{ "id": 2527903, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BLANCHE KISER TAYLOR MOORE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Moore", "decision_date": "1994-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 556A90", "first_page": "567", "last_page": "618", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "335 N.C. 567" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "298 N.C. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568503 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 ALR4th 417", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "86 ALR2d 905", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "36 ALR4th 1046", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 39", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6217574 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 941", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6277664, 6276260, 6274984, 6275996, 6278967, 6278350, 6275343, 6278644, 6279286, 6277367, 6276539, 6275708, 6278014 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0941-08", "/us/446/0941-05", "/us/446/0941-01", "/us/446/0941-04", "/us/446/0941-12", "/us/446/0941-10", "/us/446/0941-02", "/us/446/0941-11", "/us/446/0941-13", "/us/446/0941-07", "/us/446/0941-06", "/us/446/0941-03", "/us/446/0941-09" ] }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 943", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11399617, 11399849, 11399934, 11399791, 11399664, 11399698, 11400084, 11399545, 11399898, 11399742, 11400031 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. 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App. 374, 376-77, 235 S.E.2d 70, 72, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 257, 237 S.E.2d 539 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0943-02", "/us/444/0943-07", "/us/444/0943-09", "/us/444/0943-06", "/us/444/0943-03", "/us/444/0943-04", "/us/444/0943-11", "/us/444/0943-01", "/us/444/0943-08", "/us/444/0943-05", "/us/444/0943-10" ] }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 918", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 601570, 600420, 600587, 599435, 600654, 600347 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0918-03", "/us/484/0918-05", "/us/484/0918-02", "/us/484/0918-06", "/us/484/0918-04", "/us/484/0918-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 U.S. 951", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 634149, 633957, 634118, 634316, 633934, 633774, 633821, 633904, 633906, 633712, 633977, 633785, 633725, 634110 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/495/0951-04", "/us/495/0951-02", "/us/495/0951-09", "/us/495/0951-03", "/us/495/0951-13", "/us/495/0951-11", "/us/495/0951-12", "/us/495/0951-10", "/us/495/0951-08", "/us/495/0951-15", "/us/495/0951-07", "/us/495/0951-06", "/us/495/0951-14", "/us/495/0951-05" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 903", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183298, 6181252, 6182756, 6183146, 6182571, 6181805, 6181423, 6182223, 6181585, 6182964, 6182388, 6181945, 6182076 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0903-13", "/us/428/0903-01", "/us/428/0903-10", "/us/428/0903-12", "/us/428/0903-09", "/us/428/0903-04", "/us/428/0903-02", "/us/428/0903-07", "/us/428/0903-03", "/us/428/0903-11", "/us/428/0903-08", "/us/428/0903-05", "/us/428/0903-06" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763650 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686205 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694780 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "photographs of defendant and his accomplice" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491441 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "photographs of defendant and his accomplice" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 L. 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Ed. 2d 267 (1985)" }, { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530367 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648, 314 S.E.2d 493, 503 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120, 86 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1985)" }, { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568313 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 L. Ed. 2d 796", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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Gardner, 311 N.C. 489, 513, 319 S.E.2d 591, 606 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 84 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545734 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Gardner, 311 N.C. 489, 513, 319 S.E.2d 591, 606 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 84 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 2d 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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"year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2526577 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530961 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561808 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557269 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" }, { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8605472 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 S.E.2d 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629214 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" }, { "page": "782" }, { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774343 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" }, { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541929 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "800 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" }, { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594-95", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court properly admitted bottles of rat poison purchased by the Sheriff of Anson County from the same drugstore where nine months before defendant had purchased the same product to show availability of the poison at all times relevant to the murder investigation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568644 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4776805 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569559 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563208, 8563308, 8563181, 8563245, 8563278 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0257-02", "/nc/293/0257-05", "/nc/293/0257-01", "/nc/293/0257-03", "/nc/293/0257-04" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549853 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 L. Ed. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Sorrells, 33 N.C. App. 374, 376-77, 235 S.E.2d 70, 72, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 257, 237 S.E.2d 539 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169-70", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Sorrells, 33 N.C. App. 374, 376-77, 235 S.E.2d 70, 72, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 257, 237 S.E.2d 539 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566864 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Sorrells, 33 N.C. App. 374, 376-77, 235 S.E.2d 70, 72, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 257, 237 S.E.2d 539 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561569 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573188 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696763 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2402840 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541401 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4731290 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 U.S. 681", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 14005 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "construing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)" }, { "parenthetical": "construing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/485/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890" }, { "page": "890" }, { "page": "890-91" }, { "page": "891" }, { "parenthetical": "photographs of body" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554614 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "303-304" }, { "page": "304" }, { "parenthetical": "photographs of body" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "circumstantial evidence of defendant's perpetration of \"virtually identical\" strangulation, proximate in time, showing preparation, plan, knowledge or identity" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305472 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "circumstantial evidence of defendant's perpetration of \"virtually identical\" strangulation, proximate in time, showing preparation, plan, knowledge or identity" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5308068 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571526 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4773087 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 473513 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297-98" }, { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/182/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4748970 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495-96" }, { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 756", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1050", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5473, 5290, 5004, 5103, 4917 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1050-01", "/us/494/1050-04", "/us/494/1050-05", "/us/494/1050-03", "/us/494/1050-02" ] }, { "cite": "375 S.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486627 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 L. Ed. 2d 232", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539893 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 L. Ed. 2d 707", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 L. Ed. 2d 341", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" }, { "page": "146" }, { "parenthetical": "photographs taken during medical treatment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549203 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" }, { "page": "401" }, { "parenthetical": "photographs taken during medical treatment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 L. Ed. 2d 1181", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 918", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787666, 1787631 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0918-02", "/us/448/0918-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 L. Ed. 2d 1137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 907", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787596, 1787636, 1787637, 1787575, 1787641, 1787643 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0907-04", "/us/448/0907-02", "/us/448/0907-06", "/us/448/0907-01", "/us/448/0907-05", "/us/448/0907-03" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519-20", "parenthetical": "holding that evidence that defendant feared her boyfriend would learn she had forged his name on checks and turn her in to the law was sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant poisoned her boyfriend for pecuniary gain" }, { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572332 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311-12", "parenthetical": "holding that evidence that defendant feared her boyfriend would learn she had forged his name on checks and turn her in to the law was sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant poisoned her boyfriend for pecuniary gain" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4760257 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 24-26, 257 S.E.2d 569, 585 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563765 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 24-26, 257 S.E.2d 569, 585 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 L. Ed. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" }, { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2489106 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" }, { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573800 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" }, { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564130 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" }, { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569931 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4758195 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505926 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4708015 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 L. Ed. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 1230", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12108826, 12108839 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/1230-01", "/us/469/1230-02" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" }, { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4680504 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" }, { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4727612 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" }, { "page": "33" }, { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2540300 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761933 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" }, { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532070 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568503 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 39", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6217574 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" }, { "page": "341-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/0039-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2945, "char_count": 121116, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.8173506435236175e-07, "percentile": 0.8981535216918052 }, "sha256": "72bfa23f350f68cfcf4fa345460ab61817a0c8671013a3b117c22f9de616d7d9", "simhash": "1:0571d52a372f9dfa", "word_count": 19599 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:54:49.870550+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BLANCHE KISER TAYLOR MOORE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Justice.\nDefendant, Blanche Kiser Taylor Moore, was indicted for the 7 (Ictober 1986 first-degree murder of Raymond C. Reid, Sr. (herein \u201cReid\u201d). She was tried capitally at the 15 October 1990 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Forsyth County, and was found guilty as charged. Following a sentencing proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000, the jury recommended defendant be sentenced to death. Judgment of death was entered on 16 November 1990. An order staying execution of the death sentence was entered on 26 November 1990 pending the conclusion of this appeal.\nIn May of 1989, defendant\u2019s then husband, the Reverend Dwight D. Moore (herein \u201cMoore\u201d), while being treated at North Carolina Memorial Hospital in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, was diagnosed with arsenic poisoning. An investigation was begun which led to the eventual exhumation of the bodies of P.D. Kiser, Sr., defendant\u2019s father; James N. Taylor, defendant\u2019s first husband; and Reid, a previous boyfriend. All of the bodies tested positively for the presence of arsenic. Defendant was indicted in Alamance. County for the murders of Kiser and Taylor and the felonious assault on Moore; she was indicted in Forsyth County for the murder of Reid. The Alamance County cases were subsequently transferred to Forsyth County. This opinion reviews defendant\u2019s capital trial for the murder by arsenic poisoning of Reid.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show that defendant met Reid while working at Kroger supermarket in Burlington, North Carolina, in 1962. They did not start going out together, however, until 1979. According to the testimony of a Kroger risk management investigator, Reid had said he and defendant \u201cprobably would have been married, except she wanted to be there next to her family.\u201d Reid was transferred several times in 1979 and 1980 until he became manager of a store in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Defendant worked the entire time in Burlington except for a brief period in 1979 when she was at a store in Durham. Defendant last worked at Kroger 17 October 1985, when she left her employment on account of sexual harassment.\nReid initially became ill on 1 January 1986. After having spent New Year\u2019s Eve with defendant and having eaten some of her homemade potato soup, Reid began experiencing severe symptoms of nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. Reid, who had never been known to miss work, was absent from work more than four weeks over the next few months. His last day at work was 29 May 1986. Reid\u2019s condition became progressively worse; and he was admitted to Wesley Long Hospital in Greensboro, North Carolina, on 30 May 1986 by his physician, Dr. Norman H. Garrett, Jr. On admission, Reid reported to Dr. Garrett that while eating supper seven days earlier, he had experienced nausea, vomiting, and dehydration, that he had become violently ill, and that he had been unable to keep down any solid foods since that time. Dr. Garrett\u2019s admission diagnosis was acute gastroenteritis based on \u201chis profound dehydration, nausea and vomiting.