{ "id": 2548569, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERVIN WILLIAMSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Williamson", "decision_date": "1992-12-18", "docket_number": "No. 117A92", "first_page": "128", "last_page": "139", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "333 N.C. 128" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383", "parenthetical": "trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to disregard the emotional display by murder victim's widow, when defendant did not request a curative instruction" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515495 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359", "parenthetical": "trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to disregard the emotional display by murder victim's widow, when defendant did not request a curative instruction" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2496946 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539317 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510111 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "not necessary for evidence to prove precise facts brought out in witness' testimony before evidence deemed corroborative" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4752702 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "not necessary for evidence to prove precise facts brought out in witness' testimony before evidence deemed corroborative" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541753 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541929 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542427 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" }, { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498402 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" }, { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0537-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 887, "char_count": 25907, "ocr_confidence": 0.711, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.151471321870925e-07, "percentile": 0.862694311521637 }, "sha256": "b4b7e3143e14d3a3c31503a5e6d0d6c6e8cf1dded3bcbbaede4c989fbd6eef4b", "simhash": "1:06ec843ce421465a", "word_count": 4199 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:19:51.258099+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERVIN WILLIAMSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MEYER, Justice.\nOn 14 May 1990, defendant, Ervin Williamson, was indicted for the first-degree murder of Danny Lee Keel. Defendant was tried noncapitally in the Superior Court, Columbus County, in August 1991 and was found guilty. The trial court thereafter imposed the mandatory life sentence.\nThe evidence presented by the State at trial tended to show the following. On the afternoon of 3 April 1990, defendant, Tyrone Logan, and Tony Baker drove from Columbus County, North Carolina, to Wampee, South Carolina, in a blue Chevrolet Chevette owned by defendant\u2019s brother, Waylon Williamson. While in Wampee, defendant expressed animosity towards Danny Lee Keel, the victim. Defendant told Logan that \u201che was going to kill [the victim]\u201d because the victim was \u201cmessing\u201d with his girlfriend. Just after dark, the three men decided to drive back to Chadbourn, North Carolina, to defendant\u2019s family business, Williamson\u2019s Arcade (\u201cthe Arcade\u201d), located in a part of town called The Tracks.\nWhile defendant, Logan, and Baker were playing pool, the victim walked into the Arcade. Defendant approached the victim, and the two men began arguing. The argument centered around a statement that the victim supposedly made about defendant\u2019s engaging in oral sex with someone other than his girlfriend. Defendant told the victim that he was going to \u201cf\u2014 him up\u201d and then \u201ckill him.\u201d The victim then left the Arcade and walked across the railroad tracks to a building on the other side of the street. Baker also left the Arcade but returned a few minutes later and told defendant that \u201cDanny over there talking s\u2014 about you.\u201d Defendant responded, \u201cWhere my gun at? . . . I\u2019m going over there and f\u2014 this motherf \u2014 er up.\u201d After an unidentified person told defendant that his gun was under the seat in the blue Chevette, he jumped in the car and drove across the railroad tracks to where the victim was standing near a building. Logan and Baker followed defendant across the railroad tracks and saw him get out of the car.\nDefendant had a 9-millimeter pistol in his hand and said to the victim, \u201cMan, why are you over here talking, running your mouth.\u201d At this point, defendant raised the weapon and shot the victim in the chest. The victim fell back against a pole and then ran around the building. Defendant ran after the victim and fired another shot at him. Defendant then returned to the Arcade. After running up to the front yard of a mobile home, the victim knocked on the door and told the owners that he was hurt and to call the police. The victim then died in the front yard. Upon arriving at the scene, investigating officers found a 9-millimeter pistol and a belt pouch containing fifty-eight vials of crack cocaine near the victim\u2019s body.\nAn autopsy of the victim\u2019s body revealed that the victim bled to death as the result of a gunshot wound to the chest. The bullet entered the victim\u2019s chest approximately two inches from the midline in the left upper-chest area and exited about five inches from the midline in the left shoulder blade area.\nDefendant presented evidence directly contrary to that of the State. He testified that he left the Arcade solely to get something to eat and that he coincidentally saw the victim across the railroad tracks. Defendant and a witness for defendant, Kenneth R. McDougald, testified that defendant went across the tracks to make amends with the victim because of their prior argument at the Arcade. Defendant approached the victim and asked him if he were going to let a woman come between them. Both defense witnesses testified that as defendant turned to leave, the victim reached in his pocket and removed a gun. Defendant further testified that at this point, Logan screamed to defendant, \u201cLook out, Ervin, he\u2019s fixing to shoot you, man.