{ "id": 2527544, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CALVIN WILSON, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wilson", "decision_date": "1993-12-03", "docket_number": "No. 68A93", "first_page": "220", "last_page": "226", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "335 N.C. 220" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571959 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "905", "parenthetical": "finding no prejudice where substantially the same testimony was also admitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517737 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169", "parenthetical": "finding no prejudice where substantially the same testimony was also admitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 L. Ed. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 975", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1493537, 1495395, 1494695, 1494287, 1494199 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/0975-03", "/us/488/0975-05", "/us/488/0975-04", "/us/488/0975-01", "/us/488/0975-02" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2514399 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695126 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778761 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0127-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 716, "char_count": 14591, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.263811422611044e-08, "percentile": 0.511490824368525 }, "sha256": "53ac116b1e1dd5ee717d412e800cb4c1bc99996e460efac8c54f4a21c56df6ab", "simhash": "1:352f62f4b46a85ca", "word_count": 2451 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:54:49.870550+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CALVIN WILSON, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Justice.\nDefendant was charged in an indictment, proper in form, with the first-degree murder of William Sanders. There being no evidence of aggravating circumstances, defendant was tried noncapitally and convicted by the jury of first-degree murder on the theory of premeditation and deliberation. The trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. We find defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nState\u2019s evidence tended to show that on 18 June 1991 around 8:30 p.m., Lynn Ellen Morrow was at the home of defendant\u2019s sister, Teresa, who lived on Wayt Street in Charlotte, North Carolina. Morrow looked out the living room window and saw defendant, whom she knew as \u201cWine,\u201d drive up in a black Jeep. Morrow knew defendant because the two had grown up in the same residential area of Charlotte and attended the same junior high school. In junior high school, defendant\u2019s brother was Morrow\u2019s boyfriend. Defendant came into Teresa\u2019s house and asked Morrow if she knew where William Sanders and Larry Manns were. Morrow answered that she thought Sanders, who had been at Teresa\u2019s house about an hour earlier, was in South Carolina. Sanders had rented and was driving a white Pontiac automobile. Defendant responded that he had seen Sanders\u2019 car parked near Teresa\u2019s house. He said to Morrow, \u201cCome on, I\u2019ll show you.\u201d The two went out of the house and began walking toward Oaklawn Avenue. The weather was clear; it was still daylight. As they approached the Pontiac, it began to pull out of a driveway, and defendant started running toward the car. Morrow saw defendant reach into his shirt and pull out a pistol. Morrow also began to run and asked defendant, \u201cWine, what are you doing?\u201d When defendant reached the car, he shot into the car two or three times. Morrow stopped running about twenty-five feet from the car. She could see that the victim was the driver of the car. Another person, who was in the passenger seat, got out of the car and ran away. Morrow could see only the back of the person who fled. Defendant shot into the car again, and it rolled across Wayt Street and struck a utility pole. Defendant ran to his Jeep and drove away. Morrow also left and went to the residence of Richard Latimer, where she purchased heroin.\nHarvey Neal Hinton testified that on 18 June 1991 he was visiting his mother, who resided at 2008 Wayt Street. Around 8:30 p.m., Hinton was sitting at the kitchen table eating dinner. It was still light outside, and as Hinton looked out the window he saw the victim, whom Hinton knew, and another man, whom Hinton did not know, get into a car. In a few seconds Hinton again looked out the window and saw that the car had pulled into Wayt Street. Hinton saw a third man who \u201chad been running. He ran up to the car. From the way he was leaning, seemed like he had just stopped running, really. And he just started shooting into the car.\u201d Hinton recognized the shooter as defendant. Defendant, who held the gun in his right hand, fired three shots, turned away slightly to the left, turned back, fired twice more, and then ran away.\nEric Lorenzo Davis testified that he was in the car with the victim that day. Davis did not know the victim well, but the victim had offered Davis a ride home. Davis got into the front passenger seat of the white car. The victim started the car, and as it rolled out of the driveway, Davis looked to his left and saw a revolver. Davis immediately got out of the car and ran away. He heard about five shots in all. He described a revolver as \u201c[t]he gun that you got it and you don\u2019t have to put no clips in it.