{ "id": 2551016, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH B. SIDBERRY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sidberry", "decision_date": "1994-10-06", "docket_number": "No. 364A93", "first_page": "779", "last_page": "785", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "337 N.C. 779" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "48 ALR Fed 451", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "A.L.R. Fed.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "28 ALR4th 647", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732391 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518569 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553201 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1022", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5540, 5547, 5516, 5166, 5366, 4823, 5560 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1022-04", "/us/494/1022-06", "/us/494/1022-03", "/us/494/1022-05", "/us/494/1022-01", "/us/494/1022-02", "/us/494/1022-07" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "about an hour after victim's death, defendant told police officer that victim had stabbed him; statement not admitted because defendant had time to manufacture statement and it was not made spontaneously" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2564753 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "about an hour after victim's death, defendant told police officer that victim had stabbed him; statement not admitted because defendant had time to manufacture statement and it was not made spontaneously" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715827 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 531", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2494547 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 L. Ed. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 1000", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11788834, 11788679, 11788649, 11788937, 11789003, 11788777, 11789072, 11788529, 11788888, 11788601, 11788732 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/1000-07", "/us/414/1000-04", "/us/414/1000-03", "/us/414/1000-09", "/us/414/1000-10", "/us/414/1000-06", "/us/414/1000-11", "/us/414/1000-01", "/us/414/1000-08", "/us/414/1000-02", "/us/414/1000-05" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557587 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532283 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0402-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 619, "char_count": 13689, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.461584526230995e-07, "percentile": 0.8055919476386462 }, "sha256": "58a02520ddb2419ff1cf8833b12f04da050060845829a1483e7b80dc22fd4e37", "simhash": "1:573bd132146f4e58", "word_count": 2213 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:06:06.194618+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH B. SIDBERRY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MEYER, Justice.\nDefendant was indicted for first-degree murder. He was tried noncapitally to a jury and found guilty as charged. Judge Parker sentenced him to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Defendant appeals to this Court as of right from the first-degree murder conviction.\nThe State\u2019s evidence showed that on 5 November 1992, defendant Kenneth Sidberry, Jarvis Mason, Rodney Arnold, Alfred Pickett, and the victim, Shammon Mattocks, were in the area of 109 Market Street in Jacksonville, North Carolina. Mason and Mattocks began arguing about $500.00 defendant and Mason believed that Mattocks had stolen from them. Mason shot Mattocks in the forehead with a .25-caliber weapon causing his death.\nThe State\u2019s evidence indicated that, just before Mason pulled the trigger, defendant had told Mason to \u201cgo ahead.\u201d There was also evidence that the gun used to shoot Mattocks was defendant\u2019s gun and that defendant gave it to Mason during the argument with the victim. All of the witnesses to the shooting who testified for the State either had criminal records or were in jail at the time of the trial, awaiting sentencing.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence showed that defendant had been riding a motorbike behind the crime scene during the shooting and thus was not involved in the argument over money and that defendant did not own a gun. Defendant\u2019s evidence also showed that defendant heard a shot, saw the victim lying on the ground, then drove his motorbike first to his grandmother\u2019s and then to the home of his aunt, with whom he lived.\nAdditional facts will be addressed as necessary to an understanding of the issues.\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by permitting the State to cross-examine him regarding prior guilty pleas on which prayer for judgment had been continued, thus improperly chilling his right to testify. Prior to this trial, defendant pled guilty to two unrelated charges of sale and delivery of cocaine. Prayer for judgment on these crimes was continued by the judge, pending the disposition of the murder charge. The judge explained that he continued prayer for judgment because he did not want to interfere with defendant\u2019s right to testify in the murder case. Defendant made a motion in limine to prohibit the State from cross-examining defendant regarding these guilty pleas if defendant chose to testify. This motion was denied. Defendant argues that this was constitutional error, chilling his constitutional right to testify and precluding the jury from directly assessing defendant\u2019s credibility.\nNorth Carolina Rule of Evidence 609(a) provides:\nFor the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than 60 days confinement shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination or thereafter.