\u201d\nWhile hospitalized, Reid\u2019s condition continued to deteriorate; and Dr. Garrett revised his diagnosis to multiple systems failure based on Reid\u2019s symptoms including excessive nausea and vomiting, loose stools, skin rash, edema, dehydration, bone marrow damage, blood cell abnormalities, electrolyte abnormality, tachypnea (progressive shortness of breath), respiratory failure, tachycardia (fast heartbeat), low blood pressure, kidney malfunction and shutdown, and numbness and tingling in his hands and feet. Each of these symptoms is characteristic of arsenic poisoning.\nBy the morning of 5 June 1986, Reid\u2019s condition had stabilized. Dr. Garrett informed Reid, in defendant\u2019s presence, that he need only remain in the hospital for three to five more days following his circumcision (the procedure was the result of an infection and was not related to Reid\u2019s other symptoms). However, Reid\u2019s condition worsened so much over the next week that it became \u201clife threatening,\u201d and Dr. Garrett transferred him to North Carolina Baptist Hospital in Winston-Salem on 13 June 1986. Dr. Garrett was never able to make a satisfactory diagnosis of the cause of Reid\u2019s multi-system failures.\nDr. Robert Hamilton, a specialist in internal medicine and nephrology who treated Reid at Baptist Hospital, testified that Reid was admitted with a number of symptoms, including a raspy voice, severe swelling in his lower extremities, anemia, low white blood cell count, a rash over his lower extremities, white patches in his mouth, very poor bowel sounds, difficulty breathing, and signs of kidney failure. Reid\u2019s condition continued to deteriorate, resulting in a \u201cCode Blue\u201d on 21 June 1986. Emergency measures were taken and Reid was intubated so that he could be mechanically ventilated. Over the next few days, Reid became nearly paralyzed.\nDr. Hamilton began with a preliminary diagnosis of GuillainBarre syndrome. Reid showed some slight improvement following a procedure called \u201cplasmapheresis.\u201d In this procedure, the patient\u2019s blood is removed from the body, the red blood cells are separated from the plasma, and the red blood cells are returned to the body. The lab report from a urine sample obtained from Reid between 27 June 1986 and 28 June 1986 showed \u201cquite elevated\u201d levels of arsenic in the urine. Dr. Hamilton, however, never saw the results of this test. Reid further improved during July of 1986 but continued to have difficulty breathing and needed to be on a respirator. Reid gradually recovered use of his extremities and was able to breathe on his own. During this time, defendant asked Dr. Hamilton if she could bring food from home for Reid and was given permission to do so. At the end of September, Reid suffered another serious setback.\nLisa Hutchens, the head nurse in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), testified that the last time she saw Reid looking well was on 1 October 1986 when she visited him in the intermediate care unit. Defendant was with Reid and was feeding him banana pudding. Hutchens again visited Reid on 3 October 1986 in his room in the intermediate ward. Reid was in \u201cacute respiratory distress\u201d and was very frightened. He pleaded with her to \u201c[pjlease help me or I\u2019m going to die.\u201d Reid was returned to the ICU on 4 October 1986. Nurse Hutchens recalled defendant often bringing Reid food items from home such as iced tea, frozen yogurt, milk shakes, and soups during this time.\nSteven Reid, one of Reid\u2019s sons, testified that he visited his father on 4 October 1986 and found he had eaten a breakfast prepared by defendant. He stayed until late that afternoon and visited again on the fifth before returning to East Carolina University in Green-ville, North Carolina. When Steve called on Monday, 6 October 1986, defendant informed him he should return to the hospital as soon as possible. When he arrived on the evening of the sixth, he hardly recognized his father. He looked as if he had gained almost one hundred pounds and \u201c[h]is eyeballs were even starting to swell and his skin was splitting.\u201d\nDr. Kyle Jackson testified that Reid became \u201cprogressively weaker and unable to continue his breathing on his own well enough to sustain life.\u201d By 7 October 1986, Reid was on inotropic drugs and mechanical ventilation. He was able to communicate only with his eyes. In the early afternoon, Reid \u201ccoded\u201d and the responding medical personnel began to administer CPR and to perfuse his heart in order to give him emergency drugs. Dr. Jackson pronounced Reid dead from complications which he thought were attributable to Guillain-Barre syndrome. Several witnesses recalled that moments after Reid passed away defendant stated: \u201cWe cannot have an autopsy. He has been through too much. He wouldn\u2019t want to be cut on like this. We just \u2014 we cannot have one.\u201d\nSeveral hospital employees, family members, and visitors testified that they recalled defendant bringing Reid milk shakes from McDonald\u2019s while he was hospitalized at Wesley Long Hospital. Gloria Head, a fellow Kroger employee, recalled visiting Reid and observing a container of red Jello in defendant\u2019s purse. Dr. Garrett had previously testified that Reid had informed him on 30 May 1986 that he began vomiting after eating Jello the previous night.\nWanda B. Moss, a registered nurse in the ICU at North Carolina Baptist Hospital, described the treatment Reid underwent in the hospital. On some occasions Reid was fed with a Dobhoff feeding tube inserted into him. The tube is very narrow and becomes easily clogged. Nurse Moss stated that Coca-Cola is inserted by syringe into the tube and is effective in unclogging it. Defendant was frequently in the room when Nurse Moss used the syringe and the Coke to clear Reid\u2019s Dobhoff tube. The Coke was often left unattended in the patient\u2019s room, and the syringes were kept in an unlocked closet in Reid\u2019s room. Nurse Moss further recalled defendant bringing peanut butter milk shakes, banana pudding, tomato pudding, corn bread, and milk from home for Reid and feeding him herself. The ICU nursing notes reflect repeated instances where Reid complained later in the day of being nauseated after having been fed by defendant. Nurse Moss never saw anyone other than defendant bring food to Reid or feed him.\nPursuant to a court order, Reid\u2019s body was exhumed on 13 June 1989 in Alamance County. The body was taken to the medical examiner\u2019s office in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and an autopsy was performed. The autopsy revealed \u201cclearly recognizable\u201d Mees lines across the fingernails of both hands and the toxicology report indicated a concentration of arsenic in Reid\u2019s liver tissue \u201c30 times higher than one might see in an average individual who is not having a significant exposure to arsenic.\u201d The arsenic in Reid\u2019s brain tissue was approximately sixty-seven times higher than that expected in a normal individual. As a result of these findings, Dr. John D. Butts, Chief Medical Examiner for the State of North Carolina, concluded that \u201cReid died as a result of the complications of arsenic poisoning.\u201d Furthermore, based on an analysis of hair samples from the exhumed body of Reid, Dr. Vincent Guinn, a professor of chemistry at the University of California-Irvine and an expert in the field of nuclear chemistry, concluded that the arsenic levels found in Reid\u2019s hair correspond \u201cto a long period of ingestion of arsenic, multiple ingestions.\u201d Dr. Guinn noted that on 24 June 1986, the arsenic level peaked at 70 parts per million, which is \u201croughly 70 times the normal level.\u201d\nThe State presented testimony from several witnesses to link defendant with the product Anti-Ant. Brenda Green, a Kroger coworker, recalled hearing defendant recommend Anti-Ant to a customer as a good ant-killer. Moore testified that, during the summer of 1985, defendant showed him a bottle of Anti-Ant and asked him to purchase some for her from Byrd\u2019s Food Center in the Glen Raven section of Burlington. Moore further testified that he purchased the Anti-Ant at Byrd\u2019s, gave the bottle of Anti-Ant to defendant, and told defendant that he had purchased it at Byrd\u2019s. Leonard Wolfe, a former co-worker, who owned a small, community convenience store called Ken\u2019s Quickie Mart recalled defendant coming into the store in early April 1989 and asking if he \u201chad any Anti-Ant in stock.\u201d\nPeggy Vaughn, owner and operator of Atla Chemical Company in McLeansville [North Carolina], testified that her company had manufactured Anti-Ant for over ten years, including the years 1985-1988. The main active ingredient in the product Anti-Ant is arsenic. She further stated that State\u2019s Exhibit #30 was identical in appearance to other bottles of Anti-Ant manufactured by her company. Other testimony showed the availability of Anti-Ant to customers in the Burlington area.\nSpecial Agent Thomas J. Currin of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation testified concerning the investigation into a letter received by defendant in the Alamance County jail purportedly written by a man named Garvin Thomas. In the letter, Thomas allegedly confessed to the murder of Reid and the attempted murder of Moore. Based on his examinations and comparisons of defendant\u2019s handwriting samples and those of Garvin Thomas, Agent Currin, a questioned document examiner, concluded that, in his opinion, defendant was the person who wrote the confession letter attributed to Garvin Thomas.\nThe State presented extensive evidence concerning the deaths of defendant\u2019s father and her first husband and Moore\u2019s illness. Recitation of this evidence as necessary will be included in the Court\u2019s discussion of defendant\u2019s assignment of error related to the admission of this evidence.\nOnce the State rested, W.A. Shulenberger, testifying as an expert witness for the defendant, opined that defendant could not have written the confession letter. Shulenberger\u2019s examination revealed no evidence of an attempt to disguise or alter the handwriting. He stopped short, however, of stating that Garvin Thomas actually wrote the confession letter.\nCarolyn Hinshaw, a jailer with the Alamance County Sheriff\u2019s Department, testified that a man, carrying a teddy bear and signing his name as \u201cGarvin Thomas,\u201d attempted to visit defendant in jail saying \u201che had done so much wrong in his life and hurt so many people that he wanted to start doing some good to right the wrongs.\u201d Deputy Hinshaw testified this incident occurred two to four months before 19 May 1990 \u2014 the date on the alleged confession letter. Carol DiLelo, a secretary for defense counsel, Mitchell M. McEntire, testified that, when her employer learned of the \u201cteddy bear\u201d incident, she was told to arrange a meeting with Garvin Thomas. At that meeting, Mr. Thomas stated that \u201che knew he was going to die and that he knew Blanche Moore had not done the things she was accused of doing and he knew that he had hurt her and he had hurt her family and he was sorry about all that.\u201d\nDefendant also called as a witness her lawyer in her sexual harassment suit who testified that at defendant\u2019s request, he referred her to Mr. Robert Hinshaw, an attorney in Winston-Salem, about preparing a will for Reid. Hinshaw then testified that defendant gave him some notes which defendant said had been prepared by a nurse and asked if he could draft a proposed will. Hinshaw drafted a proposed will and power of attorney and then visited Reid in the hospital. At the time Reid could not speak, but Reid could communicate by nodding his head and squeezing a person\u2019s hand. The nurses present assisted Hinshaw in interpreting Reid\u2019s communications and Hinshaw was satisfied that Reid understood what was being read and what he was doing. The next day Hinshaw returned to the hospital and in the presence of a notary public and two nurses again went over the will with Reid. Since Reid could not sign his name, Hinshaw signed for him in the presence of Reid, the notary, and the two nurses who witnessed the will. Hinshaw testified that he inquired whether Reid understood that by leaving his property to defendant, his sons would be left out and whether Reid wanted defendant to share in the insurance proceeds. Reid responded affirmatively to both these questions. The same procedure was followed in executing the power of attorney.\nDefendant took the stand on her own behalf and testified that while Reid was in the ICU at Baptist Hospital, she recalled him being fed only with a tube. She denied seeing Reid \u201chave any food at all during that time\u201d or having ever taken food to Reid while he was in the hospital. She specifically denied taking banana pudding or peanut butter milk shakes to Reid in the hospital. Defendant did not recall conversing with anyone about Reid\u2019s autopsy and told the jury she would not have been opposed to an autopsy to determine the cause of his death.\nAs to Reid\u2019s will, defendant denied having anything whatsoever to do with his will, even though Reid gave her his power of attorney. While acknowledging she had heard of Anti-Ant, defendant denied ever having purchased, attempted to purchase, or directed anyone else to purchase the product. Defendant denied administering arsenic to James N. Taylor, Reid, or Moore.\nAdditional facts, when necessary, will be set forth with respect to the various issues.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of the first-degree murder of Reid. During the capital sentencing phase, the jury found as aggravating circumstances that (i) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and (ii) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. As mitigating circumstances, the jury found that defendant (i) \u201cprovided well for the needs of her children while they were growing up\u201d; (ii) \u201cupon being informed of the warrant for her arrest, peacefully submitted herself in accordance with her duty\u201d; and (iii) \u201cdemonstrated concern and kindness for others in her community.\u201d Based upon findings that the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances and that the aggravating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstances, the jury recommended that defendant be sentenced to death.\nPretrial Issues\nIn her first assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her motions for change of venue. Defendant contends she could not obtain a fair and impartial trial in Forsyth County on account of the extensive pretrial publicity resulting in great prejudice against her in violation of her state and federal constitutional rights. For the reasons discussed herein, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.\nTo support her initial motion, defendant introduced evidence to show that the local media provided regular coverage of her case, including detailed newspaper articles regarding the deaths of Kiser and Taylor and the illness of Moore; that WKRR-FM, an Asheboro, North Carolina, radio station with a market in Forsyth County, repeatedly played a song which implied defendant was guilty and called her a \u201cblack widow spider\u201d; and that the results of a random survey compiled by defendant\u2019s investigator showed the community held preconceptions prejudicial to her case. Random survey results showed that forty-nine of the fifty respondents had heard of and/or followed defendant\u2019s case with interest. Of those forty-nine, thirty-six indicated they had reached an opinion as to defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. Thirty-one of those individuals believed defendant to be guilty while five believed her to be innocent. At least two people polled said \u201cthat they felt she was guilty and that they should fry the woman.\u201d However, in her brief, defendant concedes that the media coverage was largely factually based.\nIn denying defendant\u2019s motion for change of venue, the trial court made the following findings of fact: (i) Forsyth County is a large, urban county with approximately 260,000 in population; (ii) defendant was not a resident of Forsyth County and, in fact, lived in Alamance County; (iii) the majority of individuals involved in the case also resided in Alamance County; and (iv) there had been extensive publicity in Forsyth County and the surrounding areas but the publicity was not inflammatory and, in fact, some was exculpatory. The trial court concluded as a matter of law \u201cthat defendant has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that she would not get a fair trial in Forsyth County and the Court in its discretion\u201d denied defendant\u2019s motion for change of venue.\nDefendant later renewed her motion but presented no additional supporting evidence at the motion hearing. The trial court deferred ruling on this motion pending the filing of any additional affidavits, articles, or recordings for consideration. Prior to trial, the court denied the renewed motion for change of venue as well.