{ "id": 2531340, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FRANK W. PETERSILIE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Petersilie", "decision_date": "1993-07-30", "docket_number": "No. 43PA92", "first_page": "169", "last_page": "208", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "334 N.C. 169" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522284 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 U.S. 1042", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6404260, 6404008, 6404760, 6404142, 6403727, 6404335, 6403924, 6404600, 6404892, 6403806, 6404479 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/450/1042-06", "/us/450/1042-04", "/us/450/1042-10", "/us/450/1042-05", "/us/450/1042-01", "/us/450/1042-07", "/us/450/1042-03", "/us/450/1042-09", "/us/450/1042-11", "/us/450/1042-02", "/us/450/1042-08" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2507321 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 U.S. 287", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 303872 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "conviction cannot stand merely because it could have been supported by one theory submitted to jury if another invalid theory was also submitted and general verdict does not specify theory upon which verdict is based" }, { "parenthetical": "conviction cannot stand merely because it could have been supported by one theory submitted to jury if another invalid theory was also submitted and general verdict does not specify theory upon which verdict is based" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/317/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768-69", "parenthetical": "possibility that jury relied on unsupported theory to convict defendant required new trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4739612 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162-63", "parenthetical": "possibility that jury relied on unsupported theory to convict defendant required new trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326", "parenthetical": "possibility that felony murder conviction was based on predicate felony improperly submitted to jury warranted new trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4739096 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "possibility that felony murder conviction was based on predicate felony improperly submitted to jury warranted new trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "submitting case to jury on alternative theories, including one not supported by evidence, was reversible error requiring new trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498848 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "submitting case to jury on alternative theories, including one not supported by evidence, was reversible error requiring new trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 Pa. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1767115 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute proscribes any person from publishing any statement concerning any candidate for election without signature of person responsible - not limited to charges" }, { "parenthetical": "statute proscribes any person from publishing any statement concerning any candidate for election without signature of person responsible - not limited to charges" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/492/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.W.2d 731", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10689899 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute requires all political advertisements to disclose name of sponsor - not limited to charges or candidates" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/262/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.Y.S.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 A.D.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 5603588 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/44/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 N.Y.S.2d 978", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Misc. 2d 948", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1271330 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/76/0948-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute making it a crime to write or distribute any circular designed to aid or defeat any candidate or any question submitted to voters without name of officer of organization or name of voter responsible - not limited to charges against candidates" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Mass. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 307096 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute making it a crime to write or distribute any circular designed to aid or defeat any candidate or any question submitted to voters without name of officer of organization or name of voter responsible - not limited to charges against candidates" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/368/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 So. 2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9675417 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute proscribing any person from publishing any statement concerning any candidate for election unless it is signed - not restricted to charges" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/337/0866-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 1284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute requires signature of any person who publishes or distributes any political literature soliciting votes for or against any candidate or for or against any public questions to be submitted for the ballot at an election - affects more than the chances of a particular candidate" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543388 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Cal. Rptr. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute requires signature of person responsible on circulars or handbills that seek to influence the result of elections - not limited to a particular candidate" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6035506 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute requires signature of person responsible on circulars or handbills that seek to influence the result of elections - not limited to a particular candidate" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/205/Supp. 856-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 U.S. 103", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168705 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/394/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 F. Supp. 244", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 2865313 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute makes it a crime to distribute any handbill containing any statement concerning any candidate in connection with any election of public officers unless signed - not limited to charges" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/290/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Cal. Rptr. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231, 235" }, { "page": "229" }, { "page": "231-32, 235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "393 P.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431, 416" }, { "page": "430" }, { "page": "431-32, 435" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Cal. 2d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2337762 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452, 458-59" }, { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-2d/61/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 U.S. 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6162530 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61, 65" }, { "page": "561, 563" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "562" }, { "page": "562" }, { "page": "70" }, { "page": "566", "parenthetical": "Clark, Frankfurter, Whittaker, JJ., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/362/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 780", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200638 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 L. Ed. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Cal. Rptr. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" }, { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Cal. App. 3d 887", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4722548 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" }, { "page": "890-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/109/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 214", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12031909 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 665", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782792 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 U.S. 288", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3666661 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/229/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 L. Ed. 2d 659", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "424 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 989", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 U.S. 612", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11302068 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/347/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176896 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4681578 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549576 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 L. Ed. 2d 782", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 947", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777700, 1777872, 1777300, 1777430, 1777757, 1777375 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0947-04", "/us/445/0947-06", "/us/445/0947-05", "/us/445/0947-01", "/us/445/0947-03", "/us/445/0947-02" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565664 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 L. Ed. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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Supp. 440", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 46305 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" }, { "page": "441" }, { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/195/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 S.W.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9935808 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "307" }, { "page": "306" }, { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/633/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 L. Ed. 2d 5", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11728538 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" }, { "page": "13-14" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "14-15" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Harv. L. Rev. 1111", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Harv. L. Rev.", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1286-87" }, { "page": "1290", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 S.E.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Where Record failed to disclose jurisdiction in the court below; appeal dismissed." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614273 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Where Record failed to disclose jurisdiction in the court below; appeal dismissed." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No copy of the bill of indictment contained in the record on appeal; appeal dismissed." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615999 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No copy of the bill of indictment contained in the record on appeal; appeal dismissed." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Record on appeal shows lack of jurisdiction when a defendant who is never tried in district court is tried in superior court upon a warrant; judgment arrested and vacated." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568817 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Record on appeal shows lack of jurisdiction when a defendant who is never tried in district court is tried in superior court upon a warrant; judgment arrested and vacated." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E.2d 827", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Record on appeal shows lack of jurisdiction when the superior court convicts a defendant of a misdemeanor for which there is no conviction in district court; judgment arrested." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557730 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Record on appeal shows lack of jurisdiction when the superior court convicts a defendant of a misdemeanor for which there is no conviction in district court; judgment arrested." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Record on appeal shows lack of jurisdiction when a defendant is convicted in superior court of committing a crime for which he is not charged; judgment arrested." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568922 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Record on appeal shows lack of jurisdiction when a defendant is convicted in superior court of committing a crime for which he is not charged; judgment arrested." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "710" }, { "page": "711" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564272 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565309 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 858", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12011489, 12011522, 12011844, 12011909, 12011590, 12012197, 12012294, 12011977, 12011788, 12012238, 12011630, 12012146, 12012090 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting 4 Elliot's Debates on the Constitution 571 (1876 Ed.)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0858-01", "/us/469/0858-02", "/us/469/0858-06", "/us/469/0858-07", "/us/469/0858-03", "/us/469/0858-11", "/us/469/0858-13", "/us/469/0858-08", "/us/469/0858-05", "/us/469/0858-12", "/us/469/0858-04", "/us/469/0858-10", "/us/469/0858-09" ] }, { "cite": "140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "U. Pa. L. Rev.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "quoting 4 Elliot's Debates on the Constitution 571 (1876 Ed.)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2400761 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326", "parenthetical": "quoting 4 Elliot's Debates on the Constitution 571 (1876 Ed.)