{ "id": 2506218, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HENRY LIGON, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Ligon", "decision_date": "1992-09-04", "docket_number": "No. 451A91", "first_page": "224", "last_page": "243", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 N.C. 224" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "419 S.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant entitled to new trial because, when considered cumulatively, errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497445 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant entitled to new trial because, when considered cumulatively, errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 So. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "435 So. 2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7642129 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859", "parenthetical": "\"smoke screen\" argument condemned; however, error held harmless" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/435/0854-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 L. Ed. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "913 F.2d 861", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10537287 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "improper for prosecutor to argue that defense tactics were \"smoke screens\"; however, error held harmless" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/913/0861-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2513525 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 L. Ed. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "423 U.S. 1091", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6514491, 6514340, 6514795, 6515212, 6515120, 6514896, 6514417, 6514995, 6514579, 6514715 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/423/1091-03", "/us/423/1091-01", "/us/423/1091-06", "/us/423/1091-10", "/us/423/1091-09", "/us/423/1091-07", "/us/423/1091-02", "/us/423/1091-08", "/us/423/1091-04", "/us/423/1091-05" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568094 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1022", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5540, 5547, 5516, 5166, 5366, 4823, 5560 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1022-04", "/us/494/1022-06", "/us/494/1022-03", "/us/494/1022-05", "/us/494/1022-01", "/us/494/1022-02", "/us/494/1022-07" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2564753 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517737 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497387 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "572-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574148 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" }, { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569780 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562214 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "impeachment by prior inconsistent statement of State's own witness should not be permitted where employed as a mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2487826 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "impeachment by prior inconsistent statement of State's own witness should not be permitted where employed as a mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518569 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732391 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552935 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729914 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724272 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "error to admit testimony about the reputation of defendant's neighborhood when defendant charged with drug offenses" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523146 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "error to admit testimony about the reputation of defendant's neighborhood when defendant charged with drug offenses" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "error to admit testimony that the defendant's house had the general reputation of having whiskey for sale when defendant charged with possession of nontaxpaid liquor at his premises" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575138 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "error to admit testimony that the defendant's house had the general reputation of having whiskey for sale when defendant charged with possession of nontaxpaid liquor at his premises" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" }, { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4693853 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5308068 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305171 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676-77" }, { "page": "676-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564235 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346-47" }, { "page": "346-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574036 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" }, { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 2d 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "federal firearms' form filled out by the defendant and gun salesman properly admitted into evidence under Rule of Evidence 803(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 1061", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6375268, 6376325, 6375755, 6375564, 6375412, 6376092 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "federal firearms' form filled out by the defendant and gun salesman properly admitted into evidence under Rule of Evidence 803(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/1061-01", "/us/486/1061-06", "/us/486/1061-04", "/us/486/1061-03", "/us/486/1061-02", "/us/486/1061-05" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2567820 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0125-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1379, "char_count": 45324, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.54534775212488e-07, "percentile": 0.6736941034013952 }, "sha256": "e652d31c2c9d8891f1165c4cde9dfd5d6f5ab10cfc0a05f67f74275cb2be5508", "simhash": "1:d73f702630779f3a", "word_count": 7429 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:54:56.199642+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HENRY LIGON, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nDefendant, Henry Lig\u00f3n, Jr., was indicted by a Buncombe County grand jury on 4 February 1991 on charges of first-degree murder and discharging a firearm into occupied property. Defendant was tried noncapitally to a jury and found guilty on both counts on 22 May 1991. On appeal, defendant asks this Court to grant him a new trial, arguing that seven alleged errors by the trial judge, individually or cumulatively, deprived him of a fair trial. After a thorough review of the trial transcript, record on appeal, written briefs and oral arguments, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nI.