{ "id": 2549813, "name": "THOMAS L. HICKMAN, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem, T. DANIEL WOMBLE, and DARLENE HICKMAN PRUITT v. ANGELA LYNN McKOIN, TERRY LEE McKOIN and JUDY PASS McKOIN", "name_abbreviation": "Hickman ex rel. Womble v. McKoin", "decision_date": "1994-07-29", "docket_number": "No. 170PA93", "first_page": "460", "last_page": "464", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "337 N.C. 460" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525794 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4693716 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532105 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563771 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497384 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990); Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974)" }, { "page": "321-22" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529064 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990); Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974)" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525794 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0478-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 502, "char_count": 9633, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3038067904032815e-07, "percentile": 0.6227571568844361 }, "sha256": "033c2d3c6ded74c27e5adaab6fedc5bc919850c460748079df7d485d442994c8", "simhash": "1:0a9553a855762858", "word_count": 1508 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:06:06.194618+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THOMAS L. HICKMAN, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem, T. DANIEL WOMBLE, and DARLENE HICKMAN PRUITT v. ANGELA LYNN McKOIN, TERRY LEE McKOIN and JUDY PASS McKOIN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EXUM, Chief Justice.\nOn 6 June 1991 plaintiffs sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from an injury to their mother which was caused by a motor vehicle accident involving defendant Angela McKoin. The trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We granted discretionary review on 7 October 1993.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that they are the children of Tommie R. Hickman, who was badly injured on 7 June 1988 in a head-on collision with defendants\u2019 car. Plaintiffs maintain the accident was caused by defendants\u2019 negligence. According to the complaint, plaintiffs, Thomas and Darlene, ages 12 and 15, respectively, at the time of the accident, were at the family home when they learned of the accident. Later that day they were told their mother was not likely to survive her injuries. Plaintiffs were permitted to see their mother briefly in the intensive care unit and suffered \u201cgreat emotional anguish at the sight of their mother in such condition.\u201d Plaintiffs witnessed their mother in constant pain and suffering and observed her undergo a series of life-threatening operations and treatment over the course of several years from the time of the accident. As a result, plaintiffs allege they suffered \u201cfear, shock, emotional and mental anguish and distress.\u201d\nDefendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (1990). After a hearing, Judge Rousseau allowed defendants\u2019 motion and dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 action with prejudice.\nThe Court of Appeals held \u201cthat plaintiffs\u2019 emotional distress could have been foreseeable to defendants when it arose from seeing their injured mother in the hospital shortly after the accident and continues to be caused by her severe injuries and ongoing difficulties.\u201d Hickman v. McKoin, 109 N.C. App. 478, 482, 428 S.E.2d 251, 254 (1993). The Court of Appeals, therefore, decided plaintiffs stated a claim and reversed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the complaint. We disagree.\nBecause this case was dismissed prior to trial pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (1990), it is clear under North Carolina law that we must treat the allegations of the complaint as true. Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, 334 N.C. 669, 435 S.E.2d 320 (1993) (citing Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990); Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974)).\nIt is similarly well established that to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege that: \u201c(1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress . . ., and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress.\u201d Sorrells, 334 N.C. at 672, 435 S.E.2d at 321-22 (quoting Ruark, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97). Where, as in the instant case, plaintiffs are attempting to recover for their own severe emotional distress arising from concern for another person, they may recover only if they can prove they \u201csuffered such severe emotional distress as a proximate and foreseeable result of the defendant\u2019s negligence.\u201d Id. at 672, 435 S.E.2d at 321 (citing Ruark, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85) (emphasis in original). To determine whether such distress was foreseeable:\n[T]he \u201cfactors to be considered\u201d include, but are not limited to: (1) \u201cthe plaintiffs proximity to the negligent act\u201d causing injury to the other person, (2) \u201cthe relationship between the plaintiff and the other person,\u201d and (3) \u201cwhether the plaintiff personally observed the negligent act.\u201d However, such factors are not mechanistic requirements the absence of which will inevitably defeat a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress .... [T]he question of reasonable foreseeability under North Carolina law \u201cmust be determined under all the facts presented, and should be resolved on a case-by-case basis by the trial court and, where appropriate, by a jury.\u201d\nId. at 672-73, 435 S.E.2d at 322 (quoting Ruark, 327 N.C. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98) (emphasis in original).