\nThe statute pertaining to change of venue motions provides:\nIf, upon motion of the defendant, the court determines that there exists in the county in which the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial, the court must either:\n(1) Transfer the proceeding to another county in the prosecutorial district as defined in G.S. 7A-60 or to another county in an adjoining prosecutorial district as defined in G.S. 7A-60, or\n(2) Order a special venire under the terms of G.S. 15A-958.\nThe procedure for change of venue is in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of this Chapter, Venue.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-957 (1988). In the recent case of State v. Yelverton, 334 N.C. 532, 434 S.E.2d 183 (1993), this Court stated:\nThe test for determining whether venue should be changed is whether \u201cit is reasonably likely that prospective jurors would base their decision in the case upon pre-trial information rather than the evidence presented at trial and would be unable to remove from their minds any preconceived impressions they might have formed.\u201d [State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 255, 307 S.E.2d 339, 347 (1983).] The burden of proving the existence of a reasonable likelihood that he cannot receive a fair trial because of prejudice against him in the county in which he is to be tried rests upon the defendant. State v. Madric, 328 N.C. 223, 226, 400 S.E.2d 31, 33 (1991). \u201cIn deciding whether a defendant has met his burden of showing prejudice, it is relevant to consider that the chosen jurors stated that they could ignore their prior knowledge or earlier formed opinions and decide the cas\u00e9 solely on the evidence presented at trial.\u201d Jerrett, 309 N.C. at 255, 307 S.E.2d at 348. The determination of whether a defendant has carried his burden of showing that pre-trial publicity precluded him from receiving a fair trial rests within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion. Madric, 328 N.C. at 226, 400 S.E.2d at 33. The trial court has discretion, however, only in exercising its sound judgment as to the weight and credibility of the information before it, including evidence of such publicity and jurors\u2019 averments that they were ignorant of it or could be objective in spite of it. When the trial court concludes, based upon its sound assessment of the information before it, that the defendant has made a sufficient showing of prejudice, it must grant defendant\u2019s motion as a matter of law. See State v. Abbott, 320 N.C. 475, 478, 358 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1987).\nId. at 539-40, 434 S.E.2d at 187.\nFrom our review of the materials submitted by both defendant and the State, we are satisfied the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant failed to meet her burden of proving that pretrial publicity tainted her chances of receiving a fair and impartial trial. Of the thirty-three articles submitted, at least three contain potentially exculpatory information. Only on\u00e9 of the thirty-three is potentially inflammatory \u2014 an article entitled, \u201cThe Men In Her Life Keep Dropping Like Flies,\u201d published in True Police Cases, and as to this one defendant made no showing concerning the extent of its circulation. The remaining twenty-nine articles which defendant contends caused undue pretrial publicity are primarily factually based. The articles submitted begin in September of 1989 and continue through August of 1990 and address the sequence of events including the initial investigation, the indictments, all pretrial motions, the psychiatric testing of defendant, the behavior of defendant while in prison awaiting trial, and the later investigation focusing on the alleged confession letter and handwriting analyses related thereto. \u201cThis Court has consistently held that factual news accounts regarding the commission of a crime and the pretrial proceedings do not of themselves warrant a change of venue.\u201d State v. Gardner, 311 N.C. 489, 498, 319 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 84 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1985).\nThis Court has also noted that the potential jurors\u2019 responses to questions on voir dire conducted to select the jury are the best evidence of whether pretrial publicity was prejudicial or inflammatory. State v. Richardson, 308 N.C. 470, 480, 302 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1983). \u201cWhere, as here, a jury has been selected to try the defendant and the defendant has been tried, the defendant must prove the existence of an opinion in the mind of a juror who heard his case that will raise a presumption of partiality.\u201d State v. Madric, 328 N.C. 223, 228, 400 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1991). If each juror states unequivocally that he can set aside what he has heard previously about a defendant\u2019s guilt and arrive at a determination based solely on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court does not err in refusing to grant a change of venue. State v. Soyars, 332 N.C. 47, 54, 418 S.E.2d 480, 484-85 (1992).\nIn the present case, to assure a fair and impartial venire, the trial court conducted an initial screening to eliminate potential jurors who had already formed biases about defendant. Of the 110 potential jurors initially screened on an individual basis by the court concerning pretrial publicity, forty-six were excused for cause on account of preconceived opinions of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence determined from media coverage. The remaining sixty-four potential jurors stated that, notwithstanding the publicity, they could be fair and impartial and decide the case solely on the evidence presented in court. These sixty-four prospective jurors, having passed the initial screening process, were subsequently questioned by the State and defendant in a standard voir dire. Each of the twelve jurors who ultimately served on the jury during defendant\u2019s trial stated unequivocally during the initial screening process and again during voir dire that they had formed no opinions about the case, that they could be fair and impartial, and that they would base their decisions solely on the evid\u00e9nce presented at trial.\nConsidering the entire record before us, we conclude that defendant has not established a reasonable likelihood that pretrial publicity prevented her from receiving a fair and impartial trial in Forsyth County. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motions for a change of venue.\nIn her next assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her motions for a bill of particulars with regard to the circumstances surrounding the death of Reid. The record discloses that on 9 October 1989, defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars requesting the State provide various information, including the alleged motive for Reid\u2019s murder, the date or dates of Reid\u2019s poisoning and the means thereof, the State\u2019s version of the facts concerning any poisonings and any and all other information within the possession of the District Attorney, his agents and investigators. Subsequently, on 31 October 1989, defendant filed a supplemental motion for a bill of particulars seeking information as to (i) the exact cause of death, (ii) the exact date or dates as well as the time on said dates when Reid was poisoned, (iii) the exact geographic locations where the poison was introduced into Reid\u2019s body, (iv) the type poison introduced into Reid\u2019s body, (v) the identity of any persons present during the poisonings, (vi) the identity of any persons who supplied the poison used, (vii) the specifics as to dates, times, locations of each instance where defendant acquired any poison, including substances containing arsenic, (viii) the identity of any persons present when defendant acquired the poison, and (ix) a list of aggravating circumstances on which the State would rely in seeking the death penalty.\nAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motions the State noted that it had turned over to defendant all Reid\u2019s medical records including the autopsy report and was in no better position to state the cause of death other than \u201ccomplications from arsenic poisoning.\u201d The State further responded that \u201c[t]he victim, Raymond Carlton Reid, received numerous doses of arsenic poisoning during the period of time from December 31, 1985 through October 7, 1986.\u201d The State further asserted that the specific time of the poisoning was not essential since the case involved \u201cchronic poisoning\u201d and not \u201cone particular act against Raymond Reid on a particular day at a certain time.\u201d The trial court denied the motion except as to items four and nine, namely, the type poison and the aggravating circumstances to be submitted.\nThe purpose of a bill of particulars pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-925 \u201cis to inform defendant of specific occurrences intended to be investigated at trial and to limit the course of the evidence to a particular scope of inquiry.\u201d State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 676, 325 S.E.2d 181, 186 (1985).\nWhether to allow or deny a motion for a bill of particulars\nis generally within the discretion of the trial court and is not subject to review \u201cexcept for palpable and gross abuse thereof.\u201d State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 603, 213 S.E.2d 238, 242 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 903 (1976). The court must order the State to respond to a request for a bill of particulars only when the defendant shows that the information requested is necessary to enable him to prepare an adequate defense. G.S. 15A-925(c). Stated otherwise, a denial of a defendant\u2019s motion for a bill of particulars will be held error only when it clearly appears to the appellate court that the lack of timely access to the requested information significantly impaired defendant\u2019s preparation and conduct of his case.\nState v. Easterling, 300 N.C. 594, 601, 268 S.E.2d 800, 805 (1980).\nDuring discovery, the State provided defense counsel with copies of Reid\u2019s entire medical record along with the autopsy report and reports detailing the results of the hair analyses. This information enabled defendant to determine the time frame when Reid\u2019s body contained elevated levels of arsenic and to analyze the victim\u2019s medical condition at these times. At trial, the State did not attempt to adduce any evidence indicating the timing of the poisonings with any greater particularity than reflected in the documentation furnished to defendant covering the period from \u201cDecember 31, 1985 through October 7, 1986.\u201d The State confirmed that arsenic was the poison used, and defendant had obtained through discovery statements allegedly made by defendant linking her to the purchase of Anti-Ant, an arsenic-based ant killer.\nDefendant does not suggest surprise or specify in what manner the denial of her motions for a bill of particulars affected her trial strategy. The State introduced nothing at trial which could have come as a surprise to the defendant pertaining to the dates of the poisonings. She had full knowledge of the specific occurrences to be investigated at trial, State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 612, 260 S.E.2d 567, 575 (1979). On the record before this Court, defendant has failed to show that lack of access to information \u201csignificantly impaired [her] preparation and conduct of the case.\u201d Easterling, 300 N.C. at 601, 268 S.E.2d at 805. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motions for a bill of particulars.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in failing to compel the Forsyth County District Attorney to comply with a prior agreement between defense counsel and the Alamance County District Attorney establishing an open file policy. While the trial for the murder of Reid was pending in Forsyth County, charges were also pending against defendant in Alamance County for the murder of James N. Taylor and for the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury on Moore. For judicial economy and to avoid possible prejudice created by extensive pretrial publicity in Alamance County, Judge J.B. Allen, Jr. entered an order transferring venue in the Alamance County cases to Forsyth County.\nPrior to the order, the Alamance County District Attorney\u2019s office agreed to an open file policy to afford \u201cthe defense the benefit of every document and every matter and thing in the file.\u201d However, when defendant\u2019s motion for a change of venue was granted, the District Attorney in Forsyth County refused to comply with the previous arrangement. Defendant argues in her brief that access to the Alamance County District Attorney\u2019s files was\nof material importance to the Defendant, particularly in light of the expressed intention on the part of the Forsyth County District Attorney to rely . . . upon evidence pertaining to the facts and circumstances surrounding the deaths of the Defendant\u2019s father and first husband, as well as the illnesses suffered by Rev. Moore.\nThe statute governing disclosure of evidence by the State provides:\n(a) Except as provided in G.S. 15A-903(a), (b), (c) and (e), this Article does not require the production of reports, memoranda, or other internal documents made by the prosecutor, law-enforcement officers, or other persons acting on behalf of the State in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by witnesses or prospective witnesses of the State to anyone acting on behalf of the State.\n(b) Nothing in this section prohibits a prosecutor from making voluntary disclosures in the interest of justice.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-904 (1988). Defendant has made no allegations that the State failed to provide appropriate discovery pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903. Defendant also has failed to provide any authority for her conclusion that the prosecutor of one district should be bound by the open file discovery policy of a prosecutor in another district.\nThe general rule is that \u201cthe work product or investigative files of the district attorney, law enforcement agencies, and others assisting in preparation of the case are not open to discovery.\u201d State v. Brewer, 325 N.C. 550, 574, 386 S.E.2d 569, 582 (1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 951, 109 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1990). While the prosecutor may, in his or her discretion, proceed under an open file policy, he or she may not be forced to do so. Similarly, the District Attorney in one district may not be compelled to comply with an agreement pertaining to discovery entered into by the District Attorney in another district once venue has been changed in the case. Furthermore, defendant has not shown any prejudice resulting from the Forsyth District Attorney\u2019s refusal to follow an open file policy. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to compel the State to abide by the prior agreement between defendant and the Alamance County District Attorney. This assignment of error is without merit.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for individual sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors. In denying the motion for individual voir dire throughout the entire selection process, the trial court ruled it would\nallow the motion to conduct an individual voir dire on the preliminary matters of pretrial publicity and whether or not a juror has formed an opinion about the case. . . . [W]e\u2019ll screen a pool of jurors for publicity; and then once we get an acceptable number, we\u2019ll bring them in twelve at a time and go through the regular voir dire process.\nFollowing the initial screening process, twelve prospective jurors were seated in the jury box while the remaining members of the venire were sequestered outside the courtroom until they were called to replace an excused venireperson.\nA motion for individual voir dire is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court whose ruling will not be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion. State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981), appeal after remand, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983); State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137, reh\u2019g denied, 448 U.S. 918, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1181 (1980). Defendant argues that collective voir dire on the issues other than pretrial publicity inhibited the candor of the jurors and permitted the prospective jurors to become educated concerning responses which would enable them to be excused from the panel. Thus, a \u201cdomino effect\u201d is produced as each juror expresses his or her aversion to the death penalty in order to be relieved of jury duty.