\nThe State\u2019s evidence showed that the victim, twenty-five-year-old Oscar Ray Walker, Jr., was shot to death on 27 November 1990 while attempting to steal cocaine from what can best be described as an outdoor drug supermarket in west Asheville. The State\u2019s first witness, George Alvin (Al) Davis, told jurors that on the evening of 27 November 1990, he was selling drugs for defendant at the intersection of Burton and Buffalo Streets in Asheville. More specifically, Davis testified that defendant supplied him with several small packets of cocaine to sell. Around 9 p.m., a yellow Volkswagen Rabbit driven by a \u201cwhite fellow [with] stringy hair\u201d pulled up to the intersection. Davis approached the car on the driver\u2019s side, asked the driver what he wanted and handed him a packet of cocaine. Davis then walked around to the passenger\u2019s side of the car, opened the door and began to get inside to collect his money. Before Davis could sit down, however, the driver \u201chollered\u201d at him to get out. Davis testified that he did as he was told, and the driver \u201cthrowed the car in gear and [took] off down the road.\u201d It was at this point, according to Davis, that the shots rang out. Davis said he turned around, and saw \u201cMr. Lig\u00f3n with the gun.\u201d Although Davis did not see defendant fire the gun, he testified that he saw defendant \u201con the sidewalk with the gun pointed down the street.\u201d Davis told jurors that the back windshield of the Volkswagen Rabbit was blown out, and the driver momentarily lost control of the car. The driver then regained control and \u201cwent on down Burton Street.\u201d\nRicky Morris was the State\u2019s next witness. He testified that he was currently in prison for selling drugs, and on the night in question he was selling drugs on Burton Street. Morris testified that he saw Davis approach a car and \u201cthen I seen him walk away from the car. I heard some shots, but I don\u2019t know where it came from.\u201d Morris said he did not see anyone with a gun. The State then impeached Morris with two prior inconsistent statements in which Morris said he saw defendant shoot at a yellow car.\nAnother witness for the State, Regina Hadden, testified that she was shooting pool at the community center on Burton Street the night Walker was shot. After hearing three gunshots, Hadden testified, she saw defendant put a gun in his pocket and heard him say, \u201cThat will teach people not to rip Burton Street off.\u201d\nAsheville Police Detective Jon Kirkpatrick testified that on the evening of 27 November 1990, he was dispatched to a grassy area located at the off-ramp of 1-240 at Brevard Road in Asheville. Upon his arrival, emergency medical personnel were removing the driver of a yellow Volkswagen from his car. The driver was subsequently identified as Oscar Ray Walker, Jr. Kirkpatrick testified that the distance from the I-240/Brevard Road off-ramp where Walker\u2019s car was found to the intersection where the shooting occurred is 2.65 miles.\nDr. Richard Landau, a pathologist at Memorial Mission Hospital, performed the autopsy on Walker. Landau testified that he found two bullet wounds on the body. Both bullets entered the victim\u2019s back. The cause of death, according to Dr. Landau, was a \u201cgunshot wound with organ destruction and second hemorrhage.\u201d In layman\u2019s terms, \u201cthere was massive destruction of the liver and he bled to death in combination with destruction of the lung.\u201d\nAlthough the murder weapon was never recovered, the State presented a series of witnesses in an effort to place the murder weapon in the hands of defendant at the time of the shooting. First, Bobby Lynn Davidson, an Asheville bail bondsman, testified that on 6 October 1990, his 10-millimeter Delta Elite pistol was stolen by one of his clients, Greg Anderson. Anderson, whom Davidson had just bailed out of jail, stole the pistol from Davidson\u2019s pickup truck, Davidson testified. Davidson provided police with thirty-nine spent cartridge cases from his stolen pistol.\nGreg Anderson followed Davidson to the witness stand and told jurors that he had, indeed, stolen Davidson\u2019s pistol on 6 October. Anderson testified that he immediately went to West Asheville and sold the weapon to defendant for $170.\nFour days after the gun was stolen, on 10 October 1990, a man displaying defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license purchased thirty rounds of Winchester and Remington 10-millimeter automatic ammunition from Finkelstein\u2019s store, according to the testimony of Finkelstein\u2019s employee Charles Bassett. Bassett testified that federal law requires that records be kept of pistol ammunition sales. Finkelstein\u2019s therefore requires identification from anyone purchasing pistol ammunition, and a copy of the sales ticket is retained for its records. On 10 October, Bassett testified, he sold ammunition to someone with Henry Ligon\u2019s driver\u2019s license. Bassett copied the name, date of birth, address and license number from the driver\u2019s license onto the sales ticket. The store\u2019s copy of this ticket was later introduced into evidence; another witness, Detective Kirkpatrick, testified that the information on Finkelstein\u2019s ticket matched the information on a certified copy of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license obtained from the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles. On cross-examination, however, Bassett conceded that he could not identify the person to whom he had sold the ammunition.\nDetective Kirkpatrick told jurors that two days after the shooting he and another police officer found a spent 10-millimeter cartridge case in a dirt area at the intersection of Burton and Buffalo Streets \u2014 the same intersection where the shooting occurred.\nFinally, in an attempt to tie together all these pieces of evidence, the State called to the witness stand firearms expert Gerald F. Wilkes of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C. Wilkes testified that, at the request of Asheville police, he compared the thirty-nine spent cartridge cases from bail bondsman Anderson\u2019s stolen pistol with the spent cartridge case found at the scene of the crime. The cartridge case found at the scene, Wilkes testified, was made by Winchester. Wilkes said that, in his opinion, the Winchester cartridge case from the crime scene and the cartridge cases from Anderson\u2019s pistol \u201cwere all fired in one weapon.