\u201d\nState\u2019s medical evidence showed that two bullets were removed from the victim\u2019s body. The cause of death was a gunshot wound to the victim\u2019s chest. Other evidence showed that no spent casings were recovered from the victim\u2019s automobile, but holes in the interior of the vehicle were consistent with shots having been fired from the driver\u2019s side. Although no murder weapon was recovered, the two bullets from the victim\u2019s body and another bullet found on the floorboard of the car were all of nine millimeter caliber. All had been fired from the same gun, likely a revolver.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence included the testimony of Valerie Wall, who stated that on 18 June 1991 around 7:00 p.m. she went to Richard Latimer\u2019s house on Abelwood Street in Charlotte. State\u2019s witness Morrow was there and remained there until Wall left, around 11:30 p.m. Marilyn Sloan testified that she gave Wall a ride to Latimer\u2019s and saw Morrow standing in the doorway of the house.\nZubair Ahmed, general manager of a motel on Statesville Road, authenticated a motel registration record indicating defendant was a guest there on 18 June 1991. Ahmed testified the record showed defendant checked in at 2:35 p.m. In addition, defendant\u2019s alibi evidence included testimony by his girlfriend, Brenda Alexander, that she was with defendant when he checked into the motel and the two remained there until midmorning of the next day.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss made at the close of State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all evidence. Additional facts necessary to an understanding of defendant\u2019s contentions are included in the discussion which follows.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention is that the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument. We disagree with this contention.\nIn arguing to the jury the prosecutor attempted to discredit defendant\u2019s alibi as follows:\nI would contend to you that the defendant knew what he was going to do and he knew that he needed an alibi. What better place to get an alibi than a motel room?\nI mean what they want you to believe, that he has a girlfriend who he just happened, on June 18th, to want to go to a motel with. He\u2019s got a big house over there with that big fence around it. On Munsee. On Munsee Street. It\u2019s over there. She knows where it is. Doesn\u2019t make sense. All of a sudden they want to go to a motel. Don\u2019t believe that.\n. . . [The defendant\u2019s girlfriend] wasn\u2019t no bit more over at no motel with that defendant than the man in the moon. Doesn\u2019t make any sense.\nAnd money. Money. Money can buy a lot of things. Money can buy this [indicating defendant\u2019s Exhibit 4, the motel record.]\nDefendant argues that since no evidence showed he purchased the registration record, the prosecutor\u2019s remarks constituted argument without any basis in the record or expression of a personal belief or suspicion. We do not find these arguments persuasive.\nIn closing argument, an attorney may not make arguments based on matters outside the record but may, based on \u201chis analysis of the evidence, argue any position or conclusion with respect to a matter in issue.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1230 (1988). In addition, this Court has summarized its holdings on this question as follows:\nWe have frequently held that counsel must be allowed wide latitude in jury arguments in hotly contested cases. E.g., State v. Covington, 317 N.C. 127, 343 S.E.2d 524 (1986); State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 333 S.E.2d 708 (1985). Counsel may argue the facts in evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom together with the relevant law in presenting the case. State v. Covington, 317 N.C. 127, 343 S.E.2d 524. Whether counsel has abused this right is a matter ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. Counsel may not, however, place before the jury incompetent and prejudicial matter by expressing personal knowledge, beliefs, and opinions not supported by evidence. Id. Upon objection, the trial court has the duty to censor remarks not warranted by the evidence or law and may, in cases of gross impropriety, properly intervene ex mero motu. Id.\nState v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 37, 366 S.E.2d 459, 468, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 975, 102 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1988).\nApplying these principles, we find the prosecutor\u2019s argument was within the wide latitude allowed counsel in stating contentions and drawing inferences from the evidence. The prosecutor argued first and made no mention of defendant\u2019s alibi argument. Defense counsel argued next, emphasizing the veracity of the motel record. Arguing last, and in response, the prosecutor did not express a personal opinion or belief by suggesting that money could buy such a record. Instead, this was a legitimate inference, as defendant could legitimately create such a record by renting a motel room if he had the money whether he intended to use the room or not. The prosecutor did not argue that the record had in fact been bought. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in overruling defendant\u2019s objection.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred by excluding testimony from defense witness Wall that State\u2019s witness Morrow was under the influence of drugs at the time of the murder. Defendant preserved the alleged error by making an offer of proof during Wall\u2019s testimony. We disagree with defendant\u2019s contention.