{ "id": 2526672, "name": "JAMES J. ANDERSEN, JR., Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of SAUNDRA L. ANDERSEN, Deceased, and the Estate of JOHN LAURITS ANDERSEN, Deceased v. MARILYN COMBS BACCUS, MURRAY ELTON BACCUS, and AN UNKNOWN PERSON", "name_abbreviation": "Andersen v. Baccus", "decision_date": "1994-01-28", "docket_number": "No. 111PA93", "first_page": "526", "last_page": "533", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "335 N.C. 526" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524065 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 ALR3d 1337", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "94 ALR3d 486", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497698, 2494955, 2493783 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0644-02", "/nc/327/0644-01", "/nc/327/0644-03" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497384 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532105 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313372 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529064 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525318 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571111 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568529 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming involuntary nonsuit for defendant insurance company based on lack of contact" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 N.C. App. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548767 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming involuntary nonsuit for defendant insurance company based on lack of contact" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/5/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "reversing summary judgment for defendant insurance company based on indirect contact" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168660 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "reversing summary judgment for defendant insurance company based on indirect contact" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491236, 2489286, 2489417, 2490225, 2490458 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0273-04", "/nc/325/0273-03", "/nc/325/0273-01", "/nc/325/0273-05", "/nc/325/0273-02" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528842 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2548849, 2548625, 2547510, 2549370, 2548670 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0574-02", "/nc/333/0574-01", "/nc/333/0574-05", "/nc/333/0574-03", "/nc/333/0574-04" ] }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "108-109", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524065 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" }, { "page": "19" }, { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0016-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 765, "char_count": 17542, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9716813078585186e-07, "percentile": 0.8503358690024013 }, "sha256": "dc9350df3e628697a382d01d3235f98c2f360c4e5d4823d2efbebd7c8b3ae438", "simhash": "1:0b5174af4427424c", "word_count": 2772 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:54:49.870550+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JAMES J. ANDERSEN, JR., Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of SAUNDRA L. ANDERSEN, Deceased, and the Estate of JOHN LAURITS ANDERSEN, Deceased v. MARILYN COMBS BACCUS, MURRAY ELTON BACCUS, and AN UNKNOWN PERSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Justice.\nThis case arose out of a collision on 5 February 1988 between an automobile driven by defendant Marilyn Combs Baccus and an automobile driven by Saundra L. Andersen, wife of plaintiff James J. Andersen, Jr. The collision occurred when defendant Marilyn Baccus swerved to avoid colliding with a third automobile, a Ford station wagon driven by an unknown person. The third automobile did not stop at the scene and the driver has never been identified. Plaintiff did not witness the accident but was brought to the scene of the accident before his wife was freed from the wreckage. After being freed, Mrs. Andersen was taken to a local hospital and the next day gave birth to a stillborn son, John Laurits Andersen. On 26 March 1988 Mrs. Andersen died from injuries allegedly received in the accident.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged claims for wrongful death of his wife and son, punitive damages based thereon, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages based thereon. The alleged liability of defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (\u201cState Farm\u201d) was based on its status as insurer of the automobile driven by plaintiff\u2019s intestate under a policy providing uninsured motorist coverage. Defendant State Farm asserted a counterclaim for declaratory judgment on the basis that there was no contact between any person or vehicle and the Ford automobile and \u201c[i]n particular, there was no contact between said Ford station wagon or any person or vehicle insured under said policy.