{ "id": 2506283, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOE LEWIS PITTMAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Pittman", "decision_date": "1992-09-04", "docket_number": "No. 563A90", "first_page": "244", "last_page": "262", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 N.C. 244" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 ALR3d 449", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "7 ALR4th 180", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 2d 1078", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "7 ALR3d 8", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "74 ALR4th 705", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "25 L. Ed. 2d 931", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "85 ALR2d 1111", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "78 L. Ed. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 908", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6423946, 6424206, 6424048, 6424123, 6423839 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0908-02", "/us/464/0908-05", "/us/464/0908-03", "/us/464/0908-04", "/us/464/0908-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4709347 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694660 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 U.S. 199", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167093 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/361/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "141, 142" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567167 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2560540 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385-386" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570219 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563131 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558950 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 871", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720550 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562950 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4759556 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575737 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573967 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572874 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575769 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525588 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763650 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4753359 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2540902 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 L. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2487626 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5304261 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1350, "char_count": 43588, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3480506545073494e-07, "percentile": 0.7929244137399516 }, "sha256": "5ee8a7450b869470cbbac170b9d0086f2dbe9a4e4457aea241ab8df6014760e0", "simhash": "1:ab6b7422f666b875", "word_count": 7068 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:54:56.199642+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOE LEWIS PITTMAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WEBB, Justice.\nOn appeal, defendant brings forth numerous assignments of error. We conclude that defendant\u2019s trial was free from prejudicial error.\nDefendant first assigns as error the trial court\u2019s failure to require recordation of various bench and chambers conferences. Prior to trial, defendant moved for complete recordation of all proceedings, specifically including motion hearings, jury selection and bench conferences. Although these motions were allowed by the trial court, it held several unrecorded bench and chambers conferences, including two chambers conferences that concerned the jury charge. Defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s actions violated his due process rights under the federal and North Carolina constitutions and that he was prejudiced thereby. We disagree.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1241 mandates that the trial judge require the court reporter to record \u201call statements from the bench and all other proceedings[.]\u201d In non-capital cases, jury selection, opening statements, final jury arguments and arguments of counsel on questions of law are excepted from the recordation requirement. Id. However, upon proper motion jury selection, opening statements and final jury arguments must also be recorded. Id. In this case, the trial court, having allowed defendant\u2019s motion for complete recordation, should have required recordation of all conferences and its failure to do so constituted error. We must now determine whether defendant was prejudiced by this error.\nExcluding the two unrecorded charge conferences, the record reveals that the trial court conducted seven unrecorded bench conferences and one unrecorded chambers conference. The first such bench conference occurred during defendant\u2019s suppression hearing after the State had completed its examination of its first witness and before it called its second witness. The record indicates that no ruling, significant or otherwise, resulted from this conference. At its completion, the State simply proceeded to call its next witness.\nThe chambers conference occurred when the State announced that it was prepared to call defendant\u2019s case. This conference was held at the request of the trial judge and at its conclusion, the State proceeded to call defendant\u2019s case as it had done before.\nThe second bench conference occurred immediately after defendant\u2019s case had been called when defense counsel asked to approach the bench \u201cfor a little housekeeping matter[.]\u201d The third bench conference was also initiated by defense counsel when, during jury selection, the prosecutor learned that a prospective juror was acquainted with defense counsel.