\nAs we have previously held in Oliver and Barfield, this argument is speculative and without merit. The record does not support defendant\u2019s contentions. The assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying her pretrial motion that prospective jurors be examined on their opinions concerning defendant\u2019s eligibility for parole upon conviction. This issue has previously been decided against defendant. State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 428 S.E.2d 118 (1993), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993), reh\u2019g denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 126 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1994); State v. Roper, 328 N.C. 337, 402 S.E.2d 600, cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 116 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1991); State v. McNeil, 324 N.C. 33, 375 S.E.2d 909 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds in light of McKoy, 494 U.S. 1050, 108 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1990); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 356 S.E.2d 279, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 98 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987).\nIn her next assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court erred in conducting the voir dire during the initial screening process, thus denying counsel the opportunity to make a full and complete inquiry into the fitness of the prospective jurors for service. The trial court initially allowed the State and the defendant to screen the first thirteen prospective jurors concerning pretrial publicity but then took over and conducted the remainder of the screening process after several admonitions to counsel to speed up the questioning.\nIn an effort to expedite this initial screening process, the trial court directed the following questions to each prospective juror:\nTHE COURT: Could you as best you can put out of your mind what you might have read or heard and base your decision solely on the evidence that you hear in the courtroom?\nThe COURT: Could you be fair and impartial to this defendant and not let anything you might have read or heard affect your decision in this case?\nThe COURT: The law requires that a juror presume a defendant to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Could you do that regardless of what you\u2019ve already read or heard?\nThe COURT: And as a result of what you\u2019ve read or heard, you haven\u2019t already made up your mind or formed or expressed an opinion about the guilt or innocence of this defendant, have you?\nBased on the responses to these questions, the prospective juror was either excused for cause upon motion by defendant or asked to return the following day for the continuation of the standard voir dire. A review of the entire voir dire reveals that, even after the trial court took over the screening process, defense counsel was permitted on several occasions to follow up on the questions previously asked by the court. During the standard voir dire, defense counsel was allowed to question prospective jurors further concerning any preconceived opinions attributable to the pretrial publicity surrounding this case. Two prospective jurors who had passed the initial screening process were excused for cause when additional questioning disclosed they each had formed an opinion concerning defendant\u2019s guilt.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214 provides, in pertinent part:\n(c) The prosecutor and the defense counsel, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, may personally question prospective jurors individually concerning their fitness and competency to serve as jurors in the case to determine whether there is a basis for a challenge for cause or whether to exercise a peremptory challenge. The prosecution or defense is not foreclosed from asking a question merely because the court has previously asked the same or similar question.\nDefendant has failed to show a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(e). The record discloses that the trial court acted merely to expedite the initial screening process by asking questions designed to eliminate prospective jurors with obvious opinions regarding defendant\u2019s guilt. Once the standard voir dire was commenced, defense counsel was given latitude to examine the prospective jurors for any latent ideas or beliefs formed as a result of the pretrial publicity pertaining to defendant\u2019s case. While both the State and the defendant indisputably have the right to question prospective jurors to determine their fitness and competency to serve, \u201cthe extent and manner of counsel\u2019s inquiry rests within the trial court\u2019s discretion.\u201d State v. Soyars, 332 N.C. at 56, 418 S.E.2d at 486. This assignment of error is without merit.\nGuilt-Innocence Phase\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion in limine to restrict introduction by the State of evidence concerning Kiser and Taylor\u2019s deaths and Moore\u2019s illness. Defendant also contends admission of this evidence was error and that the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument based thereon should have been disallowed and the State\u2019s requested jury instruction on similar acts or crimes denied. On 14 September 1990, the District Attorney filed a motion for an order allowing the admission into evidence of other similar crimes and offenses, charged and uncharged, against the defendant which tend to prove one or more of the purposes set forth in Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Following an extensive pretrial hearing on 5 October 1990, the trial court ruled that the State would be allowed to present evidence of similar crimes. The court noted it would rule at a later time on what preliminary showing the State would be required to make for the evidence to be admitted.\nPrior to the impanelment of the jury, the trial court .heard arguments on defendant\u2019s related motion in limine to restrict the State from commenting during its opening statement upon the evidence of similar crimes committed by defendant against Kiser, Taylor, and Moore. The trial court allowed defendant\u2019s motion as to arguments concerning the arsenic poisoning of Kiser but denied the motion, and over defendant\u2019s continuing objection, allowed opening statements and evidence concerning the arsenic poisoning death of Taylor and the near death of Moore. The court did not allow evidence of the levels of arsenic found in Kiser\u2019s body.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) provides:\n(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. \u2014 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nRelying on State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 417, 347 S.E.2d 7 (1986), and State v. Breeden, 306 N.C. 533, 293 S.E.2d 788 (1982), defendant contends that evidence of the prior death of Taylor and the arsenic-related illness of Moore was not admissible under Rule 404(b) because the State did not present direct evidence linking defendant as a participant in the prior crimes. This Court, however, rejected the requirement of a \u201cdirect evidence link\u201d for purposes of Rule 404(b) in State v. Jeter, 326 N.C. 457, 389 S.E.2d 805 (1990). Distinguishing Breeden the Court noted:\nBreeden, however, preceded the codification of N.C.R. Evid. 404(b). That rule includes no requisite that the evidence tending to prove defendant\u2019s identity as the perpetrator of another crime be direct evidence, exclusively. Neither the rule nor its application indicates that examples of other provisions \u2014 such as admissibility of evidence of other offenses to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, or plan \u2014 rest solely upon direct evidence. E.g., State v. Price, 326 N.C. 56, 388 S.E.2d 84 (1990) (circumstantial evidence of defendant\u2019s perpetration of \u201cvirtually identical\u201d strangulation, proximate in time, showing preparation, plan, knowledge or identity). Under the statutory scheme of Rules 403 and 404, the concern that anything other than direct evidence of a defendant\u2019s identity in a similar offense might \u201cmislead [the jury] and raise a legally spurious presumption of guilt\u201d is met instead by the balancing test required by Rule 403: the critical inquiry regarding evidence of other offenses introduced for purposes of showing defendant\u2019s identity as the perpetrator of the offense for which he is being tried is not whether it is direct or circumstantial, but whether its tendency to prove identity in the charged offense substantially outweighs any tendency unfairly to prejudice the defendant.\nId. at 459, 389 S.E.2d at 807.\nRule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion of relevant evidence with but one exception, that is, the evidence must be excluded if its only probative value is to show that defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged. State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 302, 406 S.E.2d 876, 890 (1991). In Stager, this Court held that the proper test under Rule 404(b) is whether there was \u201csubstantial evidence tending to support a reasonable finding by the jury that the defendant committed a similar act or crime and its probative value is not limited solely to tending to establish the defendant\u2019s propensity to commit a crime such as the crime charged.\u201d 329 N.C. at 303-304, 406 S.E.2d at 890 (adopting the rationale of Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988) (construing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b))). \u201c[E]vidence of other offenses is admissible so long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other than the character of the accused.\u201d State v. Weaver, 318 N.C. 400, 403, 348 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1986).\nMurder by poisoning is inherently a surreptitious crime. Rarely are there eyewitnesses, thus, circumstantial evidence is often the only evidence to prove the State\u2019s case against an accused. In the present case, the State presented extensive circumstantial evidence marking the similarities between Reid\u2019s death and the arsenic poisoning death of Taylor and the arsenic poisoning of Moore. Three different men either married to or intimately involved with defendant died, or barely escaped death, from arsenic poisoning, an unusual cause of death. In each case defendant had motive (financial), opportunity (close relationship), and means (knowledge of and access to Anti-Ant). In each case medical evidence suggests that multiple doses of arsenic were administered to the victim over a long period of time, as opposed to one large fatal dose. In each case defendant was frequently alone with the victim in the hospital, and medical testimony suggests that certain of defendant\u2019s visits in which she fed the victim corresponded with an onset of symptoms characteristic of arsenic poisoning. In each case defendant was heard to say that she hated the victim or that the victim was cruel or evil. In the cases of Reid and Taylor, defendant was already seeing her next victim at the time of the arsenic assaults.\nUnder Rule 404(b) a prior crime is similar to the one charged if some unusual facts or particularly similar acts are present in both which would indicate that both crimes were committed by the same person. Stager, 329 N.C. at 304, 406 S.E.2d at 890-91. While these similarities need not be unique or bizarre, they must \u201ctend to support a reasonable inference that the same person committed both the earlier and later acts.\u201d Id. at 304, 406 S.E.2d at 891. Given the similarities between the crime charged and the other crimes presented by the State, we conclude that the evidence of the other offenses was relevant under Rule 404(b) as evidence tending to prove modus operandi, motive, opportunity, intent and identity of defendant as the perpetrator. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence and in denying defendant\u2019s motion. This assignment of error is, also, overruled.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce testimony for the sole purpose of generating sympathy for Reid\u2019s family. The trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objections to the testimony of Wanda B. Moss, a registered nurse in the ICU at North Carolina Baptist Hospital, who had cared for Reid during his final illness. Defendant argues that Nurse Moss\u2019 testimony concerning medical techniques and medical equipment used to treat Reid served merely to inflame the passions of the jury and elicit feelings of sympathy for the Reid family. Defendant also argues the testimony of Reid\u2019s son concerning his father\u2019s appearance and mental state reinforced the inflammatory affect of Nurse Moss\u2019 testimony. These contentions are meritless.\nRelevant evidence is \u201cevidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (1992). \u201cAll relevant evidence is admissible\u201d unless it is excluded by some other constitutional or statutory exclusionary rule. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 402 (1992). Relevant evidence may, however, be excluded \u201cif its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992).\nThe testimony of Nurse Moss was probative to show (i) that defendant had access to Reid in the hospital, (ii) that a correlation existed between defendant\u2019s feeding Reid and the onset of Reid\u2019s symptoms, (iii) that Reid manifested symptoms associated with multiple system failure incident to arsenic poisoning, namely, swelling, rashes, skin splitting and acute paralysis, (iv) that Reid could swallow food notwithstanding the tubes, (v) that arsenic could have been introduced into Reid\u2019s body via the feeding tubes and (vi) finally, that Reid suffered inordinate pain over an extended period of time. The probative value of Nurse Moss\u2019 testimony outweighed any unfair 'prejudice to defendant. \u201c[R]elevant evidence will not be excluded simply because it may tend to prejudice the opponent or excite sympathy for the cause of the party who offers it as evidence.\u201d State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 421, 402 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991). Furthermore, the record discloses that similar evidence from other witnesses was admitted without objection. \u201c[W]here evidence is admitted over objection, but the same evidence has theretofore or thereafter been admitted without objection, the benefit of the objection is ordinarily lost.\u201d State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 551, 313 S.E.2d 523, 530 (1984). This assignment of error is without merit.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for mistrial following an emotional display by Assistant District Attorney Janet Branch during questioning of Moore as a State\u2019s witness. Defendant asserts that Branch, after the first several questions, \u201cburst into tears and after some 30 seconds fled the courtroom\u201d and that such an emotional outburst by one of the prosecuting attorneys made it virtually impossible for defendant to receive a fair and impartial trial.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1061 provides, in relevant part:\nUpon motion of a defendant or with his concurrence the judge may declare a mistrial at any time during the trial. The judge must declare a mistrial upon the defendant\u2019s motion if there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant\u2019s case.\nThe resolution of this issue lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 333 S.E.2d 245 (1985); State v. Calloway, 305 N.C. 747, 291 S.E.2d 622 (1982); State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976).\nWhen such an incident involving an unexpected emotional outburst occurs, the judge must act promptly and decisively to restore order and to erase any bias or prejudice which may have been aroused. Whether it is possible to accomplish this . in a particular case is a question necessarily first addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. \u201cNot every disruptive event occurring during the course of trial requires the court automatically to declare a mistrial,\u201d and if in the sound discretion of the trial judge it is possible despite the untoward event, to preserve defendant\u2019s basic right to receive a fair trial before an unbiased jury, then the motion for mistrial should be denied. On appeal, the decision of the trial judge in this regard is entitled to the greatest respect. He is present while the events unfold and is in a position to know far better than the printed record can ever reflect just how far the jury may have been influenced by the events occurring during the trial and whether it has been possible to erase the prejudicial effect of some emotional outburst. Therefore, unless his ruling is clearly erroneous so as to amount to a manifest abuse of discretion, it will not be disturbed on appeal.\nBlackstock, 314 N.C. at 244, 333 S.E.2d at 253 (quoting State v. McGuire, 297 N.C. 69, 75, 254 S.E.2d 165, 169-70, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943, 62 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1979) (quoting State v. Sorrells, 33 N.C. App. 374, 376-77, 235 S.E.2d 70, 72, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 257, 237 S.E.2d 539 (1977))).