\u201d\nDefendant did not testify but presented evidence that the victim was intoxicated on the night of the shooting, had gone to Burton Street to steal cocaine, and that it was possible the victim had fired the first shots.\nThomas Cleveland Trull was a friend of the victim, Oscar Walker. On the night of the shooting, Walker, who lived with his parents, had gone to\u2019Trull\u2019s house to watch movies and \u201cdrink a little bit.\u201d After a few drinks, Walker told Trull that he was going to Burton Street to \u201crip off some niggers.\u201d In a statement to police after the shooting, Trull had said that Walker was intoxicated when he left Trull\u2019s house, and that Trull had tried to talk him into spending the night.\nDr. Landau, the pathologist, testified on cross-examination that he performed two tests to determine Walker\u2019s alcohol level at the time of his death. The blood ethanol test registered .15; the urine ethanol test registered .29 \u2014 both above the .10 legal limit in North Carolina.\nAnthony De Wayne Summey, Walker\u2019s best friend, testified that Walker was not a violent person and he had never seen Walker with a gun. \u201cHe was very gentle. Oscar, he\u2019d never been in a fight in his life.\u201d However, in a statement to police after the shooting, Summey said that Walker would get \u201cbrave\u201d after he had been drinking.\nFinally, S.B.I. Agent and forensic chemist Charles Frank McClelland, Jr., testified that he conducted tests on Walker\u2019s hands to determine whether Walker had fired a gun on the night in question. McClelland, at the request of defendant\u2019s attorney, read to the jury his conclusion, contained in a written report, that, \u201cthese [test] results do not eliminate the possibility that [Walker] could have fired a gun.\u201d Pressed on cross-examination, however, McClelland acknowledged that, \u201c[b]asically what [the report] says is I don\u2019t have an opinion as to whether or not he shot a gun.\u201d\nDefendant was convicted of discharging a firearm into occupied property, a motor vehicle, and first-degree murder based on the felony murder rule. The jury specifically did not find defendant guilty of first-degree murder based on malice, premeditation and deliberation. Judge Downs sentenced defendant to life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction. No sentence was imposed for discharging a firearm into occupied property, that felony having merged into the first-degree felony murder conviction. Defendant appeals to this Court as of right. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) (1989).\nII.\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial judge erred by allowing into evidence a sales ticket and testimony concerning the purchase of ammunition from Finkelstein\u2019s. We agree with the State that this evidence was admissible under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule.\nNorth Carolina Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides:\nThe following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:\n(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. \u2014 A memorandum, report, record, or date compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term \u201cbusiness\u201d as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(6) (1988). State\u2019s witness Charles Bassett, an employee of Finkelstein\u2019s, testified that federal law requires a record be kept of pistol ammunition sales. It is the regular practice of Finkelstein\u2019s, therefore, to ask for identification when selling pistol ammunition and to record certain information on a sales ticket. Finkelstein\u2019s then keeps a copy of the ticket for its records. On 10 October 1990, Bassett testified, he sold 10-millimeter ammunition to someone who presented a driver\u2019s license bearing the name Henry Lig\u00f3n. Bassett recorded the name, license number, address, and date of birth on the sales ticket. Bassett, on cross-examination, was unable to identify defendant as the person who had purchased the ammunition and presented the driver\u2019s license.\nThe use of the sales ticket in this case fits neatly within the parameters of Rule of Evidence 803(6): the sales ticket was filled out by Bassett at the time the driver\u2019s license was presented to him; it was kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity; it was the regular practice of the business to keep such a record; and Bassett, the person who sold the ammunition and made out the sales ticket, was qualified to give the testimony. We hold, on the facts of this case, that the sales ticket was properly admitted into evidence under Rule of Evidence 803(6). See State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 362 S.E.2d 513 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988) (federal firearms\u2019 form filled out by the defendant and gun salesman properly admitted into evidence under Rule of Evidence 803(6)).\n. Defendant argues, however, that notwithstanding Rule of Evidence 803(6), the sales ticket should have been excluded under this Court\u2019s decisions in State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978), and State v. Austin, 285 N.C. 364, 204 S.E.2d 675 (1974). Defendant is mistaken. In Fulcher and Austin, this Court held that it was error for motel registration cards bearing the purported signatures of the respective defendants to be admitted into evidence. Fulcher, 294 N.C. at 515, 243 S.E.2d at 346-47; Austin, 285 N.C. at 367, 204 S.E.2d at 676-77. The reasoning in both cases was identical: the signatures had not been authenticated, that is, the State did not present evidence in either case that it was actually the respective defendants who had signed the cards. Fulcher, 294 N.C. at 515, 243 S.E.2d at 346-47; Austin, 285 N.C. at 367, 204 S.E.2d at 676-77. In this case, the authenticity of the sales ticket is not in dispute. Bassett is the person who saw defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license, made out the sales ticket and testified at trial. No one disputes that Bassett wrote on the sales ticket what he saw on the driver\u2019s license. On cross-examination, Bassett conceded that he could not identify defendant as the man who purchased the ammunition; he could only testify that someone with defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license purchased the ammunition. We agree with the State that the witness\u2019 failure to identify defendant as the man who presented the driver\u2019s license goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. This assignment of error is rejected.