\nThe next bench conference also occurred during jury voir dire. The State had challenged for cause a prospective juror who had revealed that his nephew had been convicted of murder three years earlier and that he would be unable to be an unbiased juror. This conference was initiated by the court and at its conclusion the court examined the juror before allowing the State\u2019s challenge for cause. The fifth bench conference was initiated by the court during defense counsel\u2019s examination of a prospective juror. From the context of defense counsel\u2019s initial line of examination and his examination subsequent to the conference, it appears that the conference was called for the purpose of cautioning defense counsel against asking the juror how she would decide the case under a particular set of circumstances.\nThe next bench conference occurred after defense counsel had indicated his satisfaction with a juror. At the conclusion of the conference, the judge instructed the clerk to place another juror in the jury box after which jury selection proceeded in ordinary fashion. The final bench conference was initiated by defense counsel prior to his examination of a juror whose husband worked as an administrative assistant in the District Attorney\u2019s office. This conference was preceded by another conference, also at defense counsel\u2019s initiation, between defense counsel and the prosecutor. Following the conference, defense counsel examined the juror and then unsuccessfully sought to have her excused for cause. Defense counsel then exercised a peremptory challenge against this juror.\nIn his brief, defendant does not say, and we cannot discern, how he was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s failure to record these various conferences. While the content of these conferences is unclear, the record shows that none of the conferences resulted in a significant ruling, if any ruling resulted at all.\nThe first chambers conference was held by the court before defendant\u2019s trial had actually begun. One of the bench conferences, in the words of defense counsel, concerned a \u201chousekeeping matter.\u201d Three of the conferences clearly concerned the subject of juror bias. One juror stated that he could not be impartial. Another juror was the wife of an administrative' assistant with the District Attorney\u2019s office. The third potentially biased juror was acquainted with all trial counsel and had at sometime been represented by defense counsel. The record indicates that another conference was called for the purpose of cautioning defense counsel against improper juror voir dire. The remaining two conferences were initiated by the trial judge during transitional stages of the proceedings and neither conferences resulted in any ruling by the court. Based on the record facts and defendant\u2019s failure to specifically allege how he was prejudiced by the lack of complete recordation, we hold that the trial court\u2019s failure to require complete recordation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred by conducting unrecorded jury charge conferences. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1231 provides that charge conferences must be recorded but that, \u201c[t]he failure of the judge to comply fully with the provisions of this subsection does not constitute grounds for appeal unless his failure, not corrected prior to the end of the trial, materially prejudiced the case of the defendant.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1231(b) (1988).\nIn this case, the record reflects that the trial court conducted two unrecorded charge conferences at which all counsel for defendant and for the State were present. Defense counsel did not object to the trial court\u2019s failure to require recordation of these conferences. At the conclusion of these conferences, the judge explained on the record that the chambers conferences had been conducted and that it would instruct the jury according to the applicable North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions. The judge stated to trial counsel that \u201cif you have any comment to make about these as we go along, I would suggest that you make it as we proceed.\u201d The court then read the number and title of each instruction it intended to give. The record reflects that defense counsel made numerous requests that additional or different instructions be given. As described in defense counsel\u2019s own words, these recorded requests were made \u201cfor the protection of the record[.]\u201d\nThe record shows that the trial court invited defense counsel to state its objections to the court\u2019s proposed instructions and that defense counsel took full advantage of its opportunity to do so. Thus, defendant has failed to demonstrate how he was materially prejudiced by the two earlier unrecorded charge conferences. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1231(b) (1988); see also State v. Bacon, 326 N.C. 404, 390 S.E.2d 327 (1990).\nDefendant next contends that his federal and state constitutional rights to be present at every stage of his trial were violated when the trial court conducted bench and chambers conferences outside of his presence. Defendant takes the position that he had an unwaivable right to be present at every stage of his non-capital trial because he was charged with first degree murder, for which he could have been tried for his life. Defendant cites the Court\u2019s decision in State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), sentence vacated, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990), on remand, 328 N.C. 532, 402 S.E.2d 577 (1991), in support of this contention.\nIt is well settled that the North Carolina Constitution grants criminal defendants the right to be confronted by witnesses against them and to be present at every stage of their trials. Id. at 29, 381 S.E.2d at 651. When a defendant is tried for a capital felony, his right to be present at every stage of his trial is unwaivable. Id. In this case, the State did not try defendant for his life. Thus, defendant\u2019s case lost its capital nature and defendant\u2019s right to be present at every stage of his trial was a personal right which could be waived, either expressly, or by his failure to assert it. State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 559, 324 S.E.2d 241, 246 (1985). Having failed to request to be present at either of the conferences or to object to his absence therefrom, defendant waived his right to be present and cannot, on appeal, assign as error the trial court\u2019s denial of that right. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for sequestration of the State\u2019s witnesses. Defendant says he was prejudiced by the court\u2019s ruling because, unsequestered, the State\u2019s witnesses were allowed to tailor their testimony to that of earlier State\u2019s witnesses. Defendant argues that his mental status at the time of the crime was of critical importance to his defense and that because his motion was denied, the State\u2019s witnesses tailored their testimony to the testimony of earlier witnesses to the effect that defendant appeared \u201cnormal\u201d or \u201crational\u201d at the relevant times.\nWhile it is true that one of the purposes for requiring sequestration is to prevent witnesses from tailoring their testimony from that of earlier witnesses, in order to show error a defendant must show that the trial court abused its discretion. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1225 (1988); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983); State v. Harrell, 67 N.C. App. 57, 312 S.E.2d 230 (1984). In this case, the trial court heard arguments of counsel prior to denying defendant\u2019s motion. Having reviewed those arguments, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant\u2019s motion. When asked by the court, defendant gave no reason for suspecting that the State\u2019s witnesses would use previous witnesses\u2019 testimony as their own. We hold that defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion and thus overrule this assignment of error.\nDefendant next contends that the State failed to present substantial evidence of each essential element of the offenses charged and that therefore the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss, to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial. Specifically, defendant says that considering the evidence of defendant\u2019s mental illness, there was insufficient evidence of premeditation or deliberation. We disagree.\nWhen the State presents substantial evidence of each of the elements of the crime charged, the question of the defendant\u2019s guilt of that charge should be submitted to the jury. State v. Horton, 299 N.C. 690, 263 S.E.2d 745 (1980); State v. Corn, 303 N.C. 293, 278 S.E.2d 221 (1981). \u201c \u2018Substantial evidence\u2019 is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.\u201d Corn, 303 N.C. at 296, 278 S.E.2d at 223. When determining whether the State has presented substantial evidence, the trial court should evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Simpson, 303 N.C. 439, 279 S.E.2d 542 (1981).\nPremeditation means thought beforehand for some length of time, however short. No particular length of time is required and it is sufficient if the premeditation occurred at any time prior to the killing. State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 263 S.E.2d 768 (1980). Deliberation means the defendant carried out an intent to kill in a cool state of blood and not under the influence of a violent passion or sufficient legal provocation. State v. Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162, 321 S.E.2d 837 (1984).\nPremeditation and deliberation ordinarily are not susceptible to proof by direct evidence and must usually be proved circumstantially. State v. Buchanan, 287 N.C. 408, 215 S.E.2d 80 (1975). Among the circumstances that are to be considered in determining whether a killing was with premeditation and deliberation are: (1) want of provocation on the part of the deceased; (2) the conduct and statements of the defendant before and after the killing; (3) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence giving rise to the victim\u2019s death; (4) ill-will or previous difficulty between the parties; (5) evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner; and (6) the nature and number of the victim\u2019s wounds. State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 340 S.E.2d 673, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986).\nAt trial numerous witnesses testified that, in their opinion, immediately after the killings, defendant\u2019s mental and physical faculties were not impaired, that he knew what he was saying and doing. Connie Williams\u2019 sister, Mildred Gray, testified that approximately two weeks prior to 5 May 1989, she was talking with the victim in Gray\u2019s yard. Defendant ran into the yard, carrying a knife behind him and preparing to stab the victim. When Gray told defendant that she did not believe that he would stab the victim, he turned and left. Betty Boyd, a Halifax County magistrate, testified that two or three days prior to the killings defendant had visited her at her office and told her that Spencer Powell had stolen food and clothing from defendant\u2019s home. Boyd told defendant that he needed more evidence and that the Sheriff\u2019s Department needed to investigate the allegations. Deputy Sheriff Joe Williams testified that approximately two weeks prior to 5 May, defendant told him that Powell had been stealing defendant\u2019s food and \u201cmessing with\u201d defendant\u2019s girlfriend when defendant was not around. When Williams told defendant that he should let the Sheriff\u2019s Department handle the problem, defendant said that he would \u201cdeal with it [himself].\u201d\nIn addition to the evidence above, the State introduced into evidence defendant\u2019s signed confession in which he stated in part:\nTonight Spencer Powell came to my house. I don\u2019t know exactly what time it was. He didn\u2019t bring anything to drink, but we had some beer there. Spencer wanted something to drink, but I wouldn\u2019t give him any beer because he done broke into my house one time and stole some food out of my refrigerator. He ain\u2019t nothing but a thief and a rogue. Spencer sat out on the porch because I wouldn\u2019t let him in the house. . . . I went out on the porch tonight and told Spencer I didn\u2019t want him to come to my house anymore. I don\u2019t know what he said back to me, but it was something because it made me mighty angry. I went back into my house and got my axe handle. I went back outside and I hit Spencer across the head. Spencer was standing up when I hit him. I hit him just once and he fell to the porch. I went back inside. Connie was passed out on the floor and I took and hit her. I don\u2019t know exactly where I hit her at, but I know she caught a lick from me. I only hit her once. . . .