{ "id": 2535852, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ex rel. UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC.; MCDOWELL COUNTY; MICHAEL F. EASLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL; and PUBLIC STAFF-NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION v. CAROLINA UTILITY CUSTOMERS ASSOCIATION, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Carolina Utility Customers Ass'n", "decision_date": "1994-07-29", "docket_number": "No. 410PA93", "first_page": "657", "last_page": "683", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "336 N.C. 657" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "295 N.C. 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568518 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 U.S. 535", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 368014 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/316/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 23", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11309544 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 651", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179827 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 U.S. 618", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177874 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/394/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11721475 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 U.S. 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11957048 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/410/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L. Ed. 249", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 U.S. 633", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 365137 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/332/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 U.S. 184", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11729594 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/379/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 L. Ed. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 365", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 S.E. 81", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1923, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 N.C. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655279 ], "year": 1923, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/185/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705", "parenthetical": "quoting Tarboro v. Forbes, 185 N.C. 59, 62, 116 S.E. 81, 82 (1923)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567652 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156", "parenthetical": "quoting Tarboro v. Forbes, 185 N.C. 59, 62, 116 S.E. 81, 82 (1923)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574144 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561018 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176316 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" }, { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "\"if the challenged classification bears any reasonable relation to the purpose of the statute it will not be set aside merely because it results in some inequalities in practice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571030 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567186 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563854 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 P.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Wash. 2d 959", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1125159 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "963" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/84/0959-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598", "parenthetical": "quoting Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 963, 530 P.2d 630, 632 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515756 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402", "parenthetical": "quoting Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 963, 530 P.2d 630, 632 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "902 F.2d 1134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10538820 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/902/1134-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561929 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4752843 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 N.C. L. Rev. 303", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.C. L. Rev.", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5309314 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 S.E.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "\"constitutional claims will not be acted upon by administrative tribunals\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526268 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713", "parenthetical": "\"constitutional claims will not be acted upon by administrative tribunals\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 503", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "\"Property Tax Commission is without authority to rule on the constitutionality of [statute]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524895 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "\"Property Tax Commission is without authority to rule on the constitutionality of [statute]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569569 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624863 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 953", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12862 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0953-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719032 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "682" }, { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4753047 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" }, { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729581 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" }, { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567415 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572986 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568518 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" }, { "page": "697-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0683-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1620, "char_count": 63719, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.3945477559186527e-07, "percentile": 0.9197061295851612 }, "sha256": "be1b2a6df5b9141da439703d1f67d067172296da45a80ba70db5fed10ef9bce9", "simhash": "1:aeb5bd2460ea38aa", "word_count": 10154 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:12:07.467663+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ex rel. UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC.; MCDOWELL COUNTY; MICHAEL F. EASLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL; and PUBLIC STAFF-NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION v. CAROLINA UTILITY CUSTOMERS ASSOCIATION, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MEYER, Justice.\nIn this case we decide, inter alia, the constitutionality of that portion of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 which authorizes the Utilities Commission to order a North Carolina natural gas local distribution company to create a natural gas expansion fund and which authorizes the Commission to use supplier refunds to such local distribution companies to fund the expansion fund. We also determine whether the North Carolina Utilities Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) properly ordered the creation and funding of a natural gas expansion fund by Public Service Company of North Carolina pursuant to that statute. We hold that the statute is constitutional and that the Commission properly ordered the creation of the expansion fund and the funding thereof by supplier refunds.\nIn 1991, the General Assembly enacted two statutory sections for the purpose of facilitating the expansion of natural gas service to areas of the state where it would otherwise be economically infeasible to provide such service. The first of these is N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-2(9), which states that it is the policy of the state\n[t]o facilitate the construction of facilities in and the extension of natural gas service to unserved areas in order to promote the public welfare throughout the State and to that end to authorize the creation of an expansion fund for each natural gas local distribution company to be administered under the supervision of the North Carolina Utilities Commission.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-2(9) (Supp. 1991). The second is N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158, which provides:\n(a) In order to facilitate the construction of facilities in and the extension of natural gas service to unserved areas, the Commission may, after a hearing, order a natural gas local distribution company to create a special natural gas expansion fund to be used by that company to construct natural gas facilities in areas within the company\u2019s franchised territory that otherwise would not be feasible for the company to construct. . . .