{ "id": 2527406, "name": "CHARLES E. NELSON and NANCY W. NELSON v. BATTLE FOREST FRIENDS MEETING, an unincorporated association, and STEVE WOOD", "name_abbreviation": "Nelson v. Battle Forest Friends Meeting", "decision_date": "1993-11-05", "docket_number": "No. 87A93", "first_page": "133", "last_page": "140", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "335 N.C. 133" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525235 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 ALR2d 468", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558867 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520684 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563921 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151-152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E.2d 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559260 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 636", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4723972 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570942 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574036 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "7 N.C. App. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551467 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/7/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616", "parenthetical": "quoted by the majority" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558867 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642", "parenthetical": "quoted by the majority" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E.2d 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559260 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525235 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0641-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 683, "char_count": 14459, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.5944758796000066e-07, "percentile": 0.8874071422696844 }, "sha256": "01fa37df3bdc4d08b957b56a13e86c1d74cd46e34d885bfbdc65d3cf29055bcd", "simhash": "1:22346047bcb9e65a", "word_count": 2363 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:54:49.870550+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Justice Exum and Justice Whichard join in this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "CHARLES E. NELSON and NANCY W. NELSON v. BATTLE FOREST FRIENDS MEETING, an unincorporated association, and STEVE WOOD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WEBB, Justice.\nAll parties agree that, except for the constitutional question, this case is to be resolved by the. interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-44.2 which provides in part as follows:\n(a) Whenever a railroad abandons a railroad easement, all right, title and interest in the strip, piece or parcel of land constituting the abandoned easement shall be presumed to be vested in those persons, firms or corporations owning lots or parcels of land adjacent to the abandoned easement, with the presumptive ownership of each adjacent landowner extending to the centerline of the abandoned easement. In cases where the railroad easement adjoins a public road right-of-way, the adjacent property owner\u2019s right, title and interest in the abandoned railroad easement shall extend to the nearest edge of the public road right-of-way. . . .\n(b) Persons claiming ownership contrary to the presumption established in this section shall have a period of one year from the date of enactment of this statute or the abandonment of such easement, whichever later occurs, in which to bring any action to establish their ownership. The presumption established by this section is rebuttable by showing that a party has good and valid title to the land.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-44.2 (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).\nThe part of the section crucial to the resolution of this case is the second sentence of subsection (a) which provides that a property owner\u2019s line will be along the edge of a public road right-of-way if the public road right-of-way \u201cadjoins\u201d the abandoned railroad easement. The resolution of this case turns on the meaning of the word \u201cadjoin.\u201d\nThe defendants contend the abandoned railroad easement adjoined the public road right-of-way although the right-of-way was entirely within the easement. They say first that the legislative purpose was to avoid ownership of small strips of land that are of no benefit to the owners and to maximize the access of landowners to public roads. The defendants say this legislative purpose will be accomplished if we hold that the abandoned railroad easement adjoined the public road right-of-way. The defendants say that if we hold the easement did not adjoin the right-of-way, it will render the second sentence of the section virtually meaningless because there will be very few cases in which an easement and a right-of-way will be perfectly contiguous.\nWe hold that the public road right-of-way did not adjoin the abandoned railroad easement and the second sentence of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-44.2(a) does not apply in this case. In interpreting a statute, it is presumed the General Assembly intended the words it used to have the meaning they have in ordinary speech. Transportation Service v. County of Robeson, 283 N.C. 494, 500, 196 S.E.2d 770, 774 (1973). When the plain meaning of a statute is unambiguous, a court should go no further in interpreting the statute. State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 151-152, 209 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1974).\nWe believe the definition of \u201cadjoin,\u201d as found in several dictionaries, shows that the public road right-of-way did not adjoin the railroad easement. The following are illustrations:\nadjoin ... 1. to be close to or in contact with;\nThe Random House Dictionary of the English Language 25 (2d ed. 1987).\nadjoin ... to join on; to lie next to ... .\nChambers English Dictionary 16 (1988).\nadjoin ... 4. To join; to come into union or contact.\nThe Oxford English Dictionary 156 (2d ed. 1989).