\u201d McDougald also testified that Logan similarly warned defendant. Defendant turned and started to pull his gun, which he testified he carried for protection when he worked at the Arcade. As defendant turned around, he slipped and the pistol fired. He testified that he fired a second time because the victim was pointing a gun at defendant. Defendant fled to safety at the Arcade. McDougald testified that he heard defendant\u2019s gun fire twice and that Logan also fired his own gun. McDougald stated that defendant never chased the victim and that the victim had also fired his pistol.\nDefendant denied starting the argument at the Arcade and testified that the victim actually started an argument with Logan. Defendant stated that the argument was about Logan\u2019s girlfriend, not his own, and that he only became involved as the argument became more heated.\nAdditional facts will be discussed as necessary for the proper disposition of the issues raised by defendant.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in submitting a possible verdict of first-degree murder to the jury because there was no showing of premeditation and deliberation. According to defendant, the evidence that defendant made statements to Logan regarding his intent to kill the victim had no causal relationship with the events leading up to the victim\u2019s death and were separated in time to such a degree as to make their relevance suspect. We disagree.\nIn reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and any contradictions or discrepancies are properly left for the jury to resolve. State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 544, 417 S.E.2d 756, 761 (1992). To establish premeditation, the State must prove that the killing was thought out beforehand for some length of time, however short, but no particular length of time is necessary. State v. Small, 328 N.C. 175, 181, 400 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1991). To establish deliberation, the State must prove that the defendant intended to kill, that the killing was carried out in a \u201ccool state of blood\u201d in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge, or that the killing was carried out to accomplish an unlawful purpose, not under the influence of a violent passion suddenly aroused by lawful or just cause or legal provocation. Id. However, in determining whether deliberation was present, the term \u201ccool state of mind\u201d does not require a total absence of passion or emotion. State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 238, 400 S.E.2d 57, 62 (1991).\nThe evidence presented in this case was clearly sufficient to allow the jury to find that defendant killed the victim with premeditation and deliberation. Several hours before the killing, when defendant, Logan, and Baker were in Wampee, South Carolina, defendant repeatedly expressed his intent to kill the victim because he was \u201cmessing\u201d with defendant\u2019s girlfriend and because of statements the victim had made about the defendant having oral sex with another girl. After the three men returned to the Arcade in Chadbourn, North Carolina, the victim walked into the Arcade; when defendant saw the victim, he told him that he would \u201cf\u2014 him up\u201d and then \u201ckill him.\u201d Baker and Logan broke up the argument, and the victim then left the Arcade. Defendant also told Baker and Logan that he was going to \u201cend up killing [the victim].\u201d Baker then left the Arcade and returned a few minutes later and told defendant that the victim was \u201cover there talking s\u2014 about [him].\u201d The defendant asked where his gun was and stated that he was going over to The Tracks and \u201cf\u2014 this motherf \u2014 er up.\u201d Someone told defendant that his gun was under the seat in the blue Chevette. Defendant proceeded to get into the Chevette and drive across The Tracks to where the victim was standing. Defendant jumped out of the car, with the gun in his hand, and asked the victim why he was \u201crunning [his] mouth.\u201d The victim, who was not armed, told the defendant that he had not said anything. Defendant then cocked the 9-millimeter, raised it, and shot the victim in the chest. The victim fell back against a pole, regained his balance, and ran around the building; defendant ran behind him and shot at him again.\nThis evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is more than sufficient to support the jury\u2019s findings of premeditation and deliberation. Defendant\u2019s contention to the contrary is without merit.\nIn his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce, over defendant\u2019s objection, two photographs of the victim\u2019s body. During oral arguments, defendant conceded that this assignment was groundless and waived this assignment of error.\nDefendant next assigns as error that the trial court committed prejudicial error in allowing the State to introduce lay testimony by the paramedic as to the location of the \u201centry\u201d and \u201cexit\u201d wounds on the victim\u2019s body. Defendant contends that the paramedic\u2019s testimony identifying the wounds on the body of the deceased as an entrance and an exit wound was clearly beyond the purview of admissible opinion for that witness. Defendant waives this assignment of error by admitting in his brief that \u201c[s]ince this same evidence was ultimately introduced, correctly, on the testimony of Dr. Robert Leslie Thompson, at a later point in the trial, this error cannot, in good faith, be said to be prejudicial.\u201d In addition, defendant also waived this assignment during oral arguments.