\n(b) Sources of funding for a natural gas local distribution company\u2019s expansion fund may, pursuant to the order of the Commission, after hearing, include:\n(1) Refunds to a local distribution company from the company\u2019s suppliers of natural gas and transportation services pursuant to refund orders or requirements of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;\n(2) Expansion surcharges by the local distribution company charged to customers purchasing natural gas . . .; and\n(3) Other sources of funding approved by the Commission.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 (Supp. 1991).\nThe refunds referred to in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158(b)(l) are due to excessive rates charged on an interim basis to local distribution companies by their interstate pipeline suppliers subject to a later refund. When the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (\u201cFERC\u201d) establishes wholesale rates for natural gas, any excess amounts already paid by the local distribution companies to their interstate suppliers are subject to refund to the local companies pursuant to FERC order.\nPublic Service Company is a local distribution company (\u201cLDC\u201d) within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158. On 22 May 1992, Public Service Company filed a petition to authorize establishment of an expansion fund with the North Carolina Utilities Commission. With this petition, Public Service Company requested that the Commission order the establishment of a natural gas expansion fund and approve the deposit of supplier refunds into the fund. On 3 June 1993, the Commission entered an order establishing an expansion fund for Public Service Company and directed Public Service Company to transfer certain supplier refunds to the Commission for deposit into the fund.\nCarolina Utility Customers Association (\u201cCUCA\u201d) is an organization of utilities customers that frequently intervenes and participates in proceedings before the Commission. CUCA opposed the order in part because it wanted the supplier refunds that were used to fund the expansion fund to be returned to the customers of Public Service Company. As the Commission stated in its order:\nThis Commission\u2019s practice has been to return such supplier refunds to customers consistent with the authority granted the Commission by G.S. 62-136(c). The Commission would have done so here but for the provisions of G.S. 62-158.\nCUCA appeals the order of the Commission establishing the expansion fund, approving the level of initial funding for the fund, and ordering the transfer of the supplier refunds for deposit into the fund.\nIn this appeal of the Commission\u2019s order, CUCA challenges the procedures used by the Commission in the implementation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 and challenges the validity of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 on numerous constitutional grounds. We shall first address CUCA\u2019s contentions that the Commission erred in its interpretation and implementation of the legislation at issue.\nIn its first assignment of error, CUCA contends that the Commission misapprehended the scope of its discretion under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 in making the decision to grant or deny Public Service Company\u2019s petition. As the Commission stated in its order, \u201c[o]nce we have found unserved areas that are otherwise infeasible to serve, . . . the General Assembly intends for the Commission to exercise limited discretion as to whether a fund should be created for that particular natural gas utility.\u201d CUCA argues that the Commission in fact had wide discretion to determine whether to authorize the establishment of an expansion fund for any particular LDC and that the Commission\u2019s refusal to exercise its full discretion caused its failure to address CUCA\u2019s legal and factual position. Furthermore, CUCA contends that the order should be reversed because it constitutes a Commission decision based upon a misinterpretation of applicable law. See State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Haywood Electric Membership Corporation, 260 N.C. 59, 69, 131 S.E.2d 865, 871-72 (1963).\nCUCA bases its argument on that portion of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158(a) that reads as follows:\n(a) In order to facilitate the construction of facilities in and the extension of natural gas service to unserved areas, the Commission may, after a hearing, order a natural gas local distribution company to create a special natural gas expansion fund to be used by that company to construct natural gas facilities ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158(a) (emphasis added). CUCA contends that the word \u201cmay\u201d as contained in the statute is to be viewed in the permissive sense and indicates that the legislature intended that the Commission exercise more than \u201climited discretion\u201d in determining, in light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances, whether authorizing the establishment of an expansion fund is appropriate.\nEven if we adopt CUCA\u2019s interpretation of the Commission\u2019s authority, the record does not indicate that the Commission viewed itself as without discretion to grant or deny the petition. The Commission in fact stated that it was to exercise \u201climited discretion,\u201d as opposed to no discretion whatsoever.\nThe Commission held a hearing on the matter and received testimony from numerous witnesses who were either in favor of or opposed to the creation of the expansion fund. After doing so, the Commission issued an order that included extensive findings of fact. The Commission concluded that \u201cthe creation of an expansion fund for the Company is in the public interest.\u201d\nIn addition, the terms of the statute itself clearly indicate that there are certain limitations on the Commission\u2019s authority to order the creation of an expansion fund. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 limits the creation of expansion funds for the construction of natural gas facilities to unserved areas in which it would otherwise be economically infeasible for the LDC to extend natural gas lines. In order to implement this statute, the Commission adopted Commission Rule R6-82, which requires that an LDC show \u201cthat there are unserved areas in the LDC\u2019s franchised territory and that expansion of natural gas facilities to such areas is economically infeasible.\u201d N.C. Utilities Commission, North Carolina Public Laws and Regulations, Rule R6-82(b) (1993 ed.) (Michie 1994) [hereinafter \u201cCommission Rule\u201d]. Such limitations are in keeping with the language of the enabling statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158. In addition, Rule R6-82(d) states:\nIn determining the establishment of a Fund and the sources and magnitude of the initial funding, the Commission will consider the LDC\u2019s showing that expanding to serve unserved areas is economically infeasible and such other factors as the Commission deems reasonable and consistent with the intent of G.S. 62-158 and G.S. 62-2(9). Before ordering the establishment of a Fund, the Commission must find that it is in the public interest to do so.\nCommission Rule R6-82(d). The plain language of this rule indicates that the Commission had a proper view of its discretion in making a determination of whether to authorize the creation of an expansion fund: It was to evaluate pertinent factors in a manner consistent with the legislative intent; if, after doing so, the Commission concluded that the creation of an expansion fund would not be in the public interest, it would presumably decline to order the creation of such a fund. Because the General Assembly has clearly stated that it is the policy of the state \u201c[t]o facilitate the construction of facilities in and the extension of natural gas service to unserved areas in order to promote the public welfare,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-2(9), the Commission is not free to exercise its discretion with regard to whether, in a general sense, this policy is wise or unwise.\nWe hold that the Commission did not act under a misapprehension of applicable law and that it granted the petition and established the expansion fund pursuant to a proper interpretation of its authority and discretion to do so. CUCA\u2019s assignment of error on these grounds is overruled.\nIn its next assignment of error, CUCA contends that the Commission\u2019s factual findings concerning the economic development prospects for Public Service Company\u2019s franchised but unserviced areas lack evidentiary support. CUCA says the same for the Commission\u2019s factual findings concerning the potential benefits to existing customers in Public Service Company\u2019s unserviced areas.\nThe Commission found as fact that:\n8. The General Assembly has made the policy decision that- it is necessary and in the public interest to authorize special funding methods, including the use of supplier refunds and customer surcharges, to facilitate the construction of facilities and the extension of natural gas service into areas of the State where it may not be economically feasible to expand with traditional funding methods in order to provide infrastructure to aid industrial recruitment and economic development.