{ "id": 2537813, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BERNARDINO ZUNIGA", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Zuniga", "decision_date": "1994-06-17", "docket_number": "No. 156A85(2)", "first_page": "508", "last_page": "517", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "336 N.C. 508" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1 ALR3d 1461", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4898 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 L. Ed. 2d 1146", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779521 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575159 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 667", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11714690 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part" }, { "parenthetical": "Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Harv. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498658 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531157 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 992", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6202816 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999" }, { "page": "1179" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 L. Ed. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "248-49", "parenthetical": "O'Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" }, { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "472 U.S. 320", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328-29" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "126 L. Ed. 2d 63", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "978 F.2d 872", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "determining that the McKoy rule was a new rule that would not be applied retroactively under the Supreme Court rules as set forth in Teague" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "49 L. Ed. 2d 944", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 486, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415, 423 (1990)" }, { "page": "211", "parenthetical": "quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 486, 108 L. 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BERNARDINO ZUNIGA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EXUM, Chief Justice.\nThe question in this case is whether McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), which invalidated the then-existing unanimity requirement of our capital sentencing scheme, should be applied retroactively to capital cases which, like defendant\u2019s, became final before McKoy was decided. Adopting the retroactivity standard announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989), we hold that McKoy must be applied retroactively to such cases. Because defendant was sentenced to death under jury instructions violative of McKoy, and because the error cannot be considered harmless, we now vacate his death sentence and remand for resentencing.\nI.\nIn 1985, defendant was convicted of the first-degree rape and first-degree murder of April Lee Sweet. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the rape and, in a separate capital sentencing proceeding, to death for the murder. At the capital sentencing proceeding, the judge instructed the jury that it could not consider, in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, any mitigating circumstance that it did not unanimously find. Defendant objected to this instruction and assigned it as error upon his direct appeal to this Court. At that time, we considered such an instruction valid, see State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983); therefore, we affirmed the conviction and sentences. State v. Zuniga, 320 N.C. 233, 357 S.E.2d 898 (1987). On November 16, 1987, the United States Supreme Court denied defendant\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari, 484 U.S. 959, 98 L. Ed. 2d 384.\nDefendant thereafter filed a motion for appropriate relief in the Superior Court of Davidson County, again alleging that his death sentence was unconstitutionally imposed because of the unanimity instruction. During the pendency of that proceeding, the United States Supreme Court decided McKoy. Relying on Teague, the Superior Court refused to give McKoy retroactive application and denied defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief.\nWe granted certiorari to consider the retroactivity question. Because this question is dispositive, we need not address defendant\u2019s other assignments of error.\nII.\nIn recent years, the United States Supreme Court has completely revamped its retroactivity standards for new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure. Dissatisfied with the inconsistent results and unfairness produced by the case-by-case approach of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965), the Court adopted the bright-line approach long suggested by Justice Harlan: \u201cthat new rules should always be applied retroactively to cases on direct review, but that generally they should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.\u201d Teague, 489 U.S. at 302-303, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 350-51. The Court adopted this approach in two stages.\nFirst, in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 661 (1987), the Court held that new rules of criminal procedure must be applied retroactively \u201cto all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final.\u201d The rationale for this rule was succinctly stated by Justice Harlan: \u201c \u2018If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles, it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at all.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 323, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 658.\nThen, in Teague, a non-capital case, the Court held that new rules of criminal procedure may not be applied retroactively in federal habeas corpus proceedings unless they fall within one of two narrow exceptions. 