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 U.S. 375", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168221 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" }, { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/370/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 829", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2526 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845", "parenthetical": "quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569, 579 (1962)" }, { "page": "14", "parenthetical": "quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569, 579 (1962)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 L. Ed. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1481163 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 615", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "U. Pa. L. Rev.", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "485 U.S. 312", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 13521 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/485/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 U.S. 781", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1775217 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "797-98" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "800" }, { "page": "691" }, { "page": "800-01" }, { "page": "691-92", "parenthetical": "requiring disclosure during communication itself is more burdensome than a requirement that a disclosure form be filed" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/487/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 U.S. 449", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6163673 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" }, { "page": "1499" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/357/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 U.S. 516", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170623 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" }, { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "\" 'It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective . . . restraint on freedom of association.'\" (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, 1499 (1958))" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/361/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 U.S. 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180752 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628-29", "parenthetical": "Brennan, J., concurring" }, { "page": "258", "parenthetical": "Brennan, J., concurring" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/425/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 265", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11712218 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" }, { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 214", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12043574 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "219" }, { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 415", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450732 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 U.S. 46", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 13322 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" }, { "page": "52-53" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/485/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 U.S. 886", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 636531 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913" }, { "page": "1236" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/458/0886-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 ALR2d 1412", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "376 US 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 379234 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" }, { "page": "271-72" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/376/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 US 64", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728748 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74-75" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/379/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 US 455", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185876 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 U.S. 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6162530 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "563", "parenthetical": "\"There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression.\"" }, { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/362/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 780", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200638 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788, n.9" }, { "page": "557-58, n.9" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 L. Ed. 2d 659", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685", "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "722-23" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "424 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "weight": 7, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14-15", "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "14-15" }, { "page": "18" }, { "page": "14-15" }, { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 37", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6189226 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 L. Ed. 2d 5", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11728538 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" }, { "page": "22" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0191-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2735, "char_count": 92453, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.811034788703796e-07, "percentile": 0.9639363144337759 }, "sha256": "c33296fa2e7e3b590c61f1a2b0d3a03656432f0881f76f2bf88ad28b6645bd63", "simhash": "1:8cfb233a2f619dd2", "word_count": 15018 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:40:35.485142+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Parker did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FRANK W. PETERSILIE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EXUM, Chief Justice.\nThe substantive issue before us is whether N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7), prohibiting anonymous, derogatory charges against candidates for primary or general elections, violates the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, \u00a7 14 of the North Carolina Constitution, or both. Before reaching this constitutional issue, however, we must first dispose of a procedural question: whether the Court of Appeals erred by vacating the judgment of the trial court on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We conclude the Court of Appeals did not err on the record before it when it vacated the judgment of the trial court; but, for reasons of judicial economy and to reach the important constitutional question raised, we elect to allow the State\u2019s motion to amend the record on appeal, which amendment demonstrates that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case. As for the constitutional issue, we conclude the statute does not violate defendant\u2019s free speech rights under either the federal or state constitution. We do find, however, that the trial court committed reversible error by incorrectly stating the law in its jury instructions; and defendant therefore is entitled to a new trial. We also conclude that the trial court erred in admitting certain out-of-court opinion evidence.\nI.\nDefendant was convicted of eleven counts of publishing unsigned materials about a candidate for public office \u2014all misdemeanors in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7). Judgment was entered imposing a sentence of two years\u2019 imprisonment which was suspended for three years upon the condition defendant serve six weekends in the county jail. The only charging documents contained in the record on appeal are grand jury indictments. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the superior court. We allowed the State\u2019s petition for further review.\nEvidence at defendant\u2019s trial tended to show as follows: Defendant owned a land development company, Property Services and Investments (PSI), in Boone, North Carolina, which was primarily engaged in the management of rental properties. Defendant was also among ten candidates running for three seats on the Boone Town Council in the 10 October 1989 election. Only one candidate, Ben Suttle, received a clear majority. A run-off election was required, but defendant did not receive enough votes to qualify for the run-off. Four other candidates did qualify for the run-off election, two of whom were Saul Chase and Louise Miller.\nOn 1 or 2 November 1989, defendant obtained a copy of a letter addressed to his mother with which was enclosed a copy of a Washington Post article written by Nan Chase, candidate Chase\u2019s wife. The article expressed Mrs. Chase\u2019s opinion about prayer in school. The accompanying letter stated:\nChase wants to take away aggressive Christian influence from public buildings and gathering places, such as our schools.\nIn an article published in the Washington Post, Mrs. Saul Chase ridiculed the people of Boone for their support of Christianity stating that here \u201cChristianity is . . . intimidating and self-perpetuating.\u201d\nCalling herself an \u201cunbeliever (in Christianity) in the midst of the pious\u201d, Mrs. Saul Chase states that she is unable to openly criticize \u201creligious paraphernalia displayed in public offices and on state owned vehicles\u201d and she also says that if (anyone) speak(s) out forcefully against what may be an unconstitutional mixing of church and state, they will be unable to enter the political mainstream that has the power to separate the two spheres\u201d. \u2014This thought has not been spoken to the people of Boone by Mrs. Chase, only to the Washington Post. Why keep it from us? Because her husband is on our Town Council, and was just put in the run off for re-election. If he wins, he will have the power to take away any Christian influence from the town employees, buildings, etc. It can be assumed that Chase allegedly has a goal to wipe out Christian influence from our town, take it away form the very God-fearing Christian people who helped put him in office. Candidates should be open about all of their feelings of all issues and it appears that Saul Chase has been deceptive to us by not supporting the good, wholesome beliefs of our people. A deception that is allegedly a deliberate attempt to gain power to take our Christian atmosphere from us. We, the town, should stop him, keep him out of our town government and hold fast to our Christian freedoms. Vote against Saul Chase!\nWith the help of various members of his staff at PSI, defendant reproduced and mailed approximately thirty to seventy copies of the letter to persons who voted in the 10 October 1989 election. Defendant personally addressed several of the envelopes. He did not sign his name to the mailing or otherwise indicate that the mailing came from him.\nOn 3 or 4 November 1989 defendant received a copy of a flyer concerning candidates Miller and Chase. The flyer stated:\nVOTE LIQUOR BY THE DRINK FOR BOONE.\nFOUR YEARS AGO, WITH THE HELP OF SAUL CHASE, THE A.S.U. STUDENTS BROUGHT BEER TO BOONE. NOW IS THE TIME TO COMPLETE THE PARTY!\nSUTTLE, DUGGER & MARSH REFUSE TO ENDORSE THIS ISSUE AND WOULD WORK TO DEFEAT THE REFERENDUM.\nVOTE SAUL CHASE AND LOUISE MILLER\nNOV. 7TH\nTHE \u201cPRO-LIQUOR\u201d CANDIDATES\nDefendant copied and mailed out twenty to twenty-five unsigned copies of the flyer. Again, defendant did not sign his name to the mailing or otherwise identify himself as the person who sent it.\nOn 15 November 1989 Special Agent Steve Wilson of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation began investigating the mailings. Wilson spoke with defendant on 27 November 1989 at defendant\u2019s PSI office. When Wilson informed defendant that he had compared the handwriting on defendant\u2019s notice of candidacy to handwriting appearing on the flyers and anonymously mailed envelopes, defendant admitted addressing some of the anonymous letters. He said he was unaware that sending the anonymous material was a criminal violation.\nThe opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed 21 January 1992. Concluding that the record on appeal demonstrated a lack of jurisdiction in the superior court, the Court of Appeals vacated the superior court\u2019s judgment. On 22 January 1992 the State moved in the Court of Appeals to amend the record on appeal by adding certified copies of the presentment upon which charges were initiated against defendant. The Court of Appeals denied this motion on 23 January 1992.\nII.\nThe State contends the Court of Appeals erred by vacating the superior court proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. We conclude the Court of Appeals acted properly on the record before it.\nLike the majority of states, North Carolina requires the State to prove jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case. State v. Batdorf, 293 N.C. 486, 493, 238 S.E.2d 497, 502 (1977). Exclusive, original jurisdiction of all misdemeanors lies in the District Court Division of the General Court of Justice. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-272 (1989). The superior court has jurisdiction to try a misdemeanor charge:\n(1) Which is a lesser included offense of a felony on which an indictment has been returned, or a felony information as to which an indictment has been properly waived; or\n(2) When the charge is initiated by presentment; or\n(3) Which may be properly consolidated for trial with a felony under G.S. 15A-926;\n(4) To which a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is tendered in lieu of a felony charge; or\n(5) When a misdemeanor conviction is appealed to the superior court for trial de novo, to accept a guilty plea to a lesser included or related charge.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-271(a) (1989).\n\u201cWhen the record shows a lack of jurisdiction in the lower court, the appropriate action on the part of the appellate court is to arrest judgment or vacate any order entered without authority.