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant makes at least four different arguments: (1) the trial judge erred by allowing testimony about defendant\u2019s character as it related to his drug dealings; (2) the trial judge erred by allowing testimony that the neighborhood where the shooting occurred has a reputation as an area where drugs are frequently bought and sold; (3) the trial judge erred by allowing the jury to see several documents which listed defendant as a \u201csuspect\u201d in Walker\u2019s murder; and (4) the trial judge erred by allowing character testimony concerning the reputation and propensity for violence of defendant and defendant\u2019s family. We will address each argument separately.\nFirst, defendant argues that the trial judge erred by allowing testimony about defendant\u2019s drug dealings. For example, State\u2019s witness A1 Davis testified that, on the night of the shooting, defendant gave him several packets of cocaine to sell. Davis also testified that he had sold drugs for defendant in the past, earning an average of $1,000 per week. Defendant argues that testimony concerning defendant\u2019s drug dealings was inadmissible.character evidence used to inflame jurors. The State argues that this testimony was admissible under Rule of Evidence 404(b). We agree with the State.\nRule of Evidence 404(b) provides:\n(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. \u2014 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1988) (emphasis added). In recent years, this Court has emphasized that Rule of Evidence 404(b) is a \u201cgeneral rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990); see also State v. Agee, 326 N.C. 542, 391 S.E.2d 171 (1990); State v. Jeter, 326 N.C. 457, 389 S.E.2d 805 (1990). On the facts of this case, we agree with the State that the disputed evidence was relevant to show defendant\u2019s motive for murder. The State contended at trial that Walker was shot as he attempted to steal cocaine belonging to defendant. State\u2019s witness Regina Hadden testified that immediately after the shooting she heard defendant say, \u201cThat will teach people not to rip Burton Street off.\u201d Without the knowledge that defendant sold cocaine on Burton Street, the State\u2019s case would have made little, if any, sense. We hold this evidence was properly admitted under Rule of Evidence 404(b).\nNext, defendant argues that the trial judge erred by allowing testimony that the neighborhood where the shooting occurred has a reputation of being an area where drugs are frequently bought and sold.\nDefendant is correct that the \u201capplicable general rule is that in a criminal prosecution evidence of the reputation of a place or neighborhood is ordinarily inadmissible hearsay.\u201d State v. Weldon, 314 N.C. 401, 408, 333 S.E.2d 701, 705 (1985). However, it is noteworthy that the specific holding in Weldon, a drug trafficking case, is that \u201cthe trial court erred in admitting at defendant\u2019s trial for trafficking in heroin evidence that defendant\u2019s house had a reputation as a place where illegal drugs could be bought and sold.\u201d Id. at 411, 333 S.E.2d at 707 (emphasis added); see also State v. Tessnear, 265 N.C. 319, 144 S.E.2d 43 (1965) (error to admit testimony that the defendant\u2019s house had the general reputation of having whiskey for sale when defendant charged with possession of nontaxpaid liquor at his premises); State v. Crawford, 104 N.C. App. 591, 410 S.E.2d 499 (1991) (error to admit testimony about the reputation of defendant\u2019s neighborhood when defendant charged with drug offenses).\nIn the instant case, defendant was not charged with any drug offense; he was charged with first-degree murder and discharging a firearm into occupied property. Testimony concerning the reputation of the neighborhood was offered, not because it proved that defendant was guilty of selling drugs, but because it explained why the victim went there in the first place, and why defendant was at the scene. This testimony merely set the scene. On the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court did not err by admitting the disputed evidence.\nNext, defendant argues that the trial judge erred by allowing jurors to see documents from the Asheville Police Department, S.B.I. and F.B.I., which identified defendant as the suspect in Walker\u2019s murder. Defendant does not argue that the documents were otherwise inadmissible, only that references to defendant as the \u201csuspect\u201d in Walker\u2019s murder should have been deleted. It seems obvious that any criminal defendant standing trial before a jury is, by definition, a suspect in the case. Thus, even assuming error, defendant certainly cannot demonstrate that he suffered prejudice. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1988) (to receive a new trial, defendant must demonstrate that \u201cthere is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial\u201d). This assignment of error is without merit.\nFinally, defendant argues the trial judge erred by allowing testimony concerning his and his family\u2019s reputation and propensity for violence. Defendant, argues that this evidence was inadmissible as its sole purpose was to show defendant\u2019s bad character. The disputed testimony is part of an out-of-court statement made by State\u2019s witness Ricky Morris and introduced by the State to impeach Morris\u2019 testimony at trial. This prior statement is also the subject of defendant\u2019s next assignment of error. We will therefore consider the admissibility of this testimony when we address defendant\u2019s next assignment of error.\nIn his third assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial judge erred by allowing into evidence three out-of-court statements for purposes of corroboration and impeachment: one out-of-court statement by State\u2019s witness A1 Davis, and two out-of-court statements by State\u2019s witness Ricky Morris. By \u201cout-of-court statement\u201d we mean any statement made by the witness other than while testifying at defendant\u2019s trial. We will address each statement individually.\nDefendant first argues that the trial judge erred by allowing Detective Kirkpatrick to read to the jury a statement made byA1 Davis to police. Prior to Detective Kirkpatrick reading the statement, the trial judge admonished jurors that the out-of-court statement was being admitted for corroboration purposes only. We agree with the State that this out-of-court statement was consistent with Davis\u2019 in-court testimony and was therefore admissible for corroboration purposes.