{ "id": 2546948, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRY LYNN JORDAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jordan", "decision_date": "1993-03-12", "docket_number": "No. 555A91", "first_page": "431", "last_page": "440", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "333 N.C. 431" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "39 ALR Fed 570", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "A.L.R. Fed.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561161 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511888 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565454 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" }, { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498402 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" }, { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4685694 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694299 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714364 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0626-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 972, "char_count": 22357, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.384460829613415e-07, "percentile": 0.9804843834524716 }, "sha256": "8c7646bd92038238098ae37e24c536514d4be48170bef525ca9c39eca16954e7", "simhash": "1:872fc204b4a985f2", "word_count": 3718 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:19:51.258099+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRY LYNN JORDAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MEYER, Justice.\nDefendant was indicted by a Guilford County grand jury on 14 January 1991 for the murder of Kimella Denise Hewett. Defendant was tried capitally in Superior Court, Guilford County, in August 1991, and the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Following a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000, the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. In accordance with the jury\u2019s recommendation, Judge Martin sentenced defendant to life imprisonment. Defendant appeals to this Court as of right.\nEvidence presented by the State at defendant\u2019s trial tended to show the following facts and circumstances. In the early morning hours of 10 January 1991, Patrick Little spotted Kimella Denise Hewett lying on the sidewalk near the corner of Windley and Hoover Streets in front of a house owned by Robert Fair. Fair testified that he heard three gunshots coming from the Hoover Street side of his house sometime before 2:00 a.m. Little called the police, and Officer Bob Morris with the High Point Police Department arrived at the scene at 2:10 a.m. Morris found Hewett lying face down on the sidewalk. Officer Morris saw on the ground two spent .25-caliber cartridges and one .25-caliber cartridge that had not yet been fired.\nHewett, who was still alive, was taken to the High Point Memorial Hospital. The victim died at 9:45 a.m. on 10 January 1991, almost eight hours after she was found. An autopsy of the victim\u2019s body revealed that the victim had five gunshot entrance wounds, all to the back of the body. Three gunshot wounds were to the victim\u2019s back, and two were to the back of the victim\u2019s head. The pathologist who performed the autopsy testified that, in her opinion, the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds.\nAt the time the victim died, Willie Brooks was the victim\u2019s boyfriend and had been dating her for about three months. Prior to that, the victim had been dating the defendant. In November of 1990, Brooks accompanied the victim to court in High Point regarding assault charges filed by the victim against defendant. The case was continued to 14 January 1991. After the November 1990 court appearance, defendant called the victim. Brooks answered the phone, and when defendant asked to speak to the victim, Brooks asked defendant why he would not leave the victim alone. Defendant responded to Brooks, saying, \u201cLet me tell you something. If I can\u2019t have Kim, you can\u2019t have her. Before I let you have her I\u2019ll kill her.\u201d Brooks then hung up the phone.\nAbout two or three months prior to the killing, defendant called a co-worker, John Flowers, and asked to borrow his gun. Flowers told defendant he could not use it. Approximately a month before the killing, defendant told Flowers that he and the victim were \u201chaving a little difficulty, problems and stuff.\u201d Defendant told Flowers that the victim had a new boyfriend and that he was \u201ckind of upset.\u201d Defendant told Flowers that if he (defendant) could not have the victim, \u201cnobody else [would].\u201d Defendant said that \u201che would kill her or something like that.\u201d\nA few weeks before the killing, defendant showed Michael Lorenzo Brown a pistol and asked Brown where he could get some bullets. Brown told defendant that he could get bullets at Rose\u2019s or K Mart. Two weeks prior to the killing, defendant showed Christopher Keith Archie, a co-worker and a relative by marriage, a gun that defendant said he found at a nightclub. Defendant asked Archie how to kill someone, and Archie responded that he did not know. Defendant told Archie that he was going to go to court and did not want to go to jail. Defendant told Archie that he was going to kill someone, but Archie did not think defendant was talking about the victim.\nOn 27 December 1990, defendant purchased CCI .25-caliber handgun ammunition from the K Mart on North Main Street in High Point. Tina Mixon, the clerk in the sporting and automotives department who sold defendant the ammunition, took special notice of defendant because she did not often sell handgun ammunition.\nOn the evening of 9 January 1991, Brooks and the victim had dinner together and went to the home of Brooks\u2019 stepmother, who lived approximately three blocks from the victim. At approximately 1:15 a.m. on the morning of 10 January 1991, the victim left to return home, arriving a short time later. Defendant was waiting outside of her house. He pulled out his gun, and the victim said, \u201cOh, God, what are you going to do?