\n9. The establishment of an expansion fund for Public Service for the purpose of constructing transmission lines into unserved counties in its territory that are otherwise infeasible to serve in order to provide infrastructure to aid industrial recruitment and economic development is consistent with G.S. 62-158 and 62-2(9) and is in the public interest.\n10. Expansion of natural gas facilities in the unserved areas by use of expansion funds can reasonably be expected to assist in the economic development of unserved areas in Public Service\u2019s franchised territory. The availability of natural gas service is an important factor in industrial recruitment. Economic development will in turn provide a larger tax base, more employment opportunities, and a better quality of life.\nAs support for these findings, the Commission recited the following evidence adduced at the hearing:\nSeveral witnesses addressed the issue of public interest in their testimony, and the Commission finds that this testimony bolsters the finding of public interest in this case. Mr. Dickey testified:\nExpansion of natural gas service into these [unserved] areas will improve the chances for industrial development in portions of the State which presently are unable to attract certain gas-consuming industries. Industrial expansion will bring jobs, additional residential and commercial development, and increases in tax base to these counties. Mr. Abernathy and Mr. Harmon, based on their extensive experience in industrial development activities, testified that approximately one-third of all potential industries seeking to relocate list natural gas as a requirement. Mr. Edwards testified similarly. Mr. Glass testified that natural gas \u201cmeans jobs, it means lower industrial costs, a better qualify [sic] of life for our citizens.\u201d He further stated, \u201cIn the past six years, we have greatly improved our educational system, dramatically enlarged our water distribution system, sought regional cooperation in other public services, such as solid waste and recycling. Natural gas is the missing link in the chain that will strengthen public services in our county.\u201d Similarly Mr. Birdsong testified that \u201cnatural gas is one of those items that is important when you\u2019re talking about economy growth.\u201d This testimony tends to show that expansion of natural gas facilities into unserved areas by use of expansion funds will assist in the economic development of unserved areas in Public Service\u2019s franchised territory.\nCUCA contends that these bare expressions of opinion of various witnesses are not sufficient to support the Commission\u2019s finding that the introduction of natural gas facilities into the areas would \u201creasonably be expected to assist in the economic development of unserved areas.\u201d Accordingly, CUCA argues, the Commission\u2019s order fails to satisfy the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-65(a), which states in pertinent part that \u201cno decision or order of the Commission shall be made or entered in any such proceeding unless the same is supported by competent material and substantial evidence upon consideration of the whole record.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-65(a) (1989). We hold that the Commission\u2019s findings on this matter are properly supported by the evidence.\n\u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State ex rel. Comr. of Insurance v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70, 80, 231 S.E.2d 882, 888 (1977). A review of the record indicates that the Commission heard testimony from numerous witnesses who were knowledgeable about the economic impact of natural gas facilities on local economies. Their testimony was in turn supported by written reports and studies of the matter, which were also presented to the Commission for its consideration. These studies are replete with empirical data that demonstrates the benefits of the extension of natural gas facilities to the unserved areas at issue. Simply put, the Commission heard ample evidence adequate to support its finding that the introduction of natural gas facilities into the unserved areas at issue would assist in the economic development of those areas.\nCUCA refers many times to the fact that economic development cannot be predicted with certainty. Notwithstanding this reality, a review of the record reveals that there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commission.\nCUCA makes a similar argument with regard to the Commission\u2019s Finding of Fact No. 11, that \u201c[cjustomers on Public Service\u2019s system stand to benefit from the expansion to be made possible by the expansion fund. These benefits include increased throughput, which tends to reduce expenses per unit of gas sold.\u201d Again, we hold that the Commission\u2019s finding in this regard was supported by substantial evidence. In the portion of the order designated \u201cEvidence and Conclusions for Findings of Fact Nos. 6-11,\u201d the Commission noted that Mr. Dickey\ntestified that there is benefit to all gas customers to the extent that economic development does occur, in that it will tend to lower overall rates in the future (or moderate increases in rates that might otherwise occur) due to the spreading of fixed costs over larger volumes.\nOn the other hand, Mr. Dickey admitted that \u201cwe do not know as a fact what will happen because it\u2019s dependent upon whether industry and the associated residential and commercial development actually occurs in these counties.\u201d\nIn determining whether the record as a whole supports the findings of the Commission, we note that \u201c[t]his Court\u2019s statutory function is not to determine whether there is evidence to support a position the Commission did not adopt. We ask, instead, whether there is substantial evidence, in view of the entire record, to support the position the Commission did adopt.\u201d State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Eddleman, 320 N.C. 344, 355, 358 S.E.2d 339, 347 (1987). A review of the record as a whole reveals that there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commission. We therefore affirm the decisions of the Commission with respect to these findings.\nIn its next assignment of error, CUCA contends that the Commission erred in entering an order that lacked evidentiary support for what CUCA contends are the material issues in the matter, the decision to create an expansion fund and the level of initial funding for the fund.\nCUCA argued before the Commission that in order to determine whether the fund should be created, the Commission was required to engage in a weighing process in accordance with its own mandate that \u201c[b]efore ordering the establishment of a Fund, the Commission must find that it is in the public interest to do so.\u201d Commission Rule R6-82(d). CUCA presented evidence and testimony before the Commission that demonstrated that it would be impossible to predict with any certainty whether the anticipated economic development expected as a result of the creation of the fund would occur. In addition, CUCA presented evidence designed to show that it would not occur. CUCA now contends that the Commission erred when it did not engage in a balancing process, or cost/benefit analysis, to determine whether the creation of an expansion fund in this case was in fact in the public interest. CUCA further contends that the Commission\u2019s order lacks the \u201csummary of the appellant\u2019s argument and its rejection of the same,\u201d State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Conservation Council of North America, 312 N.C. 59, 62, 320 S.E.2d 679, 682 (1984), as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-79(a), and therefore must be reversed. We disagree.\nCUCA\u2019s arguments in this regard can more properly be viewed as an attempt to have the Commission reanalyze the policy decisions made by the General Assembly in the enactment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158. The General Assembly has already determined that it is the policy of this state \u201c[t]o facilitate the construction of facilities in and the extension of natural gas service to unserved areas in order to promote the public welfare throughout the State.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-2(9). The Commission was without authority to reconsider this policy decision, and despite the fact that there was evidence that economic development was uncertain or would not occur, \u201c[t]he Commission ... is not required to comment on \u2018every single fact or item of evidence presented by the parties.\u2019 \u201d Eddleman, 320 N.C. at 351, 358 S.E.2d at 345 (quoting State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Nantahala Power and Light Co., 313 N.C. 614, 745, 332 S.E.2d 397, 474 (1985), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 476 U.S. 953, 90 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1986)). It is furthermore not necessary that the Commission evaluate the evidence based upon CUCA\u2019s faulty interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158, with which CUCA implies that the Commission is required to redetermine the economic values inherent in facilitating the construction of natural gas facilities in an unserved area, a task already undertaken by the General Assembly. To the extent that the General Assembly has already done so, it has effectively declared that the establishment of an expansion fund is in the public interest.