\nIt is now well settled that \u201c[t]o be admissible as corroborative evidence, prior consistent statements must corroborate the witness\u2019 testimony, but the corroborative testimony may contain \u2018new or additional information when it tends to strengthen and add credibility to the testimony which it corroborates.\u2019 \u201d State v. Howard, 320 N.C. 718, 724, 360 S.E.2d 790, 794 (1987) (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 25, 357 S.E.2d 359, 368 (1987)); see also State v. McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 407 S.E.2d 200 (1991); State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 389 S.E.2d 48; State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 349 S.E.2d 566 (1986). The State cannot, however, introduce prior statements which \u201c \u2018actually directly contradict[ ] . . . sworn testimony.\u2019 \u201d McDowell, 329 N.C. at 384, 407 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting State v. Burton, 322 N.C. 447, 451, 368 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1988)).\nAfter a careful review of Davis\u2019 trial testimony and his statement to police, we conclude that the out-of-court statement was properly admitted to corroborate Davis\u2019 in-court testimony. The out-of-court statement tracks almost exactly Davis\u2019 description of what took place the night of the shooting. The only \u201cnew information\u201d in the out-of-court statement consists of minor details which, we believe, strengthen and add credibility to Davis\u2019 in-court testimony. For example, in his in-court testimony, Davis says that he handed the victim a packet of cocaine through the driver\u2019s side window and then went around to the passenger\u2019s side to get into the car. In his statement to police, Davis added that he handed the packet of cocaine to Walker because, \u201cthe driver wanted to taste it.\u201d This \u201cnew information\u201d certainly does not contradict Davis\u2019 in-court testimony; instead, it merely explains why Davis handed the cocaine to Walker before collecting his money. We hold that the trial judge did not err by allowing Davis\u2019 out-of-court statement to corroborate his in-court testimony.\nNext, defendant argues that the trial judge erred by allowing into evidence two out-of-court statements to impeach and/or corroborate the testimony of State\u2019s witness Ricky Morris. Shortly after calling Morris to the witness stand, the following exchange took place between Morris and prosecutor Ronald Moore:\nQ. All right. Tell the ladies and gentlemen what you saw when that car drove up [on Burton Street], exactly.\nA. I seen \u2014 I think it was A1 Davis. He went up to the car, and then I seen him walk away from the car. I heard some shots, but I don\u2019t know where it came from.\nQ. Are you afraid being here testifying today.\nMr. LINDSAY: [defense counsel]: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nA. Not really.\nQ. All right. You heard some shots?\nA. Yep.\nQ. Did you look to see from where those shots came from?\nA. Yep.\nQ. Did you see somebody with a gun?\nA. Nope.\nFollowing this exchange, two out-of-court statements were read to the jury: (1) a lengthy transcript of Morris\u2019 sworn testimony from a sentencing hearing a few months earlier at which Morris pled guilty to an unrelated crime; and (2) a written statement Morris had given to police.\nDuring the earlier sentencing hearing, Morris was questioned about what he had seen the night Walker was killed.-, In contrast to his testimony at defendant\u2019s trial, Morris said during the sentencing hearing that, \u201c[t]he truth is I seen [defendant] shoot off in that car.\u201d In addition to this statement, however, the jury was read numerous other statements made by Morris during the sentencing hearing, such as: (a) defendant was the person who first gave Morris drugs, after which Morris \u201cgot hooked\u201d; (b) Morris was afraid of defendant\u2019s family; (c) defendant\u2019s family was not \u201cstable\u201d; (d) Morris was pressured by members of defendant\u2019s family into signing a statement saying that he had lied to police about what he had seen the night of the shooting; (e) Morris had seen defendant\u2019s stepfather cut a man with a knife; (f) Morris heard a \u201clot of people\u201d say defendant was the person who shot Walker; and (g) Morris had seen defendant purchase weapons.\nAt oral argument, defendant\u2019s attorney conceded that it was proper for the State to impeach Morris with prior inconsistent statements concerning what he had seen the night of the shooting; however, defendant\u2019s attorney argued that the trial judge erred by allowing the prosecutor, under the guise of impeaching his own witness, to get before the jury otherwise inadmissible evidence. See State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. 343, 378 S.E.2d 754 (1989) (impeachment by prior inconsistent statement of State\u2019s own witness should not be permitted where employed as a mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible). The State, at oral argument, conceded that the trial judge probably should have excluded some of the statements set out above, but argued that any error was not prejudicial to defendant.\nWe agree with both parties that the trial judge did not err by allowing the prosecutor to impeach Morris with his prior inconsistent statements concerning what he had seen the night of the shooting. We also agree with both parties that some of Morris\u2019 other statements from the prior sentencing hearing should not have been read to the jury. For example, Morris\u2019 statement which suggested that defendant was the person who got him hooked on drugs neither impeached Morris\u2019 credibility nor corroborated his testimony at trial, and therefore should have been excluded. However, even assuming, arguendo, that only Morris\u2019 prior inconsistent statements about the shooting were properly allowed, we agree with the State that, given the evidence against defendant, he cannot demonstrate prejudice and therefore is not entitled to a new trial.\nIn order to receive a new trial, defendant has the burden of showing that there was a reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a different verdict had the error in question not been committed. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a). Defendant cannot meet this burden. A1 Davis testified that he saw defendant pointing a gun down the street immediately after hearing shots fired. Regina Hadden said she saw defendant put a gun in his pocket immediately after hearing gunshots and heard defendant say, \u201cThat will teach people not to rip Burton Street off.