, as opposed to a single vehicle, being involved in separate accidents. A treatise on insurance law and practice is instructive on this point:\nA few of the decisions adhering to the rule against the stacking, or accumulation of UM coverages, use the correct reasoning. That is, the actual exposure of an insurer is multiplied by the number of vehicles, since different persons will be driving them upon separate occasions and the risk is thereby multiplied, so that separate coverage must be carried upon each whenever that particular vehicle is used.\nAlthough some courts . . . pay considerable attention to policy language, actually the intent of most policies is reasonably clear. This is true of the \u201ceach person\u201d proviso in the insuring agreements, irrespective of the number of vehicles insured. There is no rule which forbids a single insurer, ordinarily, from providing against the tacking, or stacking, of the coverages available to the several vehicles of a single insured. Nor is this considered to be against public policy, if it at least meets the minimum amount required by statute.\n8C John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice \u00a7 5106, at 517 (1981) (footnotes omitted). The treatise further states:\nIf it is not reasonable to argue for a doubling or tripling of liability limits when there is a single policy owner, and a single company, then it is not reasonable to urge such a position for uninsured motorist coverages. Yet . . . the majority of courts have confused themselves upon this issue, feeling that unless they double up such UM coverage, the insurer somehow receives a windfall, since it charges a separate premium for each coverage as it applies to a separate automobile.\nLet us analyze this reasoning, for a moment. If there were but a single insured, and only he ever drove an automobile, obviously he can drive only one vehicle at a time and the reasoning of such courts might then be logical. But, in considering basic underwriting and the actuarial computation of rate structures, we must take into consideration the customary procedures of mankind. Automobile policies are now written so as to afford liability protection not only to the named insured, who is usually the owner, but to members of his family, perhaps persons residing in the same household, and \u2014 with a few exceptions \u2014 anyone operating with the permission of the named insured or adult members of his household. When it comes to UM coverages, we have a like multiplication of exposure, since we have classes of risk, including all of the persons stated above, and pedestrians as well, with benefits granted in many circumstances when one may be in another vehicle or even upon the highway.\nWhen the insured then owns more than a single vehicle, almost always it is with the contemplation that the second, or third, vehicles will be operated by others. And those others may, also, if injured by an uninsured motorist, expose the insurer to loss under that aspect of the contract.\nNow it could reasonably be argued that an insured owning several automobiles could insure only one of them for liability, or for collision, or comprehensive, damages \u2014 yet collect as to any loss inflicted by, or upon, any of those vehicles he elected not to insure. Yet this is precisely the result for which policyholders, or their counsel, contend under UM coverages and which has been upheld repeatedly by the courts. Similarly, it is no more logical to double, or triple, a single limit of UM coverage, the amount of which the insured deliberately selected, and tender it free to the insured.\nWe may summarize the situation where there is a single policy owner, single company, and multiple vehicles by saying that the proper result is: \u201cWhat you buy is what you get \u2014 and no more.\u201d It is time for those courts, which have been so generous with the funds of others, to take a new look at this problem.\nId. \u00a7 5101, at 449-51 (footnotes omitted).\nAnother commonly made argument is also relied upon by the majority, as it was by Judge Greene in part I of his dissent, with which I have previously stated I disagree. Judge Greene wrote:\nIn Sutton, our Supreme Court held that the statute should be construed to prevent the \u201c \u2018anomalous situation that an insured is better off \u2014 for purposes of the underinsured motorist coverage \u2014 if separate policies were purchased for each vehicle.\u2019 \u201d [325 N.C.] at 267, 382 S.E.2d at 764 (citation omitted).\nTo construe \u201capplicable limits of liability under the owner\u2019s policy\u201d to be the amount of UIM coverage on any one vehicle shown in the policy declarations, here $100,000, would result in an anomalous situation where the insured would be better off had he purchased separate policies for each vehicle. If separate policies had been purchased, providing the same coverage on each of the three vehicles, the \u201climits of liability\u201d under the UIM endorsement would have been $300,000.\nHarris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.C. App. 101, 107, 404 S.E.2d 499, 503 (1991) (Greene, J., dissenting).\nAs a result of hindsight gained since this Court\u2019s decision in Sutton, I now question whether I voted correctly to allow stacking in that case. As the record in this case reveals, there may indeed be adequate justification for treating the two situations differently. I am now convinced that this is not necessarily an anomalous result, since different premiums are charged under these two different circumstances. When separate policies are purchased, the premiums paid are typically higher to cover the increased risk assumed by the insurer. When multiple vehicles are covered on a single policy, the premium is generally less because multivehicle discounts are provided to the policyholders.\nIn the policy issued by Nationwide to the Harrises, the first vehicle has a total premium of $289.60, whereas the second vehicle only has a premium totalling $131.30, as does the third vehicle. This discount is noted on the declarations page as \u201cdiscounts applied,\u201d referring to \u201cmulti car.\u201d\nAutomobile insurance, although regulated by statute, is still governed by contract law, where private parties are allowed to determine their respective rights as long as their private agreement does not conflict with the applicable statutory provisions. An insurer accepts a specifically defined risk in exchange for an agreed upon premium amount that adequately compensates the insurer for the risk being assumed. Thus, the premium is by necessity related to the risk being undertaken.\nAccordingly, as the majority of this Court liberalizes the statute beyond its terms and allows more and more persons to stack multiple car coverages, the premiums charged by the insurers will inevitably be increased. Premiums will likely increase to the point (and indeed they may already have) where many insureds will begin to reject UIM coverage. This result can only be detrimental to the public good in the long run, as motorists will begin to carry less and less protection.