\u201d State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 176, 273 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1981). See also State v. Hardy, 298 N.C. 191, 257 S.E.2d 426 (1979) (Record on appeal shows lack of jurisdiction when a defendant is convicted in superior court of committing a crime for which he is not charged; judgment arrested.); State v. Guffey, 283 N.C. 94, 194 S.E.2d 827 (1973) (Record on appeal shows lack of jurisdiction when the superior court convicts a defendant of a misdemeanor for which there is no conviction in district court; judgment arrested.); State v. Evans, 262 N.C. 492, 137 S.E.2d 811 (1964) (Record on appeal shows lack of jurisdiction when a defendant who is never tried in district court is tried in superior court upon a warrant; judgment arrested and vacated.).\nContrarily, \u201cwhen the record is silent and the appellate court is unable to determine whether the court below had jurisdiction, the appeal should be dismissed.\u201d Felmet, 302 N.C. at 176, 273 S.E.2d at 711. See also State v. Hunter, 245 N.C. 607, 96 S.E.2d 840 (1957) (No copy of the bill of indictment contained in the record on appeal; appeal dismissed.); State v. Banks, 241 N.C. 572, 86 S.E.2d 76 (1955) (Where Record failed to disclose jurisdiction in the court below; appeal dismissed.). In Felmet, we concluded the record was silent as to jurisdiction when the defendant was tried in superior court upon a warrant charging misdemeanor trespass because the record did not indicate whether the defendant had been tried in district court. We, therefore, held the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the appeal.\nAs did the Court of Appeals, we conclude this is a case in which the record affirmatively shows a lack of jurisdiction. According to the record, the only charging documents are indictments. All the offenses charged are misdemeanors. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-271, the superior court has no jurisdiction to try by indictment a defendant charged with a misdemeanor unless the charges which are the subject of the indictment were initiated by a presentment.\nThe State contends the trial transcript shows that the charges against defendant were initiated by a presentment pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-271(a)(2). The transcript does include a statement by the district attorney informing the court that the misdemeanor charges originated by presentment. Rule 9(a)(3)(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the record on appeal in criminal actions to include:\nso much of the evidence, set out in the form provided in Rule 9(c)(1), as is necessary for an understanding of the errors assigned, or a statement that the entire verbatim transcript of the proceedings is being filed with the record pursuant to Rule 9(c)(2), or designating portions of the transcript to be so filed ....\nN.C. R. App. P. 9(a)(3)(e). Relying on this requirement, the State asserts that reference to the presentment contained in the trial transcript is a part of the record and, as such, is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.\nWe are not persuaded by this argument. Appellate Rule 9(a)(3) sets forth the requisite contents of the record on appeal in criminal actions. Subsection (e), relied on by the State, is directed only to the presentation of the evidence. Subsection (c) governs how charging documents must be presented, and it provides that the record shall contain \u201ccopies of all warrants, informations, presentments, and indictments upon which the case has been tried in any court.\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 9(a)(3) (emphasis added). It is clear that this rule contemplates that all charging documents must be copied and presented verbatim in the record on appeal. Mere references to such documents in the trial transcript cannot suffice for verbatim copies of the documents themselves, nor may such references substitute for such copies when the copies are missing from the record.\nIII.\nHaving concluded that the Court of Appeals acted properly on the record before it in vacating the judgment in the trial court, we also conclude the Court of Appeals did not err when it denied the State\u2019s motion to amend the record.\nIn Felmet, the defendant moved for leave to amend the record to include \u201cthe judgment of the district court which reflected defendant\u2019s appeal therefrom to the superior court\u201d to show how the superior court obtained subject matter jurisdiction over his case. Felmet, 302 N.C. at 174, 273 S.E.2d at 710. The Court of Appeals denied the motion. Id. We concluded that the denial was a decision within the discretion of the Court of Appeals and that we could find no abuse of that discretion. Id. at 176, 273 S.E.2d at 711. Nevertheless, we held the record should be amended to reflect subject matter jurisdiction so that we could reach the substantive issue of the appeal. In so holding, we stated, \u201c[this] is the better reasoned approach and avoids undue emphasis on procedural niceties.\u201d Id.\nWhile we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying the State\u2019s motion to amend, we elect as we did in Felmet to allow the State leave to amend.\nWhen the record is amended to add the presentment, it is clear the superior court had jurisdiction over these misdemeanors under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-272(2). Section 15A-641(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides:\nA presentment is a written accusation by a grand jury, made on its own motion and filed with a superior court, charging a person, or two or more persons jointly, with the commission of one or more criminal offenses. A presentment does not institute criminal proceedings against any person, but the district attorney is obligated to investigate the factual background of every presentment returned in his district and to submit bills of indictment to the grand jury dealing with the subject matter of any presentments when it is appropriate to do so.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-641(c) (1988). Section 15A-628(a)(4) of the North Carolina General Statutes states that a grand \u25a0 jury\nmay investigate any offense as to which no bill of indictment has been submitted to it by the prosecutor and issue a presentment accusing a named person or named persons with one or more criminal offenses if it has found probable cause for the charges made. An investigation may be initiated upon the concurrence of 12 members of the grand jury itself or upon the request of the presiding or convening judge or the prosecutor.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-628(a)(4) (1988) (emphasis added).\nThe amendment to the record shows that on 2 January 1990, the district attorney asked the Watauga County Grand Jury, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-628(a)(4), to investigate the charges against defendant. The grand jury did so and, pursuant to \u00a7 15A-641(c), filed with the superior court on 2 January 1992 a presentment against defendant charging him with violating N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7). Thereafter, the district attorney, pursuant to \u00a7 15A-641(c), submitted two bills of indictment to the grand jury dealing with the subject matter of the presentment; and the grand jury returned true bills of indictment on 19 February 1990 upon which defendant was tried and convicted.\nThe judgment of the superior court should not, on the record as amended, be vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\nIV.\nWe now address the important constitutional questions raised in this case. Defendant raised the constitutional issues by moving before trial to dismiss the indictments on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the statute on which the indictments were based. He renewed the motion at the close of. the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all the evidence. All motions to dismiss were denied by the trial court, and defendant has assigned these denials as error.\nDefendant contends that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad so as to violate the free speech guarantees in both the federal and state constitutions. We conclude that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7), properly interpreted, is not unconstitutionally vague; and we think the statute serves a legitimate compelling interest of the State and is drawn no more broadly than is necessary for that purpose.\nThe statute at issue provides as follows:\n\u00a7 163-274. Certain Acts declared misdemeanors.\nAny person who shall, in connection with any primary or election in this State, do any of the acts and things declared in this section to be unlawful, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. It shall be unlawful:\n(7) For any person to publish in a newspaper or pamphlet or otherwise, any charge derogatory to any candidate or calculated to affect the candidate\u2019s chances of nomination or election, unless such publication be signed by the party giving publicity to and being responsible for such charge.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7) (1991).\nThis statute is part of Subchapter VIII, titled \u201cRegulation of Election Campaigns,\u201d and of Article 22, titled \u201cCorrupt Practices and Other Offenses against the Elective Franchise,\u201d of our General Statutes. First enacted in 1931 (see Chapter 348, section 9(10) of the 1931 Session Laws), it is in the general category of election reform statutes, which take many forms and which are designed to prohibit various kinds of practices thought to be inimical to fair elections. Developments in the Law \u2014 Elections, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1111, 1286-87 (1975); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1992) for the Court\u2019s historical account of these reforms. Forty-three states have enacted legislation similar to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7) with the clear intent of \u201cpromot[ing] honesty and fairness in the conduct of an election campaign.\u201d Tennessee v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Tenn. 1982). Additionally, the United States Congress has enacted a statute making it a criminal offense to make an expenditure to publish and distribute statements expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate without stating the name of the person or persons responsible for its publication and distribution. 2 U.S.C. \u00a7 441d (1988); United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440 (D. N.D. 1961).\nA.\nDefendant first contends that certain terms in the statute are so vague that it fails to provide persons clear notice of the prohibited conduct.\nThe test for determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague has been stated as follows:\nA statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.\nConnally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 322, 328 (1926); accord Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 531, 169 S.E.2d 879, 888 (1969). While vagueness and uncertainty may invalidate a statute, In re Burrus, 275 N.C. at 531, 169 S.E.2d at 888, the Court will strive to interpret a statute to avoid serious doubts about its constitutionality. Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 402, 329 S.E.2d 636, 647 (1985). Thus if two reasonable constructions of the statute are possible, this Court will adopt the construction which renders the statute constitutional. In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1978); Hobbs v. Moore County, 267 N.C. 665, 149 S.E.2d 1 (1966).\nThe statute, properly interpreted, is not unconstitutionally vague. It prohibits anyone in the context of an election from (1) publishing (2) any charge (3) derogatory to a candidate or calculated to affect the candidate\u2019s electoral chances (4) without signing the publication. Contrary to defendant\u2019s position, we see nothing vague about the statute\u2019s use of the verb, \u201cto publish.\u201d To publish means simply \u201c1 a. to declare publicly: make generally known: DISCLOSE, CIRCULATE ... b. to proclaim officially ... c. to make public announcement of ... d. PUBLICIZE ... to give publication to Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1837 (1976). Clearly defendant\u2019s mailing the materials in question constituted their publication under the ordinary meaning of the term.\nWe find \u201ccharge\u201d to be the only term in the statute whose meaning may not be commonly understood and which requires judicial interpretation. See State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466, 485, 406 S.E.2d 579, 590 (1991). We find the following definitions to be instructive: The American Heritage Dictionary 260 (2d college ed. 1985) (\u201c6. An accusation or indictment: a charge of conspiracy to defraud\u201d); Webster\u2019s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 227 (1988) (\u201c6 . . . b : a statement of complaint or hostile criticism \u201d); Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 377 (1966) (\u201c6 a : an accusation of a wrong or offense : ALLEGATION, INDICTMENT b : a statement of complaint or hostile criticism \u201d); see also Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 233 (6th ed. 1990) (\u201can accusation\u201d); Legal Thesaurus 71 (1980) (\u201cAccusation ... allegation, arraignment, attack, blame, castigation, censure, citation, complaint, condemnation, count, countercharge\u201d). The common thread in these definitions is that \u201ccharge\u201d means an \u201caccusation.\u201d An \u201caccusation\u201d is defined as \u201ca charge of wrongdoing; imputation of guilt or blame.\u201d Random House Webster\u2019s College Dictionary 10.\nA Kentucky statute provided: \u201cAny person [could] prefer charges against a member of the police or fire department by filing them with the city manager\u201d for purposes of having the accused \u201creprimanded, dismissed or demoted.\u201d Mason v. Seaton, 303 Ky. 528, 529, 198 S.W.2d 205, 206 (1946) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that \u201c \u2018charges\u2019 signify an accusation ... of illegal conduct, either of omission or commission, by the person charged.\u201d Id. at 531, 198 S.W.2d at 207. In Rosales v. City of Elroy, 122 Ariz. 134, 593 P.2d 688 (1979), a former police officer who had been discharged for misconduct sued the city and the police chief, alleging libel and slander because the mayor and police chief had informed a newspaper that \u201ccharges\u201d had been placed against him. Both defendants contended that the officer could not prevail against them because no formal criminal charges had been filed against the officer. The Arizona court interpreted the word \u201ccharges\u201d as follows: \u201cThe basic premise of appellees\u2019 argument is that the word \u2018charges\u2019 means \u2018the filing of criminal charges\u2019 . . . . We do not agree with this premise. The word \u2018charges\u2019 also denotes \u2018accusations\u2019 or \u2018allegations\u2019 and does not necessarily mean the filing of criminal charges.