\nAdditional evidence tended to show that defendant killed the victims by striking their heads with an ax. Williams suffered multiple wounds to her head and face. One wound was caused by a severe blow to her head that broke the skull bone, forced it inward and then tore the underlying brain tissue. Powell suffered a depressed skull fracture to the front left of his skull as well as a wound to the crown of his head which literally laid his skull open.\nThis evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, tended to show that neither of the victims provoked defendant. Connie Williams was helpless when she was attacked by defendant. Previous difficulties existed between defendant and each of the victims and there was some evidence that he had threatened each of them on previous occasions. These killings were committed in a brutal manner during which defendant inflicted numerous wounds on the victims. We hold that there was substantial evidence of each element of the crimes charged and that the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motions.\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s failure to suppress two statements that were allegedly made by defendant following the killings. Defendant contends that the trial court should have suppressed these statements as a sanction against the State for failing to provide a copy of one of defendant\u2019s statements, providing an inaccurate copy of another statement, and for failing to provide a list of the witnesses interviewed by law enforcement officers at the crime scene. This assignment of error is meritless.\nWhether to impose sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery order is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Thomas, 291 N.C. 687, 231 S.E.2d 585 (1977); State v. Jones, 295 N.C. 345, 245 S.E.2d 711 (1978). The first statement that defendant contends should have been suppressed was testified to by Gwen Wright. Wright testified that defendant said, \u201c[i]f you come up here, it already two dead bodies, and if you come up here there\u2019ll be two more dead bodies.\u201d Defendant contends that this statement was never provided to defendant and that it therefore should have been suppressed. However, defendant never informed the trial court that this statement had not been provided to defendant, nor did he request that the statement be suppressed. Likewise, it does not appear that defendant informed the court that he thought he was entitled to the list of witnesses or that he had not been provided a copy of the same. When a party fails to bring a matter to the court\u2019s attention in order for the judge to exercise his discretion and rule thereon, there can be no abuse of discretion.\nThe second statement defendant contends should have been suppressed occurred in the testimony of Trooper Carmon. Carmon testified, as transcribed by the court reporter, that while he was transporting defendant to jail, defendant said, \u201cI went to the Sheriff\u2019s Department and told \u2019em I was gone [sic] kill \u2019em. . . .\u201d Defendant says that Carmon\u2019s testimony was that defendant said, \u201cI was gone [sic] kill them.\u201d [Emphasis added.] Prior to trial, the State provided defendant with a copy of a statement in which he allegedly said, \u201cI told the Sheriff\u2019s Department that I was going to kill him.\u201d [Emphasis added.] Defendant does not contend that the State intentionally provided inaccurate discovery. However, he does argue that he was prejudiced by the admission of Carmon\u2019s testimony because it was the only evidence tending to show that defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation in the killing of Williams.\nWe hold that defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to suppress this statement. However, taking as true defendant\u2019s contention that Carmon\u2019s testimony differed from the statement provided to defendant, any error in the admission of the statement was harmless. As we held above, the State presented substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation, even in the absence of the statement at issue.\nBy his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing a defense witness to read into evidence the prior testimony of State\u2019s witness Carmon. Defendant called the witness in order to rebut Trooper Carmon\u2019s testimony that defendant had used the word \u201cthem\u201d as opposed to the word \u201chim.\u201d On recross-examination the prosecutor asked the witness to read into evidence Carmon\u2019s prior suppression hearing testimony in which he stated that defendant had used the word \u201cthem.\u201d\nIn State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314, 255 S.E.2d 373 (1979), the Court held that no error was committed when the trial court allowed the court reporter to read into evidence the prior testimony of witnesses who testified during the defendant\u2019s second trial. Specifically, the Court held that, \u201c[testimony at a former trial is admissible for corroborative purposes.\u201d Id. at 334, 255 S.E.2d at 385-386. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err by allowing the witness to read into evidence the suppression hearing testimony of Trooper Carmon in order to corroborate Carmon\u2019s trial testimony to the effect that defendant said that, \u201che was going to kill them.\u201d [Emphasis added.] This assignment of error is overruled.