489 U.S. at 310, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356. Under the first exception, a new rule will be applied retroactively if it \u201cplace[s] an entire category of primary conduct beyond the reach of the criminal law,\u201d or \u201cprohibits] the imposition of a certain type of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.\u201d Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193, 211 (1990). Under the second exception, a new rule will be applied retroactively if it is a \u201c \u2018watershed rule[ ] of criminal procedure\u2019 implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.\u201d Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415, 429 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356). The Court extended Teague to embrace the capital sentencing context in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256, 275 (1989).\nAs stated by Justice O\u2019Connor, the Teague rule was premised primarily on finality concerns:\nApplication of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect. . . . \u201c[I]f a criminal judgment is ever to be final, the notion of legality must at some point include assignment of final competence to determine legality.\u201d Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 450-51 (1962) (emphasis omitted). . . . \u201cNo one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation.\u201d\n489 U.S. at 309, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 355 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)).\nBy its terms, Teague is applicable only in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Defendant\u2019s amici, the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers (The Academy), cite State v. Rivens, 299 N.C. 385, 261 S.E.2d 867 (1980), for the proposition that under North Carolina law all new rules, whether state or federal, are presumed to operate retroactively unless there is a compelling reason to make them prospective only. The Academy urges us to ignore Teague and instead apply Rivens because the case at bar is before us on writ of certiorari from a state post-conviction proceeding.\nWe decline to follow the Academy\u2019s suggestion. Though Rivens correctly states the retroactivity standard applicable to new state rules, our courts have always adverted to then-existing federal retroactivity standards when applying new federal constitutional rules. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 317 N.C. 1, 343 S.E.2d 814 (1986), vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 1077, 94 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1987); State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975), reversed on other grounds, 432 U.S. 233, 53 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1977); State v. Swann, 275 N.C. 644, 170 S.E.2d 611 (1969); State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E.2d 492 (1968); State v. Bullock, 268 N.C. 560, 151 S.E.2d 9 (1966); State v. Mills, 268 N.C. 142, 150 S.E.2d 13 (1966); State v. Hager, 12 N.C. App. 90, 182 S.E.2d 588 (1971); Yarborough v. State, 6 N.C. App. 663, 171 S.E.2d 65 (1969); State v. Branch, 1 N.C. App. 279, 161 S.E.2d 492 (1968).\nWe see no reason to chart a new course now. Presuming retroactivity for new federal constitutional rules would put us in conflict with the Fourth Circuit \u2014 where the general rule under Teague is nonretroactivity \u2014 undoubtedly resulting in confusion and conflicting results. Therefore, joining a number of other states, we hereby adopt Teague as the test of retroactivity for new federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure on state collateral review. See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. 1990); Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77 (Iowa 1989); Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 124 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1993); State v. Reeves, 234 Neb. 711, 453 N.W.2d 359, judgment vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 964, 112 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1990); contra Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514 (S.D. 1990).\nIII.\nDefendant\u2019s conviction became final on November 16, 1987, when the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. McKoy was not decided until 1990. 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369. Therefore, under Teague we must now decide whether McKoy should apply retroactively to defendant\u2019s case.\nThe Fourth Circuit has already addressed the retroactivity of McKoy to cases on collateral review. In Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 121 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1992), the court assumed without deciding that McKoy was a new rule but held that it nevertheless fell within the second Teague exception. As the court stated:\nWe find that the rules set out in Mills and McKoy are \u201cbedrock procedural elements\u201d and are \u201cimplicit in the concept of ordered liberty.\u201d The procedures they struck down have been described as \u201carbitrary\u201d and \u201ccapricious.\u201d Those procedures did not provide for the \u201cfundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment.\u201d Woodson [v. North Carolina], 428 U.S. [280,] 304, [49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976)]. Given the history of the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the constitutional requirement of individualized sentencing, we believe that a rule striking down an arbitrary unanimity requirement has the same \u201cprimacy and centrality\u201d of Gideon [v. Wainwright]. Therefore, we hold that the Mills and McKoy rules fall within the second Teague exception and should be applied retroactively.\n961 F.2d at 456. But see Wilcher v. Hargett, 978 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 126 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1993). We find this analysis persuasive and therefore hold that McKoy is applicable retroactively to final cases on state post-conviction review.