{ "id": 2529364, "name": "JUDITH COKER COLEMAN NEWELL v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MICHAEL BLACKMON and ROBERT LEE BLACKMON", "name_abbreviation": "Newell v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance", "decision_date": "1993-07-30", "docket_number": "No. 282A91", "first_page": "391", "last_page": "402", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "334 N.C. 391" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525328 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555303 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 S.E.2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572987 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557714 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564714 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 Ga.App. 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 467646 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/180/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Md. App. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 4446049 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521-22" }, { "page": "1349", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/75/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 S.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622752 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561396 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 S.W.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9987532 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/700/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" }, { "page": "507, 508" }, { "page": "507" }, { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 906", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3452572 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0906-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5308955 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" }, { "page": "529", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525328 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0622-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 875, "char_count": 24981, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.153178813131719e-07, "percentile": 0.7687293737974685 }, "sha256": "1f6c26586658ac29a9d33d541b8b2d91906d3f2eb829b50d453cdcc1e083f5e0", "simhash": "1:ebded442654ffec8", "word_count": 4050 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:40:35.485142+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Parker did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "JUDITH COKER COLEMAN NEWELL v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MICHAEL BLACKMON and ROBERT LEE BLACKMON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EXUM, Chief Justice.\nOn 9 February 1987 plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident allegedly caused by the negligence of Robert Lee Blackmon, who was operating a 1977 Ford pickup truck owned by his father Michael Blackmon. Nationwide had issued an automobile liability policy to Michael Blackmon and wife which contained, among other exclusions, the following: \u201cWe do not provide Liability Coverage for any person ... 8. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so.\u201d Nationwide, contending that Robert Blackmon was operating the vehicle without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so, denied liability coverage. Plaintiff, contending the exclusion has no application to Robert Blackmon because he is a family member of the named insured, brings this declaratory judgment action to determine the coverage issue. The question to be determined is the application of this exclusion, sometimes called the \u201centitlement\u201d exclusion, in light of the facts and policy provisions before us.\nBoth the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals concluded the exclusion had no application. We disagree and reverse.\nPlaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action on 13 February 1989 seeking a declaration of the rights, duties and obligations of defendant Nationwide under its policy issued to the Blackmons. Plaintiff also joined defendant State Capital, seeking a declaration of rights under the uninsured motorists (UM) coverage of an automobile policy which State Capital issued to plaintiff.\nOn 30 August 1989 defendant State Capital moved for summary judgment; Nationwide opposed the motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in State Capital\u2019s favor, specifically concluding that defendant Robert Blackmon was insured by the Nationwide' policy. The trial court further concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Robert Blackmon (1) was the son of Michael Blackmon, (2) was a resident of his father\u2019s household at the time of the accident with plaintiff, and (3) was therefore a covered person under the Nationwide poljcy which was in full force and effect at the time of the accident.\nThe next day, 1 November 1989, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. In response, defendants Nationwide and Michael Blackmon moved jointly for summary judgment. On 14 November 1989 the trial court granted plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment against Nationwide, once again determining that the Nationwide policy insured the defendant tortfeasor. The trial court also denied the summary judgment motion of defendants Nationwide and Michael Blackmon.\nDefendant Nationwide appealed from these rulings in plaintiff\u2019s favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We now reverse, concluding that on the forecast of evidence at the summary judgment hearing, which included the Nationwide policy itself, the Nationwide policy provides no liability coverage to the alleged tortfeasor, Robert Blackmon.