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the prosecutor to introduce through S.B.I. Agent Matt White noncorroborative testimony contained in statements made by Tyrone Logan to Agent White. In addition, defendant contends that the admission of these statements as impeachment evidence was improper under Rule 607 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence because the statements did not, in fact, impeach.\nThe first basis for defendant\u2019s assignment of error involves testimony provided by Agent White, who read from his notes statements made to him by Logan, who was with defendant on the day of the murder. When the State first began questioning Agent White about statements that Logan had made to him, defendant lodged an objection, stating, \u201cunless it\u2019s for corroborative purposes.\u201d The State acknowledged that it was, and the defendant then obtained a jury instruction on corroborative testimony. The trial judge gave the jury the following instruction:\nLadies and gentlemen of the jury, the testimony of this witness as to what Tyrone Logan told him is being offered for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of Tyrone Logan. You would consider it for that purpose only.\nAgent White then began to read his notes regarding Logan\u2019s verbal statement made to White on 26 May 1990 at the Columbus County jail. Agent White read the following from his notes:\nTyrone Logan stated that on April the 3rd, 1990, he was in the Williamson Arcade shooting dollar pool. Logan stated that Williamson\u2019s Arcade was located in Chadbourn, North Carolina. Logan observed Danny Keel walk into the arcade. [Defendant] was already in the arcade. When [defendant] observed Keel, he asked Keel why he was lying on him. [Defendant] meant why Keel was telling lies about [defendant] to his \u2014\nDefense counsel interrupted with an objection, suggesting that Agent White was substituting his own impression as to what defendant meant. The trial judge overruled the objection and gave another corroborative testimony instruction. Agent White then clarified this matter by specifically testifying that \u201cLogan stated that [defendant] meant why was Keel telling lies about [defendant] to his girlfriend who lives in Wampee, South Carolina.\u201d\nAlso, while Agent White was reading his notes as to what Logan told him on 26 July 1990, defendant objected on the grounds that Logan\u2019s statement did not corroborate Logan\u2019s testimony at trial that \u201c[defendant] wanted Logan and Tony Baker to testify that Keel had pulled a gun.\u201d The trial judge overruled the objection and gave yet another instruction on corroborative testimony.\nThe admissibility of alleged noncorroborative testimony has recently been addressed by this Court in State v. Harrison, 328 N.C. 678, 403 S.E.2d 301 (1991), and State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 417 S.E.2d 756 (1992). These cases establish the rule that prior consistent statements are admissible even though they contain new or additional information so long as the narration of events is substantially similar to the witness\u2019 in-court testimony. Harrison, 328 N.C. at 682, 403 S.E.2d at 304; State v. Higgenbottom, 312 N.C. 760, 324 S.E.2d 834 (1985) (not necessary for evidence to prove precise facts brought out in witness\u2019 testimony before evidence deemed corroborative). Furthermore,\n\u201c[i]n a noncapital case, where portions of a statement corroborate and other portions are incompetent because they do not corroborate, the defendant must specifically object to the incompetent portions.\u201d\nBenson, 331 N.C. at 548, 417 S.E.2d at 763 (quoting Harrison, 328 N.C. at 682, 403 S.E.2d at 304).\nDefense counsel objected three times during Agent White\u2019s direct examination by the State. Defense counsel initially made a general objection to Agent White\u2019s reading his notes as to Logan\u2019s statement of 26 May 1990. This qualified objection was contingent upon the statement being used for corroborative purposes. The State acknowledged that the statement was being read for corroborative purposes, and the judge instructed the jury that the statement was being used solely for corroborative purposes.\nDefense counsel\u2019s second objection dealt with a misconception that Agent White was inserting his own personal impression of what defendant had meant or actually said rather than reading from his notes a statement from Logan. The trial judge overruled the objection and gave another instruction on corroborative testimony to the jury. When Agent White continued his testimony, he clarified this matter by specifically reading from his notes Logan\u2019s statement \u201cthat [defendant] meant why was Keel telling lies about [defendant] to his girlfriend who lives in Wampee, South Carolina.\u201d Thus, Agent White conclusively rebutted defense counsel\u2019s suspicion that White was interjecting his own personal impression rather than reading from Logan\u2019s statement.\nAlso, while Agent White was reading from his notes of Logan\u2019s statement of 26 July 1990, defendant again objected, on grounds that the statement that \u201c[defendant] wanted Logan and Tony Baker to testify that Keel had pulled a gun\u201d did not corroborate Logan\u2019s verbal testimony. Agent White\u2019s reading of the statement clearly corroborated Logan\u2019s in-court testimony during cross-examination by defense counsel. When defense counsel asked Logan during cross-examination why his testimony in court was different from what he told defense counsel in his office, Logan stated that defendant had told him to \u201csay it like this [that Keel pulled a gun] here; told me \u2014 tried to give me another way to tell it.\u201d The two statements of Agent White and Logan, although not exactly the same, are substantially similar. Again, the trial judge correctly overruled the objection and gave yet another instruction on corroborative testimony to the jury.