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609(a) (1993). Defendant argues that a prayer for judgment continued is not a final judgment and should not be treated as a conviction for purposes of Rule 609. We disagree.\nRule 609(a) allows a party, for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, to elicit whether the witness has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than sixty days\u2019 confinement. The permissible scope of inquiry is restricted to the name of the crime, the time and place of conviction, and the punishment imposed. State v. Lynch, 334 N.C. 402, 432 S.E.2d 349 (1993). \u201cIt is settled law in this State that a plea of guilty, freely, understandingly, and voluntarily entered, is equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged.\u201d State v. Watkins, 283 N.C. 17, 27, 194 S.E.2d 800, 808, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1000, 38 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973).\nHere, defendant was told by his attorney and by the judge during the plea hearing in his case for sale and delivery of cocaine that the entry of pleas of guilty had potential consequences in his pending murder trial and further, that if he were convicted of less than first-degree murder, these convictions could be used to enhance punishment under the Fair Sentencing Act. The judge determined that defendant understood the impact of his guilty pleas and then accepted the guilty pleas after finding a factual basis for the pleas. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in ruling that the State could cross-examine defendant regarding these prior guilty pleas if defendant chose to testify.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to allow Mai Pickett, his aunt with whom he lived, to testify regarding an exculpatory statement made by defendant. Defendant notes that in this case, his evidence showed that he was sixteen years old; he saw the victim lying on the street, found his grandmother who lived nearby, called his aunt from his grandmother\u2019s home, and then rode his motorbike home to his aunt\u2019s. Defendant arrived at his home distraught and on the verge of tears. Defendant then recounted the events of the shooting to his aunt, who was a trusted adult and caretaker. Defendant told his aunt about the shooting within an hour of the shooting.\nNorth Carolina Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides that testimony of a witness as to a statement made by the declarant relating to a startling event and made while the declarant was under the stress of that event is not excludable under the hearsay rule. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(2) (1993); State v. Sneed, 327 N.C. 266, 393 S.E.2d 531 (1990). This Court has held that for a statement to be admitted as an excited utterance, \u201cthere must be (1) a sufficiently startling experience suspending reflective thought and (2) a spontaneous reaction, not one resulting from reflection or fabrication.\u201d State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 86, 337 S.E.2d 833, 841 (1985).\nIn this case, defendant first talked to his aunt on the telephone after the shooting from his grandmother\u2019s house. He called his aunt to tell her where he was and that he was on his way home. Defendant did not mention the shooting on the phone. Instead, he waited until after he had ridden home, an hour after the shooting, to tell her what had happened. These facts indicate a lapse of time sufficient to manufacture a statement and that the statement lacked spontaneity. See State v. Fullwood, 323 N.C. 371, 373 S.E.2d 518 (1988) (about an hour after victim\u2019s death, defendant told police officer that victim had stabbed him; statement not admitted because defendant had time to manufacture statement and it was not made spontaneously), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 108 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1990), on remand, 329 N.C. 233, 404 S.E.2d 842 (1991). Therefore, we find that the trial court properly excluded Mai Pickett\u2019s testimony on the grounds that it was inadmissible hearsay.\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing Alfred Pickett\u2019s pretrial statement into evidence as corroboration of his testimony because the statement was inconsistent with Pickett\u2019s in-court testimony. Alfred Pickett was a key witness for the State. Over defendant\u2019s objection, Police Detective Carol Lynch was permitted to read into evidence notes that she had taken during an interrogation of Pickett prior to trial, as corroboration of Pickett\u2019s testimony. Defendant argues that Lynch should not have been allowed to read these notes because they included significant contradictions and a material noncorroborative addition to the testimony.\nIn support of this argument, defendant relies on this Court\u2019s decision in State v. Burton, 322 N.C. 447, 368 S.E.2d 630 (1988). In Burton, we held that \u201c \u2018prior statements as to facts not referred to in his trial testimony and not tending to add weight or credibility to it are not admissible as corroborative evidence. Additionally, the witness\u2019s prior contradictory statements may not be admitted under the guise of corroborating his testimony.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 450, 368 S.E.2d at 632 (quoting State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 573-74 (1986)) (emphasis in original).\nDefendant maintains that there were two discrepancies between Pickett\u2019s testimony and his pretrial statement to Officer Lynch. The first concerned whether defendant handed Mason the murder weapon just prior to the shooting. During direct examination and cross-examination, Pickett testified that he did not see defendant give Mason the gun prior to the shooting. However, Lynch\u2019s notes, read at trial, indicated that Pickett stated Mason got the gun from defendant, that defendant had the gun in his pants and then gave it to Mason.