\u201d Id. at 136, 593 P.2d at 690.\nUsing the above definitions and analyses, we conclude the legislature intended the word \u201ccharge\u201d to mean an accusation of wrongdoing.\nAs interpreted, the statute defines the proscribed conduct with sufficient definiteness so as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1982). We therefore conclude the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.\nB.\nDefendant next argues that the statute is not drawn narrowly enough and is constitutionally overbroad. Defendant agrees that the statute\u2019s goal of prohibiting anonymous pejorative campaign material is legitimate and concedes that \u201cwith more specificity in legislative drafting, that aim may be constitutionally sustainable.\u201d Defendant-Appellee\u2019s New Brief, p. 22. He contends that, as drawn, the statute \u201cembraces protected speech which the government may not restrict.\u201d Id. at 21. The State contends to the contrary, arguing the statute is narrowly drawn so as to encompass only \u201canonymous, derogatory material that is directed toward specific candidates.\u201d Brief for the State, p. 31. The State\u2019s position is that the statute could not be drawn more narrowly and still serve the State\u2019s compelling interest in insuring as far as possible fair elections. For the reasons which follow we find ourselves in agreement with the State.\nThe parties agree the State\u2019s interest in promoting fair and honest elections is legitimate and compelling. They disagree on whether the statute, as drafted, is necessary to serve that interest. This is the ultimate question for decision under the doctrines developed by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Free Speech Clause of the United States Constitution and which we adopt here for purposes of applying the Free Speech Clause of the North Carolina Constitution.\nThe First Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides:\nCongress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press[.]\nU.S. Const. amend. I. Similarly, Article I, \u00a7 14 of the North Carolina Constitution states:\nFreedom of speech and of the press are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but every person shall be held responsible for their abuse.\nN.C. Const. art. I, \u00a7 14.\nUnder the Federal Constitution, \u201cfreedom of .speech . . . which [is] secured by the First Amendment against abridgement by the United States, [is] among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a state.\u201d Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 1098 (1940). Where a statute regulating the time, place and manner of expressive activity is content-neutral in that it does not forbid communication of a specific idea, it will be upheld if the restriction is \u201cnarrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,\u201d and it \u201cleaves open ample alternatives for communication.\u201d Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. \u2014, \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 13 (1992); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 75 L. Ed. 2d 736, 743-44 (1983). A statute, however, which on its face reg\u00falates the content of protected speech in that it restricts communication of a specific idea \u201cmust be subjected to exacting scrutiny: the State must show that the \u2018regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.\u2019 \u201d Burson, 504 U.S. at \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13-14, quoting Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 804 (1983). A content-based regulation of speech occurs where restrictions are placed on the espousal of a particular viewpoint, or when there is a prohibition of public discussion on an entire topic. Burson, 504 U.S. at \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13. In such a case, \u201ca state must do more than assert a compelling state interest \u2014 it must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest.\u201d Id. at \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 15.\nBecause the statute expressly regulates political speech, it is content-based. E.g., id. at \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13. We must give it exacting scrutiny; and we must be satisfied that it is necessary to serve the State\u2019s compelling interest in having fair, honest elections.\nOur State Constitution offers similar free speech protection in Article I, Section 14. This provision is self-executing, and we have recognized a cause of action against state officials for its violation. Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289, cert. denied, Durham v. Corum, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 121 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1992). In some of our cases, the Court has found the guarantees in the state and federal constitutions to be parallel and has addressed them as if their protections were equivalent. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708; Andrews v. Chateau X, 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979), vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 947, 63 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1980). We have also recognized that \u201cin construing provisions of the Constitution of North Carolina, this Court is not bound by opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States construing even identical provisions in the Constitution of the United States.\u201d State v. Hicks, 333 N.C. 467, 483, 428 S.E.2d 167, 176 (1993); State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 642, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1984). \u201cWe do, however, give great weight to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States interpreting provisions of the Constitution of the United States which are parallel to provisions of the State Constitution to be construed.\u201d Id. at 484, 428 S.E.2d at 176. In this case, for the purpose of applying our State Constitution\u2019s Free Speech Clause we adopt the United State\u2019s Supreme Court\u2019s First Amendment jurisprudence.\nThe United States Supreme Court has long permitted certain regulations of protected speech for appropriate reasons. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1976). Thus, a paid lobbyist, a member of a specialized occupation, can be required to register and disclose his or her contributors. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 98 L. Ed. 989 (1954). A candidate for election can be required to disclose the sources of contributions so as to prevent corruption. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976). A publisher of a newspaper can be required to make disclosures to obtain second-class mailing privileges. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 57 L. Ed. 1190 (1913). A grand jury can require disclosure of newspaper sources to aid in the prosecution of criminal activity. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1972).\nEven in the area of political speech, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a state \u201cindisputably has a compelling state interest in preserving the integrity and reliability of its election process.\u201d Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231, 103 L. Ed. 2d 271, 287 (1989); e.g., Schuster v. Imperial County Airport, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887, 896, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447, 451 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, 68 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1981). While \u201cthere is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the [First] Amendment [is] to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs . . . including] discussion of candidates,\u201d Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 685, there is also agreement as to the compelling government interest in ensuring honest and fair elections. Burson, 504 U.S. at \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 14-15. Therefore, the Supreme Court has \u201cupheld generally-applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.\u201d Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 557 n.9 (1983); Burson, 504 U.S. at \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 15.\nWe believe the statute before us is an example of such a evenhanded restriction. In arriving at this decision two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court have been our polar stars: Burson, 504 U.S. \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, and Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 4 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1960). Burson is the latest of several decisions of the Court sustaining the constitutionality of various election law reform statutes against free speech challenges. Burson holds that a state statute prohibiting the display and distribution of campaign materials and the solicitation of votes for or against a candidate or party within 100 feet from the entrance of the polling place did not violate the Free Speech Clause. A plurality of justices concluded the statute survived strict scrutiny and was necessary to serve the state\u2019s compelling interest in preventing voter intimidation and fraud and \u201cin protecting the right to vote.\u201d Burson, 504 U.S. at \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 20. Burson relied heavily on the history of campaign abuses which election reform statutes like the one before it were designed to curb in concluding the statute was a. necessary infringement on free speech.\nTalley holds that a municipal ordinance banning the distribution of anonymous \u201chandbill[s] in any place under any circumstances\u201d violates the Free Speech Clause. 362 U.S. at 61, 65, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 561, 563. Relying on history demonstrating the need for certain persecuted groups at certain times \u201cto criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all,\u201d id. at 64, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 563, the Court concluded the statute must fail because it prohibited too much. The municipality had argued that the ordinance was necessary to \u201cidentify those responsible for fraud, false advertising and libel.\u201d 362 U.S. at 64, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 562. The Supreme Court concluded there was no such necessity, saying:\nYet the ordinance is in no manner so limited, nor have we been referred to any legislative history indicating such a purpose. Therefore we do not pass upon the validity of an ordinance limited to prevent these or any other supposed evils. This ordinance simply bars all handbills under all circumstances anywhere that do not have the names and addresses printed on them in the place the ordinance requires.\n364 U.S. at 64, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 562. Talley thus expressly left open the question whether a more narrowly drawn ordinance would be upheld. Tennessee v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306. Interestingly, the dissenters in Talley (Associate Justices Clark, Frankfurter and Whittaker) cited electoral reform statutes prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign material directed toward political candidates as an example of valid restrictions on speech, saying\nthe several States have corrupt practices acts outlawing, inter alia, the distribution of anonymous publications with reference to political candidates. While.these statutes are leveled at political campaign and election practices, the underlying ground sustaining their validity applies with equal force here.\n362 U.S. at 70, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 566 (Clark, Frankfurter, Whittaker, JJ., dissenting).\nThe statute before us falls in between the ones considered, respectively, by Burson and Talley. Like the statute in Burson it is directed at serving the state\u2019s compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process. Like the statute in Talley it proscribes anonymity. Burson, however, involved a prohibition on all speech within certain geographic boundaries. Talley involved a prohibition of all anonymous handbills. Our statute, on the other hand, proscribes only anonymous speech only if that speech involves an accusation of wrongdoing against an electoral candidate which is derogatory or which is calculated to affect the candidate\u2019s chances for election. We conclude our statute, being more akin to the statute in Burson, survives strict scrutiny in that it is a necessary enactment which could not- be drawn more narrowly in order to serve the state\u2019s compelling interest in protecting electoral integrity.\nDefendant and the dissenters complain that the statute covers even truthful statements, and it clearly does. Burson teaches that this alone is no ground for striking the statute, for the restrictions on speech upheld in Burson also applied to truthful campaign materials. In the context of a campaign it is necessary for accusers of candidates to identify themselves, even if they speak the truth, in order for the electorate to be able to assess the accusers\u2019 bias and interest. Why is it that the accuser comes forward with the accusation, even if it is true? What motivates the accuser? This kind of information is required in order for the electorate to determine what weight, if any, should be given the accusation, even if it is true. The source of the charge is as much at issue as the charge itself. Our statute, then, serves the compelling state interest of \u201cproviding voters with information to aid them in assessing the weight to be given a particular statement. \u201cThere does not appear to be a less restrictive means of furthering this interest, and therefore, unlike the ordinance in Talley, campaign disclosure laws cannot be said to be overly broad.\" Developments \u2014 Election Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1111, 1290 (1975) (emphasis supplied).\nThe statute, consequently, is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. Albeit a restraint on speech, it comports with the free speech guaranties in both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of North Carolina.