\u201d Defendant responded that he wanted to talk to her. She said \u201cOkay,\u201d and they began talking. Defendant asked her where she had been and asked her if she had been with another man. The victim responded in the affirmative, and they began arguing. Defendant attempted to get the victim to go to his car, but the victim said, \u201cIf you\u2019re going to kill me, you\u2019re going to have to do it here.\u201d The victim turned around and walked away. Defendant fired the gun, hitting the victim in the back. The victim fell to the ground, and defendant aimed the gun at her head and shot the victim four more times.\nDefendant arrived at work later that morning at approximately 3:00 a.m. Defendant was four hours late and appeared nervous. Defendant asked Alvin Jessie Thompson, Jr., a co-worker, numerous questions. Defendant asked Thompson, \u201cHow do you get rid of powder burns?\u201d Defendant inquired of Thompson, \u201cIf you shot somebody from about five to ten feet, could they \u2014 if they didn\u2019t die, could they testify against you?\u201d Defendant asked Thompson, \u201cIf you shot somebody twice in the head and twice in the back, would they live?\u201d Defendant continued questioning Thompson, saying, \u201cIf I was standing here, and somebody was standing there, and you take and shoot somebody like [making a motion as if pointing a gun] .... If you shoot somebody and you\u2019re standing\u2014 . . . pow, pow, pow, would they live or could they testify against you?\u201d\nDefendant presented no evidence at the guilt phase of the trial.\nAdditional facts will be discussed as n\u00e9cessary for the proper disposition of the issues raised by defendant.\nBy his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by limiting defendant\u2019s cross-examination of State\u2019s witness Hairston about prior bad acts to questions about prior convictions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609. Brian William Hairston, III, testified for the State regarding conversations he had with defendant while he and defendant were in jail. Hairston testified that defendant told him that he and his girlfriend (the victim) were \u201chaving a lot of problems before he had did the incident.\u201d Defendant told Hairston that the victim had filed some assault charges against him, that he (defendant) had been following her around the city, and that she \u201cwas messing around with another guy or something.\u201d Hairston testified that defendant was \u201cgetting upset about it, and he tried to talk to her about it and she had refused to listen to him so he knocked her off. ... He knocked her off, killed her. . . . Shot her in the head.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, defense counsel sought to discredit Hairston\u2019s testimony by questioning him about prior specific instances of conduct, which defendant argues was probative of truthfulness.\nQ. Let\u2019s go back to December. In December you forged a check from the account of Robbie Ingram, didn\u2019t you?\nA. Yes, I did.\nQ. And when you were doing that you knew what you were doing, didn\u2019t you?\nA. Yes, I did.\nQ. You knew it was wrong, didn\u2019t you?\nA. Yes.\nQ. You didn\u2019t care about Mr. Ingram, did you?\nA. I didn\u2019t know Mr. Ingram.\nAt this point, the prosecutor objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. A bench conference was held, and defense counsel argued that the questioning was permissible pursuant to Rule 608(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. The prosecutor argued that the cross-examination should be limited to prior criminal convictions pursuant to Rule 609 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. The trial court agreed and ruled that defense counsel would be limited to questioning Hairston about prior convictions under Rule 609.\nA voir dire examination of Hairston was conducted by the prosecution, wherein Hairston stated that he had been convicted of felony larceny, credit card theft, thirteen counts of forgery and uttering, and driving without a license. Following this voir dire examination, defense counsel made an offer of proof. When questioned, Hairston stated that his purpose for coming forward about what defendant had told him was \u201cjustice.\u201d Hairston admitted that when he committed forgery, credit card theft, and larceny, justice was not his goal.\nThe jury returned, and defense counsel resumed its cross-examination of Hairston.\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred by limiting the cross-examination of Hairston about his prior acts to cross-examination concerning prior convictions under Rule 609 and thereby prevented defense counsel from questioning Hairston about his \u201crecent pursuit of justice and his facility with deception\u201d under Rule 608(b). We disagree. Rule 608(b) reads, in pertinent part:\n(b) Specific instances of conduct. \u2014 Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608(b) (1992). As the rule provides, it is within the trial court\u2019s discretion to allow or disallow cross-examination of a witness about his specific acts if the acts are relevant to his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See also State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 340 S.E.2d 84 (1986). In Morgan, we held that prior to admitting evidence under Rule 608(b), \u201cthe trial judge must determine, in his discretion, . . . that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, and that the questioning will not harass or unduly embarrass the witness.\u201d Id. at 634, 340 S.E.2d at 90 (emphasis added). A trial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 343 S.E.2d 828 (1986); State v. Hayes, 314 N.C. 460, 334 S.E.2d 741 (1985).