\nIn the instant case plaintiffs\u2019 complaint sufficiently alleges defendants\u2019 negligence and that this negligence did in fact cause plaintiffs severe emotional distress. The remaining question is whether plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that it was reasonably foreseeable to defendants that their negligent conduct would cause plaintiffs severe emotional distress. We believe they have not.\nIn Gardner v. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662, 435 S.E.2d 324 (1993), this Court affirmed summary judgment for a defendant sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The forecast of evidence showed that the plaintiff mother \u201csuffered sever\u00e9 emotional distress upon seeing her son in the emergency room undergoing resuscitative efforts a period of time after [an automobile] accident, and upon learning subsequently of his death.\u201d Plaintiff was several miles away at the time of the accident and learned of it by telephone. We concluded the parent-child relationship was not sufficient to compensate for plaintiffs lack of close proximity to the negligent act and lack of observance of defendant\u2019s negligent act; therefore, we decided plaintiff failed to establish the element of reasonable foreseeability. Id. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328.\nIn Sorrells, we affirmed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress, concluding \u201cplaintiffs\u2019 alleged severe emotional distress arising from their concern for their son was a possibility \u2018too remote\u2019 to be reasonably foreseeable.\u201d Sorrells, 334 N.C. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323. The Sorrells complaint alleged that employees of defendant continued to serve alcohol to plaintiffs\u2019 son, Travis, even when they knew he was intoxicated. Plaintiffs later learned \u201cthat their son had been killed in a car accident and \u2018his body mutilated,\u2019 \u201d and they suffered severe emotional distress as a result. Id. at 671, 435 S.E.2d at 321. Despite the parent-child relationship between plaintiffs and the victim of defendants\u2019 alleged negligence, we concluded plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. We said:\nWe conclude as a matter of law that the possibility (1) the defendant\u2019s negligence in serving alcohol to Travis (2) would combine with Travis\u2019 driving while intoxicated (3) to result in a fatal accident (4) which would in turn cause Travis\u2019 parents (if he had any) not only to become distraught, but also to suffer \u201csevere emotional distress\u201d as defined in Ruark, simply was a possibility too remote to permit a finding that it was reasonably foreseeable. This is so despite the parent-child relationship between the plaintiffs and Travis.\nId. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323.\nReviewing motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court has held that the Rule\n\u201cgenerally precludes dismissal except in those instances where the face of the complaint discloses some insurmountable bar to recovery.\u201d ... A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) \u201cunless it affirmatively appears that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be presented in support of the claim.\u201d\nLadd v. Estate of Kellenberger, 314 N.C. 477, 481, 334 S.E.2d 751, 755 (1985) (citations omitted).\nReviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal before us, we conclude that Gardner and Sorrells control the issue favorably to defendants. These cases establish that when a parent sues for negligent infliction of emotional distress because of injury to a child caused by the negligence of a third party, the parent-child relationship, standing alone, is insufficient to establish that the severe emotional distress was reasonably foreseeable. It follows that when the suit is by a child seeking recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress because of injury to a parent, the parent-child relationship, standing alone, is insufficient to establish reasonable foreseeability. Here, on the issue of reasonable foreseeability, plaintiffs allege nothing more than a parent-child relationship. Thus, under no state of facts which might otherwise be proved can plaintiffs establish the necessary element of reasonable foreseeability.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court\u2019s order granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, is\nREVERSED.", "type": "majority", "author": "EXUM, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert A. Lauver, PA., by Robert A. Lauver, for plaintiffappellees.", "Petree Stockton, L.L.P, by Richard J. Keshian, for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS L. HICKMAN, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem, T. DANIEL WOMBLE, and DARLENE HICKMAN PRUITT v. ANGELA LYNN McKOIN, TERRY LEE McKOIN and JUDY PASS McKOIN\nNo. 170PA93\n(Filed 29 July 1994)\nNegligence \u00a7 19 (NCI4th)\u2014 negligent infliction of emotional distress \u2014 injury to parent \u2014 parent-child relationship insufficient to show foreseeability\nWhen a child sues for negligent infliction of emotional distress because of injury to a parent caused by the negligence of a third party, the parent-child relationship, standing alone, is insufficient to establish reasonable foreseeability.\nAm Jur 2d, Negligence \u00a7\u00a7 488 et seq.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 109 N.C. App. 478, 428 S.E.2d 251 (1993), reversing the judgment dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 claims against defendants entered by Rousseau, J., at the 28 October 1991 Civil Session of Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 31 January 1994.\nRobert A. Lauver, PA., by Robert A. Lauver, for plaintiffappellees.\nPetree Stockton, L.L.P, by Richard J. Keshian, for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0460-01", "first_page_order": 488, "last_page_order": 492 }