\nWe are bolstered in our conclusion by decisions from other jurisdictions sustaining similar statutes against the contention that they violate free speech guaranties; the courts conclude the statutes are necessary to serve a state\u2019s compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d at 307; United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. at 443; Canon v. Justice Ct., 61 Cal. 2d 446, 452, 458-59, 393 P.2d 428, 431, 416, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228, 231, 235 (1964).\nIn Canon v. Justice Court, the Supreme Court of California held that a statute which, like our own, prohibited publication of anonymous literature designed to injure or defeat any candidate for public office by reflecting on his personal character or political action, was a constitutional restraint on free speech. 61 Cal. 2d at 451, 393 P.2d at 430, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 229. Although the Canon Court did find the statute unconstitutionally discriminatory against all individuals other than California voters, the court held that the statute in no way was flawed by overbreadth. In so holding, the Canon Court stated:\n[The statute] requires identification so that (1) the electorate may be better able to evaluate campaign material by examination of the competence and credibility of its source, (2) irresponsible attacks will be deterred, (3) candidates may be better able to refute or rebut charges \u2014 so that elections will be the expression of the will of an undeceived, well-informed public. It is clear that the integrity of elections, essential to the very preservation of a free society, is a matter \u2018in which the State may have a compelling regulatory concern.\u2019 . . . [The statute] was intended to deter the scurrilous hit and run smear attacks which are all too common in the course of political campaigns. The primary concern is not for the candidate, however, although it is clearly in the public interest to create conditions conducive to the encouragement of good citizens to seek public office. The chief harm is that suffered by all people when, as a result of the public having been misinformed and misled, the election is not the expression of the true public will.\n\u201c[A]nonymity all too often lends itself, in the context of attacks upon candidates in the preelection period, to smears, as a result of which the electorate is deceived. Identification permits confrontation and often makes refutation easier and more effective. It tends to reduce irresponsibility. It enables the public to appraise the source.\u201d\nId. at 452-53, 459, 393 P.2d at 431-32, 435, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32, 235.\nIn United States v. Scott, the United States District Court upheld Section 612 of Title 18 of the United States Code which reads:\nWhoever willfully publishes or distributes . . . any card, pamphlet, circular, poster, dodger, advertisement, writing, or other statement relating to or concerning a person who has publicly declared his intention to do so to be publicly declared, which does not contain the names of the persons, associations, committees, and corporations responsible for the publication or distribution of the same, and the names of the officers of each such association, committee, or corporation, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both.\n195 F. Supp. at 441. While 18 U.S.C.A. 612 considered by Scott was repealed in 1976, it has been replaced by a substantially similar statute. See 2 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 441d. The Scott Court held the statute was a constitutional enactment by the United States Congress that ensured \u201cthe electorate would be informed and [would] make its own appraisal of the reason or reasons why a particular candidate was being supported or opposed by an individual or group.\u201d Id. at 443. Although the statute in Scott, was limited to candidates for the Executive Branch of the federal government and to candidates for United States Congress, the scope of its prohibition was not as narrow as section 163-274(7) in that it was not limited to \u201ccharges\u201d against candidates.\nIn Tennessee v. Acey, the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld a statute imposing criminal sanctions upon persons anonymously disseminating written statements about candidates for public office. 633 S.W.2d at 306. Recognizing the state\u2019s compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process and ensuring the existence of an informed electorate, the Acey Court concluded that the campaign literature disclosure law was the least restrictive means of furthering these interests. Id. at 307.\nDefendant relies on Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 4 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1960), and Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1980), both of which we find distinguishable. We have already considered Talley and elaborated our reasons for believing that it does not control. Schuster, a California Court of Appeals case, dealt with a statute that prohibited \u201call anonymous political campaign literature\u201d by all persons. 109 Cal. App. 3d at 890-91, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 448. Neither the Talley ordinance nor the Schuster statute was limited, as is our statute, to a far narrower spectrum of prohibited activity.\nWe recognize that other jurisdictions have found statutes proscribing anonymous publications to be unconstitutionally overbroad. We find these cases unpersuasive because, unlike our own, the statutes in question are considerably broader than ours. Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. N.Y. 1968) (statute makes it a crime to distribute any handbill containing any statement concerning any candidate in connection with any election of public officers unless signed \u2014 not limited to charges), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 394 U.S. 103, 22 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1969); California v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856, 23 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1962) (statute requires signature of person responsible on circulars or handbills that seek to influence the result of elections \u2014 not limited to a particular candidate); Illinois v. White, 116 Ill. 2d 171, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (1987) (statute requires signature of any person who publishes or distributes any political literature soliciting votes for or against any candidate or for or against any public questions to be submitted for the ballot at an election \u2014 affects more than the chances of a particular candidate); Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So. 2d 866 (1976) (statute proscribing any person from publishing any statement concerning any candidate for election unless it is signed \u2014 not restricted to charges); Massachusetts v. Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706 (1975) (statute making it a crime to write or distribute any circular designed to aid or defeat any candidate or any question submitted to voters without name of officer of organization or name of voter responsible \u2014 not limited to charges against candidates); New York v. Duryea, 76 Misc. 2d 948, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (statute makes anonymity a crime when anyone prints or distributes any literature in quantity containing any statement concerning any candidate or issue on the ballot in connection with any party or governmental action \u2014 not limited to charges or candidates), order aff\u2019d, 44 A.D.2d 663, 354 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1974); North Dakota v. Education Association, 262 N.W.2d 731 (1978) (statute requires all political advertisements to disclose name of sponsor \u2014 not limited to charges or candidates); Pennsylvania v. Wadzinski, 492 Pa. 35, 422 A.2d 124 (1980) (statute proscribes any person from publishing any statement concerning any candidate for election without signature of person responsible \u2014 not limited to charges). Significantly we have found no case, state or federal, holding unconstitutional a statute with a prohibition drawn as narrowly as ours.\nFinally, although the North Carolina Constitution holds freedom of speech and the press to be \u201cgreat bulwarks of liberty\u201d never to be restrained, it also provides that \u201cevery person shall be held responsible for their abuse.\u201d N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 14. We believe the General Assembly has enacted section 163-274(7) in an effort to effect, by the narrowest possible means, the latter prong of this constitutional guarantee.\nV.\nDefendant next contends the trial court committed reversible error by incorrectly defining the essential elements of the statute in its instructions to the jury. We agree.\nSection 163-274(7) requires that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant published \u201ca charge derogatory to a candidate or calculated to affect the candidate\u2019s chances of nomination or election.\u201d For all eleven counts against defendant the trial court instructed the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant published:\na charge he intended to be derogatory to a candidate for election to the Boone Town Council, or which he calculated would affect such candidate\u2019s chances of election and that such publication was not signed by the party giving publicity to and being responsible for such charge it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of this count. . . .\n(Emphasis supplied.)\nPrior to delivery of the verdict sheets to the jury, defendant timely objected to the trial court\u2019s instructions on the ground that the trial court had \u201cswitched over from an objective standard set forth in the statute to a subjective standard. . . .\u201d See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2) (party may not assign as error any portion of jury charge unless objection is made before jury retires to consider its verdict). The trial court overruled the objection, stating that it understood the statute to require a finding that defendant intended the charge to be derogatory to a candidate or intended the material to affect the candidate\u2019s chances for election.\nDefendant argues that the trial court\u2019s charge erroneously included a scienter requirement while no such requirement is present in the statute. Conversely, the State contends that the trial court\u2019s instruction required the jury to find more than the statute required and therefore placed a heavier burden on the State to prove defendant\u2019s guilt. We agree with defendant and conclude the trial court erroneously instructed the jury to defendant\u2019s prejudice, thus entitling him to a new trial.\n\u201cWhen [the trial court] undertakes to define the law, [it] must state it correctly.\u201d State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 70, 296 S.E.2d 649, 654 (1982). Failure to do so may be prejudicial error sufficient to warrant a new trial. Id. In Earnhardt defendant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 65, 296 S.E.2d at 651. One item of proof necessary for a conviction as accessory after the fact is that the defendant knew the felony had been committed by the person assisted. Id. at 69, 296 S.E.2d at 654, In instructing the jury, \u201cthe trial court stated that if defendant, \u2018knowing Horne and Lagree or Horne and Lagree could have committed the crime of voluntary manslaughter, assisted Horne or Lagree in escaping or attempting to escape detection, arrest or punishment by concocting a story which was not true . . .,\u2019 then he should be found guilty.\u201d Upon review, this Court held that the trial court\u2019s instruction was reversible error. Id. at 70, 296 S.E.2d at 654. Even though this was the only error found in defendant\u2019s trial, the Court held that the instructions incorrectly defined a crucial element of the crime with which the defendant was charged and allowed for the possibility of confusion among the jurors. Id.\nHere, as in Earnhardt, we believe the incorrect instruction was \u201ctoo prejudicial to be hidden by the familiar rule that the charge must be considered contextually as a whole.\u201d Id. Section 163-274(7) is framed both objectively and subjectively. Objectively, it requires conviction if the jury determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the material published by defendant was a charge and that such charge was derogatory to a candidate. Whether a defendant believed or intended such material to be a charge derogatory is irrelevant. The jury\u2019s determination is not based on the state of mind of defendant, but on its objective interpretation of the publication. The statute also includes a subjective inquiry. It requires conviction if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the publication was \u201ccalculated to affect the candidate\u2019s chances of nomination or election.\u201d\nWe do not agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s state of mind is relevant to both inquiries. Rather, we conclude the legislature drafted this statute giving the jury two distinct grounds upon which to convict. The jury could find that the published material was a derogatory charge, and it could find that the charge was \u201ccalculated\u201d by defendant to affect a candidate\u2019s chances for nomination or election. Were the jury to find that defendant did not intend the published material to affect the candidate\u2019s electoral chances, it could only find defendant guilty of violating the statute if it were to find that the published materials contained a derogatory charge.\nIn the instant case defendant testified that at the time he mailed the offending materials he did not think candidates Chase or Miller would win the election in any event. Based on this testimony, the jury could have found that the published materials were not calculated by defendant to affect either candidate\u2019s chances for election. If such were the case, defendant only could have been convicted if the jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the charge was objectively derogatory. Because, however, of the trial court\u2019s erroneous instructions, the jury would have been required to convict defendant upon a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant only intended the materials to be derogatory even if, objectively, the jury did not consider them to be so.