\nCUCA further contends that the Commission\u2019s order is deficient because it lacks a \u201csummary of the appellant\u2019s argument and its rejection of the same.\u201d State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Conservation Council of North Carolina, 312 N.C. at 62, 320 S.E.2d at 682. By making this argument, CUCA engrafts a requirement upon N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-79 that does not exist. All that is required under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-79 is that\n[a]ll final orders and decisions of the Commission shall be sufficient in detail to enable the court on appeal to determine the controverted questions presented in the proceedings and shall include:\n(1) Findings and conclusions and the reasons or bases therefor upon all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented in the record, and\n(2) The appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief or statement of denial thereof.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-79(a) (1989). This statute does not require that an order of the Commission contain the \u201csummary of the appellant\u2019s argument\u201d referred to in State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Conservation Council of North Carolina, 312 N.C. 59, 320 S.E.2d 679, if the order taken as a whole is \u201csufficient in detail to enable the court on appeal to determine the controverted questions presented in the proceedings\u201d and contains the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-79(a). We hold that the order is sufficient to do so, and CUCA\u2019s assignment of error on these grounds is overruled.\nCUCA makes a similar argument with regard to the amount of funding authorized for the expansion fund. CUCA\u2019s position before the Commission was that, if the expansion fund was to be established at all, the amount of initial funding should be nominal because Public Service Company had not formally proposed specific expansion projects. CUCA contends that the Commission could have rationally concluded that the insertion of a significant amount of money into the expansion fund would have been unduly burdensome to Public Service Company\u2019s existing ratepayers and that because the Commission\u2019s order lacks a summary of its argument, it is insufficient. Again, we decline to impose the requirement that Commission orders contain a summary and rejection of each argument presented before it. In addition, we hold that the Commission properly authorized the initial funding based upon its findings of the economic infeasibility of extending natural gas service to currently unserved areas.\nIn making the determination that the expansion of natural gas service to unserved areas is economically infeasible, the Commission is required to adhere to the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158(c), which states that \u201c[o]nly those projects with a negative net present value shall be determined to be economically infeasible for the company to construct.\u201d The Commission\u2019s own rules define net present value as \u201c[t]he present value of expected future net cash inflows over the useful life of a Project minus the present value of net cash outflows.\u201d Commission Rule R6-81(b)(3). If the projected costs associated with a project are greater than the expected returns of the project, the project has a \u201cnegative net present value\u201d and is economically infeasible for the company to construct. The record indicates that Public Service Company demonstrated that extension of natural gas service into its unserved areas had a negative net present value. The record also indicates that the Commission had before it documentation showing that the amount of initial funding requested was insufficient to fully offset this negative net present value. Thus, even if the entire amount of funds requested by Public Service Company was dedicated to the extension of natural gas service to the unserved areas in its franchised territory, the projects would nonetheless remain economically infeasible. The level of funding authorized by the Commission is less than what would be required for Public Service Company to \u201cbreak even\u201d on the construction of natural gas facilities in presently unserved areas. Accordingly, the amount of funding authorized by the Commission appears to have been reasonable and in accordance with the policy and intent of the natural gas expansion legislation, and we see no reason to overturn the decision of the Commission on-this point. CUCA\u2019s assignment of error on these grounds is overruled.\nIn its next assignment of error, CUCA contends that the Commission erred when it determined that it did not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158. CUCA argues that the Commission has this authority pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-60, which provides:\nFor the purpose of conducting hearings, making decisions and issuing orders, and in formal investigations where a record is made of testimony under oath, the Commission shall be deemed to exercise functions judicial in nature and shall have all the powers and jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction as to all subjects over which the Commission has or may hereafter be given jurisdiction by law.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-60 (1989). CUCA takes the position that this statute gives the Commission the authority to determine the constitutionality of the legislation at issue. We disagree.\nWe addressed this question in a similar context in Great American Insurance Co. v. Gold, 254 N.C. 168, 118 S.E.2d 792 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976), where an insurance company sought a declaratory judgment in order to have the Fireman\u2019s Pension Fund created by the legislature declared unconstitutional. In that case, the Court asked the following pertinent question and answered it:\nQuaere: Does a quasi-judicial board of the executive branch of government have jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute? Administrative boards have only such authority as is properly conferred upon them by the Legislature. The question of constitutionality of a statute is for the judicial branch.\nId. at 173, 118 S.E.2d at 796; see also In re Appeals of Timber Cos., 98 N.C. App. 412, 415, 391 S.E.2d 503, 505 (1990) (\u201cProperty Tax Commission is without authority to rule on the constitutionality of [statute]\u201d); Johnston v. Gaston County, 71 N.C. App. 707, 713, 323 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1984) (\u201cconstitutional claims will not be acted upon by administrative tribunals\u201d).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-23 provides:\nThe Commission is hereby declared to be an administrative board or agency of the General Assembly created for the principal purpose of carrying out the administration and enforcement of this Chapter, and for the promulgation of rules and regulations and fixing utility rates pursuant to such administration .... In proceedings in which the Commission is exercising functions judicial in nature, it shall act in a judicial capacity as provided in G.S. 62-60.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-23 (1989). Again, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-60 provides that, for certain purposes, \u201cthe Commission shall be deemed to exercise functions judicial in nature and shall have all the powers and jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction as to all subjects over which the Commission has or may hereafter be given jurisdiction by law.\u201d (Emphasis added.) As an administrative agency created by the legislature, the Commission has not been given jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of legislative enactments. We hold that the Commission did not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-2(9) or N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 and properly declined to do so.\nCUCA now seeks to have this Court determine that the legislation at issue here is unconstitutional.\nCUCA\u2019s constitutional challenges to the legislation at issue concern the Commission\u2019s authority to create the expansion fund and the Commission\u2019s authority to order the use of supplier refunds to fund the expansion fund.\nSo that we may resolve CUCA\u2019s constitutional challenges in an orderly manner, we first address the contention that the creation of the expansion fund is an unconstitutional exercise of Commission authority.\nIn its first challenge to the Commission\u2019s authority to order the creation of an expansion fund, CUCA contends that the expansion fund scheme is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Commission because the Commission is vested with too much discretionary power with regard to the decision to order the creation of an expansion fund. As CUCA concedes, however, \u201cwe have repeatedly held that the constitutional inhibition against delegating legislative authority does not preclude the legislature from transferring adjudicative and rule-making powers to administrative bodies provided such transfers are accompanied by adequate guiding standards to govern the exercise of the delegated powers.