\nAlthough the transcript is silent as to what actually transpired, it appears from arguments of counsel that once Ms. Branch became unable to continue questioning the witness and before her tears' became apparent to the court, she immediately excused herself from the courtroom. The trial court, upon request by the State, promptly called for a short recess and removed the jury from the courtroom. No further proceedings took place until the next morning when defense counsel moved for mistrial. Following arguments from both parties, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1061. In so ruling, the trial judge noted that\nwhile Ms. Branch was questioning the juror \u2014 excuse me \u2014 the witness that she did apparently become somewhat emotional and unable to ask further questions. There was no audible outburst. It was not clearly apparent to me whether she was crying or sick or what the problem was, but she did become unable to continue her questioning and did get up and leave the courtroom. A recess was immediately called and the jury sent out.\nWhen the jurors returned to the courtroom, the trial judge inquired whether Ms. Branch\u2019s inability to continue her questions for a brief period of time would in any way affect their decision in the case or their ability to be fair and impartial. No juror responded to these questions. Then by a show of hands, the jurors each affirmatively acknowledged that they could still base their \u201cdecision solely on the evidence that [they heard] from the witness stand and that nothing that happened or transpired would in any way prevent [them] from giving this defendant a completely fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence.\u201d\nFrom our review of the transcript, the findings by the trial court and the responses of the jury members, we are satisfied the Assistant District Attorney\u2019s brief emotional display was not prejudicial to defendant. Ms. Branch removed herself from the courtroom quickly and quietly. The jury was immediately removed from the courtroom. In response to questions by the court, not one juror answered that the incident would prevent him or her from being able to give defendant a completely fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in failing to conduct a \u201cvoir dire\u201d examination of the District Attorney\u2019s files to determine whether the State had provided defendant with required discovery pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903. During cross-examination of defendant\u2019s witness, Jean Leath, a jailer with the Alamance County Sheriff\u2019s Department, the prosecutor questioned her recollection of an interview between a former inmate, Terri Michelle Edwards, and Detective Benny Bradley, an investigator with the Burlington police department who was assigned to the case. In an effort to refresh her recollection, the prosecutor handed Ms. Leath a written report of the interview compiled by Detective Bradley. Defendant objected, arguing she had not been supplied a copy of the \u201cstatement\u201d pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(f)(5)(b) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Defendant argued the report was Brady material because it tended to show that the State\u2019s witness, Terri Michelle Edwards, had committed perjury during her testimony the previous week. The court, believing the document to be a \u201cstatement,\u201d ruled that the prosecutor should provide defendant with a copy of the report. Court was recessed until the following day.\nWhen court convened the next morning, the prosecutor, relying on State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988), declined to produce the report because it was not a \u201cstatement\u201d of Terri Michelle Edwards. The term \u201cstatement\u201d found in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903 includes \u201cstatements signed or otherwise adopted by the witness and \u2018substantially verbatim\u2019 recitals or oral statements which are contemporaneously recorded.\u201d Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 573, 364 S.E.2d at 375. The State argued that this document contains merely \u201ca narrative [written by Detective Bradley at a later time] of what the witness had said. ... It is not a transcription. It is not \u2014 has never been adopted, has never been subscribed to.\u2019.\u2019 Defendant then moved for the court to examine the document in camera to make the \u201cdetermination of whether [the document] is a transcription or a field report\u201d pursuant to Vandiver. The trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objection to the State\u2019s line of questioning about Detective Bradley\u2019s notes. At this point, the prosecutor agreed to produce the document but the trial court stated: \u201cWell, I think it\u2019s probably too late now. We\u2019re ready for the jury and we\u2019re ready to get on with this trial.\u201d Defendant then renewed her earlier motion to strike Terri Edwards\u2019 testimony and instruct the jury to disregard it. The court denied the motion to strike.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s assertion on appeal, defendant did not request the court to conduct an in camera examination of th\u00e9 prosecutor\u2019s file to determine if the District Attorney had provided discovery as required. Rather defendant asked for an in camera inspection of Detective Bradley\u2019s report to determine if it was a statement or field report. The discovery statutes do not alter the general rule that the work product or investigative files of the District Attorney, law enforcement agencies, and others assisting in the preparation of the case are not subject to discovery. State v. Brewer, 325 N.C. 550, 574, 386 S.E.2d 569, 582 (1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 951, 109 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1990). The trial court is under no obligation to ex mero mo tu examine the prosecutor\u2019s investigative files for discovery compliance. This assignment of error is without merit.\nIn her next assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce items of physical evidence which had no conceivable bearing upon the question of defendant\u2019s guilt and served merely to inflame the passions of the jury. The objectionable items were a bottle of Anti-Ant introduced during the testimony of Peggy Vaughn and several medical appliances introduced during Nurse Wanda Moss\u2019 testimony.\nThe State called Ms. Peggy Vaughn to testify that she owned and operated the Atla Chemical Company in McLeansville which had manufactured the product Anti-Ant for over ten years. The active ingredient in Anti-Ant is arsenic. When the State asked her to identify State\u2019s Exhibit 30 as a bottle of Anti-Ant produced by her company, defense counsel objected and argued the lack of relevance of the bottle of Anti-Ant to this case. The trial court overruled the objection.\nEvidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to prove a fact in issue. State v. Prevette, 317 N.C. 148, 345 S.E.2d 159 (1986). The evidence may be excluded if the trial court determines that an unfair prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992). The identification of the bottle of Anti-Ant was not irrelevant in this case. The State\u2019s evidence tended to prove that defendant was familiar with the product as early as the 1970s; that the product was available in the Burlington area at all relevant times; and that defendant actually had a bottle of Anti-Ant in her possession during the summer of 1985, which she showed to Moore with the request that he purchase another bottle. The fact that the bottle of Anti-Ant was not the exact bottle used by defendant to poison Reid is immaterial. See State v. Hunt, 297 N.C. 258, 261-62, 254 S.E.2d 591, 594-95 (1979) (holding that trial court properly admitted bottles of rat poison purchased by the Sheriff of Anson County from the same drugstore where nine months before defendant had purchased the same product to show availability of the poison at all times relevant to the murder investigation). The trial court did not err in admitting the bottle of Anti-Ant into evidence.\nDuring her testimony, Nurse Wanda Moss identified the following medical devices:\nExhibit 58 \u2014 Nasogastric tube\nExhibit 59 \u2014 Endotracheal tube\nExhibit 60 \u2014 Dobhoff tube\nExhibit 63 \u2014 Swan-Ganz catheter\nExhibit 64 \u2014 IV fluid bag\nExhibit 65 \u2014 Syringe\nExhibit 67 \u2014Suction catheter\nThe court allowed each of the exhibits to be introduced into evidence for illustrative purposes only. Defendant now argues that the admission of these medical devices, together with detailed explanations concerning their use and purpose, served merely to inflame the passions of the jury and had no reasonable bearing on proving any issue in controversy. Relying on State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 372 S.E.2d 523 (1988), defendant argues that the inflammatory nature of the devices prejudiced the jury and eclipsed any probative value the items may have had.\nDefendant\u2019s reliance on Hennis is misplaced. In Hennis after defendant stipulated the cause of the victim\u2019s death, the forensic pathologist projected on the wall directly above defendant\u2019s head twenty-six slides of the bodies taken during the autopsies and nine taken at the scene of the crime. Thereafter, eight- by ten-inch color photographs of the crime scene and the autopsy were presented one by one to the members of the jury. In ruling that the \u201cthirty-five duplicative photographs published to the jury . . . were excessive in both their redundancy and in the slow, silent manner of their presentation,\u201d Hennis, 323 N.C. at 286, 372 S.E.2d at 528, the Court found the photographic evidence more prejudicial than probative and granted the defendant a new trial. However, we have not extended the rationale of Hennis to include other forms of physical evidence.\nIn the present case the medical devices were identified and introduced solely to illustrate the testimony of a registered nurse involved in Reid\u2019s primary care and treatment. The pieces of equipment were not excessively displayed and were not presented separately to the jury for a closer inspection. Defendant has failed to show how the single presentation of medical devices used in the daily attempts to save Reid\u2019s life rises to the level of excessive and repetitious use of the highly disturbing photographs found in Hennis. The medical equipment was introduced merely to illustrate the types of treatment received and the physical condition of Reid while at North Carolina Baptist Hospital. As discussed earlier, the probative value of this evidence substantially outweighs the possibility of any unfair prejudice to defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992). This assignment of error is without merit.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss all the charges on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury. Defendant argues that since no poison was ever positively placed in her hands, it is mere speculation and conjecture that she was responsible for Reid\u2019s death; and a rational trier of fact could not justifiably find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.\nWe have previously stated the standard for determining a motion to dismiss thusly:\nWhen a defendant moves for dismissal, the trial court is to determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1982). Whether evidence presented constitutes substantial evidence is a question of law for the court. Id. at 66, 296 S.E.2d at 652. Substantial evidence is \u201csuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Smith, 800 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). The term \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d simply means \u201cthat the evidence must be existing and real, not just seeming or imaginary.\u201d State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980).\nState v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991). In passing upon a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference. Id. at 237, 400 S.E.2d at 61. \u201cThe test of the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss is the same whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or both.\u201d Id. When the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is questioned by a motion to dismiss, the issue for the trial court is \u201cwhether a reasonable inference of the defendant\u2019s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances.\u201d Id.\nWhen a murder is committed by means of poison, premeditation and deliberation are not elements of the crime of first-degree murder and premeditation and deliberation are hence irrelevant. Similarly, a specific intent to kill is not relevant to the crime of first-degree murder perpetrated by means of poison. State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 203, 344 S.E.2d 775, 781 (1986).\nA murder which is perpetrated by means of poison is deemed to be murder in the first degree. G.S. 14-17. And when the State undertakes to prosecute for such a murder, it has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the deceased died by virtue of a criminal act, and (2) that such criminal act was committed by the accused. S. v. Palmer, 230 N.C. 205, 52 S.E.2d 908, and cases cited. In other words, the State, in such case, and in this case, has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the deceased died from poison, administered with criminal intent by the person charged.\nState v. Hendrick, 232 N.C. 447, 453, 61 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1950).\nApplying these principles to the evidence before us, we find that there is sufficient, competent evidence to show, and from which a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt, that Reid died from arsenic poisoning administered by defendant through a series of repeated doses. The evidence showed that defendant had on at least three occasions possessed, attempted to purchase or asked someone else to purchase an arsenic-based ant killer. All three of the men who were either married to or romantically involved with defendant died or nearly died as a result of arsenic poisoning. Defendant expressed negative feelings about Reid to her psychiatrist and in November 1985 stated that her feelings toward him \u201chad turned to hate.\u201d Defendant denied taking food to Reid in the hospital, but the State presented evidence that she did. Further the medical evidence demonstrated a correlation between defendant\u2019s visits and the renewed onset of Reid\u2019s symptoms. Given this evidence and the infrequency of death by arsenic poisoning, we are satisfied \u201cany rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979), quoted in State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66-67 n.1, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 n.1 (1982). This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s refusal to give particular jury instructions which she contends were supported by the evidence and in conformity with the law. We find no error in the court\u2019s failure to give the requested instructions on reasonable doubt, identity of the perpetrator, dying declarations, and uncontroverted evidence.\nReasonable doubt. Defendant requested the following instruction on reasonable doubt:\nWhen it is said that the jury must be satisfied of the Defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is meant that they must be fully satisfied, or entirely convinced, or satisfied to a moral certainty. If, after considering, comparing and weighing all the evidence, the minds of the jurors are left in such condition that they cannot say they have an abiding faith, to a moral certainty, in the Defendant\u2019s guilt, then they have a reasonable doubt.\nThe trial court declined to give the requested instruction, but advised it would use the reasonable doubt instruction in the Pattern Jury Instruction, which in substance covered everything defendant requested. The judge gave the following instruction from the Pattern Jury Instruction:\nNow, a reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense arising out of some or all of the evidence that \u2018has been presented or the lack or insufficiency of the evidence, as the case may be. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that fully satisfies or entirely convinces you of the defendant\u2019s guilt.\nAs defendant correctly notes, trial courts are not required to use the exact language of a requested instruction; but if the request is a correct statement of the law, and supported by the evidence, the court must give the instruction in substance. State v. Monk, 291 N.C. 37, 54, 229 S.E.2d 163, 174 (1976). The court is not required to define reasonable doubt absent a request, but if the court does so, the instruction must be a correct statement of the law. State v. Wells, 290 N.C. 485, 226 S.E.2d 325 (1976).\nIn light of this Court\u2019s recent decision in State v. Bryant, 334 N.C. 333, 432 S.E.2d 291 (1993), finding error under Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 112 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1990), defendant\u2019s requested instruction arguably was not an accurate statement of the law. In Bryant we said, \u201cWhen a jury is instructed that it may convict if it finds the defendant guilty to a moral certainty it increases the possibility that a jury may convict a person because the jury believes he is morally guilty without regard to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to prove his guilt.