\nAt the respective summary judgment hearings the trial court had before it not only the automobile insurance policies issued, respectively, to plaintiff by State Capital and to Mr. and Mrs. Blackmon by Nationwide, but also separate affidavits from the two elder Blackmons. Michael Blackmon\u2019s affidavit stated unequivocally that his son, Robert Blackmon, was \u201ctold . . . that he was not to drive any of my vehicles. ... I knew that Robert Lee Blackmon\u2019s driver\u2019s license had been permanently revoked. Both my wife [Nan Blackmon] and I had told him that he could not drive our vehicles.\u201d Likewise, Nan Blackmon, Robert Blackmon\u2019s stepmother, stated in her own affidavit that\nI had told Robert Lee Blackmon, and I heard my husband tell Robert Lee Blackmon during the time Robert Lee Blackmon lived with us from the middle of January, 1987, until February 9, 1987, that he was not to drive any of our vehicles. Both my husband and I knew that Robert Lee Blackmon\u2019s driver\u2019s license had been permanently revoked.\nPlaintiff failed to present any evidence at the summary judgment hearing contrary to the affidavits of Mr. and Mrs. Blackmon and has conceded in her brief that Robert Blackmon was not driving his father\u2019s vehicle with either the express or implied permission of his father and stepmother.\nOther evidence before the trial court showed that Robert Blackmon, who was twenty years old at the time of the accident, was, as a result of the accident and the investigation which followed, convicted of driving while impaired and driving while his license was revoked. This was his second driving while impaired offense in less than two years.\nNationwide\u2019s policy issued to the elder Blackmons provided liability coverage for the named insureds, Michael Lacy Blackmon and Nan Brigman Blackmon, the alleged tortfeasor\u2019s father and stepmother. The \u201cInsuring Agreement\u201d for the policy\u2019s liability coverage, found in Part B of the policy, states:\n\u201cWe will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. . . . \u2018Covered person\u2019 as used in this Part means:\n1. You or any family member for the ownership, maintenance or use of any auto or trailer.\n(Bold in original.) In the Definitions section at the beginning of the policy, \u201c[f]amily member\u201d is defined as \u201ca person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household.\u201d\nPart B of the policy also contains certain exclusions. The \u201cEXCLUSIONS\u201d section of Part B provides:\nWe do not provide Liability Coverage for any person:\n1. Who intentionally causes bodily injury or property damage.\nThis exclusion applies only to damages in excess of the minimum limit required by the financial responsibility law of North Carolina.\n5. For that person\u2019s liability arising out of the ownership or operation of a vehicle while it is being used to carry persons or property for a fee. This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense car pool.\n6. While employed or otherwise engaged in the business or occupation of:\na. selling;\nb. repairing;\nc. servicing;\nd. storing; or\ne. parking\nvehicles designed for use mainly on public highways. This includes road testing and delivery. This exclusion does not apply to the . . . use of your covered auto by:\na. you;\nb. any family member; or\nc. any partner, agent or employee of you or any family member.\n8. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so.\n(Bold in original; italics added.)\nThroughout these proceedings, Nationwide has contended that Michael Blackmon\u2019s son, Robert, was not insured under its policy issued to the elder Blackmons for two reasons. First, Nationwide has argued that Robert Blackmon was not a \u201ccovered person\u201d under the policy because he was not a \u201cresident of [his father\u2019s] household\u201d pursuant to the policy\u2019s definition of \u201cfamily member.\u201d Under the policy, a \u201ccovered person\u201d is defined as including \u201cYou [the named insured] or any family member . . . .\u201d (Emphasis in policy.) Because, Nationwide argues, there are genuine issues of material fact to be resolved on the issue of Robert\u2019s intent to reside in his father\u2019s house and, therefore, on whether Robert was a resident of the named insured\u2019s household under the terms of the policy, summary judgment was improperly granted for plaintiff on these issues.\nSecond, Nationwide contends that Robert Blackmon was specifically and unambiguously excluded from coverage by Exclusion 8, the entitlement exclusion, because he was, as a matter of law, using the vehicle in question \u201cwithout a reasonable belief that [he was] entitled to do so.\u201d Agreeing with this second contention, we need not discuss, and hazard no opinion, as to the validity of Nationwide\u2019s first argument. We assume for purposes of this opinion only that Robert Blackmon was a \u201cfamily member\u201d within the meaning of the policy.\nWe note, too, that plaintiff has conceded that the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(2) of the Financial Responsibility Act do not afford mandatory minimum coverage for Robert Blackmon and that \u201cNationwide\u2019s liability must be measured by the terms of the policy.\u201d Plaintiff Appellee\u2019s New Brief, p. 5. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(2) provides that an \u201cowner\u2019s policy of liability insurance: ... (2) Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured, or any other persons in lawful possession . . . .\u201d Plaintiff makes no argument that Robert Blackmon was operating his father\u2019s vehicle with his father\u2019s permission or that he was in lawful possession of the vehicle at the time of the accident.\nWe have previously upheld in principle the entitlement exclusion in an automobile liability policy in a case where the alleged tortfeasor was operating a vehicle without a driver\u2019s license. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 326 N.C. 771, 392 S.E.2d 377 (1990). However, we held that summary judgment in the liability insurer\u2019s favor was improper where the tortfeasor, Mr. Slater, was directed to use the vehicle by an employee of the vehicle\u2019s owner, the named insured. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Frye stated that the tortfeasor\u2019s testimony\nraises a question of whether he reasonably believed under the circumstances that he was entitled to drive the truck. Although Slater answered in the negative when asked if he believed he was entitled to operate the truck, he qualified his answer by giving as a reason the fact that he was driving without a license. A jury might well conclude that while he knew that it was \u201cwrong to be driving without a license regardless of what goes on,\u201d he nevertheless believed he was entitled to drive the truck under the circumstances because he believed that he had the permission of the owner to do so. . . . Slater\u2019s reasonable belief is a question of fact to be determined by a jury. . . .\nId. at 776-77, 392 S.E.2d at 380 (emphasis added).\nIn the present case, however, based on the forecast of evidence below, we conclude as a matter of law that Robert Blackmon could not have had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use his father\u2019s vehicle. Not only was Robert\u2019s driver\u2019s license under revocation by the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles for a previous driving while impaired conviction, the Record also contains separate affidavits of his father and stepmother stating that Robert was expressly forbidden to use any of his father\u2019s motor vehicles while living in his father\u2019s home. There is no forecast of evidence to the contrary. The Record further discloses, without contradiction, that, on the night of the accident with plaintiff, Robert was once again charged with driving while impaired. On this forecast of evidence there is simply no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Robert Blackmon could have had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use his father\u2019s vehicle. The forecast shows conclusively that he could not have had such a belief.\nIn its opinion below, the Court of Appeals declined to decide whether Robert Blackmon was using his father\u2019s vehicle \u201cwithout a reasonable belief that [he was] entitled to do so.\u201d Newell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 102 N.C. App. 622, 627, 403 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1991). After concluding that Robert Blackmon was a \u201cresident\u201d of his father\u2019s household and included within the policy\u2019s definition of a \u201cfamily member,\u201d the Court of Appeals held that Robert was a \u201ccovered person\u201d under the terms of the policy. The Court of Appeals further held that, although the Exclusions section by its terms applies to \u201cany person,\u201d none of the exclusions, including the entitlement exclusion, applies to a family member. Id.\nRelying on Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kubik, 142 Ill. App. 3d 906, 492 N.E.2d 504 (1986), and State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 700 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985), the Court of Appeals found coverage for Robert Blackmon as a \u201cfamily member\u201d because the court thought the policy\u2019s use of that term and the terms \u201ccovered person\u201d and \u201cany person\u201d creates an ambiguity as to whether the term \u201cany person\u201d as used in the Exclusion section applies to family members. Applying the familiar principle that ambiguities in the language of an insurance policy will be resolved in favor of coverage, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 172 S.E.2d 518 (1970), the Court of Appeals held that the term \u201cany person\u201d did not apply to family members. The court stated:\n[T]he Nationwide policy uses \u201ccovered person,\u201d \u201cfamily member,\u201d and \u201cany person\u201d selectively throughout the policy and more specifically in the Exclusions section of the policy. . . . Under the express terms of the policy, \u201cany person\u201d is not an \u201call inclusive\u201d term; it does not include family members. The policy establishes mutually exclusive classes. The selective use of these terms creates an ambiguity.\nNewell, 102 N.C. App. at 629, 403 S.E.2d at 529 (emphasis added).\nWe think the cases relied on by the Court of Appeals are clearly distinguishable. The policy which the Illinois court considered in Kubik was different from the Nationwide policy before us. The policy in Kubik used the terms \u201cany person\u201d and \u201cfamily member\u201d selectively within the Exclusions section itself, implying, as the Illinois court noted,\nthat some exclusions are applicable to only a \u201cfamily member,\u201d some exclusions are applicable to only the class comprising \u201cany person\u201d (a group separate and distinct from a \u201cfamily member\u201d), and some exclusions are applicable to both a \u201cfamily member\u201d and \u201cany person.\u201d\n.... Exclusion #11 [the entitlement exclusion] does not bar, as several other exclusions specifically do, coverage for a family member. ... As a result ... an ambiguity is created with regard to whether a \u201cfamily member\u201d is barred from coverage by exclusion #11.\u201d\nKubik, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 910, 492 N.E.2d at 507.\nThe Kentucky court in Ellis, also relied on by the Court of Appeals, simply concluded that the policy\u2019s lack of guidance as to how the terms of the entitlement exclusion should be applied created an ambiguity in its application which should be resolved in favor of not applying the exclusion in that case. The Ellis decision is of little help since we have already sustained in principle the validity of the entitlement exclusion. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 326 N.C. 771, 392 S.E.2d 377.\nOur examination of the Nationwide policy convinces us that there is no ambiguity in the term \u201cany person\u201d as it is used in the Exclusions section even when the use of this term is considered with the use of the terms \u201cfamily member\u201d and \u201ccovered person.\u201d The term \u201ccovered person\u201d never appears in the Exclusion section, and the term \u201cfamily member\u201d appears quite clearly only for the purpose of defining an exception to one of the exclusions.\nWithin the Exclusions section at least two of the exclusionary categories, the first and the sixth, plainly show that family members, and even the named insureds, are contemplated by the use of the term \u201cany person.\u201d\nIn the first exclusion listed, the policy states that coverage is not provided for one who \u201cintentionally causes bodily injury or property damage.\u201d Following the rule that liability insurance coverage is generally not provided for anyone who intentionally commits injurious acts, this exclusion is obviously intended to include not only family members of named insureds but also named insureds themselves. This exclusion, however, by its terms and in recognition of case law, see Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482 (1960), does not apply to minimum coverages which may be mandated by the Financial Responsibility Act.\nThe sixth exclusion listed provides even more support for our conclusion that no ambiguity exists with regard to whether the term \u201cany person\u201d applies to family members. This exclusion by its terms \u201cdoes not apply to the . . . use of your covered auto by: . . . any family member.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) That the policy expressly provides for a family member exception to the sixth exclusion compels the conclusion that other exclusions which do not contain a family member exception apply to family members.\nWe are also persuaded by a well-reasoned decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, Gen'l Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co. v. Perry, 75 Md. App. 503, 541 A.2d 1340 (1988), in which the Maryland court conducted an exhaustive review of the decisions of other states on whether the entitlement exclusion applies to family members. Construing a policy almost identical to the one before us, the Perry court found that the entitlement exclusion does indeed apply to family members of the named insured. The Perry court stated:\nAppellee argues \u201cthat an ambiguity may exist with respect to \u2018family member\u2019 and \u2018any person\u2019 as used in the policy exclusion A.8 [which is, we note, the same exclusion as the one at issue here].\u201d Appellee\u2019s argument is based on the holding of the court in Economy Fire & Casualty v. Kubik, 97 Ill.Dec. [68], 72, 492 N.E.2d at 507, 508. The reasoning of the Kubik court necessarily depended upon the policy it was construing. The Kubik court concluded that the insurer\u2019s policy was ambiguous because the policy\u2019s terms \u201cfamily member\u201d and \u201cany person\u201d were used in the policy\u2019s exclusions \u201cin such a way as to create the impression that they refer to mutually exclusive classes.\u201d Id., 97 Ill.Dec. at 71, 492 N.E.2d at 507. The Kubik court pointed out that some of the exclusions referred only to a \u201cfamily member\u201d, others referred only to the class constituting \u201cany person\u201d and still other exclusions applied to both classes. The Kubik court concluded that because the exclusion at issue did not include the term \u201cfamily member\u201d, \u201cit is apparent that at the very least, an ambiguity is created with regard to whether a \u2018family member\u2019 is barred from coverage. . , .\u201d Id. In Georgia Farm Bureau, 350 S.E.2d at 326, the court construed a policy identical to the policy at issue in the case sub judice, see note 6, supra. The Georgia Farm Bureau [v. Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 180 Ga.App. 777, 350 S.E.2d 325 (1986)] court rejected the identical argument made by appellee here. That court said, \u201c[c]overage of all types is set forth in one part and all the exclusions are grouped separately. The language \u2018any person\u2019 refers to each of the nine exclusions listed, including the named insured.\u201d Id., 350 S.E.2d at 326. We note that the policy at issue in Kubik and the policy at issue in Georgia Farm Bureau were different, structurally. We hold that there is no ambiguity in the exclusion sub judice based on the \u201cvagueness created by the manner in which [the insurer] use[d] the term \u2018family member\u2019 and \u2018any person\u2019 interchangeably throughout the policy\u2019s exclusions.\u201d Cf. Kubik, 97 Ill.Dec. at 71, 492 N.E.2d at 507.\nPerry, 75 Md. App. at 521-22, 541 A.2d at 1349 (emphasis in original). The language in the Nationwide policy before us is nearly identical also to the language in the policy considered in Georgia Farm Bureau, upon which Perry relies.\nTo the extent that plaintiff relies on the decisions in Kubik and other cases to support her position that the Exclusions section of the Nationwide policy does not include family members, we have satisfied ourselves that those cases are either distinguishable or unpersuasive.\nSince the words \u201cany person\u201d as used in the Exclusions section of Nationwide\u2019s policy are not ambiguous and have no technical or otherwise defined meaning in the policy itself, they should be accorded their plain, everyday meaning. Woods v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 500, 246 S.E.2d 773 (1978). As a result, \u201cany person\u201d encompasses any person, whether that person is the named insured, a family member or a third party, unless express exceptions in the policy, as in the sixth exclusion, provide otherwise.