\u201d The State\u2019s evidence also showed that a cartridge case found at the scene of the crime came from the same 10-millimeter pistol which Greg Anderson testified he had sold to defendant less than two months before the shooting. Charles Bassett testified that he had sold 10-millimeter ammunition to someone with defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license just four days after Anderson said he sold the 10-millimeter pistol to defendant. Finally, defendant concedes that Morris\u2019 prior statement that he saw defendant shoot into the car was properly admitted to impeach his in-court testimony that he did not see anyone with a gun immediately after the shooting. Although other portions of Morris\u2019 prior statement were not flattering to defendant and his family, defendant cannot demonstrate that, had this evidence not been admitted, there was a reasonable possibility that the jury would have found him not guilty of felony murder.\nFinally, defendant argues in his brief that the trial judge erred by allowing Morris to be impeached by another prior inconsistent statement \u2014 one he made to police after the shooting. The gist of that statement is that Morris saw A1 Davis approach a yellow car and give the driver a packet of cocaine; the car then sped off, and defendant shot at the car with a 10-millimeter pistol. We agree with the State that this statement contradicted Morris\u2019 in-court testimony, and it was therefore proper for prosecutors to use this statement to impeach Morris\u2019 credibility.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant argues there was evidence at trial that Walker was intoxicated on the night of the shooting and admitted to his friend that he was going to Burton Street to steal cocaine. There was also evidence, defendant argues, that the victim might have fired a gun at the crime scene. Thus, concludes defendant, there was evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on two theories: (a) imperfect self-defense; and (2) killing under heat of passion upon sudden provocation.\nIt is, of course, \u201can elementary rule of law that a trial judge is required to declare and explain the law arising on the evidence and to instruct according to the evidence.\u201d State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274, 284, 298 S.E.2d 645, 652 (1983). The trial judge is not required, however, to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses \u201c \u2018when there is no evidence to sustain a verdict of defendant\u2019s guilt of such lesser degrees.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Shaw, 305 N.C. 327, 342, 289 S.E.2d 325, 333 (1982)). Thus, the question in this case is whether there was evidence adduced at trial to support either of defendant\u2019s theories. We hold there was not.\nVoluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice and without premeditation and deliberation. State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 529, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1981). Under the law of imperfect self defense, a person may be found guilty of voluntary manslaughter if: (1) the person believed it necessary to kill the deceased in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm; and (2) the person\u2019s belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared to him at the tipie were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness; but (3) the person, without murderous intent, was the aggressor in bringing on the difficulty, or (4) the person used excessive force. Id. at 530, 279 S.E.2d at 573; accord State v. McAvoy, 331 N.C. 583, 417 S.E.2d 489 (1992). Even assuming defendant\u2019s version of the evidence is accurate, he still would not be entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on the law of imperfect self defense. The undisputed evidence at trial was that the back windshield of Walker\u2019s car was blown out by gunshots, and that two bullets entered Walker\u2019s back as he drove away in his car. There was absolutely no evidence that defendant believed -it necessary to kill Walker in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm. Furthermore, even if he had such a belief, it certainly would not have been reasonable, given that Walker\u2019s car was speeding away when the shots were fired.\nDefendant also argues that he was entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was evidence that he acted in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation. In order to be entitled to an instruction based on this theory, there must be evidence that: (1) defendant shot Walker in the heat of passion; (2) this passion was provoked by acts of the victim which the law regards as adequate provocation; and (3) the shooting took place immediately after the provocation. See State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 173, 367 S.E.2d 895, 908 (1988). Again,-accepting defendant\u2019s version of the evidence as accurate, there was absolutely no evidence that defendant shot Walker in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that defendant watched as Walker took a packet of cocaine from one of defendant\u2019s surrogates; that Walker took off down the street without paying; and that defendant then shot at Walker\u2019s car as it fled the scene. Even if Walker fired a pistol, there was no evidence it was fired at defendant. Indeed, there was no evidence that Walker and defendant ever spoke or even saw one another. While defendant may have been \u201cprovoked\u201d that Walker stole his cocaine, that is hardly what the law regards as \u201cadequate provocation.\u201d This assignment of error is without merit.\nIn his fifth assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the law of perfect self-defense. The first two elements of perfect self-defense are identical to the first two elements of imperfect self defense. See Norris, 303 N.C. at 530, 279 S.E.2d at 572-73. For the reasons set out above, this assignment of error is rejected.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant argues the trial judge erred by denying defense counsel\u2019s request for a jury instruc-tion on \u201cmere presence.\u201d We disagree.\nIf a party requests a jury instruction which is a correct statement of the law and which is supported by the evidence, the trial judge must give the instruction at least in\u2019 substance. State v. Fullwood, 323 N.C. 371, 390, 373 S.E.2d 518, 529 (1988), death sentence vacated, 494 U.S. 1022, 108 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1990). Defendant is correct that the \u201cmere presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime, even though he is in sympathy with the criminal act and does nothing to prevent its commission, does not make him guilty of the offense.