\u201d 334 N.C. at 343, 432 S.E.2d at 297. The instruction in Bryant also contained the term, \u201chonest substantial misgiving,\u201d which was not contained in defendant\u2019s requested instruction. However, recognizing that this Court recently declined to find error under Cage in State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 439 S.E.2d 578 (1994), where the trial court instructed in part that \u201c[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt means that you must be fully satisfied, entirely convinced or satisfied to a moral certainty of the Defendant\u2019s guilt,\u201d id. at 443-44, 439 S.E.2d at 582, we cannot say that the trial court erred in the present case.\nThe pattern instruction given by the trial court contained none of the offending Cage phrases, namely, \u201cgrave uncertainty,\u201d \u201cactual substantial doubt,\u201d and \u201cmoral certainty,\u201d Cage, 498 U.S. at 40, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 341-42, or terms of similar import. Furthermore, this instruction correctly informed the jury that the standard for conviction beyond a reasonable doubt was certainty based upon the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant\u2019s requested instruction on reasonable doubt.\nIdentity of Perpetrator. Arguing that the State\u2019s evidence raised only a suspicion of defendant\u2019s guilt which was insufficient to convict, defendant requested the following instruction:\nWhere all of the evidence in a case only engenders or raises the question, if Defendant did not commit the killing, then who did?, it is not sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Evidence which merely shows that Defendant had the opportunity to commit a criminal offense and which raises a suspicion that she did so is not sufficient evidence on which the jury may convict.\nThe court denied the motion, noting that it would give an instruction on circumstantial evidence which would be in substance what defendant requested. The trial court then instructed on direct and circumstantial evidence as follows:\nNow, there are two types of evidence from which you may find the truth as to the facts of a case, direct and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is the testimony of one who asserts actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain or group of facts and circumstances indicating the guilt or the innocence of a defendant. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. Nor is a greater degree of certainty required of circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence. You should weigh all the evidence in the case. After weighing all the evidence, if you are not convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find her not guilty.\nDefendant contends on appeal that her requested instruction taken in conjunction with her requested instruction on reasonable doubt would have focused the issue to be answered by the jury, namely, the identity of the individual responsible for Reid\u2019s death.\n\u201c[I]f a party requests an instruction which is a correct statement of the law and is supported by the evidence, the court must give the instruction at least in substance.\u201d State v. Warren, 327 N.C. 364, 371, 395 S.E.2d 116, 121 (1990). In this case the instruction as given, when read in conjunction with the entire charge to the jury, adequately links the State\u2019s burden to prove defendant\u2019s identity as the perpetrator of the crime with the quantum of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by defendant.\nDying Declarations. Defendant also requested the trial court to instruct the jury that \u201c[t]he law recognizes that persons who believe themselves to be in danger of imminent death are highly unlikely to lie.\u201d During the charge conference, defense counsel argued this instruction was appropriate since there was conflicting evidence that Garvin Thomas had written a letter shortly before he died in which he confessed to the poisonings of Reid and Moore. The State responded there was no evidence showing that the letter was even written by Garvin Thomas. Defendant\u2019s own expert refused to opine that Thomas authored the letter while the State\u2019s expert, SBI Agent Currin, a questioned documents examiner and forensic chemist, ruled out Thomas as the author to a ninety-nine percent degree of certainty. Furthermore, the letter was offered into evidence by the State not as the dying declaration of Garvin Thomas but as evidence of defendant\u2019s \u201cdeceptive plan to throw suspicion away from herself.\u201d\nFollowing this exchange, the trial court denied the request to instruct the jury on the inherent reliability of dying declarations but noted it would \u201ccertainly let both sides argue those positions.\u201d The court then instructed the jurors that they were the \u201csole judges of the weight to be given any evidence. By this I mean if you decide that certain evidence is believable, you must then determine the importance of that evidence in light of all the other believable evidence in the case.\u201d Therefore, we find that the jury was properly instructed on the issue of credibility of the evidence and it was not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct on dying declarations.\nUncontroverted Evidence. Lastly, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to give the following instruction pertaining to uncontradicted evidence:\nYou are not required to accept testimony, even when uncontradicted, and even if the witness is not impeached. You may decide, because of the witness\u2019 bearing and demeanor, or because of the inherent improbability of the testimony, or for other reasons sufficient to you, that such testimony is not worthy of belief.\nAlthough the court denied defendant\u2019s request, our review of the jury charge reveals that the court gave the requested charge essentially verbatim. This assignment of error is without merit.\nIn her next assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to submit the lesser included offense of second-degree murder to the jury. Defendant argues that in not submitting second-degree murder, the court, in effect, allowed the jury to presume premeditation and deliberation. As a result, the trial court relieved the State of its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.\n\u201c[A]n intent to kill is not necessary to constitute the crime of first-degree murder when the murder was allegedly committed by means of poison. Any murder committed by means of poison is automatically first-degree murder.\u201d State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 204, 344 S.E.2d 775, 782 (1986). As noted earlier premeditation and deliberation are not elements of the crime and are, hence, irrelevant. Id. The evidence in this case supported each and every element of first-degree murder by poisoning. As in Johnson, the only evidence to the contrary was defendant\u2019s denial that she had committed the offense.\nIf the State\u2019s evidence is sufficient to fully satisfy its burden of proving each element of the greater offense and there is no evidence to negate these elements other than the defendant\u2019s denial that he [or she] committed the offense, the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on a lesser offense.\n317 N.C. at 205, 344 S.E.2d at 782. This assignment of error is overruled.\nSentencing Proceeding\nIn her next assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to strike the death penalty from consideration by the jury and to impose a life sentence. At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued that the death penalty in our state is unconstitutional for a number of reasons \u2014 none, of which included the reasonable doubt instruction requested by defendant during the guilt-innocence phase. The trial court denied the motion.\nNow, for the first time, defendant focuses her argument on the court\u2019s failure to give her requested instruction on reasonable doubt during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial as the basis of her contention that the court should strike the death penalty from the jury\u2019s consideration. Without citing any authority, defendant asserts the trial court\u2019s failure to give her requested reasonable doubt instruction contributed substantially to the action of the jury in returning a death recommendation and exposed defendant to an arbitrary and capricious sentencing proceeding. Even had defendant properly preserved this issue for appellate review, this assignment of error is without merit. As we have discussed above, the trial court did not err in failing to give defendant\u2019s requested instruction on reasonable doubt.\nDefendant further contends under this same assignment of error that the trial court erred in failing to explain to the jury that the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt applies to mitigating circumstances as well as to aggravating circumstances. This contention is an incorrect statement of law. \u201cThe burden of proof on the existence of any mitigating circumstance is on the defendant, and the standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 158, 362 S.E.2d 513, 534 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988). For the foregoing reasons, we overrule this assignment of error.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the aggravating circumstance that Reid\u2019s murder was committed for pecuniary gain. In support of her motion to dismiss pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance, defendant argued this circumstance should be submitted only when the primary motivation of defendant is financial gain. This assertion is not supported by the law. Our research reveals no authority and the cases cited by defendant fail to support such an argument.\nRather, \u201c[t]he gravamen of the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance is that \u2018the killing was for the purpose of getting money or something of value.\u2019 \u201d State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 621, 430 S.E.2d 188, 210 (1993) (quoting State v. Gardner, 311 N.C. 489, 513, 319 S.E.2d 591, 606 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 84 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1985)). This aggravating circumstance considers defendant\u2019s motive and is appropriate where the impetus for the murder was the expectation of pecuniary gain. State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 288-89, 283 S.E.2d 761, 785 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1398, reh\u2019g denied, 463 U.S. 1249, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1456 (1983). For purposes of determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 80, 405 S.E.2d 145, 156 (1991).\nThe evidence presented at trial tending to show that defendant killed for financial gain includes, but is not limited to, the following: (i) in April of 1986, Reid visited his oldest son, Ray, and stated he had given defendant $10,000 because she was unemployed; (ii) Reid also informed Ray he wanted defendant to receive one-third of his estate should he die; (iii) defendant began telling others she was Reid\u2019s fiancee and displayed a family heirloom as an engagement ring; (iv) defendant, during a brief period of improvement in Reid\u2019s condition, commented to a nurse that she wanted to take care of Reid\u2019s interests and felt his will should be changed naming her as the executrix; (v) defendant contacted an attorney about coming to the hospital to have Reid execute a will; (vi) defendant asked a nurse to recopy a scrap of paper containing notes for the will; (vii) on 2 September 1986, an attorney came to the hospital, reviewed the new will, and executed the will for Reid since, due to his continuing state of paralysis, he was unable to sign his name; (viii) the new will named defendant as the executrix, gave her power of attorney and left her a one-third share of the estate; (ix) after Reid\u2019s death, defendant took Reid\u2019s sons to the bank to close out his account and told bank personnel that Reid was \u201cdoing fine\u201d; (x) defendant told Reid\u2019s sons that since she was the executrix of their father\u2019s estate, she was entitled to one-third of the insurance proceeds; (xi) each of Reid\u2019s sons paid her a portion of their proceeds from the life insurance, representing her alleged one-third share, even' though Reid had never changed the beneficiary designation to include her; (xii) Reid\u2019s sons later contacted the attorney for the estate and learned they were not obligated to share the insurance proceeds with defendant; (xiii) defendant refused to return the money the boys had shared with her; and (xiv) defendant received $45,384 from the insurance policy plus her distribution from the estate, all as a direct result of Reid\u2019s death. In our view, this evidence would permit a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Reid\u2019s murder was committed for the purpose of pecuniary gain. Cf., e.g., State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 311-12, 259 S.E.2d 510, 519-20 (1979) (holding that evidence that defendant feared her boyfriend would learn she had forged his name on checks and turn her in to the law was sufficient to support the jury\u2019s finding that defendant poisoned her boyfriend for pecuniary gain), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137, reh\u2019g denied, 448 U.S. 918, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1181 (1980). This assignment of error is without merit.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the aggravating circumstance that the murder of Reid was \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious or cruel.\u201d Defendant asserts that the rationale underlying this Court\u2019s decision in State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941, 64 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1980), should be applied. In Cherry we held that in felony-murder cases, the underlying felony could not be submitted as an aggravating circumstance to aggravate a d\u00e9fendant\u2019s sentence for first-degree murder. The reasoning of the decision is that the underlying felony becomes an element of the capital murder; and since a defendant convicted of felony murder would always have an aggravating circumstance pending under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5), the possibility exists that a defendant convicted of felony murder would be more likely to be sentenced to death than a defendant convicted on the basis of premeditation and deliberation.\nIn the present case defendant argues that since arsenic has an inherent propensity to inflict a prolonged and painful period of suffering prior to death, the jury should not be allowed to consider the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance when poison was the method used to murder. At trial defendant did not argue this basis for not submitting the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance and has, therefore, failed to preserve this issue for appeal. See State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 495-96, 356 S.E.2d 279, 297-98 (holding that where the theory had not been presented to the trial court and was being raised for the first time on appeal, it was not properly before the appellate court), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 98 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987). Nevertheless, in light of our inherent authority to suspend the rules in order \u201cto prevent manifest injustice to a party,\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 2, we have elected to review defendant\u2019s argument.\nThe holding in Cherry is specifically confined to felony-murder cases and the rationale of the case is not applicable to poisoning deaths. Poisoning is the element of the offense of first-degree murder perpetrated by means of poisoning. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17 (1993). The act of poisoning itself makes the killing first-degree murder. Id. The fact that the poison is administered in small doses over an extended period of time thereby causing excruciating and prolonged pain and suffering is not essential to prove the offense. Nor is the type poison chosen, be it a slow acting or fast acting agent, an element of the offense. Accordingly, we decline to extend the holding in Cherry to murder by poisoning.\nHaving so held, we conclude that this aggravating circumstance was properly submitted.\n\u201cWhile we recognize that every murder is, at least arguably, heinous, atrocious, and cruel, we do not believe that this subsection is intended to apply to every homicide. By using the word \u2018especially\u2019 the legislature indicated that there must be evidence that the brutality involved in the murder in question must exceed that normally present in any killing before the jury would be instructed upon this subsection.