\u201d Adams v. Dept. of N.E.R. and Everett v. Dept. of N.E.R., 295 N.C. 683, 697, 249 S.E.2d 402, 410 (1978). \u201c[T]he General Assembly cannot delegate a portion of its legislative power to subordinate agencies or units of government without accompanying such a delegation with adequate guiding standards to govern the exercise of the delegated power.\u201d Northampton County Drainage District Number One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 748, 392 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1990). The principal inquiry to be made in assessing the constitutionality of a grant of legislative authority is \u201cto insure that the decision-making by the agency is not arbitrary and unreasoned and that the agency is not asked to make important policy choices which might just as easily be made by the elected representatives in the legislature.\u201d Adams, 295 N.C. at 697-98, 249 S.E.2d at 411 (quoting Peter G. Glenn, The Coastal Management Act in the Courts: A Preliminary Analysis, 53 N.C. L. Rev. 303, 315 (1974)). In undertaking such an analysis, this Court has listed certain factors to be considered. These include (1) \u201cdeclarations by the General Assembly of the legislative goals and policies which an agency is to apply when exercising its delegated powers,\u201d and (2) \u201cwhether the authority vested in the agency is subject to procedural safeguards.\u201d Id. at 698, 249 S.E.2d at 411.\nAfter applying these principles to the case sub judice, we conclude that the expansion fund legislation at issue is a proper delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency.\nThe General Assembly amended the declaration of policy section of Chapter 62 to state clearly that it is the policy of the state\n[t]o facilitate the construction of facilities in and the extension of natural gas service to unserved areas in order to promote the public welfare throughout the State and to that end to authorize the creation of an expansion fund for each natural gas local distribution company to be administered under the supervision of the North Carolina Utilities Commission.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-2(9). In addition, within the legislation itself, there are extensive procedural safeguards designed to ensure that the Commission carries out the expansion of natural gas facilities in a way that is consistent with the intent of the legislature and in furtherance of the stated policies. These safeguards specifically include a direction that \u201c[t]he Commission shall ensure that all projects to which expansion funds are applied are consistent with the intent of this section and G.S. 62-2(9).\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158(c). This portion of the statute goes on to- direct that\n[i]n determining economic feasibility, the Commission shall employ the net present value method of analysis on a project specific basis. Only those projects with a negative net present value shall be determined to be economically infeasible for the company to construct. In no event shall the Commission authorize a distribution from the fund of an amount greater than the negative net present value of any proposed project as determined by the Commission. If at any time a project is determined by the Commission to have become economically feasible, the Commission may require the company to remit to the expansion fund or to customers appropriate portions of the distributions from the fund related to the project, and the Commission may order such funds to be returned with interest in a reasonable amount to be determined by the Commission. Utility plant acquired with expansion funds shall be included in the local distribution company\u2019s rate base at zero cost except to the extent such funds have been remitted by the company pursuant to order of the Commission.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158(c). The Commission is also directed to \u201creport to the Joint Legislative Utility Review Committee on the operation of any expansion funds in conjunction with the reports required under G.S. 62-36A.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158(d). We hold that this delegation of authority to the Commission meets the criteria outlined in Adams-, accordingly, CUCA\u2019s assignment of error on these grounds is overruled.\nCUCA next contends that the legislation at issue violates that part of the North Carolina Constitution which provides that \u201c[n]o person or set of persons is entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services.\u201d N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 32. CUCA argues that the legislation creates a private benefit only for those residents of unserved areas, therefore constituting an exclusive emolument prohibited by our Constitution.\nThat residents of unserved areas would receive more benefit than other members of the public from the extension of natural gas service to their areas is not determinative of the question of whether the act constitutes exclusive or separate emoluments in violation of our Constitution. \u201c[N]ot every classification which favors a particular group of persons is an \u2018exclusive or separate emolument or privilege\u2019 within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.\u201d Lowe v. Tarble, 312 N.C. 467, 470, 323 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1984). The prohibition against exclusive emoluments or privileges is not implicated when the enactment is intended for \u201cthe promotion of the general welfare, as distinguished from the benefit of the individual, and if there is reasonable basis for the Legislature to conclude that the granting of the [benefit] would be in the public interest.\u201d State v. Knight, 269 N.C. 100, 108, 152 S.E.2d 179, 184 (1967). In the present case, both of these requirements are met. The General Assembly clearly stated that the purpose of natural gas expansion is to \u201cpromote the public welfare throughout the State.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-2(9). In addition, it is not difficult to see how the legislature could have concluded that expansion of natural gas facilities into previously unserved areas would be in the public interest. As stated in the declaration of policy of the Public Utilities Act, \u201cit has been determined that the rates, services and operations of public utilities . . . are affected with a public interest and that the availability of an adequate and reliable supply of electric power and natural gas to the people, economy and government of North Carolina is a matter of public policy.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-2 (emphasis added). We conclude, therefore, that the legislation at issue here does not confer an exclusive emolument or privilege in violation of Article I, Section 32 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nWe now turn our attention to CUCA\u2019s contention that the use of supplier refunds as a source of funding of the natural gas expansion fund is violative of several provisions of the state and federal constitutions.\nWith regard to CUCA\u2019s constitutional challenges to the capture of supplier refunds, it first contends that the capture of supplier refunds for the purpose of funding the expansion fund constitutes a taking without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the \u201claw of the land\u201d clause of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nCUCA further contends that the use of supplier refunds to fund the expansion of natural gas lines to unserved areas violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, again, the \u201claw of the land\u201d clause of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. Because we hold that neither CUCA nor the companies represented by CUCA have a property interest in the refunds at issue, these contentions are rejected.\nInvocation of constitutional protection against takings without just compensation or without due process requires a property interest on the part of the person seeking such protection. Where there is no property interest, there is no entitlement to constitutional protection. To have a property interest that is subject to procedural due process protection, the individual must be entitled to a benefit created and defined by a source independent of the Constitution, such as state law. Huang v. Board of Governors of University of North Carolina, 902 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1990). The supplier refunds in the present case do not qualify as such a vested benefit.\n\u201cA vested right, entitled to protection from legislation, must be something more than a mere expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, a demand, or legal exemption from a demand by another.\"\nArmstrong v. Armstrong, 322 N.C. 396, 402, 368 S.E.2d 595, 598 (1988) (quoting Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 963, 530 P.2d 630, 632 (1975)).