\nAdjoining. The word in its etymological sense means touching or contiguous, as distinguished from lying near to or adjacent. To be in contact with; to abut upon[.]\nDeluxe Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 41 (6th ed. 1990).\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary defines contiguous as:\nIn close proximity; neighboring; adjoining; near in sdccession; in actual close contact; touching at a point or along a boundary; bounded or traversed by[.]\nDeluxe Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 320 (6th ed. 1990).\nWe believe that the definition of \u201cadjoin\u201d does not include a tract which, as in this case, is included within the bounds of another tract. To adjoin, a tract must be \u201cclose to or in contact,\u201d \u201cnext to\u201d or \u201ctouching.\u201d None of the definitions include a tract that is encompassed within another tract. We hold that the plain meaning of the statute in this case excludes the plaintiffs\u2019 land from coverage by the statute.\nIf we were to hold that the public road right-of-way adjoined the railroad easement we would face the question of whether N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-44.2, which divests persons of their property, is unconstitutional. See McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Dwyer, 111 N.C. App. 127, 432 S.E.2d 165 (1993). In interpreting a statute if \u201cone of two reasonable constructions will raise a serious constitutional question, the construction which avoids this question should be adopted.\u201d In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642, 231 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1977). The defendants say that this maxim does not apply in this case because the constitutional question will not be avoided but merely postponed until a case arises in which a public road right-of-way adjoins an abandoned railroad easement. We shall avoid the constitutional question in this case and decide it when it is properly before us.\nFor the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the Court of Appeals.\nREVERSED.", "type": "majority", "author": "WEBB, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice Meyer\ndissenting.\nI dissent.\nThe presumption set forth in the pertinent statute is that\n[w]henever a railroad abandons a railroad easement, all right, title and interest in the strip, piece or parcel of land constituting the abandoned easement shall be presumed to be vested in those persons, firms or corporations owning lots or parcels of land adjacent to the abandoned easement, with the presumptive ownership of each adjacent landowner extending to the centerline of the abandoned easement. In cases where the railroad easement adjoins a public road right-of-way, the adjacent property owner\u2019s right, title and interest in the abandoned railroad easement shall extend to the nearest edge of the public road right-of-way.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-44.2(a), para. 1 (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).\nThe application of the presumption in the case at bar is dependent upon the meaning to be given the word \u201cadjoin.\u201d I conclude that Judge Greene, who wrote for the majority on the panel below, correctly interpreted N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-44.2(a) as follows:\nIn applying statutes we must presume that the legislature intended that the words used in statutes be given the meaning they have in ordinary speech. LaFayette Transp. Serv., Inc. v. County of Robeson, 283 N.C. 494, 500, 196 S.E.2d 770, 774 (1973). Courts use the dictionary to determine the ordinary meaning of words. State v. Martin, 7 N.C. App. 532, 533, 173 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1970). Objects \u201cadjoin\u201d when they are \u201cclose to or in contact with one another.\u201d Webster\u2019s New Collegiate Dictionary 56 (9th ed. 1984). Therefore, the word \u201cadjoin,\u201d as used in the second sentence of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-44.2(a), applies whenever the abandoned easement touches a public road right-of-way, whether within the abandoned easement or at its boundary.\nBecause the OB Road right-of-way is located within the abandoned easement, they adjoin, and the exception in the second sentence of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-44.2(a) applies. Title to the disputed strip therefore is vested in the Church as adjacent property owner. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Nelson was error.\nNelson v. Battle Forest Friends Meeting, 108 N.C. App. 641, 646, 425 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1993).\nThe dictionary definitions cited by the majority demonstrate the various shades of meaning that the word embraces, and reasonable minds could read them to support a different result. I believe that the Court of Appeals\u2019 interpretation of the word \u201cadjoin\u201d carries out the intention of the legislature.\nAs this Court has stated many times, the cardinal principle of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature is controlling. State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978). \u201cWhere possible, statutes should be given a construction which, when practically applied, will tend to suppress the evil which the Legislature intended to prevent.\u201d In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 96, 240 S.E.2d 367, 372 (1978). It is my view that the \u201cevil\u201d that the sentence of the statute emphasized above is designed to prevent is the loss of access to a public road enjoyed by owners of land lying adjacent to the railroad easement prior to its abandonment. The legislature was no doubt aware that, over the course of the many miles of railways in this state, many landowners can gain access to a public roadway only by crossing over a railroad easement. This circumstance is true whether the roadway traces the edge of the railway easement, is partially contained within it, or is completely contained within it. Under the Court of Appeals\u2019 interpretation of the statute, a landowner in such a position will, upon abandonment of the easement, be presumed to own the land over which it is necessary for him to cross to gain access to the roadway.