\nBecause the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding one of two possible theories upon which defendant could be convicted and it is unclear upon which theory or theories the jury relied in arriving at its verdict, we must assume the jury based its verdict on the theory for which it received an improper instruction. State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 393 S.E.2d 811 (1990) (submitting case to jury on alternative theories, including one not supported by evidence, was reversible error requiring new trial); State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 574, 356 S.E.2d 319, 326 (1987) (possibility that felony murder conviction was based on predicate felony improperly submitted to jury warranted new trial); State v. Belton, 318 N.C. 141, 162-63, 347 S.E.2d 755, 768-69 (1986) (possibility that jury relied on unsupported theory to convict defendant required new trial); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942) (conviction cannot stand merely because it could have been supported by one theory submitted to jury if another invalid theory was also submitted and general verdict does not specify theory upon which verdict is based).\nVI.\nDefendant next contends the trial court\u2019s failure to exclude the testimony of candidates Chase and Miller relating out-of-court declarations of others on the effect of the publications constituted prejudicial error. We conclude that the witnesses\u2019 testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay and should have been excluded. Because defendant is entitled to a new trial on other grounds, we express no opinion as to whether the admission of this testimony was reversible error.\nDuring the presentation of the State\u2019s case, candidate Miller was directly examined as follows:\nQ. Ma\u2019am, the people who contacted you \u2014 you said a moment ago that there were several people who called you about the flyer?\nA. Yes.\nQ. The people-who contacted you about the flyer, did they indicate it was helpful or hurtful to your election chances?\nMr. WHITTLE: Your Honor, I OBJECT to that as calling for hearsay and it\u2019s opinion hearsay.\nTHE COURT: Well, you don\u2019t offer it for the truth of what was stated \u2014\nMr. WILSON: No, sir-\nThe COURT: \u2014but for what they said?\nMr. WILSON: For what they said.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nQ. Yes, ma\u2019am, go ahead.\nA. Ahh people asked if I had sent that out, and I said no I didn\u2019t. Ahh they were surprised, they thought maybe I had sent it out.\nQ. But my question was, ma\u2019am, did they indicate to you whether it was helpful or hurtful to your election chances?\nMR. WHITTLE: OBJECTION to that.\nA. Oh, they didn\u2019t think it was helpful\u2014\nThe Court: Overruled.\nA. They did not think it was helpful at all and they were quite surprised.\nQ. How many people did you talk to concerning the flyer?\nA. I think about eight people that evening.\nMR. WHITTLE: MOVE TO STRIKE.\nThe Court: Denied. .\nCandidate Chase was examined similarly:\nQ. Did you discuss, sir, with your supporters and with the voting public in Boone generally [the flyer concerning liquor by the drink]?\nA. Not to as great an extent because it came later compared to the date of the election.\nQ. Those that you did discuss it with, sir, did you find it helpful or derogatory to your candidacy?\nMR. WHITTLE: Objection, Your Honor.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nA. That evening I only discussed it with one member of the public and he, and he found, he was, he was \u2014 the best that I can recall he said \u2014\nQ. Well, don\u2019t tell us what he said, but just whether or not he felt it was derogatory, whether or not you found it to be derogatory or helpful to your candidacy.\nA. He found it to be derogatory.\nMR. WHITTLE: OBJECTION.\nTHE COURT: OVERRULED.\nMR. WHITTLE: MOVE TO STRIKE.\nThe Court: Denied.\nUnder our Rules of Evidence, \u201c[hjearsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or by these rules.\u201d N.C.6.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 802 (1988); State v. Patterson, 332 N.C. 409, 420 S.E.2d 98 (1992). Hearsay is \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1988). A \u201cstatement\u201d is \u201c(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(a) (1992). Here, candidates Miller and Chase testified as to the actual opinions expressed by certain local residents out of court concerning whether the materials were derogatory and hurtful to the candidate\u2019s chances of being elected. We conclude these statements were admitted for the truth of what was said; therefore, they were inadmissible hearsay.\nWe further conclude the evidence does not fall within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. The State contends the statements were admissible as lay witness opinion testimony under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701. We conclude these statements do not fall within the scope of Rule 701. Rule 701 allows a lay witness to testify as to his or her opinion if it is \u201c(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 (1992). Here, Miller and Chase were not testifying as to their own opinions. Rather, both witnesses were repeating the out-of-court opinions expressed by non-testifying declarants. These opinions should have been subject to cross-examination by defendant. Because neither witness was testifying as to their own opinion, Rule 701 is inapplicable.\nFor the foregoing reasons the decision of the Court of Appeals vacating the judgment of the superior court is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the superior court in order that defendant may be given a new trial.\nREVERSED; REMANDED; NEW TRIAL.\nJustice Parker did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. Defendant states in his brief at p. 30: \u201cThe Defendant agrees with the State that \u2018[i]t is well settled that a state has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity and orderliness of the election process.\u2019 \u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "EXUM, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "Justice MITCHELL\ndissenting.\nThe majority errs in its conclusion that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7) is a constitutionally permissible restriction on free expression. Although I agree that the State has an interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process by promoting openness, honesty and fairness in the conduct of elections, I reject the majority\u2019s conclusion that this interest justifies the limitations on First Amendment rights imposed by this statute.\nThe statute at issue in the present case makes it a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment \u201c[f]or any person to publish in a newspaper or pamphlet or otherwise, any charge derogatory to any candidate or calculated to affect the candidate\u2019s chances of nomination or election, unless such publication be signed by the party giving publicity to and being responsible for such charge.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7) (1991). The statute prohibits anonymous exposure in a public forum of truthful information about public figures. Therefore, it is a restriction on pure political expression which forms the innermost core of protected free speech. I have grave reservations as to whether, consistent with the First Amendment, any public purpose can justify such a limitation on pure political expression; I am convinced that the state interest advanced in the present case is insufficient to sustain the statute against this First Amendment challenge. Further, the definition that the majority has given the word \u201ccharge\u201d as used in the statute, to include only accusations of wrongdoing, guilt or blame, causes the statute to be an even more impermissible denial of First Amendment rights.\nThe majority acknowledges that the statute plainly places a restriction on publications which convey truthful information to the public about important public issues \u2014 the election of public officials. Such publications constitute pure political expression which is protected by the most basic tenets of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.\nIn N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized the importance of free debate of such public issues:\nThis Court has recognized that expression on public issues \u201chas always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.\u201d Carey v Brown, 447 US 455, 467, 65 L Ed 2d 263, 100 S Ct 2286. \u201c[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.\u201d Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64, 74-75, 13 L Ed 2d 125, 85 S Ct 209. There is a \u201cprofound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.\u201d New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270, 11 L Ed 2d 686, 84 S Ct 710, 95 ALR2d 1412.\n458 U.S. 886, 913, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1215, 1236 (1982). As a result of this \u201cprofound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open,\u201d the Supreme Court has held that even false charges, when made in relation to a public figure and without knowledge of or reckless disregard for the statement\u2019s falsity, are protected by the First Amendment. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41, 52-53 (1988); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964). The Supreme Court has done so because \u201cerroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, ... it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the \u2018breathing space\u2019 that they \u2018need ... to survive.\u2019 \u201d Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 701 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, 418 (1963)). This nation is committed \u201cto the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.\u201d Id. at 270, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 701.\nJames Madison emphasized the importance of unrestricted freedom of expression concerning candidates for public office when he stated the following in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions;\n\u201cLet it be recollected, lastly, that the right of electing the members of the government constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and responsible government. The value and efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates respectively.\u201d\nSullivan, 376 U.S. at 275 n.15, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 703 n.15 (quoting 4 Elliot\u2019s Debates on the Constitution 575 (1876)). The Supreme Court of the United States also has recognized the importance of the right to freely discuss candidates for political office:\n[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates [is] integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. ... In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential,- for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.\nBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, 685 (1976) (per curiam). \u201cWhatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates.\u201d Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 16 L. Ed. 2d 484, 488 (1966). \u201c \u2018It can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.\u2019 \u201d Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 685 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 28 L. Ed. 2d 35, 41 (1971)) (emphasis added).\nThe right to anonymity has long been recognized in this country as a necessary component of the constitutional rights of free speech and a free press. In Talley v. California, the Supreme Court of the United States stressed that \u201c[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.\u201d 362 U.S. 60, 64, 4 L. Ed. 2d 559, 563 (1960). Even before the Revolutionary War, many authors in England, including such well-known authors as Defoe, Swift, and Johnson, published anonymous pamphlets criticizing political affairs. Notes and Comments, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 Yale L. Rev. 1084, 1085 (1961) (citing Courtney, The Secrets of Our National Literature 151-77 (1908)). By the time the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was proposed by Congress in 1789, anonymously published political criticisms were a familiar source of information. Id. Both before and after the First Amendment became effective on 15 December 1791, the founders of this country often were compelled to exercise their right to criticize governmental officials anonymously. \u201c[BJetween 1789 and 1809 no fewer than six presidents, fifteen cabinet members, twenty senators, and thirty-four congressmen published political writings either unsigned or under pen names.\u201d Id. (citing 4 Beveridge, The Life of Marshall, 313-19 (1919)). Anonymous publications of that time included the following: The Federalist Papers, written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, which were originally published as letters to the editor and signed \u201cPublius\u201d; The Letters of Pacificus, written by Hamilton in defense of Washington\u2019s proclamation of neutrality, and Madison\u2019s responding Letters of Helvidius; and anonymous exchanges between Chief Justice Marshall, writing as \u201ca friend to the Republic\u201d and in defense of Supreme Court decisions, and Spencer Roane, who anonymously attacked certain Supreme Court decisions. Id. The Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have demonstrated their firm grasp of such historical facts when repeatedly concluding that regulations requiring the disclosure of a speaker\u2019s identity are restrictions on the exercise of the right to free speech. E.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 628-29, 48 L. Ed. 2d 243, 258 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (\u201cRestraints implicit in identification requirements, ... extend beyond restrictions on time and place \u2014 they chill discussion itself.\u201d); Talley, 362 U.S. at 64, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 563 (\u201cThere can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression.\u201d); see Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523, 4 L. Ed. 2d 480, 485 (1960) (\u201c \u2018It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective . . . restraint on freedom of association.\u2019\u201d (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, 1499 (1958))).