\nThe record indicates that the trial judge articulated two primary bases for disallowing questioning of Hairston pursuant to Rule 608. First, the court indicated its concern about the amount of time such an inquiry would require:\nThe COURT: . . . : Let\u2019s restrict it. I don\u2019t want you to go off on a tangent here and be here all day asking this witness all about his past history and that sort of thing. We could be here forever. Let\u2019s hold it down to the usual procedure of past convictions.\nSecond, the trial court stated that defendant\u2019s objective could be accomplished under the trial court\u2019s ruling:\nMr. HAMMER [Defense Counsel]: I don\u2019t plan to question him on every little thing he\u2019s ever done because we would be here more than an afternoon, I guarantee you that.\nThe COURT: I understand. That\u2019s why I would like to, in my discretion, bar you from going into all of that. I think you can accomplish the same purpose by following the usual rule under 609.\nWe believe that the record clearly indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.\nOn cross-examination, pursuant to Rule 609, which allows a party to impeach a witness by evidence of prior convictions, Hairston testified that he had been convicted of larceny and credit card theft and that he had been in jail on charges of forgery and uttering. Hairston maintained that his purpose for coming forward and testifying against defendant was \u201cjustice.\u201d Hairston testified, however, that after informing the district attorney about his conversations with defendant, he was released from jail on a promise to appear. Hairston admitted that despite the fact that he had made a promise to appear and a promise not to break the law, upon his release, new charges were filed against him for first-degree sexual offense, kidnapping, and armed robbery. Hairston further admitted to being charged with selling counterfeit controlled substances, and when Hairston testified that he did not remember whether he was convicted of those charges, defense counsel refreshed his memory as to his voir dire testimony to the contrary. Defense counsel elicited testimony from Hairston which implied to the jury that he had misrepresented his mental condition while in jail in order to be sent to Dorothea Dix Hospital. Hairston testified that he \u201cwanted to be able to walk around, breathe some air.\u201d Hairston further admitted to knowing that he was HIV positive since 1988 and that he was currently being held for a sexual offense on a young man.\nAlthough defendant contends that he was not able to cross-examine Hairston about his recent conversion to the pursuit of justice and his facility with deception, this testimony clearly indicates that defense counsel communicated to the jury the issue of Hairston\u2019s credibility as effectively as if he had proceeded under Rule 608. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder for insufficiency of the evidence. By this assignment of error, defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to show that the shooting of the victim was the proximate cause of her death. Defendant relies on the following portion of testimony given at trial by Russell Blaylock, the neurosurgeon who examined the victim when she was brought to the hospital:\nQ. When did she die?\nA. She lived throughout the night and died the next morning. Q. About what time?\nA. I think she was pronounced dead at nine-fifty a.m.\nQ. Could anything medically within reason be done for her?\nA. No. I discussed with the family the massive nature of her brain injury, and they decided, along with me, that there was no further course that we could take to try to save her life or bring her any kind of useful life.\nDefendant argues, based on this testimony, that Dr. Blaylock and the victim\u2019s family determined that they would not pursue medical options available to keep the victim alive and therefore that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for insufficiency. We disagree. The law is well settled that when reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal trials, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 544, 417 S.E.2d 756, 761 (1992). The State receives the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and any contradictions or discrepancies are for the jury to resolve. Id. To hold a person criminally responsible for a homicide, the State must prove that his act caused or directly contributed to the death. State v. Luther, 285 N.C. 570, 206 S.E.2d 238 (1974).\nThe evidence presented in this case was clearly sufficient to establish that the gunshot wounds inflicted by defendant were the proximate cause of the victim\u2019s death. Pathologist Deborah L. Radish testified that the victim received five gunshot wounds to her back and head. One gunshot wound was to the victim\u2019s right upper back. This bullet went into the right chest, through her right lung, through her body to the left, and through the left carotid artery and was recovered from the victim\u2019s body below her left collar bone. A second bullet went into and through the muscle tissue of the victim\u2019s left back and was recovered from the victim\u2019s middle back. A third bullet entered the victim\u2019s back and went into the victim\u2019s abdominal cavity, through the small intestine several times, and through the large intestine and was recovered from the muscle tissue of the abdominal wall. A fourth bullet chipped the victim\u2019s skull. A fifth bullet went into the scalp, through the skull bone on the back of the head, through the left side of the brain, crossing over the midline of the brain towards the front, and exiting the right front of the brain. This bullet was recovered from between the dura and the brain. Dr. Radish testified that, in her opinion, the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. This evidence was clearly sufficient to allow the jury to find that the victim\u2019s death was caused by the shots fired by defendant into her body and head. Any contention by defendant that the testimony of Dr. Blaylock indicates some independent and intervening cause of the victim\u2019s death, even if supported by the evidence, amounts to nothing more than an argument that there exists a contradiction in the evidence. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, as \u201c \u2018contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case \u2014 they are for the jury to resolve.\u2019 \u201d State v. Benson, 331 N.C. at 544, 417 S.E.2d at 761 (quoting State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 67, 296 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1982)).\nAs his final assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial judge committed prejudicial error when, in instructing on the elements of first-degree murder, he instructed the jury that the State must prove that defendant did not act in self-defense. We disagree. Defendant failed to object to the challenged instruction at trial, and thus, any error must be reviewed under the plain error rule. State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 375 (1983). Under the plain error rule, defendant must convince this Court not only that there was error, but that absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result. State v. Faison, 330 N.C. 347, 411 S.E.2d 143 (1991).\nIn State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 297 S.E.2d 563 (1982), after determining that there was no evidence that would have supported a finding that the defendant formed a reasonable belief that it was necessary to kill in order to protect himself from death or great bodily harm, we held:\n[T]he trial court erred in giving the jury any instructions relative to self-defense. This error was favorable to the defendant and clearly harmless to him beyond a reasonable doubt, since it resulted in the jury giving consideration to acquittal upon a ground which the defendant was not entitled to have the jury consider. When a trial court undertakes to instruct the jury on self-defense in a case in which no instruction in this regard is required, the gratuitous instructions on self-defense are error favorable to the defendant even though they contain misstatements of law which would constitute reversible error in a case in which instructions on self-defense were required by the evidence. As the defendant in the present case was not entitled to any jury instructions on self-defense, any mistakes by the trial court in its instructions on self-defense were, at worst, harmless error not necessitating a new trial.\nId. at 161, 297 S.E.2d at 569 (citation omitted). Applying these principles to the case at bar, we conclude that defendant derived the benefit of an instruction to which he was not entitled and cannot demonstrate that this error was prejudicial to him. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFor the reasons stated above, we find that defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "MEYER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Mary Jill Ledford, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Nora Henry Hargrove for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRY LYNN JORDAN\nNo. 555A91\n(Filed 12 March 1993)\n1. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 3025 (NCI4th)\u2014 impeachment \u2014 limited to prior convictions\nThe trial court did not err in a murder prosecution where a State\u2019s witness testified concerning conversations with defendant in jail by limiting defendant\u2019s cross-examination of that witness about prior bad acts to questions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609 concerning prior convictions. Although defendant contends that he was not able to cross-examine the witness about his recent conversion to the pursuit of justice and his facility with deception, the testimony clearly indicates that defense counsel communicated to the jury the issue of the witness\u2019s credibility as effectively as if he had proceeded under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608.\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7\u00a7 910, 911.\nConstruction and application of Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permitting impeachment of witness by evidence of prior conviction of crime. 39 ALR Fed 570.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 211 (NCI4th)\u2014 first degree murder \u2014sufficiency of evidence \u2014cause of death\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a first degree murder prosecution for insufficient evidence that the shooting of the victim was the proximate cause of death. Although defendant contended that the victim\u2019s family and doctor determined that they would not pursue medical options available to them to keep the victim alive, the evidence presented was clearly sufficient to establish that the gunshot wounds inflicted by defendant were the proximate cause of the victim\u2019s death. Contradictions in the evidence are for the jury to resolve.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 432.\n3. Appeal and Error \u00a7 149 (NCI4th)\u2014 first degree murder \u2014 instructions \u2014 error favorable to defendant \u2014no objection \u2014no prejudice\nThere was no plain error in a first degree murder prosecution where the court instructed the jury that the State must prove that defendant did not act in self-defense. Defendant failed to object at trial and derived the benefit of an instruction to which he was not entitled.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7 545.\nAppeal as of right by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a life sentence entered by Martin (Lester P., Jr.), J., at the 21 August 1991 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Guilford County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 January 1993.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Mary Jill Ledford, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nNora Henry Hargrove for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0431-01", "first_page_order": 479, "last_page_order": 488 }