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing defendant\u2019s request to include an instruction on diminished mental capacity in its final mandate. The court\u2019s charge included instructions on diminished mental capacity and the defense of insanity. Defendant does not contend that these instructions were erroneous. Rather he contends that by refusing to include a diminished capacity instruction in its final mandate, the trial court\u2019s instructions confused the jury \u201cas to where defendant\u2019s \u2018mental capacity\u2019 fit in with the elements the State has the burden of proving[.]\u201d Having thoroughly reviewed the court\u2019s charge, we disagree. The court included in its charge an instruction that the jury could consider defendant\u2019s mental condition in connection with his ability to formulate a specific intent to kill. This charge is in accord with the Court\u2019s decision in State v. Rose, 323 N.C. 455, 373 S.E.2d 426 (1988). That the court did not include a similar charge in its final mandate could not have created confusion in the minds of the jurors as to the State\u2019s burden of proof. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress defendant\u2019s signed confession. Defendant says that, based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant\u2019s confession was involuntary and that the trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. He further says that because the trial court would not allow defendant\u2019s counsel to present his legal arguments in favor of his position, defendant was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.\nDefendant contends that this case is similar to State v. Ross, 297 N.C. 137, 254 S.E.2d 10 (1979), in which the Court, after weighing and considering all of the evidence, held that \u201cthe inescapable conclusion is that \u2018the confession most probably was not the product of any meaningful volition.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 143, 254 S.E.2d at 14, quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 211, 4 L. Ed. 2d 242, 250 (1960). In Ross, the evidence showed that the defendant had a history of mental illness dating back twelve or thirteen years and that he had been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital as recently as one week prior to the crime he allegedly committed. Id. at 141, 254 S.E.2d at 12. Three days prior to the crime and the defendant\u2019s confession, he had been to a mental health clinic. The therapist who saw him testified that his \u201cmood and affect were \u2018inappropriate,\u2019 he had \u2018poor judgment,\u2019 and \u2018there was a very high likelihood that he was suffering from psychotic conditions,\u2019 specifically schizophrenia.\u201d Id. at 141, 142, 254 S.E.2d at 13. Other evidence tended to show that the defendant had been unable to work, incapable of caring for himself, and exhibiting bizarre behavior. Id. at 142, 254 S.E.2d at 13. The victim of the crime testified that the defendant looked strange and psychiatric examination following the defendant\u2019s confession revealed that he was suffering from \u201cchronic, undifferentiated schizophrenia.\u201d Id. In addition, the defendant\u2019s confession was itself illogical and nonsensical. Id. at 143, 254 S.E.2d at 13.\nThe evidence in the case sub judice concerning defendant\u2019s mental status is distinguishable from the evidence presented in Ross. Furthermore, the evidence supports the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, which findings are thus binding on appeal despite the existence of conflicts in the evidence. State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 334 S.E.2d 53 (1985). Although there was substantial evidence that defendant had a history of suffering from schizophrenia and that he had sought and obtained medication for this condition approximately three days prior to the crimes at issue, this evidence, standing alone, fails to establish that defendant lacked the capacity to knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his rights.\nDefendant\u2019s psychiatric expert, Dr. Lara, testified that he was unable to offer a professional opinion as to whether defendant could have properly waived his rights. Dr. Lara testified that although he was unable to determine the exact level of defendant\u2019s understanding, the fact that defendant responded coherently to questions indicated that he had some level of understanding.\nUnlike Ross, here there was no evidence that defendant exhibited bizarre behavior. Nor was there any evidence that he was unable to care for himself. Additionally, there was evidence which tended to show that defendant made periodic visits to the Halifax County Mental Health Center to obtain medicine to control his mental illness and that he had done so three days prior to the killings. Contrary to defendant\u2019s contention, his confession was not illogical and nonsensical. Rather, his confession is a chronological account of the events leading up to the killings. In his confession, defendant stated his belief that Powell had stolen defendant\u2019s food and that the victims were engaged in some type of intimate relationship. This statement was consistent with statements he had made on prior occasions to two State\u2019s witnesses. Defendant\u2019s statement was also consistent with the physical evidence at the scene. He accurately described the position of the victims\u2019 bodies, the location of their wounds, and the location where he had placed the murder weapon. Although defendant described the ax used to kill the victims as a stick or an ax handle, we cannot say that this inaccuracy is necessarily indicative of mental incompetence.