\u201d\nState v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 59, 274 S.E.2d 183, 203 (1981) (quoting State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 24-26, 257 S.E.2d 569, 585 (1979)). The evidence heretofore summarized depicts a pitiless murder perpetrated over a period of ten months during which the deceased suffered prolonged physical agony including swelling, paralysis, skin splitting, loss of speech, and multiple systems failure necessitating intrusion into his body with tubes and paraphernalia. As defendant stated in her brief, \u201cReid was subjected to a debilitating, lingering and painful illness before he finally died in North Carolina Baptist Hospital.\u201d Based on the evidence in the record before this Court, we are satisfied this aggravating circumstance was properly submitted to the jury. This assignment of error is overruled.\nNext, defendant contends the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of death not supported by the evidence. Defendant\u2019s argument is based on a contention that one or both of the aggravating circumstances were improperly submitted to the jury. However, as we have noted, the trial court properly submitted the aggravating circumstances that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. This assignment of error is overruled.\nProportionality\nHaving found no error in defendant\u2019s trial and capital sentencing proceeding, we are next required by statute to review the entire record and determine (i) whether the record supports the jury\u2019s finding the aggravating circumstances on which the court based its sentence of death; (ii) whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (iii) whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) (1988); State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 239, 433 S.E.2d 144, 161 (1993); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 526, 356 S.E.2d 279, 315, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 98 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987).\nThe jury found in aggravation (i) that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(6), and (ii) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9). We have held the evidence supports the jury\u2019s finding both of these aggravating circumstances. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, transcripts, and briefs submitted by the parties, we also find nothing to suggest that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.\nFinally we must determine \u201cwhether the death sentence in this case is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering the crime and the defendant.\u201d State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 79, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177, reh\u2019g denied, 464 U.S. 1004, 78 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1983). In conducting this proportionality review, we compare similar cases in a pool consisting of\nall cases arising since the effective date of our capital punishment statute, 1 June 1977, which have been tried as capital cases and reviewed on direct appeal by this Court and in which the jury recommended death or life imprisonment or in which the trial court imposed life imprisonment after the jury\u2019s failure to agree upon a sentencing recommendation within a reasonable period of time.\nId. Only cases found to be free of error in both the guilt-innocence and penalty phases are included in the pool, but the Court is not bound to give a citation to every case in the pool of similar cases. State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 400, 428 S.E.2d 118, 146 (1993), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993), reh\u2019g denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 126 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1994).\nIn essence, our task on proportionality review is to compare the case at bar with other cases in the pool which are roughly similar with regard to the crime and the defendant, such as, for example, the manner in which the crime was committed and the defendant\u2019s character, background, and physical and mental condition.\nState v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 239, 433 S.E.2d 144, 161 (1993) (quoting State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648, 314 S.E.2d 493, 503 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120, 86 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1985)). When our review reveals that juries have consistently returned death sentences in those similar cases, a strong basis exists for concluding that the death sentence under consideration is not excessive or disproportionate. However, when juries have consistently returned life sentences in the similar cases, a strong basis exists for concluding that the sentence under consideration is excessive or disproportionate. State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 401, 428 S.E.2d 118, 146.\nSignificant characteristics of defendant\u2019s case include (i) the murder of her fiance which the jury found to be for pecuniary gain; (ii) skillful execution of a systematic plan, requiring advance preparation, to poison the victim repeatedly; (iii) substantial evidence that defendant used the same means and method to murder her first husband and to attempt to murder her second husband; (iv) the conscienceless and pitiless vigil of Reid\u2019s indescribable physical agony for the ten months leading to his death which the jury found to be especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (v) knowledge that she, and she alone, could prevent her victim\u2019s death.\nNo statutory mitigating circumstances were submitted to the jury. In mitigation, the jury considered fifteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances but deemed only three to exist and have mitigating value. These three included (i) upon being informed of the warrant for her arrest, defendant peacefully submitted herself in conformance with her duty; (ii) defendant demonstrated concern and kindness for others in her community; and (iii) defendant provided well for the needs of her children while they were growing up. The value of these mitigating circumstances in assessing defendant\u2019s culpability for the crime is minimal.\nThis Court has found the death penalty to be disproportionate on seven occasions. Only two of these seven cases involved the \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious, or cruel\u201d aggravating circumstance. State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983). These two cases are not similar to the instant case. Of the remaining five cases, in only one, State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985), did the jury find multiple aggravating circumstances. In finding the death sentence in Young to be disproportionate, this Court focused on the jury\u2019s failure to find either that the murder was committed as part of a course of conduct which included the commission of violence against another person or persons or that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. McCollum, 334 N.C. at 241, 433 S.E.2d at 162.\nSignificant dissimilarities between this case and Stokes include that (i) defendant Stokes was convicted on a felony-murder theory; defendant Moore was convicted of murder by poisoning; (ii) defendant Stokes was seventeen years old; defendant Moore was fifty-three years old; and (iii) in Stokes there was substantial mitigating evidence that defendant suffered from impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and that he was under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder; in the present case the jury found no statutory mitigating circumstances and only three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.\nSignificant dissimilarities between this case and Bondurant include that (i) the jury in Bondurant found in aggravation of the murder only that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; in this case the jury also found that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and (ii) defendant Bondurant immediately exhibited remorse and concern for the victim\u2019s life by helping him get medical treatment; whereas, defendant Moore showed no sign of remorse or regret as she watched and anticipated the effects of the deadly poison she had administered to the man whom she was engaged to marry. Moreover, the facts in Bondurant \u201cdemonstrate that defendant did not coldly calculate the commission of this crime for a long period of time as did the defendant in State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, reh\u2019g denied, 448 U.S. 918 (1980).\u201d State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. at 693, 309 S.E.2d at 182.\nThe most analogous case for comparison to this case in terms of the crime committed is State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137, reh\u2019g denied, 448 U.S. 918, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1181 (1980). In Barfield, the defendant, a middle-aged woman, poisoned her boyfriend, Stewart Taylor, by placing arsenic in his tea and beer out of fear he would \u201cturn her in\u201d to law enforcement officials for forging checks to herself on his checking account. Evidence was introduced showing that Barfield also poisoned others to death. In aggravation, the jury found that (i) the murder of Stewart Taylor was committed for pecuniary gain; (ii) the murder of Stewart Taylor was committed to hinder the enforcement of the law; and (iii) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. During defendant Moore\u2019s sentencing hearing, the jury found two of these same aggravating circumstances to exist. In Barfield, the jury rejected the two statutory mitigating circumstances that (i) the murder was committed while Barfield was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance; and (ii) Barfield\u2019s capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired. In defendant Moore\u2019s sentencing hearing, no statutory mitigating circumstances were even submitted to the jury. The jury found only three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances with minimal mitigating effect.\nIn reviewing Barfield, this Court stated:\nThe manner in which death was inflicted and the way in which defendant conducted herself after she administered the poison to Taylor leads us to conclude that the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate considering both the crime and the defendant.\nState v. Barfield, 298 N.C. at 355, 259 S.E.2d at 544. From our comparison of this holding with the instant case, we, likewise, cannot say that the death sentence given defendant Moore was excessive or disproportionate, considering both the crimes and the defendant.\nConclusion\nWe hold that defendant received a fair trial and sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error. The death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. The death sentence imposed is not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.\nNO ERROR.\n. In a previous assignment of error we have found Nurse Moss\u2019 testimony concerning Reid\u2019s physical appearance, his symptoms, the medical procedures used in his care and treatment, and the timing of defendant\u2019s visits with a renewed onset of symptoms to be relevant in establishing the causal link between Reid\u2019s illness and defendant\u2019s actions.\n. See State v. Kyle, 333 N.C. 687, 430 S.E.2d 412 (1993) (autopsy photographs); State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 428 S.E.2d 118 (1993) (photographs taken during medical treatment), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993), reh\u2019g denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 126 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1994); State v. Locke, 333 N.C. 118, 423 S.E.2d 467 (1992) (photographs of decomposed bodies); State v. Cummings, 332 N.C. 487, 422 S.E.2d 692 (1992) (photographs of the graves and autopsies); State v. Phipps, 331 N.C. 427, 418 S.E.2d 178 (1992) (color photographs of crime scene and body); State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 415 S.E.2d 719 (1992) (autopsy photographs); State v. Wynne, 329 N.C. 507, 406 S.E.2d 812 (1991) (photographs of decomposed body); State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 406 S.E.2d 876 (1991) (photographs of body); State v. Bearthes, 329 N.C. 149, 405 S.E.2d 170 (1991) (autopsy photographs); State v. Thompson, 328 N.C. 477, 402 S.E.2d 386 (1991) (photographs of victims\u2019 bodies), habeas corpus denied, 794 F. Supp. 173 (E.D.N.C. 1992), aff\u2019d, 987 F. 2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1993); State v. Robinson, 327 N.C. 346, 395 S.E.2d 402 (1990) (photographs of crime scene); State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 389 S.E.2d 66 (1990) (autopsy photographs); State v. Price, 326 N.C. 56, 388 S.E.2d 84 (photographs of crime scene, body, and hands of victim), sentence vacated on other grounds in light of McKoy, 498 U.S. 802, 112 L. Ed. 2d 7 (1990); State v. Hunt, 325 N.C. 187, 381 S.E.2d 453 (1989) (photographs of defendant and his accomplice).\n. State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).\n. In State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567 (1979), this Court concluded that the dates of the murderous acts rather than the date of death were determinative of when the murder was committed. As a result, Rebecca Detter\u2019s death sentence was set aside and a life sentence imposed since Detter, in all instances, had administered arsenic poisoning to her husband prior to 1 June 1977, the effective date of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000 (1978).", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Barry S. McNeill, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "David F. Tamer and Lisa S. Costner for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BLANCHE KISER TAYLOR MOORE\nNo. 556A90\n(Filed 4 March 1994)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 78 (NCI4th) \u2014 murder \u2014pretrial publicity \u2014 change of venue denied \u2014no error\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motions for a change of venue in a first-degree murder prosecution where three of the thirty-three articles submitted contained potentially exculpatory information; only one was potentially inflammatory and defendant made no showing concerning the extent of its circulation; the remaining twenty-nine articles were primarily factually based; and each of the twelve jurors who ultimately served on the jury stated unequivocally during the initial screening process and again during voir dire that they had formed no opinions about the case, could be fair and impartial, and would base their decisions solely on the evidence presented at trial. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-957.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 378.\n2. Indictment, Information, and Criminal Pleadings \u00a7 41 (NCI4th| \u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 poisoning\u2014motion for a bill of particulars denied \u2014no error\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution involving poisoning by denying defendant\u2019s motions for a bill of particulars where the State provided defense counsel with copies of the victim\u2019s entire medical record along with the autopsy report and reports detailing the results of hair analysis, which enabled defendant to determine the time frame when the victim\u2019s body contained elevated levels of arsenic; the State at trial did not attempt to adduce any evidence indicating the timing of the poisonings with any greater particularity than reflected in the documentation furnished to defendant covering the period from \u201cDecember 31,1985 through October 7,1986\u201d; defendant does not suggest surprise or specify the manner in which the denial of her motions affected her trial strategy; the State introduced nothing at trial which could have come as a surprise to the defendant pertaining to the dates of the poisonings; and defendant had full knowledge of the specific occurrences to be investigated at trial. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-925.\nAm Jur 2d, Indictments and Informations \u00a7\u00a7 159 et seq.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 107 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014open file policy \u2014case transferred \u2014not applicable\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motion to compel the Forsyth County District Attorney to abide by the prior agreement between defendant and the Alamance County District Attorney for an open file policy. While the prosecutor may proceed under an open file policy, he or she may not be forced to do so and the District Attorney in one district may not be compelled to comply with an agreement pertaining to discovery entered into by the District Attorney in another district once venue has been changed in the case. Furthermore, defendant did not show any prejudice resulting from the Forsyth District Attorney\u2019s refusal to follow an open file policy. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-904.\nAm Jur 2d, Depositions and Discovery \u00a7\u00a7 428 et seq.\n4. Jury \u00a7 113 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 jury selection-individual voir dire denied \u2014no error\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motion for individual sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors. Defendant\u2019s argument that collective voir dire inhibited the candor of the jurors and permitted prospective jurors to become educated concerning responses which would enable them to be excused from the panel is speculative, without merit, and not supported by the record.