\nWall testified that Morrow was not on Wayt Street when the murder occurred. Accordingly, if Wall\u2019s testimony were believed by the jury, Morrow could not have seen the events to which she testified. Hence, whether Morrow was under the influence of drugs would be irrelevant, and exclusion of Wall\u2019s testimony on this point could not have prejudiced defendant. Relevant evidence is \u201cevidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (1992). Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 402 (1992). To show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there was a reasonable possibility that had the alleged error not occurred, a different result would have been reached at trial. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1988). Morrow herself testified on direct examination that she was addicted to heroin and cocaine at the time of the murder and used these drugs on that day. Under these circumstances, assuming arguendo that exclusion of the evidence was error, we conclude defendant has failed to show prejudice arising from exclusion of the proffered evidence, see id.; State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 169, 367 S.E.2d 895, 905 (1988) (finding no prejudice where substantially the same testimony was also admitted), and the trial court did not err in excluding it.\nFinally defendant contends the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to inquire of defense witness Sloan whether defendant paid her to testify. Again we disagree. The Rules of Evidence permit cross-examination of a witness \u201con any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (1992). This Court has said that the scope of cross-examination is subject to the control of the trial judge and \u201cthe questions must be asked in good faith.\u201d State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 675, 185 S.E.2d 174, 181 (1971); see also 1 Henry Brandis, Jr., Brandis on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 111 (3d ed. 1988) (reiterating good faith requirement).\nWe note first that the trial court required the prosecutor to give his basis for asking the challenged question. The prosecutor stated he had received information from an acquaintance of Sloan that Sloan sold drugs for defendant. From this the prosecutor inferred that Sloan would do \u201canything she can to help [defendant].\u201d In addition, the prosecutor argued that Sloan testified she was unemployed and lived at defendant\u2019s house on Munsee Street. From the record, we conclude the trial court did not err in overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s question.\nFor the foregoing reasons we hold defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Jeffrey P. Gray, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Janine M. Crawley, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CALVIN WILSON, JR.\nNo. 68A93\n(Filed 3 December 1993)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 460 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014prosecutor\u2019s argument concerning defendant\u2019s alibi \u2014no error\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument where defendant introduced alibi evidence that he had been in a motel when the shooting occurred and the prosecutor attempted to discredit defendant\u2019s alibi by arguing that money could buy a lot of things, including a motel record. Although defendant contended that the argument was without basis in the record because there was no evidence that he had purchased the registration record, the prosecutor did not argue that the record had been bought. The argument was a legitimate inference because defendant could legitimately create such a record by renting a motel room if he had the money whether he intended to use the room or not.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 609 et seq.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 761 (NCI4th)\u2014 testimony that State\u2019s witness on drugs \u2014excluded \u2014no prejudice\nThere was no prejudice in a first-degree murder prosecution, assuming error, where the court excluded testimony from a defense witness that a State\u2019s witness to the murder had been on drugs at the time. The defense witness also testified that the State\u2019s witness was not at the scene, so that whether the witness was on drugs would be irrelevant if the defense witness was believed. Moreover, the State\u2019s witness herself testified on direct examination that she was addicted to heroin and cocaine at the time of the murder and used drugs on that day.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7 806.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2954 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 cross-examination\u2014whether witness paid to testify\u2014 no error\nThere was no error in a first-degree murder prosecution where the court allowed the prosecutor to ask a defense witness whether defendant had paid her to testify where the trial court required the prosecutor to give his basis for the question and the prosecutor stated that he had received information that the witness sold drugs for defendant, was unemployed and lived at defendant\u2019s house, and inferred that the witness would do anything she could to help defendant.\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7 888.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Beal, J., at the 20 July 1992 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 17 September 1993.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Jeffrey P. Gray, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Janine M. Crawley, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0220-01", "first_page_order": 254, "last_page_order": 260 }