\nThe second discrepancy concerned a comment made during an argument among Mason, Pickett, and defendant on the day following the shooting. Pickett testified that on 6 November 1992, he accused defendant of acting wrongly on the previous day by telling Mason what to do. Pickett did not testify that Mason had said anything to defendant on that date. However, Lynch\u2019s notes indicated that Mason had said, \u201cI shouldn\u2019t have listened to you [defendant].\u201d Defendant argues that this was significant because Pickett\u2019s testimony at trial did not indicate that Mason had listened or responded to defendant, but the pretrial statement indicates that Mason was responding to defendant\u2019s request when shooting the victim.\nWe agree with defendant that Alfred Pickett\u2019s pretrial statement contained significant discrepancies from his testimony at trial and should not have been admitted as corroborative evidence. However, we find that the error was harmless. Prior to Pickett\u2019s corroborative statement being read to the jury, Rodney Arnold had testified that he saw defendant give Mason the gun during the argument. Anthony Winchip, a witness for the State, had also testified that defendant admitted giving the gun to Mason. As to the second discrepancy complained of, there is overwhelming evidence that Mason listened to or carried through on defendant\u2019s advice to shoot Shammon Mattocks. Therefore, we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that, had the error not occurred, a different result would have been reached at trial.\nIn conclusion, we hold that there was no prejudicial error in defendant\u2019s conviction for first-degree murder and in the imposition of the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "MEYER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John H. Watters, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Janine M. Crawley, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH B. SIDBERRY\nNo. 364A93\n(Filed 6 October 1994)\n1. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2994 (NCI4th)\u2014 cross-examination of defendant \u2014 prior convictions \u2014 guilty pleas \u2014 prayer for judgment continued\nThe trial court in a first-degree murder prosecution did not err by permitting the State to cross-examine defendant regarding prior guilty pleas to cocaine charges on which prayer for judgment had been continued pending the disposition of the murder charge where defendant was told by his attorney and by the judge during the plea hearing on the cocaine charges that the entry of guilty pleas had potential consequences in his pending murder trial and, further, that these convictions could be used to enhance punishment if he were convicted of less than first-degree murder, and the trial judge determined that defendant understood the impact of his guilty pleas and accepted the pleas after finding a factual basis for them.\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7 570.\nPermissibility of impeaching credibility of witness by showing verdict of guilty without judgment of sentence thereon. 28 ALR4th 647.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 930 (NCI4th)\u2014 exculpatory statement \u2014 hour after shooting \u2014 not excited utterance\nAn exculpatory statement about the shooting of the victim made by defendant to the aunt with whom he lived was not admissible as an excited utterance and was properly excluded as hearsay in this first-degree murder trial where defendant first talked with his aunt on the telephone after the shooting from his grandmother\u2019s house but did not mention the shooting, and defendant waited until he went to his aunt\u2019s home an hour after the shooting to tell her what had happened, since defendant had time to manufacture the statement and the statement lacked spontaneity. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(2).\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 865, 882.\nWhen is hearsay statement an \u201cexcited utterance\u201d admissible under Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 48 ALR Fed 451.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 3169 (NCI4th)\u2014 pretrial statement \u2014 admission for corroboration \u2014 significant discrepancies \u2014 harmless error\nA witness\u2019s pretrial statement contained significant discrepancies from his testimony in a murder trial as to whether defendant handed the murder weapon to the killer just prior to the killing and whether the killer was responding to defendant\u2019s request when he shot the victim, and the trial court erred by admitting the statement into evidence as corroboration of the witness\u2019s trial testimony. However, this error was harmless where other witnesses testified that defendant gave the killer the gun and that defendant admitted giving the gun to the killer, and there was overwhelming evidence that the killer listened to or carried through on defendant\u2019s advice to shoot the victim.\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7\u00a7 641 et seq.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Parker, J., at the 1 June 1993 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Onslow County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 September 1994.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John H. Watters, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Janine M. Crawley, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0779-01", "first_page_order": 807, "last_page_order": 813 }