\u201d\nPrior to trial defendant State Farm moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim. State Farm and defendants Baccus moved for summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claims for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress. After a hearing, the trial court (i) denied State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim but granted summary judgment for plaintiff on the issue of uninsured motorist coverage; (ii) entered summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff\u2019s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress; (iii) denied defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment on the wrongful death claims; and (iv) granted defendants partial summary judgment as to plaintiff\u2019s claim for punitive damages related to the wrongful death claims.\nOn appeal to the Court of Appeals plaintiff did not pursue the punitive damages claims. As to the claims appealed, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court\u2019s judgments. This Court granted all parties\u2019 petitions for discretionary review, Andersen v. Baccus, 333 N.C. 574, 429 S.E.2d 568-69 (1993); and for the reasons which follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.\nIn reversing summary judgment for plaintiff on the uninsured motorist issue, the Court of Appeals first concluded that the policy issued by defendant State Farm \u201cclearly require[d] that the unidentified vehicle make contact with the insured or the insured\u2019s auto.\u201d Andersen v. Baccus, 109 N.C. App. at 19, 426 S.E.2d at 107. The court also considered whether the policy was in conflict with the uninsured motorist statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21 (1993), and concluded that statute does not \u201cprovide for uninsured motorist coverage where a phantom vehicle allegedly cause[s] a collision between two other automobiles but make[s] no physical contact with either.\u201d Andersen v. Baccus, 109 N.C. App. at 19, 426 S.E.2d at 107. The Court of Appeals also relied on its cases interpreting the statute as requiring a collision, direct or indirect, between a hit-and-run driver\u2019s car and that of the insured. Petteway v. South Carolina Insurance Co., 93 N.C. App. 776, 379 S.E.2d 80 (affirming summary judgment for defendant insurance company based on lack of contact), disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 273, 384 S.E.2d 518 (1989); McNeil v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 84 N.C. App. 438, 352 S.E.2d 915 (1987) (reversing summary judgment for defendant insurance company based on indirect contact); Hendricks v. Guaranty Co., 5 N.C. App. 181, 167 S.E.2d 876 (1969) (affirming involuntary nonsuit for defendant insurance company based on lack of contact). The court also stated:\nOur interpretation of [section 20-279.21] is further supported by the fact that the legislature has undertaken to amend the uninsured motorist statute subsequent to this Court\u2019s first interpreting it as requiring physical contact between the insured and the hit-and-run driver. To date, it has not chosen to amend the statute to indicate that [such] physical contact is not required. When the legislature acts, it is always presumed that it acts with full knowledge of prior and existing law; and where it chooses not to amend a statutory provision that has been interpreted in a specific, consistent way by our courts, we may assume that it is satisfied with that interpretation. Thus, in consideration of the time-tested prior rulings of this Court, we are constrained to conclude that any shift away from the \u201cphysical contact\u201d requirement must derive not from this Court, but from legislative action, or action by our Supreme Court[,] which is the final arbiter for interpreting the statutes of this state.\nAndersen v. Baccus, 109 N.C. App. at 22, 426 S.E.2d at 108-109 (citations omitted).\nWe approve the careful reasoning of the Court of Appeals. Adhering to the principle of stare decisis, we decline to change existing judicial interpretation of the uninsured motorist statute, especially in light of the legislature\u2019s recent revision. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21 (1993).\nSummary judgment is to be granted\n\u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue. Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 218 S.E.2d 379 (1975). The movant may meet this burden by proving that an essential element' of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim or cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim. Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982); Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).\nCollingwood v. G.E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989).\nApplying these principles, we note that the forecast of evidence before the trial court showed there was no collision or contact between the automobile driven by the unknown motorist and any other automobile, including that driven by plaintiff\u2019s intestate. Therefore, defendant State Farm was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and we conclude the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing summary judgment for plaintiff on this issue.\nWe next consider the Court of Appeals\u2019 reversal of summary judgment for all defendants on plaintiff\u2019s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Before this Court defendants contend that they were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress and that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding it was reasonably foreseeable that plaintiff Andersen would suffer such distress. We agree. The Court of Appeals, relying on two of its recent decisions, based its analysis on the foreseeability element of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The cases relied on, however, have recently been reversed by this Court. Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, 108 N.C. App. 668, 424 S.E.2d 676, rev\u2019d, 334 N.C. 669, 435 S.E.2d 320 (1993); Gardner v. Gardner, 106 N.C. App. 635, 418 S.E.2d 260 (1992), rev\u2019d, 334 N.C. 662, 435 S.E.2d 324 (1993). Accordingly, in the case under review, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on the issue of foreseeability.\nIn Sorrells this Court reiterated that to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff need only allege that (i) defendant negligently engaged in conduct; (ii) it was reasonably foreseeable the conduct would cause plaintiff severe emotional distress; and (iii) the conduct in fact caused plaintiff to suffer such distress. 334 N.C. at 672, 435 S.E.2d at 321-22. Where a plaintiff seeks to recover for severe emotional distress arising from injury to another, the plaintiff must prove he suffered such distress \u201c \u2018as a proximate and foreseeable result of the defendant\u2019s negligence.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 672, 435 S.E.2d at 322 (quoting Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97, reh\u2019g denied, 327 N.C. 644, 399 S.E.2d 133 (1990)). Some factors to be considered in making the foreseeability determination include (i) plaintiff\u2019s proximity to defendant\u2019s negligent act, (ii) the relationship between plaintiff and the injured person, and (iii) whether plaintiff personally observed the negligent act. These three factors \u201care not mechanistic requirements'\u201d whose absence will inevitably defeat plaintiff\u2019s claim. Id. Sorrells expressly disavowed mechanical application of any arbitrary factors, stating that the issue of reasonable foreseeability must be determined under all the facts and \u201cresolved on a case-by-case basis.\u201d Id. at 673, 435 S.E.2d at 322. Sorrells shows that this Court will also look to other cases in which it has considered foreseeability of a plaintiff\u2019s emotional distress arising from concern for another. Holding that plaintiffs\u2019 alleged distress arising from their concern for their son was a possibility too remote to be reasonably foreseeable, the Court said:\nHere, it does not appear that the defendant had any actual knowledge that the plaintiffs existed. Further, while it may be natural to assume that any person is likely to have living parents or friends [who might] suffer some measure of emotional distress if that person is severely injured or killed, those factors are not determinative on the issue of foreseeability. The determinative question for us in the present case is whether, absent specific information putting one on notice, it is reasonably foreseeable that such parents or others will suffer \u201csevere emotional distress\u201d as that term is defined in law. We conclude as a matter of law that the possibility (1) the defendant\u2019s negligence in serving alcohol to Travis (2) would combine with Travis\u2019 driving while intoxicated (3) to result in a fatal accident (4) which would in turn cause Travis\u2019 parents (if he had any) not only to become distraught, but also to suffer \u201csevere emotional distress\u201d as defined in Ruark, simply was a possibility too remote to permit a finding that it was reasonably foreseeable. This is so despite the parent-child relationship between the plaintiffs and Travis. With regard to the other factors mentioned in Ruark as bearing on, but not necessarily determinative of, the issue of reasonable foreseeability, we note that these plaintiffs did not personally observe any negligent act attributable to the defendant. However, we reemphasize here that any such factors are merely matters to be considered among other matters bearing on the question of foreseeability. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98.\nId. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323.\nIn Gardner, the question presented was whether a mother, not present at the scene of a car accident in which her child received injuries resulting in his death shortly thereafter, could recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 334 N.C. at 663, 435 S.E.2d at 325-26. The parties stipulated that two of the three elements of the claim had been established, i.e., that decedent, the minor son of plaintiff and defendant, died as a result of defendant father\u2019s negligence and that plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. Id. at 666, 435 S.E.2d at 327. Discussing the third element, foreseeability, this Court noted that plaintiff was not in close proximity to, nor did she observe, defendant\u2019s negligent act. This fact, while not determinative, militated against defendant\u2019s ability to foresee that plaintiff would suffer severe emotional distress. Id. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328. In view of this fact and plaintiff\u2019s \u201cfailure to show that defendant knew she was susceptible to an emotional or mental disorder or other severe and disabling emotional or mental condition as a result of his negligence and its consequences,\u201d the Court held \u201cplaintiff\u2019s injury was not reasonably foreseeable and its occurrence was too remote from the negligent act itself to hold defendant liable for such consequences.