\nSeveral of the State\u2019s witnesses were acquainted with defendant and were aware of his history of mental illness. These witnesses testified that on the night of the killings, defendant was rational and aware of what he had done. None of these witnesses observed anything abnormal about defendant, his behavior, or his speech on the night in question. He was cooperative and generally followed instructions. He made no bizarre statements and acted appropriately in light of the circumstances. We hold that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and that these findings in turn support the court\u2019s conclusion that defendant freely, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s contention that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel is without merit. Defendant argues that this right was denied by the trial court\u2019s refusal to hear his counsel\u2019s arguments in favor of his motion to suppress. However, after reviewing the portions of the record referenced by defendant, it does not appear that defense counsel ever made any effort to argue in support of defendant\u2019s position. It does appear that defense counsel stated to the court that he possessed three cases discussing the State\u2019s burden of showing a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, and that the judge stated that it would not be necessary for him to review those cases. We find nothing in these proceedings which indicates that the trial court denied defendant his right to the effective assistance of counsel. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the prosecutor\u2019s final argument was improper and that he was thus denied his right to a fair trial. At the outset we note that defendant lodged only one objection to the prosecutor\u2019s argument. Where a defendant fails to object to the State\u2019s closing argument he must show that the argument was so grossly improper that the trial judge should have corrected the argument ex mero motu. State v. Craig, 308 N.C. 446, 302 S.E.2d 740, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 78 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1983). Defendant contends that the prosecutor\u2019s argument violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1230(a), which prohibits abusive arguments, arguments in which counsel asserts his personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence or the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and arguments based on matters outside the record. We disagree.\nThe prosecutor argued that the jury had the opportunity to \u201cdo something about it, this case, and what this man did. . . .\u201d He argued that the jury had a duty to perform and that the judge would instruct the jury as to its duty. He argued that the jury was the \u201cthey\u201d that is often referred to by members of the public when the public says, \u201c[T]hey ought to do something about [the economy, politics, war, Hussein].\u201d The prosecutor\u2019s statements regarding his personal thoughts or beliefs did not concern the evidence or defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. The prosecutor further argued that the jury would render a verdict and that it could find defendant not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity, but that if it did, \u201cthen you just as well take a wreath, a big wreath and hang it on the courthouse door because justice in Halifax County will be dead.\u201d Defendant objected to this latter argument.\nWhile it is true that it is improper to argue to a jury that it should convict a defendant based upon anything other than the evidence presented at trial, we find no such argument in the present case. We cannot say that the prosecutor\u2019s argument that if defendant was found not guilty, \u201cjustice in Halifax County will be dead[J\u201d was an improper argument. This argument was a hyperbolic expression of the State\u2019s position that a not guilty verdict, in light of the evidence of guilt, would be an injustice. Nor can we say that there was anything in the remainder of the prosecutor\u2019s argument that was so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened ex mero motu. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant brings forth six additional assignments of error. However, defendant candidly concedes that this Court has previously decided, adversely to defendant\u2019s position, the issues raised by the first three of these assignments of error and he has expressly abandoned the three remaining assignments of error. For the reasons stated herein, we find no error in the trial.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "WEBB, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by G. Lawrence Reeves, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "William L. Livesay for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOE LEWIS PITTMAN\nNo. 563A90\n(Filed 4 September 1992)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 507 (NCI4th)\u2014 unrecorded bench and chambers conferences \u2014no prejudice\nThe trial court did not commit prejudicial error in a non-capital murder prosecution by failing to record bench and chambers conferences after granting defendant\u2019s motion for complete recordation where none of the conferences resulted in a significant ruling, if any ruling resulted at all, and defendant failed to specifically allege how he was prejudiced by the lack of complete recordation. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1241.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 916.\nExclusion or absence of defendant, pending trial of criminal case, from courtroom, or from conference between court and attorneys, during argument on question of law. 85 ALR2d 1111.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 507 (NCI4th)\u2014 unrecorded jury charge conferences \u2014no prejudice\nA defendant in a noncapital murder prosecution failed to demonstrate how he was materially prejudiced by two unrecorded jury charge conferences where all counsel for defendant and the State were present, defense counsel did not object to the failure to require recordation of these conferences, the trial court invited defense counsel to state its objections to the court\u2019s proposed instructions, and defense counsel took full advantage of its opportunity to do so. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1231(b).\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 916.\nExclusion or absence of defendant, pending trial of criminal case, from courtroom, or from conference between court and attorneys, during argument on question of law. 85 ALR2d 1111.