\nPlaintiff also argues that the \u201cbroad public policy goals\u201d of the Financial Responsibility Act operate to nullify any exclusionary language in the Nationwide policy which contravenes those stated goals. On the facts here we disagree. The public policy goals of the Financial Responsibility Act apply only when the Act itself is being construed or when determinations are being made regarding the extent to which the Act as to its mandatory minimum coverages may override conflicting insurance policy provisions. Plaintiff has conceded that the Act itself provides no mandatory coverage to the tortfeasor here; this concession forecloses plaintiff\u2019s argument, as we understand it, on this point.\nNeither do the cases relied on by plaintiff support this argument. The cases are Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life and Casualty Co., 283 N.C. 87, 194 S.E.2d 834 (1973); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964); and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Webb, 10 N.C. App. 672, 179 S.E.2d 803 (1971). It is true that in all of these cases the courts refused to apply exclusionary provisions in insurance policies which conflicted with mandatory minimum coverage requirements of the Financial Responsibility Act. But in all the cases the courts first determined that the Financial Responsibility Act afforded mandatory coverage to the tortfeasor. In Aetna the tortfeasor was operating the motor vehicle with the permission of the named insured; in Roberts and Webb the tortfeasor was the named insured. Because of these facts in these cases, facts which are not present here, the Act afforded mandatory minimum coverage despite any conflicting exclusionary provisions in the policies under consideration.\nFor the reasons given, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for remand to the trial court for entry of judgment for Nationwide on the coverage issue.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\nJustice Parker did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. On the same date, plaintiff brought a separate tort action against the individual defendants. The two insurers and defendant Robert Blackmon filed answers individually, and on 19 April 1989 defendant Michael Blackmon moved to dismiss the action against him. This action is not before us.", "type": "majority", "author": "EXUM, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "O\u2019Briant, O\u2019Briant, Bunch, Whatley & Robins, by Lillian B. O\u2019Briant and Thomas D. Robins, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Nichols, Caffrey, Hill, Evans & Murrelle, by Joseph R. Beatty, for defendant-appellant Nationwide." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JUDITH COKER COLEMAN NEWELL v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MICHAEL BLACKMON and ROBERT LEE BLACKMON\nNo. 282A91\n(Filed 30 July 1993)\n1. Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 598, 1175 (NCI4th)\u2014 automobile liability insurance \u2014son forbidden to use vehicle \u2014entitlement exclusion\nThe insured\u2019s son was excluded from coverage under an automobile liability policy while driving the insured\u2019s vehicle by the \u201centitlement\u201d exclusion of the policy, even though he was a \u201cfamily member\u201d within the meaning of the policy, where the policy provided in the exclusion section that liability coverage was not provided for \u201cany person ... 8. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so,\u201d and the uncontradicted forecast of evidence showed as a matter of law that the son could not have had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use his father\u2019s vehicle in that his driver\u2019s license had been permanently revoked for a previous driving while impaired conviction, he had been expressly forbidden by his father and stepmother to use any of the father\u2019s vehicles while living in his father\u2019s home, and on the night of the accident he was again charged with driving while impaired. The words \u201cany person\u201d as used in the exclusion section of the policy are not ambiguous and encompass the named insured, a family member or a third party unless express exceptions in the policy provide otherwise.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 254 et seq.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 499 (NCI4th)\u2014 automobile liability insurance \u2014 entitlement exclusion \u2014no prohibition by Financial Responsibility Act\nThe public policy goals of the Financial Responsibility Act did not preclude application of the entitlement exclusion of an automobile liability policy where plaintiff conceded that the Act itself provided no mandatory coverage to the tortfeasor because he was not driving the vehicle with the insured\u2019s permission and he was not in lawful possession of the vehicle at the time of the accident. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(2).\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 28 et seq.\nOn appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2), and on discretionary review of additional issues pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31, from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 102 N.C. App. 622, 403 S.E.2d 525 (1991), affirming summary judgment entered in plaintiffs favor by R. G. Walker, Jr., J., on 13 November 1990 in Superior Court, Randolph County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 March 1992.\nO\u2019Briant, O\u2019Briant, Bunch, Whatley & Robins, by Lillian B. O\u2019Briant and Thomas D. Robins, for plaintiff-appellee.\nNichols, Caffrey, Hill, Evans & Murrelle, by Joseph R. Beatty, for defendant-appellant Nationwide." }, "file_name": "0391-01", "first_page_order": 415, "last_page_order": 426 }