\u201d State v. Sanders, 288 N.C. 285, 290, 218 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091, 47 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1976). Thus, if there was evidence at trial that defendant was \u201cmerely present\u201d at the scene, the trial judge should have instructed the jury on this principle of law. We agree with the State, however, that there was no evidence presented at trial to support this instruction.\nTwo witnesses testified that they saw defendant at the scene of the crime on the night of the murder: A1 Davis testified that he saw defendant pointing a gun at the victim\u2019s car; and Regina Hadden testified that she saw defendant put a gun in his pocket immediately after hearing gunshots, and heard him make an incriminating statement. Ricky Morris testified that he saw A1 Davis approach a car and heard gunshots, but did not see anybody with a gun. On cross-examination, Morris added he did not see defendant on the street when the shots were fired. In sum, witnesses either saw defendant with a gun in his hand after hearing gunshots, or did not see him at all. Thus, there was no evidence that defendant was \u201cmerely present\u201d at the scene. This assignment of error is without merit.\nIn his seventh assignment of error, defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial because of \u201cimproper and prejudicial comments\u201d made by the prosecutor during closing argument. Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor repeatedly accused defense counsel of raising \u201csmoke screens,\u201d thus questioning defense counsel\u2019s integrity and truthfulness.\nFour times during his closing argument, the prosecutor mentioned \u201csmoke\u201d or \u201csmoke screen\u201d to describe how defense counsel was trying to obscure the fact that defendant was guilty of murder. Defendant concedes in his brief that defense counsel did not object to the use of these phrases; thus, \u201cappellate review is limited to whether the prosecutor\u2019s remarks were so extremely or grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened on its own motion.\u201d State v. Shaw, 322 N.C. 797, 806, 370 S.E.2d 546, 551 (1988). Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument may be viewed as questioning his opponent\u2019s integrity, we agree with the State that the prosecutor\u2019s comments in this case were not so grossly improper as to require the trial judge to intervene ex mero motu. Cf. U.S. v. De La Vega, 913 F.2d 861, 872 n.11 (11th Cir. 1990) (improper for prosecutor to argue that defense tactics were \u201csmoke screens\u201d; however, error held harmless), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 114 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1991); McGee v. State, 435 So. 2d 854, 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (\u201csmoke screen\u201d argument condemned; however, error held harmless), rev. denied, 444 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1984).\nFinally, defendant argues that, even if this Court does not find that any one error, standing alone, requires a new trial, the cumulative effect of \u201cnumerous\u201d errors deprived him of a fair trial. See State v. White, 331 N.C. 604, 419 S.E.2d 557 (1992) (defendant entitled to new trial because, when considered cumulatively, errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial). We did not find \u201cnumerous\u201d errors in defendant\u2019s trial. Although defendant may not have received a \u201cperfect\u201d trial, we are confident, after a thorough review of his case, that he received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.\n. Although S.B.I. Agent McClelland concluded in his report that test results \u201cdo not eliminate the possibility that [Walker] could have fired a gun,\u201d when pressed on cross-examination, he acknowledged that, \u201c[bjasically what [the report] says is I don\u2019t have an opinion as to whether or not [defendant] shot a gun.\u201d Thus, it is by no means clear that there was evidence that Walker fired a gun at the crime scene.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Dennis P. Myers, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Elmore & Elmore, by David W. Cartner, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HENRY LIGON, JR.\nNo. 451A91\n(Filed 4 September 1992)\n1. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 967 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 sales ticket for pistol ammunition \u2014business record \u2014admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a noncapital murder prosecution by allowing into evidence a sales ticket and testimony concerning a purchase of pistol ammunition where the use of the sales ticket fits neatly within the parameters of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(6) in that the ticket was filled out by the witness at the time defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was presented to him at the sale; the ticket was kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity; it was the regular practice of the business to keep such a record; and the witness was qualified t\u00f3 give the testimony. The witness\u2019s failure to identify defendant as the man who presented the driver\u2019s license goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 478, 937-939, 945, 947.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 357 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014evidence of defendant\u2019s drug dealings \u2014admissible to show motive\nThe trial court did not err in a noncapital murder prosecution by allowing testimony about defendant\u2019s drug dealings where the disputed evidence was relevant to show defendant\u2019s motive for murder. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b).\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 325, 363.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 186 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 reputation of neighborhood \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a noncapital murder prosecution by allowing testimony that the neighborhood where the shooting occurred has a reputation as an area where drugs are frequently bought and sold because defendant was not charged with any drug offense and the testimony was offered to explain why the victim went there and why defendant was there.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 249.\n4. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 729 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 law enforcement documents \u2014 defendant identified as suspect \u2014 no prejudice\nThere was no prejudice in a murder prosecution in allowing the jury to see documents from the Asheville Police Department, the S.B.I., and the F.B.I. which identified defendant as the suspect in the murder where defendant did not contend that the documents were otherwise inadmissible, only that the references to defendant as the suspect should have been deleted. Assuming error, there was no prejudice because it is obvious that any criminal defendant standing trial is a suspect in the case.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 797, 801.\n5. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 3172 (NCI4th)\u2014 out of court statement-admitted for corroborative purposes \u2014new information\nThe trial court did not err in a murder prosecution by allowing a detective to read to the jury a statement by a witness to police for corroborative purposes only. The out-of-court statement was properly admitted to corroborate the in-court testimony, and the only new information in the statement consisted of minor details which strengthened and added credibility to the in-court testimony.\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7 1013.\n6. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 3081 (NCI4th)\u2014 State\u2019s witness \u2014 prior statements \u2014 introduced to impeach \u2014 no error \u2014additional material \u2014 no prejudice\nThe trial court did not err in a murder prosecution by allowing into evidence three out-of-court statements for purposes of corroboration and impeachment where a State\u2019s witness testified that he had been present at the scene and had heard shots but had not seen anyone with a gun and the State introduced a transcript of the witness\u2019s testimony from a prior sentencing hearing for an unrelated crime to which the witness had pled guilty and two written statements the witness had given police. Defendant conceded at oral argument that it was proper for the State to impeach the witness with prior inconsistent statements concerning what he had seen the night of the shooting and, while some of the other statements, such as the suggestion that defendant was the person who had gotten him hooked on drugs, should not have been read to the jury, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice given the evidence against him.\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7\u00a7 1013 et seq.; Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 797, 801.\n7. Homicide \u00a7 566 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014instruction on voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offense \u2014imperfect self defense \u2014 denied\nThe trial court did not err in a murder prosecution by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self defense where, even assuming defendant\u2019s version of the evidence is accurate, there was absolutely no evidence that defendant believed it necessary to kill the victim in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm and, even if he had such a belief, it certainly would not have been reasonable, given that the victim\u2019s car was speeding away when the shots were fired.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 498, 510, 511, 525.\n8. Homicide \u00a7 562 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014instruction on voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offense \u2014provocation \u2014denied\nThe trial court did not err in a murder prosecution by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on provocation where, assuming defendant\u2019s version of the evidence was accurate, there was absolutely no evidence that defendant shot the victim in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation. While defendant may have been \u201cprovoked\u201d that the victim stole his cocaine, that is hardly what the law regards as adequate provocation.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 479, 485.\n9.Homicide \u00a7 609 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 instruction on self defense refused \u2014no evidence of reasonable apprehension of death or great bodily harm\nThe trial court did not err in a murder prosecution by refusing to instruct the jury on perfect self defense where the undisputed evidence at trial was that the back windshield of the victim\u2019s car was blown out by gunshots and that two bullets entered his back as he drove away in his car.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 480, 485, 519.\n10. Criminal Law \u00a7 40 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014instruction on presence \u2014denied \u2014no error\nThe trial court did not err in a murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s request for an instruction on mere presence where witnesses either saw defendant with a gun in his hand after hearing gunshots or did not see him at all and there was thus no evidence that defendant was \u201cmerely present\u201d at the scene.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 485.\n11. Criminal Law \u00a7 466 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014closing argument-reference to defense counsel raising smoke screens \u2014no prejudice\nThe prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments in a murder prosecution were not so grossly improper as to require intervention ex mero motu where the prosecutor mentioned smoke or smoke screen four times during his closing argument to obscure the fact that defendant was guilty of murder.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7 624; Trial \u00a7\u00a7 554 et seq.\n12. Appeal and Error \u00a7 502 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014cumulative effect of errors \u2014not prejudicial\nThe cumulative effect of \u201cnumerous\u201d errors in defendant\u2019s murder trial did not require a new trial where the Supreme Court did not find \u201cnumerous\u201d errors and, although defendant may not have received a perfect trial, he received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7 789.\nAPPEAL as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Downs, J., upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder, at the 13 and 20 May 1991 Criminal Sessions of Superior Court, BUNCOMBE County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 11 March 1992.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Dennis P. Myers, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nElmore & Elmore, by David W. Cartner, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0224-01", "first_page_order": 252, "last_page_order": 271 }