\n3. Constitutional Law \u00a7 342 (NCI4th)\u2014 bench and chambers conferences \u2014 outside defendant\u2019s presence \u2014no request or objection \u2014 waiver of right to appeal\nA defendant in a noncapital murder prosecution waived his right to be present at bench and chambers conferences where he failed to request to be present or to object to his absence. Because the State did not try defendant for his life, his right to be present at every stage of his trial was a personal right which could be waived by his failure to assert it.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 910, 928.\nAccused\u2019s right, under Federal Constitution, to be present at his trial \u2014 Supreme Court cases. 25 L. Ed. 2d 931.\n4. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2479 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 defendant\u2019s mental status \u2014 sequestration of witnesses denied \u2014no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a noncapital murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motion for sequestration of the State\u2019s witnesses where the trial court heard the arguments of counsel prior to denying defendant\u2019s motion and defendant gave no reason for suspecting that the State\u2019s witnesses would use previous witnesses\u2019 testimony as their own.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 240-242.\nPrejudicial effect of improper failure to exclude from courtroom or to sequester or separate state\u2019s witnesses in criminal case. 74 ALR4th 705.\n5. Homicide \u00a7 230 (NCI4th)\u2014 first degree murder \u2014evidence sufficient\nThere was substantial evidence of each element of two first degree murders where the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, tended to show that neither of the victims provoked defendant; one victim was helpless when she was attacked by defendant; previous difficulties existed between defendant and each of the victims and there was some evidence that he had threatened each of them on previous occasions; and the killings were committed in a brutal manner during which defendant inflicted numerous wounds on the victims.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 44-48.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 113 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014failure to provide statements and witness list \u2014 motion to suppress denied \u2014no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a noncapital murder prosecution, and there was no prejudice, where defendant contended that the State had not given an inculpatory statement to defendant or provided a list of witnesses interviewed by law enforcement officials at the scene, but defendant never informed the trial court that the statement had not been provided, did not request that the statement be suppressed, and did not inform the court that he thought he was entitled to the list of witnesses or that he had not been provided with the list. There can be no abuse of discretion when a party fails to bring a matter to the court\u2019s attention in order for the judge to exercise his discretion and rule thereon. There was no abuse of discretion in refusing to suppress another statement which was allegedly inaccurate as provided because the State presented substantial evidence on the issue even absent the statement.\nIN THE SUPREME COURT\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 998.\nRight of accused in state courts to inspection or disclosure of evidence in possession of prosecution. 7 ALR3d 8.\n7. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 3198 (NCI4th) \u2014 defense witness \u2014 recross examination \u2014 allowed to read suppression hearing testimony of State\u2019s witness into evidence \u2014no error\nThe trial court did not err in a noncapital murder prosecution by allowing a defense witness to read into evidence the prior suppression hearing testimony of a State\u2019s witness where defendant had called the witness to rebut the testimony of a State\u2019s witness, a Highway Patrol officer, concerning statements made by defendant, and the State asked the witness on recross examination to read into evidence the Trooper\u2019s prior suppression hearing testimony\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 728.\n8. Homicide \u00a7 678 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014instructions \u2014diminished capacity \u2014no error\nThe trial court did not err in a murder prosecution by refusing defendant\u2019s request to include an instruction on diminished capacity in its final mandate where the court included in its charge an instruction that the jury could consider defendant\u2019s mental condition in connection with his ability to formulate a specific intent to kill. The failure to include a similar charge in its final mandate could not have created confusion in the minds of the jurors as to the State\u2019s burden of proof.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 561.\n9. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1274 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 confession \u2014 waiver of rights \u2014 defendant\u2019s mental capacity\nThe trial court did not err in a noncapital murder prosecution by failing to suppress defendant\u2019s signed confession where defendant contended that the confession was involuntary due to his mental condition. Although there was substantial evidence that defendant had a history of schizophrenia and that he had sought and obtained medication for this condition approximately three days prior to the crimes at issue, that evidence alone fails to establish that defendant lacked the capacity to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights. Defendant\u2019s psychiatric expert was unable to offer a professional opinion as to whether defendant could have properly waived his rights; there was no evidence that defendant exhibited bizarre behavior or that he was unable to care for himself; his confession was not illogical and nonsensical, but was consistent with statements he had made on prior occasions to two State\u2019s witnesses and with the physical evidence at the scene; several of the State\u2019s witnesses who were acquainted with defendant and his history of mental illness testified that defendant was rational and aware of what he had done on the night of the killing; and defendant was cooperative and generally followed instructions.