\nIn the present case, the very existence of supplier refunds is dependent upon the actions and rulings of the FERC. Should refunds to LDCs be mandated by FERC order, their subsequent distribution to the customers of the LDC then becomes a matter governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-136(c), which states in pertinent part:\nIf any refund is made to a distributing company operating as a public utility in North Carolina of charges paid to the company from which the distributing company obtains the energy, service or commodity distributed, the Commission may, in cases where the charges have been included in rates paid by the customers of the distributing company, require said distributing company to distribute said refund plus interest among the distributing company\u2019s customers in a manner prescribed by the Commission.\nAccordingly, the Commission is to determine the eventual fate of these supplier refunds. Apart from the decision to direct the distribution of refunds to utilities customers, the Commission is authorized to apply refunds to other purposes, for instance, to legal fees and travel expenses incurred when it appears before federal or state courts on behalf of the users of public utility service. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6248(b) (1989). Presumably, the entire amount of supplier refunds could be so dedicated, leaving no surplus for distribution to LDC customers.\nWe also note that subsequent to the 1981 amendments to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62436(c), which governs the distribution of supplier refunds, \u201cthe Commission is now empowered to order the distribution of supplier refunds to either current or past customers, utilizing whatever method the Commission deems most appropriate.\u201d State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Public Service Co., 307 N.C. 474, 480, 299 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1983). In addition, it is no longer required that the refunds be returned to the customers in proportion to the charges paid by them. Id. Implicit in these rulings is the proposition that it makes no difference that a customer who receives a refund might not have paid any rates that composed the source of the refund. Accordingly, the existence of a property interest in the refunds has not been the basis of a Commission decision to order an LDC to distribute the refunds to its customers, and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62436(c) does not, by virtue of its existence, create anything more than a mere expectation that LDC customers will receive a refund distribution.\nIt is clear that customers of an LDC cannot know whether, when, or in what amount supplier refunds will be made to them pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62436(c). Despite the fact that it has been the practice of the Commission to remit supplier refunds to customers of local distribution companies, past history is not determinative of the question of the nature or existence of the customers\u2019 interest in the refunds. Until the Commission makes a decision to remit these supplier refunds to LDC customers, the interest of these customers in the refunds is nothing more than a mere expectation of receiving them.\nWhen viewed in the overall framework of utilities regulation, it becomes apparent that rights in the refunds at issue do not automatically vest in LDC customers in the event that they are created by FERC order. Instead, the refunds to the LDC come under the supervision of the Commission until such time as it makes a determination with regard to the disposition of the refunds. This remains true until the Commission, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-136(c), makes the determination to create such rights on behalf of the customers. Until that time, the utilities customers have no vested interest in the refunds.\nNeither CUCA nor its members have an interest in the refunds sufficient to entitle them to constitutional protection from legislative action impacting upon the refunds. Accordingly, CUCA\u2019s contention that the Commission\u2019s transfer of supplier refunds to the expansion fund pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 amounts to an unconstitutional taking and a violation of due process is overruled.\nCUCA next contends that the use of supplier refunds to fund the expansion fund is a violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions because the burden of financing the expansion fund mechanism is imposed only upon existing customers, while the economic benefits created by the expansion of natural gas lines will accrue to all North Carolina citizens.\nWith regard to challenges to legislation on grounds that the law violates the right to equal protection, we have said\nthat the principle of the equal protection of the law, made explicit in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, was also inherent in the Constitution of this State even prior to the revision thereof at the General Election of 1970. By the above mentioned revision, it has now been expressly incorporated in Art. I, \u00a7 19, of the Constitution of North Carolina, effective 1 July 1971.\nS.S. Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654, 660, 178 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1971) (citations omitted). \u201cThe North Carolina cases applying the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions to challenged classifications have used the same test the federal courts use[] . . . .\u201d Duggins v. North Carolina State Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners, 294 N.C. 120, 131, 240 S.E.2d 406, 413 (1978).\nA claim that legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause is to be evaluated under one of two levels of review. The first of these entails \u201cstrict scrutiny\u201d of the challenged legislation; this level of review is required when the challenged legislation impacts upon a \u201csuspect class\u201d or a \u201cfundamental right.\u201d Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520, 524 (1976); see also Texfi Industries, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 269 S.E.2d 142 (1980). This level of review \u201crequires the government to demonstrate that the classification is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.\u201d Texfi, 301 N.C. at 11, 269 S.E.2d at 149.\nThe second level of review, which is used when the legislation at issue does not impact upon a suspect class or a fundamental right, involves a determination of whether the \u201cchallenged classification bears any reasonable relation to the purpose of the statute.\u201d Duggins, 294 N.C. at 131, 240 S.E.2d at 413 (emphasis added). Since the legislation at issue here does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, our inquiry is limited to this lower level of review. \u201c[SJtate economic regulatory classifications need bear only a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective in order to withstand an equal protection challenge.\u201d State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Edmisten, 294 N.C. 598, 611, 242 S.E.2d 862, 870 (1978).\nExpansion of natural gas facilities to unserved areas of the state is undoubtedly a legitimate governmental objective. Id. With regard to the contention that the legislation does not bear a rational relationship to the ends sought, it has been held that the relationship need not be a perfect one, but that the legislature need only have had a reasonable basis for concluding that the measures taken would assist in the accomplishment of the goal. See Duggins, 294 N.C. at 131, 240 S.E.2d at 413 (\u201cif the challenged classification bears any reasonable relation to the purpose of the statute it will not be set aside merely because it results in some inequalities in practice\u201d).\nIn the present case, the legislation directs that the refunds be applied for a purpose that the General Assembly has determined to be for the benefit of the citizens of North Carolina, including both existing and future ratepayers. The utilization of the refunds in the manner prescribed by the expansion fund scheme will result in a direct furtherance of the goal sought to be accomplished by the legislature: expansion of natural gas facilities to unserved areas. We have already determined that existing LDC customers have no cognizable property interest in the supplier refunds that are to be used for this purpose. The burden upon existing customers, if any, does not necessitate a finding that the legislation is wholly irrational and without reasonable basis. The same is true given the fact that heretofore unserved citizens may derive equal or greater benefits from the extension of natural gas services, although they did not pay the rates that resulted in the subsequent refunds.\nWe hold that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 clearly bears a sufficient relationship to the legitimate goal of expanding natural gas facilities to unserved areas of the state to withstand a challenge that it violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. Accordingly, CUCA\u2019s challenge to the legislation on these grounds is overruled.\nIn its next assignment of error, CUCA contends that the capture of supplier refunds for use in establishing an expansion fund constitutes a tax that violates the requirements of Article V, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution, which provides that \u201c[t]he power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner, for public purposes only, and shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away.