\nThe type of communications restricted by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7) \u2014 anonymous publications of \u201cany charge derogatory to any candidate or calculated to affect the candidate\u2019s chances of nomination or election\u201d \u2014 encompasses both true statements and honest misstatements of fact relating to public figures. Both of these types of statements are forms of core political expression which are entitled to the greatest protection provided by the First Amendment. The statute\u2019s requirement that \u201cthe party giving publicity to and being responsible for\u201d such publications always either \u201csign\u201d them or face imprisonment for failure to do so undoubtedly will prevent many individuals from exercising their constitutionally protected right to attack a candidate with the truth. Furthermore, in addition to the deterrent effect of a disclosure requirement on the exercise of protected core political expression, \u201c[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.\u201d Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797, 101 L. Ed. 2d 669, 689 (1988). Both because N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7) chills the exercise of protected free expression and because it mandates the content of such expression, this statute is subject to \u201cexacting First Amendment scrutiny.\u201d Id. at 797-98, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 690; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 18, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 687.\nThe statute at issue here, among other things, makes it a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for any person to publish a completely truthful charge against any candidate for nomination or election to office, unless the person signs the publication. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7) (1991). As authoritatively construed by the majority, the statute does not prohibit anonymous publications praising candidates or otherwise not amounting to a charge of wrongdoing or an imputation of guilt or blame. Therefore, under any recognized constitutional test, the challenged statute is a content-based restriction on pure political expression in a public forum. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 99 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1988); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, \u00a7 12-2 (2d ed. 1988); Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech; A Treatise on the First Amendment \u00a7 2.04 (1984 & Supp. 1992); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 615 (1991). Accordingly, the statute \u201cmust be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny.\u201d Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 321, 99 L. Ed. 2d at 345. The State must bear the burden of showing that the \u201c \u2018regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.\u2019 \u201d Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. \u2014, \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 14 (1992) (plurality opinion) (quoting Perry Education Ass\u2019n. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Ass\u2019n., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 804 (1983)). The Supreme Court of the United States has expressly emphasized that \u201cit is the rare case in which ... a law survives strict scrutiny.\u201d Id. at \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 22. This is no such \u201crare case.\u201d\nIn Burson v. Freeman, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that it has \u201cupheld generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.\u201d Id. at \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 15 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, n.9, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 557-58, n.9 (1983)). The statute under challenge in the present case, however, clearly is neither generally applicable nor evenhanded. As construed by the majority, the statute prohibits anonymous publication of truthful charges against a candidate, but does not reach the anonymous publication of untruthful praise for a candidate. Surely this statute cannot be an example of the sort of \u201cgenerally applicable and evenhanded restrictions\u201d protecting the integrity of the electoral process which the Supreme Court of the United States finds constitutionally acceptable.\nIn Burson, a decision relied upon by the majority here, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a statute forbidding political campaigning at polling places on election day. In doing so, however, the plurality opinion for the Court expressly emphasized that the Court\u2019s \u201cexamination of the evolution of election reform, both in this country and abroad, demonstrates the necessity of restricted areas in or around polling places.\u201d Id. at \u2014, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 15. It is clear to me that no similar demonstration of necessity for the restrictions embodied in the statute under attack here has been or could be made.\nIn my view, the State has made nothing remotely approaching a showing in the present case that the statute at issue is necessary to serve a compelling state interest or that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Instead, it is apparent to me that the statute in question, which prohibits anonymous but truthful charges against political candidates, falls within the class of statutes properly deemed by the Supreme Court to be an \u201cobvious and flagrant abridgement\u201d of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. at 219, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 488.\nI agree that the State has a compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of the electoral process and in encouraging openness, honesty and fairness in elections. This state interest itself is grounded in one of the First Amendment\u2019s most fundamental purposes: to encourage unfettered discussion on the qualifications of candidates for public office in order to enable the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-15, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 685. However, the burdensome restrictions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7) are not \u201cnecessary\u201d to serve that interest and most certainly are not \u201cnarrowly drawn to achieve that end.\u201d The statute unconstitutionally tramples on the right to publish anonymously and, thus, freely on issues of public concern.\nThe State acknowledges in its brief before this Court that the purpose of the statute is to eliminate \u201cthe opportunity for a person to remain hidden while disseminating derogatory material about a specific candidate.\u201d The State argues, and the majority of this Court agrees, that such a limitation is necessary, because a voter who reads anonymous, derogatory publications regarding a candidate \u201chas no context within which to evaluate the bias of the source of anonymous information,\u201d and because \u201cthe candidate has no opportunity fully to rebut such material by showing the motives of the sender.\u201d The essence of the argument is that the statute in question will encourage openness in the election process by requiring that additional information \u2014 the identity of the publisher of any charge concerning a candidate for public office\u2014 be submitted to the voters. This argument fails to recognize the obvious and undeniable fact that the disclosure requirement will prevent many individuals from making truthful and highly relevant statements crucial to the public\u2019s ability to judge the qualifications of candidates for public office. Rather than being necessary to encourage openness, honesty and fairness in the electoral process, the criminal statute at issue here frustrates those goals by reducing the amount of relevant truthful information about candidates for public office that will reach the voting public. Absent the right to criticize a candidate anonymously, some truthful messages \u201cmay never enter the marketplace of ideas at all.\u201d Kreimer, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 87.\nThe statute as construed by the majority here will deter many individuals from publishing negative facts about a candidate which are clearly true and relevant to that candidate\u2019s fitness for public office. The State acknowledges that the statute has such an effect and even suggests that it is a desirable effect. The State points out in its brief before this Court that \u201cdisparaging and belittling material about a particular candidate may often be true; its very truthfulness can make it more derogatory and hurtful than lies.\u201d Although perhaps an accurate analysis, this is all the more reason why it is crucial to the openness and honesty of elections to give such information to the voting public. The truthful information will be harmful only if the voting public deems the information relevant to a candidate\u2019s fitness for office, and the public must have such information in order to make an informed selection at the polls. Rather than damaging the integrity of the electoral process, access to truthful but anonymous charges concerning a candidate clearly promotes that integrity by providing the public with more complete information about the candidate.\nDespite the fact that the statute restricts individuals wishing to publish truthful but anonymous charges about political candidates and, thereby, places a limitation upon their exercise of First Amendment rights, the State has offered no evidence in support of its contention that disclosure of the author\u2019s identity is necessary to enable voters to evaluate the reliability or weight to be given such charges. One commentator, citing several studies indicating that voters are not at all subject to being so easily misled, has concluded, to the contrary, that \u201c[i]t seems unlikely that our media-saturated electorate will be duped, into self-destruction by nefarious forces\u201d which are concealing their identities. Kreimer, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 88.\nThe State has not shown that voters are more easily misled by anonymous statements than by statements which are attributed. However, even if it is assumed that voters are more likely to be misled by anonymous statements, the statute as interpreted by the majority permits an individual to make laudatory anonymous statements about a candidate freely. Therefore, the statute results in \u201cviewpoint discrimination\u201d and unquestionably is a \u201ccontent-based\u201d regulation of expression. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. \u2014, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992). \u201cThe First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech . . . because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.\u201d Id. at \u2014, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 317 (emphasis added). Therefore, for example, \u201cthe government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government. Id. at \u2014, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 318. The State has offered no evidence showing that false anonymous statements praising a particular candidate are less damaging to the integrity of the electoral process than the truthful \u201ccharges\u201d of wrongdoing by a candidate which are made imprisonable offenses by the statute. Indeed, it is inconceivable that any such showing could be made. See id. The State has failed utterly to establish a rational basis for these distinctions under the statute, and it most certainly has failed to overcome the presumption of the invalidity of this content-based statute by making the required showing that such discrimination is necessary to insure open and fair elections and narrowly drawn to reach that end.\nThe State also has failed to show that disclosure of the author\u2019s identity is necessary to enable candidates to refute false statements. A candidate can rebut allegations contained in negative campaign material without knowing the identity of the author of that material. Furthermore, although the candidate may have difficulty showing the bias of an unidentified author, the fact that the author of a statement is unwilling to reveal his or her identity in itself serves to put every recipient of voting age on notice that the statement may be less believable than one which has been signed.\nFinally, none of the State\u2019s purported justifications for the statute at issue explain why a requirement that truthful publications be signed is necessary to promote openness, honesty and fairness in the electoral process. It would seem that anonymous but truthful and relevant information about the candidates would promote rather than detract from that goal. The State has not shown that the criminal penalties imposed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7) are either \u201cnecessary\u201d to promote any compelling interest or \u201cnarrowly drawn\u201d to achieve any such end. To the contrary, the statute\u2019s requirements are \u201cprophylactic, imprecise, and unduly burdensome.\u201d Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. at 800, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 691.\nIn sum, the type of \u201cdanger\u201d presented by the publication of a truthful anonymous statement about a candidate for public office which is an imprisonable criminal offense under the statute at issue \u201c \u2018is precisely one of the types of activity envisioned by the Founders in presenting the First Amendment for ratification.\u2019 \u201d Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1, 14 (1978) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569, 579 (1962)). The statute criminalizes protected \u201ccore\u201d or fundamental political expression of a type which cannot be prohibited and thereby violates the guarantees of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.\nAdditionally, and of equal constitutional importance, this statute permits the imprisonment of a person solely because of the content of his or her anonymous publications criticizing a candidate. As authoritatively construed by the majority of this Court, the statute would permit a person to anonymously praise a candidate with impunity even if the praise is false. This criminal statute prohibiting anonymous expression about a candidate on the ground that its content includes a charge against the candidate is directly contrary to the principles of the First Amendment as quite clearly interpreted by a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. ---, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305.