\nThe issue becomes not how much coverage one can voluntarily choose to purchase, but rather, how much coverage will be required and at what costs to society and the consuming public. Continued expansion of UIM coverage may eventually have the unwanted and deleterious result of reducing an accident victim\u2019s ability to recover, thereby thwarting the remedial purpose for the Financial Responsibility Act.\nFor the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and vote to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nJustice LAKE joins in this dissenting opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice Meyer" }, { "text": "Justice Webb\ndissenting.\nI dissent. The majority correctly says that the determination as to whether the tortfeasor, Mary Elizabeth Faust, is an under-insured motorist depends on the interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4), which defines an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d as\na highway vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which, the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the owner\u2019s policy.\nThere is no question in this case that the \u201capplicable limits of liability under the owner\u2019s policy\u201d in this case would be $100,000 if Michelle Harris had been liable for injuries and damages suffered in the accident. This is the amount of insurance coverage which the tortfeasor had and she was not an underinsured motorist under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4).\nThe majority cites treatises dealing with the subject of uninsured motorist coverage and says that noticeably absent from any of them is a comparison of the tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage with the plaintiff\u2019s liability insurance. Whatever the treatises may say, I believe the plain language of the statute requires a comparison of liability coverages to determine whether there is underinsured motorist coverage. The plain language requires us to hold that Mary Elizabeth Faust was not an underinsured motorist.\nI vote to reverse the Court of Appeals.\nJustice LAKE joins in this dissenting opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice Webb" } ], "attorneys": [ "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Richard T. Rice and Clayton M. Custer, for plaintiff-appellees.", "Nichols, Caffrey, Hill, Evans & Murrelle, by Paul D. Coates and ToNola D. Brown, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHELLE K. HARRIS, through her guardian ad litem, DAVID B. FREEDMAN, DAVID A. HARRIS, and ELLEN E. HARRIS v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY\nNo. 305A91\n(Filed 4 September 1992)\n1. Insurance \u00a7 527 (NCI4th)\u2014 underinsured highway vehicle \u2014 meaning of \u201capplicable limits of liability\u201d\nIn determining whether a tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4), the \u201capplicable limits of liability\u201d referred to in the statute are those under the UIM coverage in the owner\u2019s policy. Therefore, the proper comparison is between the tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage and plaintiff\u2019s UIM coverage rather than between the tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage and plaintiff\u2019s liability coverage.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 322.\nUninsured and underinsured motorist coverage: recover-ability under uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage of deficiencies in compensation afforded injured party by tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage. 24 ALR4th 13.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 528 (NCI4th)\u2014 underinsured vehicle \u2014intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverages\nThe language \u201capplicable limits of liability\u201d in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) refers to all UIM limits available in a policy applicable to plaintiff\u2019s claim and allows the intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverages in determining whether a tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle is an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle.\u201d Therefore, the tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle qualified as an underinsured vehicle where plaintiff\u2019s aggregate UIM coverages exceed the aggregate liability of the tortfeasor.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 322.\nUninsured and underinsured motorist coverage: recover-ability under uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage of deficiencies in compensation afforded injured party by tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage. 24 ALR4th 13.\n3. Insurance \u00a7 528 (NCI4th) \u2014 intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverages \u2014 nonowner family member\nThe minor plaintiff, as a nonowner family member living in the same household as the named insured, is entitled to stack UIM coverages in her parents\u2019 policy in determining whether the tortfeasor\u2019s vehicle is underinsured. Intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverages is allowed when the injured party is a person insured of the first class.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 322.\nUninsured and underinsured motorist coverage: recover-ability under uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage of deficiencies in compensation afforded injured party by tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage. 24 ALR4th 13.\n4. Insurance \u00a7 529 (NCI4th)\u2014 intrapolicy stacking by nonowner \u2014 not excess insurance\nStacking multiple vehicles on one policy by a nonowner is not \u201cexcess\u201d or \u201cadditional\u201d coverage not subject to the compulsory provisions of the Financial Responsibility Act under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(g).\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 322.\nUninsured and underinsured motorist coverage: recover-ability under uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage of deficiencies in compensation afforded injured party by tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage. 24 ALR4th 13.\nJustice Meyer dissenting.\nJustice Lake joins in this dissenting opinion.\nJustice Webb dissenting.\nJustice LAKE joins in this dissenting opinion.\nAppeal by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 103 N.C. App. 101, 404 S.E.2d 499 (1991), affirming the entry of summary judgment for the plaintiff by Long, J., at the 14 June 1990 Session of Superior Court, FORSYTH County. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 February 1992.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Richard T. Rice and Clayton M. Custer, for plaintiff-appellees.\nNichols, Caffrey, Hill, Evans & Murrelle, by Paul D. Coates and ToNola D. Brown, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0184-01", "first_page_order": 212, "last_page_order": 232 }