\nThe jury instructions in defendant\u2019s capital sentencing proceeding were violative of McKoy. Because defendant objected to these instructions at trial and assigned them as error on direct review, there is no issue of waiver. We must grant defendant a new sentencing hearing unless we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. State v. McKoy, 327 N.C. 31, 44, 394 S.E.2d 426, 433 (1990). This Court has refused to hold McKoy error harmless where we have found \u201ccredible evidence supporting at least one submitted, but unfound mitigating circumstance.\u201d State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 34, 409 S.E.2d 288, 307 (1991). In the case at bar, five of the submitted mitigating circumstances were rejected by the jury, though supported by credible evidence. Therefore, we cannot find the McKoy error harmless; we must grant defendant a new capital sentencing proceeding.\nIV.\nFinding under Teague that McKoy must be applied retroactively to cases on state collateral review, and that the McKoy error in defendant\u2019s capital sentencing proceeding was not harmless, we reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief, vacate defendant\u2019s death sentence and remand for a new sentencing proceeding.\nDEATH SENTENCE VACATED. REMANDED FOR NEW SENTENCING PROCEEDING.\n. A \u201cfinal\u201d case is one in which \u201ca judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.\u201d Griffith, 479 U.S. at 321, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 657, n.6.\n. We leave for another day the question whether defendants sentenced under the unanimity instruction who did not assign the instruction as error on direct review waived their right to assert the McKoy issue in post-conviction proceedings.", "type": "majority", "author": "EXUM, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "Justice MEYER\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI agree that the proper test to be used to determine if the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), should be applied retroactively is the test set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989). However, I do not believe that the rule set forth in McKoy satisfies the second narrow exception of Teague, which would require retroactive relief of McKoy error on collateral review.\n\u201cUnder Teague, new rules may be applied . . . only if they come within \u2018one of two narrow exceptions.\u2019 \u201d Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193, 211 (1990) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 486, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415, 423 (1990)). \u201cThe second Teague exception applies to new \u2018watershed rules of criminal procedure\u2019 that are necessary to the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding.\u201d Id. at 241-42, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 211 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 495, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 429).\nUnlike the majority, I am not persuaded by the analysis of the Fourth Circuit in Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 121 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1992). In Williams, the court found that the rule set out in McKoy was a \u201c \u2018bedrock procedural element[ ],\u2019 \u201d id. (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. at 242, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 211), \u201cimplicit in the concept of ordered liberty,\u201d id. at 456, in part because the procedure had been described by the United States Supreme Court as \u201c \u2018arbitrary or capricious,\u2019 \u201d id. (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. at 454, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 387 (Kennedy, J., concurring)), . and did not provide the \u201c \u2018fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment,\u2019 \u201d id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976)).\nThe United States Supreme Court in determining the case of Caldwell v. Mississippi, found prejudicial error in a prosecutor\u2019s comments which led a jury to the false belief that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant\u2019s capital sentencing rests elsewhere. 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 239 (1985). One member of the Court noted that such prosecutorial error created an \u201cunacceptable risk that \u2018the death penalty [may have been] meted out arbitrarily or capriciously.'\u201d Id. at 343, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 248-49 (O\u2019Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1171, 1179 (1983)) (emphasis added). The Court held that Caldwell error might produce \u201csubstantial unreliability as well as bias in favor of death sentences.\u201d Id. at 330, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 240. In spite of this language, the United States Supreme Court determined that Caldwell would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, specifically finding that it was a \u201cnew rule\u201d that did not satisfy the second exception of Teague. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 245, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193, 213 (1990).\nJust as the rule set forth in Caldwell was not applied retroactively, neither should the rule set forth in McKoy be applied retroactively. I do not believe that retroactive application of the McKoy rule is a prerequisite to \u201cfundamental fairness\u201d of the type that comes within Teague\u2019s second exception. See Wilcher v. Hargett, 978 F.2d 872 (1992) (determining that the McKoy rule was a new rule that would not be applied retroactively under the Supreme Court rules as set forth in Teague), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 126 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1993).\nJustice Harlan first set forth the language used in Teague in his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404, 410 (1971). In Mackey, Justice Harlan noted that he believed that a new rule that should be applied retroactively would be one such as the right to counsel, which is now \u201ca necessary condition precedent to any conviction for a serious crime.