\nUntil today, I thought that no reasonable lawyer or judge would have imagined that a statute such as the one in question here could possibly pass First Amendment scrutiny. Obviously, I was wrong in this regard as my colleagues on this Court ordinarily are reasonable people.\nBefore the majority upholds this statute allowing defendants to be imprisoned for publishing political pamphlets such as those at issue in the present case, it would do well to recall the following words of James Madison, who understood as well as anyone ever has the evils which led to the adoption of the First Amendment:\nSome degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing, and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.\nIt has accordingly been decided . . . that it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than by pruning them away, to injure the vigor of those yielding the proper fruits.\nRenwick v. News and Observer, 310 N.C. 312, 326, 312 S.E.2d 405, 413, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858, L. Ed. 2d 121 (1984) (quoting 4 Elliot\u2019s Debates on the Constitution 571 (1876 Ed.)). I am convinced that Madison and the other founders of our nation believed that the First Amendment was adopted to prohibit the enactment of statutes precisely such as the one which the majority of this Court declares constitutionally acceptable in the present case.\nThe decision of the majority to uphold this flagrant violation of the First Amendment opens a sad chapter in the history of this Court. I can only pray that this chapter and the inevitable harm that will result to this State\u2019s people and their government will be brief.\nFor the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority.\n. The decision as to whether a publication is such an accusation and, thus, a \u201ccharge\u201d will still lie in the eye of the beholder of the statement. Is a statement that a candidate is a \u201cpracticing heterosexual\u201d or a statement that a candidate is a \u201cknown\u201d communist a negative statement of the type amounting to a \u201ccharge\u201d within the meaning of the statute? I leave such questions to the majority.\n. In Talley, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that \u201c[bjefore the Revolutionary War colonial patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or distribution of literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by English-controlled courts. Along that time the Letters of Junius were written and the identity of their author is unknown to this day.\u201d 362 U.S. at 65, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 563.\n. Regardless of whether such fears are well founded, everyone who is not somnambulant knows that many citizens fear reprisals if they openly criticize those having positions of power over them. In his concurring opinion in Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 626, 48 L. Ed. 2d 243, 256 (1976), Justice Brennan noted that \u201cDeplorably, apprehension of reprisal by the average citizen is too often well founded. The national scene in recent times has regrettably provided many instances of penalties for controversial expression in the form of vindictive harassment, discriminatory law enforcement, executive abuse of administrative powers, and intensive government surveillance.\u201d Another commentator has noted that \u201cpublic identification with the unorthodox may bring with it substantial . . . pressures. Moreover, a citizen with a prudent concern for the future and a knowledge of history may feel these pressures even in times of relative tolerance.\u201d Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 87 (1991). As an example, Professor Kreimer refers to the recent successful use of the description \u201ccard carrying member of the ACLU\u201d as an epithet in political discourse.\n. The restrictions at issue in the present case are significantly more burdensome than the individual disclosure requirement upheld in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976). As construed, the regulation at issue in Buckley required individuals who were not candidates or political committees to report expenditures only when (1) they made contributions, in excess of $100, earmarked for political purposes or authorized or requested by a candidate or his agent, to some person other than a candidate or political committee; or (2) they made expenditures, in excess of $100, for communications that expressly advocated the election or defeat of clearly identified candidates. 424 U.S. at 80, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 722-23. The Court upheld this regulation on the basis that it furthered the governmental interests of stemming corruption in the election process and in disclosing candidates\u2019 supporters to the voters.\nIn the present case, the State asserts neither of the interests present in Buckley in support of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7). Additionally, the Buckley regulation applied only to expenditures in excess of $100 either made at the behest of a candidate or used for communications \u201cthat expressly advocated the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.\u201d See 424 U.S. at 44 n.52, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 702 n.52 (Court held that this construction was necessary to prevent the statute\u2019s being unconstitutionally vague; restricts application of statute to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat). The regulation at issue in the present case applies to any person publishing any derogatory \u201ccharge\u201d or any \u201ccharge . . . calculated to affect the candidate\u2019s chances of nomination or election,\u201d regardless of the expense of the publication and regardless of whether the charge expressly advocates the election or defeat of the candidate. Furthermore, the regulation in Buckley did not require that communications be \u201csigned\u201d as does the regulation in the present case. See Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. at 800-01, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 691-92 (requiring disclosure during communication itself is more burdensome than a requirement that a disclosure form be filed).\n. The following is a hypothetical example of a statement concerning a candidate\u2019s qualifications which might not be made as a result of the regulation at issue in the present case. Citizen X is an employee of Candidate Y and is aware that Y has participated in unethical practices. However, Y is a powerful member of the community and could effectively prevent X from finding other employment in the community. X fears losing her job if she openly criticizes Y but is even more afraid that she will be subjected to a criminal prosecution if she sends an anonymous letter or publishes some other form of anonymous communication truthfully describing Y\u2019s unethical conduct. X remains silent, and the voters elect Y without being aware of Y\u2019s unethical conduct.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice MITCHELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Charles M. Hensey, Special Deputy Attorney .General, for the State.", "Chester E. Whittle, Jr., for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FRANK W. PETERSILIE\nNo. 43PA92\n(Filed 30 July 1993)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 48, 362 (NCI4th); Criminal Law \u00a7 67 (NCI4th)\u2014 misdemeanors \u2014original trial in superior court \u2014 failure of record to show jurisdiction \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s statement insufficient to show presentment \u2014vacation of judgment\nThe Court of Appeals did not err by vacating the superior court\u2019s judgment in a prosecution for publishing unsigned materials about a candidate for public office in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7) on the ground that the record on appeal showed that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction where all the offenses charged were misdemeanors; the only charging documents in the record on appeal are grand jury indictments; and the superior court has no jurisdiction to try by indictment a defendant charged with a misdemeanor unless the charges which are the subject of an indictment are initiated by a presentment. A statement in the trial transcript by the district attorney informing the court that the misdemeanor charges originated by presentment was insufficient to comply with the requirement of Appellate Rule 9(a)(3)(e) that the record shall contain \u201ccopies of all warrants, informations, presentments, and indictments upon which the case has been tried in any court,\u201d since the rule contemplates that all charging documents must be copied and presented verbatim in the record on appeal, and mere references to such documents in the trial transcript cannot suffice for verbatim copies of the documents themselves or substitute for such copies when the copies are missing from the record.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 352; Justices of the Peace \u00a7 108.\n2. Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 48, 367 (NCI4th)\u2014 motion to amend record \u2014addition of presentment \u2014 denial by Court of Appeals not error \u2014 election by Supreme Court to allow amendment\nThe Court of Appeals did not err when it denied the State\u2019s motion to amend the record on appeal by adding copies of the presentment upon which misdemeanor charges were initiated against defendant to show that the superior court had jurisdiction over the case. However, the Supreme Court elects to allow the amendment to reflect subject matter jurisdiction so that it may reach the substantive issues of the appeal.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 482, 484; Justices of the Peace \u00a7 108.\n3. Elections \u00a7 13 (NCI4th) \u2014 unsigned publication of charge against election candidate \u2014 statute prohibiting \u2014 not unconstitutionally vague\nAs used in the statute making it unlawful for anyone in the context of an election (1) to publish (2) any charge (3) derogatory to a candidate or calculated to affect the candidate\u2019s electoral chances (4) without signing the publication, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7), the verb \u201cto publish\u201d is to be given its ordinary meaning, and the term \u201ccharge\u201d is interpreted to mean an accusation of wrongdoing. When so interpreted, the statute defines the proscribed conduct with sufficient definiteness so that it is not unconstitutionally vague.\nAm Jur 2d, Elections \u00a7\u00a7 379, 380.\n4. Elections \u00a7 13 (NCI4th); Constitutional Law \u00a7 117 (NCI4th) \u2014 unsigned publication of charge against election candidate \u2014 statute prohibiting \u2014 no violation of free speech\nThe statute making it unlawful for anyone to publish any charge derogatory to an election candidate or calculated to affect the candidate\u2019s electoral chances without signing the publication, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7), is not constitutionally over-broad so as to violate free speech guarantees in the federal and state constitutions. The statute serves the compelling interest of the State of promoting fair and honest elections and is drawn no more broadly than is necessary to serve that interest. U.S. Const, amend. I; N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 14.\nAm Jur 2d, Constitutional Law \u00a7\u00a7 496, 497; Elections \u00a7\u00a7 379, 380.\n5. Elections \u00a7 13 (NCI4th)\u2014 publishing unsigned materials about candidates \u2014alternate theories \u2014erroneous intent instruction on one theory \u2014 prejudice\nIn a prosecution for publishing unsigned materials about two candidates for public office in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(7), the trial court erred by instructing the jury that, in order to convict defendant, it must find that defendant published \u201ca charge he intended to be derogatory to a candidate for election to the Boone Town Council, or which he calculated would affect such candidate\u2019s chances of election,\u201d since the statute permits a conviction if the jury finds either (1) that the published material was a derogatory charge or (2) that the charge was \u201ccalculated\u201d by defendant to affect a candidate\u2019s chances for nomination or election; the jury\u2019s determination of whether the material was a derogatory charge is not based on defendant\u2019s intention but on its objective interpretation of the publication; and the trial court\u2019s instruction permitted the jury to convict defendant upon a finding that defendant only intended the materials to be derogatory even if, objectively, the jury did not consider them to be so. Because the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding one of two possible theories upon which defendant could be convicted and it is unclear upon which theory or theories the jury relied in arriving at its guilty verdict, it is assumed that the jury based its verdict on the theory for which it received an improper instruction.\nAm Jur 2d, Elections \u00a7\u00a7 379, 380.\n6. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7\u00a7 906, 2047 (NCI4th)\u2014 unsigned materials about candidates \u2014opinions of others as to whether derogatory or hurtful \u2014 inadmissible hearsay\nIn a prosecution for publishing unsigned materials about two candidates for public office, testimony by the candidates as to the actual opinions expressed by certain local residents out of court concerning whether the materials were derogatory or hurtful to the candidates\u2019 chances of being elected was admitted for the truth of what was said and was inadmissible hearsay. The statements were not admissible as lay witness opinion testimony under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 because neither witness was testifying as to his or her own opinion.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 497; Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 26, 53, 54.\nJustice Mitchell dissenting.\nJustice PARKER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 105 N.C. App. 233, 414 S.E.2d 41 (1992), vacating a judgment entered by Lamm, J., at the 19 October 1990 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Watauga County. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 September 1992.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Charles M. Hensey, Special Deputy Attorney .General, for the State.\nChester E. Whittle, Jr., for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0169-01", "first_page_order": 193, "last_page_order": 232 }