\nAm Jur 2d, Jury \u00a7 197.\n5. Jury \u00a7 141 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 jury selection-eligibility for parole \u2014questions not allowed \u2014no error\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motion that prospective jurors be examined on their opinions concerning defendant\u2019s eligibility for parole upon conviction.\nAm Jur 2d, Jury \u00a7 197.\n6. Jury \u00a7 96 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 jury selection-initial screening by judge \u2014no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by conducting the voir dire during the initial screening process where the court initially allowed the State and the defendant to screen the first thirteen prospective jurors concerning pretrial publicity but then took over and conducted the remainder of the screening process after several admonitions to counsel to speed up the questioning; the judge directed four questions concerning pretrial publicity and the presumption of innocence to each prospective juror; the prospective juror was either excused for cause upon motion by defendant or asked to return the following day for the continuation of the standard voir dire; and defense counsel was permitted on several occasions to follow up on the questions previously asked by the court. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(c).\nAm Jur 2d, Jury \u00a7\u00a7 195 et seq.\n7. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 365 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 poisoning \u2014 other occurrences \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution involving poisoning by denying defendant\u2019s motion in limine to restrict introduction by the State of evidence concerning the deaths of defendant\u2019s father and first husband and the illness of her last husband where three different men either married to or intimately involved with defendant died or barely escaped death from arsenic poisoning, an unusual cause of death; defendant had motive (financial), opportunity (close relationship), and means (knowledge of and access to Anti-Ant) in each case; in each case medical evidence suggests that multiple doses of arsenic were administered to the victim over a long period of time, as opposed to one large fatal dose; defendant was frequently alone with the victim in the hospital in each case, and medical testimony suggests that certain of defendant\u2019s visits in which she fed the victim corresponded with an onset of symptoms characteristic of arsenic poisoning; defendant was heard to say in each case that she hated the victim or that the victim was cruel or evil; and, in the cases of this victim and her first husband, defendant was already seeing her next victim at the time of the arsenic assaults. Given the similarities between the crime charged and the other crimes presented by the State, the evidence of the other offenses was relevant under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) as evidence tending to prove modus operandi, motive, opportunity, intent and identity of defendant as the perpetrator.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 310.\n8. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 223 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder\u2014 medical techniques and equipment for victim \u2014admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution involving poisoning by allowing the State to introduce testimony from a registered nurse who had cared for the victim during his final illness concerning medical techniques and medical equipment used to treat the victim. Although defendant contended that the sole purpose of the testimony was to generate sympathy for the victim\u2019s family, the testimony was probative to show that defendant had access to the victim in the hospital, that a correlation existed between defendant\u2019s feeding the victim and the onset of his symptoms, that the victim manifested symptoms associated with multiple system failure incident to arsenic poisoning, that the victim could swallow food notwithstanding the tubes, that arsenic could have been introduced into the victim\u2019s body via the feeding tubes, and that the victim suffered inordinate pain over an extended period of time. The probative value of the testimony outweighed any unfair prejudice to defendant; furthermore, the record discloses that similar evidence from other witnesses was admitted without objection.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 280 et seq.\n9. Criminal Law \u00a7 473 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014emotional display by prosecutor \u2014 no mistrial \u2014no error\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial where the prosecutor burst into tears and after some 30 seconds fled the courtroom, but the prosecutor removed herself from the courtroom quickly and quietly, the jury was immediately removed from the courtroom, and, in response to questions by the court, not one juror answered that the incident would prevent him or her from being able to give defendant a completely fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence. The Assistant District Attorney\u2019s brief emotional display was not prejudicial to defendant.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 194.\n10. Criminal Law \u00a7 107 (NCI4th) \u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 discovery \u2014 review of files to determine compliance \u2014 no ex mero motu obligation\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by failing to conduct a voir dire examination of the District Attorney\u2019s files to determine whether the State had complied with discovery where defendant asked for an in camera inspection of a disputed report to determine if it was a discoverable statement rather than an in camera examination of the prosecutor\u2019s file to determine if the District Attorney had provided discovery as required. The trial court is under no obligation ex mero motu to examine the prosecutor\u2019s investigative files for discovery compliance.\nAm Jur 2d, Depositions and Discovery \u00a7\u00a7 428 et seq.\n11. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1497 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 poisoning \u2014Anti-Ant \u2014not same bottle used in poisoning \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution involving poisoning by admitting into evidence a bottle of Anti-Ant even though it was not the bottle used to poison the victim. The identification of the bottle of Anti-Ant was not irrelevant; the State\u2019s evidence tended to prove that defendant was familiar with the product as early as the 1970\u2019s; that the product was available in the Burlington area at all relevant times; and that defendant actually had a bottle of Anti-Ant in her possession during the summer of 1985, which she showed to her current husband with the request that he purchase another bottle.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 414.\n12. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1548 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 poisoning\u2014medical devices \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err during a first-degree murder prosecution involving poisoning by admitting into evidence medical devices which defendant contended were used merely to inflame the passions of the jury. The medical devices were identified and introduced solely to illustrate the testimony of a registered nurse involved in the victim\u2019s primary care and treatment, the pieces of equipment were not excessively displayed and were not presented separately to the jury for a closer inspection, and the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed the possibility of any unfair prejudice to defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 771 et seq.\n13. Homicide \u00a7 259 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014poisoning\u2014 evidence sufficient\nThere was sufficient evidence to submit first-degree murder by poisoning to the jury even though no poison was ever positively placed in defendant\u2019s hands where there was sufficient competent evidence from which a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim, Reid, died from arsenic poisoning administered by defendant through a series of repeated doses; defendant had possessed, attempted to purchase, or asked someone else to purchase an arsenic based ant killer on at least three occasions; all three of the men who were either married to or romantically involved with defendant died or nearly died as a result of arsenic poisoning; defendant expressed negative feelings about Reid to her psychiatrist and stated that her feelings toward Reid had turned to hate; the State presented evidence that defendant had taken food to Reid in the hospital; and the medical evidence demonstrated a correlation between defendant\u2019s visits and the renewed onset of Reid\u2019s symptoms.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 443.\n14. Criminal Law \u00a7 762 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder-instructions \u2014 reasonable doubt\nThe trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant\u2019s requested instruction on reasonable doubt in a first-degree murder prosecution where the pattern instruction given by the trial court contained none of the offending phrases under Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, namely, \u201cgrave uncertainty,\u201d \u201cactual substantial doubt,\u201d and \u201cmoral certainty,\u201d or terms of similar import. Furthermore, this instruction correctly informed the jury that the standard for conviction beyond a reasonable doubt was certainty based upon the sufficiency of the evidence.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 832.\n15. Criminal Law \u00a7 763 (NCI4th| \u2014 first-degree murder-instructions \u2014 identity of perpetrator \u2014 circumstantial evidence \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by refusing to instruct the jury on the identity of the individual responsible for the victim\u2019s death as requested by defendant where the court met the requirement of giving the requested instruction in substance in that the instruction as given, when read in conjunction with the entire charge to the jury, adequately linked the State\u2019s burden to prove defendant\u2019s identity as the perpetrator of the crime with the quantum of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 843 et seq.\nModern status of rule regarding necessity of instruction on circumstantial evidence in criminal trial \u2014 state cases. 36 ALR4th 1046.\n16. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 983 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder\u2014 instructions \u2014dying declarations\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by not giving defendant\u2019s requested instruction on dying declarations where the State contended that there was no evidence showing that the letter was even written by the purported author, Garvin Thomas; defendant\u2019s own expert refused to opine that Thomas authored the letter while the State\u2019s expert, a questioned documents examiner and forensic chemist, ruled out Thomas as the author to a ninety-nine percent degree of certainty; and the letter was offered into evidence by the State not as the dying declaration of Garvin Thomas but as evidence of defendant\u2019s \u201cdeceptive plan to throw suspicion away from herself.\u201d The court properly instructed the jury on the issue of credibility of the evidence.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 347 et seq.\nAdmissibility in criminal trial of dying declarations involving an asserted opinion or conclusion. 86 ALR2d 905.\n17. Criminal Law \u00a7 687 (NCI4th) \u2014 first-degree murder \u2014requested instructions denied \u2014given essentially verbatim\nThere was no error in a first-degree murder prosecution where the trial court denied defendant\u2019s requested instruction pertaining to uncontradicted evidence but gave the requested charge essentially verbatim.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 588 et seq.\n18. Homicide \u00a7 557 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014poisoning\u2014 instruction on second-degree murder refused \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution arising from a poisoning by refusing to submit the lesser included offense of second-degree murder to the jury. Although defendant argued that the court, in effect, allowed the jury to presume premeditation and deliberation and relieved the State of its burden of proof, any murder committed by means of poison is automatically first-degree murder. The evidence here supported every element of first-degree murder by poisoning.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 525 et seq.\n19. Criminal Law \u00a7 1318 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder-sentencing \u2014 requested instruction on reasonable doubt \u2014not given in guilt stage \u2014 no error in sentencing stage\nThere was no error in the sentencing stage of a first-degree murder prosecution where the court had failed to give defendant\u2019s requested instruction on reasonable doubt in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. This assignment of error would be without merit even if defendant had properly preserved it for appellate review.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 888 et seq.\n20. Criminal Law \u00a7 1326 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder-sentencing \u2014 instructions\u2014reasonable doubt \u2014application to mitigating circumstances\nThe trial court did not err during a sentencing proceeding for first-degree murder by not explaining to the jury that the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt applies to mitigating circumstances as well as to aggravating circumstances. Defendant\u2019s contention is an incorrect statement of law.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 888 et seq.\n21. Criminal Law \u00a7 1341 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder-sentencing \u2014 aggravating circumstance \u2014 pecuniary gain\nThe trial court did not err in the sentencing portion of a first-degree murder prosecution by submitting the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain where the evidence would permit a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed for the purpose of pecuniary gain. Although defendant contended that this circumstance should be submitted only when the primary motivation is financial gain, that assertion is not supported by the law. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(6).\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598 et seq.\nSufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that murder was committed for pecuniary gain, as consideration or in expectation of receiving something of monetary value, and the like \u2014 post-Gregg cases. 66 ALR4th 417.\n22. Criminal Law \u00a7 1344 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 poisoning \u2014 sentencing\u2014aggravating circumstances \u2014 especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel\nThe trial court properly submitted the aggravating circumstance that a poisoning death was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel where defendant contended that the circumstance should not have been submitted since arsenic has an inherent propensity to inflict a prolonged and painful period of suffering prior to death. The fact that the poison is administered in small doses over an extended period of time thereby causing excruciating and prolonged pain and suffering is not essential to prove the offense, nor is the type poison chosen, be it a slow acting or fast acting agent, an element of the offense. The holding in State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, is specifically confined to felony-murder cases and the rationale of the case is not applicable to poisoning deaths. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9).\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598 et seq.\n23. Criminal Law \u00a7 1373 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014death sentence \u2014not disproportionate\nThere was no proportionality error in a death sentence for a first-degree murder by poisoning where the record supports the jury\u2019s finding of the aggravating circumstances on which the sentence was based; the sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary fact; and the sentence was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and defendant.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 628.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Freeman, J., at the 15 October 1990 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Forsyth County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 16 February 1993.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Barry S. McNeill, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nDavid F. Tamer and Lisa S. Costner for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0567-01", "first_page_order": 601, "last_page_order": 652 }