\u201d N.C. Const, art. V, \u00a7 2(1). CUCA contends that the payments required of existing ratepayers are not used for a public purpose but are used to subsidize the extension of economic benefits to the individuals and private businesses of unserved areas. Accordingly, CUCA argues, the scheme violates Article V, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nThis Court has defined a tax as \u201ca charge \u2018levied and collected as a contribution to the maintenance of the general government . ... [It is] imposed upon the citizens in common at regularly recurring periods for the purpose of providing a continuous revenue ....\u2019\u201d State ex rel. Dorothea Dix Hospital v. Davis, 292 N.C. 147, 156, 232 S.E.2d 698, 705 (1977) (quoting Tarboro v. Forbes, 185 N.C. 59, 62, 116 S.E. 81, 82 (1923)). The capture of supplier refunds does not conform to this definition of a tax.\nThe monies making up the supplier refunds consist of payments made pursuant to rates set by the Commission in accordance with statutorily controlled standards. The capture of the refunds is hot a charge levied upon the general citizenry for the general maintenance of the government. The capture and dedication of supplier refunds to an expansion fund is not a tax.\nIn addition, amounts refunded to local distribution companies cannot be characterized as payments made by natural gas utilities customers. We have previously stated that because an independent agency, the FERC, causes refunds to be made to local distribution companies, a property interest in the funds is not suddenly created in these refunds on behalf of natural gas customers. It is true that the Commission may order the refunds to be distributed to utilities customers, but its authority to do so does not amount to a directive that it must always be done. Unless the Commission makes the decision to do so, the utilities customers have no property interest in the refunds; accordingly, the allocation of the refunds to the expansion fund does not amount to an unconstitutional tax. CUCA\u2019s assignment of error on these grounds is overruled.\nTo conclude, we hold that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 as enacted pursuant to the General Assembly\u2019s declaration of policy in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-2(9) is a constitutional exercise of legislative authority and that the Commission properly authorized, established, and funded the challenged expansion fund pursuant to the authority lawfully delegated to it by the legislature. The order of the Commission is affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\n. By its petition to authorize establishment of expansion fund dated 22 May 1992, Public Service Company sought approval to deposit a supplier refund in the amount of $5.8 million received in February 1992 into the expansion fund, plus previous supplier refunds amounting to approximately $150,000 received pursuant to FERC Docket No. RP 88-68 et al. (\u201cSupplier Refund RP 88-68\u201d). Public Service Company anticipated continuing payments of approximately $20,000 per month in connection with Supplier Refund RP 88-68.\nIn a supplemental request for approval of funding dated 11 September 1992, Public Service Company reported that the amount of the February 1992 refund was now $5,925,000 with interest and reported that Supplier Refund RP 88-68 now totaled $257,000 and that Public Service Company remained in anticipation of continuing refunds in the amount of $20,000 per month.\nIn this supplemental request, Public Service Company noted that the February 1992 refund was subject to appeal and suggested that \u201cif this money is applied to the expansion fund, it should be maintained in a separate sub-account until this contingency is resolved.\u201d Also in this supplemental request, Public Service Company requested the transfer of another supplier refund in the amount of $4,288,946, received on 7 August 1992, into the fund, as well as a producer settlement payment of $51,526. The 7 August 1992 refund was no longer subject to appeal.\n. In this order, the Commission directed the \u201ctransfer to the Commission for deposit in Public Service\u2019s expansion fund the sum of $4,774,840 as calculated in Hoard Exhibit 1, plus the additional monthly supplier refunds since calculation of Hoard Exhibit 1 and through July 1994,\u201d plus applicable interest. Hoard Exhibit 1 indicates that the sum of $4,774,840 is composed of (1) the 7 August 1992 supplier refund, $4,288,946; (2) the producer settlement payment of $51,526; (3) Supplier Refund RP 88-68 as increased by subsequent monthly refunds to a total of $357,333; and (4) accrued interest in the amount of $77,035.\n. The portion of State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Conservation Council of North Carolina to which CUCA refers is the following: \u201cThe Commission\u2019s summary of the appellant\u2019s argument and its rejection of the same is sufficient to enable the reviewing court to ascertain the controverted questions presented in the proceeding. That is all that G.S. \u00a7 62-79(a) requires.\u201d 312 N.C. at 62, 320 S.E.2d at 682. We do not read this as requiring a summary and rejection of each argument before the Commission, but only as an indication that the manner in which the order was promulgated in that particular case was sufficient to enable the Court to properly engage in its review.\n. In Finding of Fact No. 3, the Commission stated that \u201c[t]he Commission has no authority to rule on CUCA\u2019s motion to dismiss the Petition in this proceeding on grounds that G.S. 62-158 is unconstitutional.\u201d In so finding, the Commission adhered to a ruling made pursuant to another expansion proceeding, Docket No. G-21, Subs 306 and 307.\n. Suspect classes heretofore identified by the United States Supreme Court include: alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1971); race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964); and ancestry, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 92 L. Ed. 249 (1948).\n. Fundamental rights heretofore identified by the United States Supreme Court include: rights of a uniquely private nature, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973); the right to vote, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1972); the right of interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974); rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1968); and the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942).", "type": "majority", "author": "MEYER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Tharrington, Smith & Hargrove, by Wade H. Hargrove, William A. Davis, II, and Marcus W. Trathen, for applicant-appellee Public Service Co.", "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Jo Anne Sanford, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Karen E. Long, Assistant Attorney General, for intervenor-appellee Attorney General.", "Robert P. Gruber, Executive Director, Public Staff, by Gisele L. Rankin, Staff Attorney, for intervenor-appellee Public Staff; and Hunter and Evans, P.A., by Robert C. Hunter, for intervenor-appellee McDowell County.", "Byrd, Byrd, Ervin, Whisnant, McMahon & Ervin, P.A., by Sam J. Ervin, IV, for intervenor-appellant Carolina Utility Customers Assoc., Inc. (CUCA)." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ex rel. UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC.; MCDOWELL COUNTY; MICHAEL F. EASLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL; and PUBLIC STAFF-NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION v. CAROLINA UTILITY CUSTOMERS ASSOCIATION, INC.\nNo. 410PA93\n(Filed 29 July 1994)\n1. Utilities \u00a7 27 (NCI4th)\u2014 natural gas \u2014 expansion fund\u2014 Commission\u2019s discretion\nThe Utilities Commission did not act under a misapprehension of applicable law and acted pursuant to a proper interpretation of its authority and discretion under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 when it granted a petition to establish a natural gas expansion fund financed by supplier refunds to local distribution companies for the purpose of facilitating the expansion of natural gas service to areas where it would not otherwise be feasible. Although the Carolina Utility Customers Association (CUCA) contends that the word \u201cmay\u201d in the statute indicates that the legislature intended the Commission to exercise more than \u201climited discretion\u201d in determining whether to authorize establishment of the fund, the terms of the statute itself clearly indicate that there are certain limitations on the Commission\u2019s authority. The General Assembly has clearly stated that it is the policy of the state \u201c[t]o facilitate the construction of facilities in and the extension of natural gas service to unserved areas in order to promote the public welfare,\u201d and the Commission is not free to exercise its discretion with regard to whether, in a general sense, this policy is wise or unwise.\nAm Jur 2d, Public Utilities \u00a7\u00a7 235 et seq.