\u201d Id. at 667-68, 435 S.E.2d at 328.\nViewing the present case in light of Gardner and Sorrells, we conclude that under all the facts and circumstances defendant Marilyn Baccus could not reasonably have foreseen that her negligent act, if any, would cause plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. While in this case plaintiff observed his wife before she was freed from the wreckage, as in Gardner, plaintiff was not in close proximity to and did not observe defendant Marilyn Baccus\u2019 negligent act, if any. As in Sorrells, nothing suggests that Marilyn Baccus knew of plaintiff\u2019s existence. The forecast of evidence is undisputed that at the moment of impact Marilyn Baccus did not know who was in the car which her vehicle struck and had never met Saundra Andersen. Both Gardner and Sorrells teach that the family relationship between plaintiff and the injured party for whom plaintiff is concerned is insufficient, standing alone, to establish the element of foreseeability. In this case as in Sorrells the possibility that the decedent might have a parent or spouse who might live close enough to be brought to the scene of the accident and might be susceptible to suffering a severe emotional or mental disorder as the result of defendant Marilyn Baccus\u2019 alleged negligent act is entirely too speculative to be reasonably foreseeable. Since on the undisputed forecast of evidence, plaintiff could not establish the element of foreseeability, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff\u2019s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff\u2019s claim.\nAFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "D. Keith Teague, P.A., by D. Keith Teague, for plaintiff-appellant Andersen.", "Baker, Jenkins, Jones & Daly, P.A., by Robert C. Jenkins and Roger A. Askew, for defendant-appellants Marilyn Combs Baccus and Murray Elton Baccus.", "Homthal, Riley, Ellis & Maland, by L.P. Homthal, Jr., and John D. Leidy, for defendant-appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES J. ANDERSEN, JR., Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of SAUNDRA L. ANDERSEN, Deceased, and the Estate of JOHN LAURITS ANDERSEN, Deceased v. MARILYN COMBS BACCUS, MURRAY ELTON BACCUS, and AN UNKNOWN PERSON\nNo. 111PA93\n(Filed 28 January 1994)\n1. Insurance \u00a7 1165 (NCI4th)\u2014 uninsured motorist coverage-requirement of physical contact\nThe Court of Appeals correctly reversed a summary judgment for plaintiff on the uninsured motorist issue in a wrongful death action arising from an automobile collision where defendant had swerved to avoid colliding with a third automobile which did not make contact. The Supreme Court declined to change the existing judicial interpretation of the uninsured motorist statute requiring contact, especially in light of the legislature\u2019s recent revision. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21.\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 2020 et seq.\n2. Negligence \u00a7 6 (NCI4th)\u2014 automobile accident \u2014spouse arriving after accident \u2014negligent infliction of emotional distress \u2014 foreseeability\nDefendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff\u2019s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment for defendants, in an action arising from an automobile collision involving defendant Marilyn Baccus and plaintiff\u2019s pregnant wife where plaintiff did not witness the accident but was brought to the scene before his wife was freed from the wreckage. The possibility that the decedent might have a parent or spouse who might live close enough to be brought to the scene of the accident and might be susceptible to suffering a severe emotional or mental disorder as the result of defendant Marilyn Baccus\u2019s alleged negligent act is \u2022 entirely too speculative to be reasonably foreseeable.\nAm Jur 2d, Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance \u00a7\u00a7 1-12, 45, 51, 52, 55.\nRelationship between victim and plaintiff-witness as affecting right to recover damages in negligence for shock or mental anguish at witnessing victim\u2019s injury or death. 94 ALR3d 486.\nRight to recover damages in negligence for fear of injury to another, or shock or mental anguish at witnessing such injury. 29 ALR3d 1337.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 109 N.C. App. 16, 426 S.E.2d 105 (1993), reversing summary judgment granted in favor of plaintiff on defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company\u2019s counterclaim for declaratory judgment and reversing summary judgment granted in favor of all defendants on plaintiff\u2019s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by orders entered 4 November and 8 November 1991 by Greeson, J., in Superior Court, Pasquotank County. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 October 1993.\nD. Keith Teague, P.A., by D. Keith Teague, for plaintiff-appellant Andersen.\nBaker, Jenkins, Jones & Daly, P.A., by Robert C. Jenkins and Roger A. Askew, for defendant-appellants Marilyn Combs Baccus and Murray Elton Baccus.\nHomthal, Riley, Ellis & Maland, by L.P. Homthal, Jr., and John D. Leidy, for defendant-appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company." }, "file_name": "0526-01", "first_page_order": 560, "last_page_order": 567 }