\u201d Id. at 694, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 421 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).\nFinally, I am persuaded that McKoy error cannot at the same time be both subject to harmless error analysis (as we have held numerous times) and its retroactive effect be necessary to \u201cthe fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding.\u201d I note that this Court has found the failure to follow McKoy to be harmless error on five occasions: State v. Price, 334 N.C. 615, 433 S.E.2d 746 (1993); State v. Allen, 331 N.C. 746, 417 S.E.2d 227, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 122 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1992), reh\u2019g denied, --- U.S. ---, 123 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1993); State v. Hunt, 330 N.C. 501, 411 S.E. 2d 806, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 120 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1992); State v. Laws, 328 N.C. 550, 402 S.E.2d 573, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 116 L. Ed. 2d 174, reh\u2019g denied, --- U.S. ---, 116 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1991); State v. Roper, 328 N.C. 337, 402 S.E.2d 600, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 116 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1991). Thus, it is clear that jury instructions free of McKoy error are not \u201ca necessary condition precedent to any conviction for a serious crime.\u201d See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 421 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I believe that it is inconsistent to find that a right is so fundamental to the accuracy of the criminal proceeding as to require it to be applied retroactively but also find that a violation of this right is subject to \u201charmless error\u201d analysis.\nI would affirm the decision of Judge Albright, refusing to give McKoy retroactive relief and denying defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Justice MEYER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Joan Herre Byers, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Robin E. Hudson for defendant-appellant.", "Stephen T. Smith, and Katherine E. Jean for defendant-appellant.", "Tkarrington, Smith & Hargrove, by Roger W. Smith; and Steptoe & Johnson, by William T. Hassler, on behalf of the Government of Mexico, amicus curiae.", "Patterson, Harkavy, Lawrence, Van Noppen & Okun, by Maxine Eichner and Melinda Lawrence; Goldsmith & Goldsmith, by C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr.; Louis D. Bilionis; and Ferguson, Stein, Watt, Wallas, Adkins & Gresham, by Adam Stein, on behalf of the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BERNARDINO ZUNIGA\nNo. 156A85(2)\n(Filed 17 June 1994)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 166 (NCI4th); Criminal Law \u00a7 956 (NCI4th)\u2014 state collateral review \u2014retroactivity of federal constitutional rules\nThe test set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), is adopted as the test of retroactivity for new federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure on state collateral review.\nAm Jur 2d, Constitutional Law \u00a7\u00a7 634 et seq.\nSupreme Court\u2019s views as to what constitutes an ex post facto law prohibited by Federal Constitution. 53 L. Ed. 2d 1146.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 1352 (NCI4th) \u2014 retroactivity of McKoy decision\nThe decision of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), which invalidated the unanimity requirement for finding mitigating circumstances in a capital sentencing proceeding, is to be applied retroactively on state post-conviction review to capital cases which became final before McKoy was decided because the rule set forth in McKoy is a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding within the meaning of the second Teague exception.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598, 599.\nUnanimity as to punishment in criminal case where jury can recommend lesser penalty. 1 ALR3d 1461.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 1352 (NCI4th)\u2014 McKoy error \u2014new capital sentencing hearing\nA defendant whose conviction became final before the McKoy decision was rendered is entitled to a new capital sentencing hearing where he was sentenced to death under jury instructions violative of McKoy, defendant objected to these instructions at trial and assigned them as error on direct review; and the error cannot be considered harmless because five of the mitigating circumstances rejected by the jury were supported by credible evidence.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598, 599.\nUnanimity as to punishment in criminal case where jury can recommend lesser penalty. 1 ALR3d 1461.\nJustice Meyer concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nOn writ of certiorari issued to the Superior Court, Davidson County, on 9 January 1992 following the superior court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief on 30 July 1991, W. Douglas Albright, J., presiding. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 January 1993.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Joan Herre Byers, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nRobin E. Hudson for defendant-appellant.\nStephen T. Smith, and Katherine E. Jean for defendant-appellant.\nTkarrington, Smith & Hargrove, by Roger W. Smith; and Steptoe & Johnson, by William T. Hassler, on behalf of the Government of Mexico, amicus curiae.\nPatterson, Harkavy, Lawrence, Van Noppen & Okun, by Maxine Eichner and Melinda Lawrence; Goldsmith & Goldsmith, by C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr.; Louis D. Bilionis; and Ferguson, Stein, Watt, Wallas, Adkins & Gresham, by Adam Stein, on behalf of the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0508-01", "first_page_order": 548, "last_page_order": 557 }