\n2. Utilities \u00a7 27 (NCI4th)\u2014 natural gas expansion fund-creation \u2014 findings\u2014benefit to service areas\nA review of the record as a whole in a Utilities Commission proceeding which established a natural gas expansion fund reveals that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings concerning the economic development prospects for Public Service Company\u2019s franchised but unserviced areas and the potential benefits to existing customers in unserviced areas. Although CUCA contends that economic development cannot be predicted with certainty and that bare expressions of opinion are not sufficient, the Commission heard testimony from numerous witnesses who were knowledgeable about the economic impact of natural gas facilities on local economies; their testimony was in turn supported by written reports and studies of the matter; and these studies are replete with empirical data that demonstrates the benefits of the extension of natural gas facilities to the unserved areas at issue.\nAm Jur 2d, Public Utilities \u00a7\u00a7 235 et seq.\n3. Utilities \u00a7 27 (NCI4th) \u2014 natural gas expansion fund \u2014 creation \u2014 findings\u2014public interest\nThe Utilities Commission did not err in entering an order establishing a natural gas expansion fund where CUCA contended that the Commission lacked evidentiary support for the decision to create the fund and for the level of initial funding for the fund. The General Assembly has already determined that it is the policy of this state to facilitate the construction of facilities in and the extension of natural gas service to unserved areas and the Commission was without authority to reconsider this policy decision.\nAm Jur 2d, Public Utilities \u00a7\u00a7 235 et seq.\n4. Utilities \u00a7 286 (NCI4th)\u2014 natural gas expansion fund-\ncreation \u2014 findings\u2014summary and rejection of argument\nThe Utilities Commission did not err in an order\nestablishing a natural gas expansion fund by not including a summary of CUCA\u2019s argument and the Commission\u2019s rejection of that argument. CUCA\u2019s argument engrafts a requirement upon N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-79 that does not exist.\nAm Jur 2d, Public Utilities \u00a7\u00a7 273 et seq.\n5. Utilities \u00a7 286 (NCI4th)\u2014 natural gas expansion fund-\ncreation \u2014 findings\u2014amount of initial funding\nThe Utilities Commission did not err in an order\nestablishing a natural gas expansion fund by not including a summary and rejection of CUCA\u2019s arguments concerning the amount of the fund or the amount of initial funding, which appears to have been reasonable and in accordance with the policy and intent of the natural gas expansion legislation. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158(c).\nAm Jur 2d, Public Utilities \u00a7\u00a7 273 et seq.\n6. Utilities \u00a7 210 (NCI4th| \u2014 Utilities Commission \u2014 constitutionality of statute \u2014authority to determine\nThe Utilities Commission did not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-2(9) or N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 and properly declined to do so. Although N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-60 provides that the Commission shall be deemed to exercise functions judicial in nature for certain purposes, as an administrative agency created by the legislature, the Commission has not been given jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of legislative enactments.\nAm Jur 2d, Public Utilities \u00a7\u00a7 264 et seq.\n7. Constitutional Law \u00a7 34 (NCI4th)\u2014 Utilities Commission \u2014 establishment of natural gas expansion fund \u2014not unconstitutional delegation of authority\nThe natural gas expansion fund legislation is a proper delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency because there are extensive procedural safeguards designed to ensure that the Utilities Commission carries out the expansion of natural gas facilities in a way that is consistent with the intent of the legislature and in furtherance of stated policies. This delegation of authority to the Commission meets the criteria outlined in Adams v. Dept, of N.E.R. and Everett v. Dept, of N.E.R., 295 N.C. 683.\nAm Jur 2d, Constitutional Law \u00a7 339.\n8. Constitutional Law \u00a7 135 (NCI4th)\u2014 natural gas expansion fund \u2014not an exclusive emolument\nLegislation creating a natural gas expansion fund did not confer an exclusive emolument or privilege in violation of Article I, Section 32 of the North Carolina Constitution where, although residents of unserved areas would receive more benefit than other members of the public from the extension of natural gas service to their areas, the General Assembly clearly stated that the purpose of natural gas expansion is to \u201cpromote the public welfare throughout the State\u201d and it is not difficult to see how the legislature could have concluded that expansion of natural gas facilities into previously unserved areas would be in the public interest.\nAm Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions \u00a7\u00a7 128-138, 193 et seq.\n9. Constitutional Law \u00a7 49 (NCI4th)\u2014 natural gas expansion fund \u2014funding with supplier refunds \u2014taking without compensation \u2014 due process \u2014 standing\nCUCA\u2019s contention that the Commission\u2019s transfer of supplier refunds to a natural gas expansion fund pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 amounts to an unconstitutional taking and a violation of due process was overruled because neither CUCA nor its members have an interest in the refunds sufficient to entitle them to constitutional protection from legislative action impacting upon the refunds. The very existence of supplier refunds is dependent upon the actions and rulings of the FERC and, should refunds to local distribution suppliers be mandated by FERC order, the Utilities Commission determines the eventual fate of these supplier refunds. Despite the fact that it has been the practice of the Commission to remit supplier refunds to customers of local distribution companies, past history is not determinative; until the Commission makes a decision to remit these supplier refunds to LDC customers, the interest of these customers in the refunds is nothing more than a mere expectation of receiving them.\nAm Jur 2d, Constitutional Law \u00a7 190.\n10. Constitutional Law \u00a7 90 (NCI4th)\u2014 natural gas expansion fund \u2014funding with supplier refunds \u2014 equal protection \u2014no violation\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 clearly bears a sufficient relationship to the legitimate goal of expanding natural gas facilities to unserved areas of the state to withstand a challenge that it violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. Expansion of natural gas facilities to unserved areas of the state is undoubtedly a legitimate governmental objective and, although CUCA contends that the use of supplier refunds means that the burden of financing the expansion fund is imposed only on existing customers while the economic benefits accrue to all North Carolina citizens, the legislation directs that the refunds be applied for a purpose that the General Assembly has determined to be for the benefit of the citizens of North Carolina, including both existing and future ratepayers.\nAm Jur 2d, Constitutional Law \u00a7\u00a7 748-751.\n11. Constitutional Law \u00a7 28 (NCI4th) \u2014 natural gas expansion fund \u2014supplier refunds \u2014not a tax\nThe use of supplier refunds in establishing a natural gas expansion fund does not constitute a tax that violates the requirements of Article V, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution because the monies making up the supplier refunds consist of payments made pursuant to rates set by the Commission in accordance with statutorily controlled standards and the capture of the refunds is not a charge levied upon the general citizenry for the general maintenance of the government. Additionally, unless the Commission makes the decision to order the refunds to be distributed to utilities customers, the utilities customers have no property interest in the refunds and the allocation of the refunds to the expansion fund does not amount to an unconstitutional tax.\nAm Jur 2d, State and Local Taxation \u00a7\u00a7 1-9.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals of an order of the North Carolina Utilities Commission establishing a natural gas expansion fund for Public Service Company of North Carolina and approving initial funding of the expansion fund pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 62-158 entered 3 June 1993 in Docket No. G-5, Sub 300. Heard in the Supreme Court 1 February 1994.\nTharrington, Smith & Hargrove, by Wade H. Hargrove, William A. Davis, II, and Marcus W. Trathen, for applicant-appellee Public Service Co.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Jo Anne Sanford, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Karen E. Long, Assistant Attorney General, for intervenor-appellee Attorney General.\nRobert P. Gruber, Executive Director, Public Staff, by Gisele L. Rankin, Staff Attorney, for intervenor-appellee Public Staff; and Hunter and Evans, P.A., by Robert C. Hunter, for intervenor-appellee McDowell County.\nByrd, Byrd, Ervin, Whisnant, McMahon & Ervin, P.A., by Sam J. Ervin, IV, for intervenor-appellant Carolina Utility Customers Assoc., Inc. (CUCA)." }, "file_name": "0657-01", "first_page_order": 697, "last_page_order": 723 }