\nThe only portions of Agent White\u2019s testimony regarding Logan\u2019s statements that are now subject to review, for anything other than plain error, are those specifically objected to at trial. State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 417 S.E.2d 756; State v. Harrison, 328 N.C. 678, 403 S.E.2d 301. We find that those portions of Agent White\u2019s testimony regarding Logan\u2019s statements that were objected to were properly admitted.\nDefendant\u2019s contention that Agent White\u2019s testimony was improperly admitted for impeachment purposes is without merit. The assignment of error regarding Agent White\u2019s testimony was based solely on noncorroboration of the testimony, and the Rule 607 argument was not raised at trial. The scope of appellate review is limited to those issues presented by assignment of error set out in the record on appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a); Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97-98, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Because no assignment of error corresponds to the issue presented, this matter is not properly presented for our consideration.\nAs his final argument, defendant contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial based on the admission of noncorroborative statements which tended to indicate that the defendant wanted to set up an issue of self-defense. Agent White continued to read from his notes of Logan\u2019s statement as follows:\n[Defendant] wanted Logan and Tony Baker to testify that Keel had pulled a gun on [defendant] first and that his attorney . . . was going to try and show this. [Defendant] stated that his defense was going to be Keel pointed a weapon first and that [defendant] shot him in self-defense.\nThe trial judge then, sua sponte, sustained the objection to that portion of the statement which dealt with a false self-defense theory. Defendant, relying on N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1061, asserts that the trial judge must declare a mistrial \u201cif there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings . . . resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant\u2019s case.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1061 (1988). Defendant argues that defense counsel was made to appear to have calculatingly designed a defense, and thus, the admission of Agent White\u2019s statement irreparably prejudiced his case.\nIt is well established that the decision as to whether substantial and irreparable prejudice has occurred lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and that his decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Black, 328 N.C. 191, 400 S.E.2d 398 (1991). The decision of the trial judge is entitled to great deference since he is in a far better position than an appellate court to determine whether the degree of influence on the jury was irreparable. State v. Hightower, 331 N.C. 636, 643, 417 S.E.2d 237, 248 (1992).\nApplying these principles to the case at bar, we reject defendant\u2019s contention that the trial judge should have granted a mistrial. After the trial judge sustained defendant\u2019s objection, he recessed the jury while defense counsel made his motion for mistrial, claiming that the challenged testimony made it appear as if the self-defense theory were fabricated. The trial judge, however, correctly pointed out that earlier testimony from Logan had already indicated that defendant discussed fabricating a defense. Furthermore, based on his own close observation of the jury, the trial judge stated that he was \u201cnot convinced that . . . the defendant can\u2019t get a fair trial, that this defendant still can get a fair trial, and for that reason I am denying the motion.\u201d These findings are clearly supported by the record, and we therefore find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.\nFinally, we disagree with defendant\u2019s argument that the trial judge should have given the jury a curative instruction to provide some relief to the defendant if he were not going to grant a mistrial. A trial court does not err by failing to give a curative jury instruction when, as here, it is not requested by the defense. See State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 359, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988) (trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to disregard the emotional display by murder victim\u2019s widow, when defendant did not request a curative instruction). Defense counsel could well conclude that a curative instruction would do more harm than good by highlighting the matter in the jury\u2019s eyes. Id. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe have conducted a thorough review of the transcript of the trial and sentencing proceeding, the record on appeal, and the briefs of defendant and the State. We find no error in defendant\u2019s trial warranting reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction. We further find that the trial court committed no error in the sentence imposed for defendant\u2019s noncapital conviction.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "MEYER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Clarence J. DelForge, III, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Junius B. Lee, III, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERVIN WILLIAMSON\nNo. 117A92\n(Filed 18 December 1992)\n1. Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 251, 243 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014premeditation and deliberation \u2014evidence sufficient\nThere was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation in a first degree murder prosecution where defendant and two companions, Logan and Baker, were in Wampee, South Carolina several hours before the killing; defendant repeatedly expressed his intent to kill the victim because he was \u201cmessing\u201d with defendant\u2019s girlfriend and because of statements the victim made about the defendant having oral sex with another girl; after the three men returned to the Arcade in Chadbourn, North Carolina, the victim walked into the Arcade and defendant told the victim that he would \u201cf\u2014 him up\u201d and then \u201ckill him\u201d; Baker and Logan broke up the argument and the victim left the Arcade; defendant told Baker and Logan that he was going to end up killing the victim; Baker left the Arcade and returned a few minutes later and told defendant that the victim was talking about him; defendant asked where his gun was and stated that he was going over to The Tracks and \u201cf\u2014 this motherf \u2014 er up\u201d; someone told defendant his gun was under the seat of a car; defendant drove to where the victim was standing; defendant jumped out of the car with his gun in his hand and asked the victim why he was \u201crunning his mouth\u201d; the victim, who was unarmed, told defendant that he had not said anything; defendant then cocked his pistol, raised it, and shot the victim in the chest; the victim fell against a pole, regained his balance, and ran around the building, and defendant ran behind him and shot again.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 147, 155, 275, 438, 439.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 758 (NCI4th) \u2014 murder \u2014 opinion of paramedic \u2014other evidence of same import introduced\nThere was no prejudicial error in a murder prosecution from the introduction of a paramedic\u2019s testimony identifying the wounds on the body of the deceased as an entrance and exit wound where the defendant waived the assignment of error in his brief by admitting that the same evidence was correctly introduced at a later point in the trial and by waiving the assignment of error during oral arguments.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 652, 670; Homicide \u00a7 560.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 3161 (NCI4th)\u2014 statements of witness to SBI agent \u2014 noncorroborative testimony \u2014 no error\nThere was no error in a murder prosecution in allowing the introduction of an SBI agent\u2019s testimony containing statements made by a witness to the agent where defendant contended that the testimony was noncorroborative. Defendant initially made a general objection to the agent reading his notes, the objection being contingent upon the statement being used for corroborative purposes, the State acknowledged that the statement was being read for corroborative purposes, and the judge instructed the jury that the statement was being used solely for corroborative purposes. Defense counsel\u2019s second objection dealt with a misconception that the agent was inserting his own version of what defendant had meant, but the trial court overruled the objection and gave another instruction on corroborative testimony and the agent clarified the matter when he continued his testimony. Defendant\u2019s last objection was on the grounds that a portion of the statement to the agent did not corroborate the witness\u2019s testimony, but the agent\u2019s reading of the statement clearly corroborated the witness\u2019s testimony during cross-examination by defense counsel.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 493, 496, 519, 539; Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1213, 1218, 1288.\n4. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 688 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 testimony improperly admitted for impeachment purposes \u2014assignment of error based solely on noncorroboration \u2014impeachment issue not properly presented\nA contention that a prior consistent statement was improperly admitted for impeachment purposes in a murder prosecution was not properly presented on appeal because the assignment of error dealing with the testimony was based solely on noncorroboration.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 515, 654, 655, 670; Witnesses \u00a7 1012.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 553 (NCI4th)\u2014 noncorroborative testimony \u2014 defendant\u2019s false claim of self-defense \u2014mistrial denied\nThere was no abuse of discretion in a murder prosecution where the court denied defendant a mistrial after the admission of noncorroborative statements which indicated that defendant wanted to set up a false claim of self-defense. After the trial judge sustained defendant\u2019s objection, he recessed the jury while defendant made his motion for a mistrial, correctly pointed out that earlier testimony had indicated that defendant discussed fabricating a defense, and, based on the judge\u2019s own observation of the jury, stated that he was not convinced that defendant could not get a fair trial.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 772, 774; Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 147, 539, 560.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 685 (NCI4th)\u2014 noncorroborative testimony\u2014 mistrial denied \u2014 no curative instruction \u2014 no request for instruction\nThe trial court did not err in a murder prosecution by not giving a curative instruction after denying defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial following noncorroborative statements which indicated that defendant wanted to fabricate a defense. A trial court does not err by failing to give a curative jury instruction when, as here, it is not requested by the defense.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 672, 673, 696; Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 496, 519.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment upon defendant\u2019s conviction of first-degree murder entered by Fullwood, J., at the 26 August 1991 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Columbus County. Heard in the Supreme Court 2 November 1992.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Clarence J. DelForge, III, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nJunius B. Lee, III, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0128-01", "first_page_order": 176, "last_page_order": 187 }