\nIt is my view that the majority\u2019s interpretation of the word \u201cadjoin\u201d severely and unnecessarily limits the purpose of the presumption and is contrary to the intent of the legislature. \u201cA construction which will defeat or impair the object of the statute must be avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative language.\u201d In re Hardy, 240 N.C. at 96, 240 S.E.2d at 372. I do not believe that the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals does violence to the language of the statute, and I would hold that the second sentence of the statute applies in this case.\nThe Court of Appeals\u2019 majority remanded this case to the trial court for consideration of the question of the constitutionality of the statute in question. The majority of this Court, however, declines to interpret the statute as did the Court of Appeals so as to avoid the constitutional question that such interpretation presents. It is true that \u201c[w]here one of two reasonable constructions will raise a serious constitutional question, the construction which avoids this question should be adopted.\u201d In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642, 231 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1977) (quoted by the majority). It is nonetheless also true that \u201c[i]n matters of statutory construction, our primary task is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.\u201d Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Electric Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991). In addition, the Court is \u201c \u2018not at liberty to give a statute a construction at variance with [the legislature\u2019s] intent, even though such construction appears to us to make the statute more desirable and free it from constitutional difficulties.\u2019 \u201d Delconte v. North Carolina, 313 N.C. 384, 402, 329 S.E.2d 636, 648 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 520, 243 S.E.2d 338, 350 (1978)).\nI believe that this Court\u2019s interpretation of the statute circumvents the intent of the legislature and that such interpretation should not be chosen for the purpose of avoiding a constitutional question. I vote to affirm the Court of Appeals.\nChief Justice Exum and Justice Whichard join in this dissenting opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice Meyer" } ], "attorneys": [ "Fuller, Becton, Billings & Slifkin, P.A., by Steven B. Epstein and Charles L. Becton, for plaintiff-appellants.", "Elrod & Lawing, P.A., by Frederick K. Sharpless and Stephanie T. Farabow, for defendant-appellees.", "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by James C. Gulick, Special Deputy Attorney General, Amicus Curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLES E. NELSON and NANCY W. NELSON v. BATTLE FOREST FRIENDS MEETING, an unincorporated association, and STEVE WOOD\nNo. 87A93\n(Filed 5 November 1993)\nRailroads \u00a7 13 (NCI4th)\u2014 abandoned railroad easement \u2014 road right-of-way within easement \u2014easement does not adjoin right-of-way \u2014 title to property between railroad and right-of-way\nWhere the right-of-way for a public road was entirely within an abandoned railroad easement, the abandoned railroad easement did not \u201cadjoin\u201d the public road right-of-way within the meaning of the second sentence of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-44.2(a) so that the statute does not apply to vest title to a 30-foot strip of land between the center of the railroad tracks and the edge of the public road right-of-way in defendant church as adjacent property owner.\nAm Jur 2d, Railroads \u00a7\u00a7 82-86.\nWhat constitutes abandonment of a railroad right of way. 95 ALR2d 468.\nJustice MEYER dissenting.\nChief Justice Exum and Justice WHICHARD join in this dissenting opinion.\nOn appeal by the defendants pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) and on discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31(c) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 108 N.C. App. 641, 425 S.E.2d 4 (1993), reversing a judgment entered by Allen (W. Steven), J., on 24 January 1991 in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 September 1993.\nThe dispute in this case involves a tract of land in Greensboro. The plaintiffs own a tract which they say extends to the center of what was an easement owned by the Southern Railway. The defendants contend the plaintiffs\u2019 tract extends only through the right-of-way of a public road.\nThe plaintiffs brought this action for trespass and to quiet title to the tract. Each side made a motion for summary judgment. The papers filed in support and in opposition to the motions showed that the following matters are not in dispute. The plaintiffs and defendant Battle Forest Friends Meeting own adjoining tracts of land. The record titles show that the property line of each party runs along the centerline of a track of the Southern Railway. The Southern Railway had an easement for the track that extended one hundred feet on each side from the center of the track onto the property of the parties. Old Battleground Road ran parallel and approximately thirty feet from the track. The right-of-way for the road was entirely within the railway easement. The following diagram depicts the interests of the parties.\nSouthern Railway removed the tracks in 1981 and abandoned the easement shortly thereafter.\nThe superior court denied the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment and allowed the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for the determination by the superior court of a constitutional question. The plaintiffs appealed based on a dissent in the Court of Appeals. We allowed discretionary review as to issues other than those raised in the dissent.\nFuller, Becton, Billings & Slifkin, P.A., by Steven B. Epstein and Charles L. Becton, for plaintiff-appellants.\nElrod & Lawing, P.A., by Frederick K. Sharpless and Stephanie T. Farabow, for defendant-appellees.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by James C. Gulick, Special Deputy Attorney General, Amicus Curiae." }, "file_name": "0133-01", "first_page_order": 167, "last_page_order": 174 }