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 526, 543, 582.\nValidity or admissibility, under Federal Constitution, of accused\u2019s pretrial confession as affected by accused\u2019s mental illness or impairment at time of confession \u2014Supreme Court cases. 93 L. Ed. 2d 1078.\n10. Constitutional Law \u00a7 290 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 effective assistance of counsel \u2014 refusal to hear argument \u2014no error\nDefendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in his noncapital murder trial where, although defendant contended that the court refused to hear counsel\u2019s arguments in'favor of a motion to suppress, it does not appear that defense counsel ever made any effort to argue in support of defendant\u2019s position. Defense counsel stated that he possessed three cases discussing the State\u2019s burden of showing a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights and the judge stated that it would not be necessary to review those cases. Nothing in those proceedings indicates that the trial court denied defendant his right to the effective assistance of counsel.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 748, 751, 752.\nAdequacy of defense counsel\u2019s representation of criminal client regarding confessions and related matters. 7 ALR4th 180.\n11. Criminal Law \u00a7 446 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014closing argument \u2014 if defendant not guilty, justice is dead \u2014not improper\nThere was no error requiring the court to intervene ex mero motv, in the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument in a murder prosecution where the prosecutor argued that if defendant was found not guilty, \u201cjustice in Halifax County will be dead,\u201d nor was there anything in the remainder of the argument so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 554, 566-567, 654.\nPropriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor\u2019s argument to jury indicating his belief or knowledge as to the guilt of accused \u2014modern state cases. 88 ALR3d 449.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing two consecutive life sentences entered by Booker, J., at the 20 August 1990 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Halifax County, upon two verdicts of guilty of first degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 March 1992.\nDefendant was tried non-capitally for the first degree murders of Spencer Powell and Connie Williams. He relied on insanity as a defense. The evidence presented at trial showed that defendant, an honorably discharged veteran, lived in Scotland Neck with his mother and girlfriend. Defendant\u2019s girlfriend, Connie Williams, was one of the victims. On 5 May 1989, around 8:00 p.m., defendant went to the house of his neighbor, Durwood Lewis, and told Lewis, \u201c[tjhere\u2019s been a mercy killing at my house, call the sheriff.\u201d Defendant then left and returned to his house.\nLaw enforcement officers arrived at defendant\u2019s house approximately twenty minutes later. When they arrived they observed one of the victims, Spencer Powell, lying on defendant\u2019s front porch in a puddle of blood. Powell was defendant\u2019s neighbor. Powell had suffered two severe wounds to the head. Defendant then appeared, walked out of the house, stepped over the body and onto the porch. Defendant was instructed to place his hands over his head and to walk down the steps. Defendant proceeded down the steps and said, \u201c[y]ou might as well come on and get me, ... I done killed both of \u2019em.\u201d Continuing, he said, \u201cI killed both of them, with a damn stick.\u201d Defendant was handcuffed and transported to the Sheriff\u2019s Department.\nThe officers who remained at the crime scene entered the house where they found Connie Williams lying face down on the floor in a puddle of blood. Williams suffered a large gaping wound to the head. The officers discovered an ax in the kitchen which was later determined to have inflicted the fatal wounds to the victims\u2019 heads.\nDefendant was transported to the Sheriff\u2019s Department by a Highway Patrol officer. While en route, defendant stated to the officer, who had known defendant for some time, that, \u201cI told \u2019em I was gone [sic] kill \u2019em. I went to the Sheriff\u2019s Department and told \u2019em that I was gone [sic] kill \u2019em. ... I caught \u2019em together and I did what I had to do.\u201d Defendant was later met by a detective from the Sheriff\u2019s Department. The detective advised defendant of his rights pursuant to the decisioif in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Defendant indicated that he understood his rights and that he would answer the, detective\u2019s questions. Defendant signed a written waiver of his rights and then confessed to killing the two victims. The detective prepared a written summary of what defendant had told him and read it aloud to defendant. Defendant told the detective, \u201c[y]ou got it right[,]\u201d and signed the statement.\nThe State presented several lay witnesses who testified that they knew the defendant, that they were aware that he had a history of mental illness, and that he had a reputation in the community as being mentally unstable. These witnesses also testified that on the evening of the murders, defendant was coherent and that he acted normal in all aspects. There was some evidence that defendant had the odor of alcohol about his person, yet several witnesses testified as to defendant\u2019s apparent sobriety.\nDefendant called three witnesses who presented testimony from which the jury could have found the defendant was . not guilty by reason of insanity.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by G. Lawrence Reeves, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nWilliam L. Livesay for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0244-01", "first_page_order": 272, "last_page_order": 290 }