{ "id": 2521468, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TROY PEREASE HERRING", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Herring", "decision_date": "1994-11-03", "docket_number": "No. 44A94", "first_page": "271", "last_page": "279", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "338 N.C. 271" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "96 ALR2d 1435", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "9 ALR4th 526", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "8 ALR3d 1236", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573967 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 S.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566504 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568027 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 S.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486845 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306390 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763094 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "775" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2393544 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2503217 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568313 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" }, { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568550 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" }, { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569931 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E. 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658968 ], "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/164/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" }, { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2564377 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0339-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 805, "char_count": 20125, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.305061021461981e-08, "percentile": 0.4797308646179758 }, "sha256": "a80d7b44089b9b8543675c2d934444be0ac4f58093f6bc84bca3eea5625d589e", "simhash": "1:2338423be32e90fe", "word_count": 3262 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:54:51.848235+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TROY PEREASE HERRING" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nDefendant was indicted for the first-degree murder of Jerome Hopkins. He was tried noncapitally by a jury, found guilty as charged, and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Defendant appeals to this Court asserting four assignments of error. We find no reversible error.\nThe evidence presented at trial tended to show the following facts and circumstances. On 10 April 1992, defendant and three of his associates, Anthony Ellis, Tony Costa, and Demetrice Williams were selling crack cocaine in the Moyewood subdivision of Greenville. At approximately 11:30 p.m. that evening, a potential customer, Jerome Gorham, pretended to examine two \u201ctwenty size rocks\u201d of cocaine and ran off with them. Defendant and his three associates searched for Gorham for thirty minutes to an hour, but were unable to locate him.\nThe following evening, defendant, Costa, and Ellis were standing on a comer, in Moyewood, drinking alcoholic beverages. At about 10:30 p.m., Willie Jones approached the three men and offered to lead them to Jerome Gorham. Jones led them to Mark Gorham and Jerome Hopkins. Jones mistakenly believed that Jerome Hopkins was Jerome Gorham. Ellis, Costa, and defendant approached Hopkins and Hopkins was shot and killed.\nAfter the shooting, defendant, Ellis, and Costa went to a nightclub. While at the club, they were able to secure a ride to Scotland Neck. They were apprehended by the police before they reached their destination.\nAn autopsy revealed that when the victim was shot the \u201cgun was at light contact with the clothing surface of the body at the time of the discharge.\u201d The entry wound was on the left side of the chest by the armpit, and the bullet punctured Hopkins\u2019 lung, diaphragm, spleen, aorta, and liver.\nMark Gorham, Jerome Gorham\u2019s brother, testified that, when the three men approached Jerome Hopkins, one of them said \u201cIs this the one?\u201d Jerome Hopkins responded, \u201cMy name is not Jerome,\u201d as if he was attempting to say \u201cmy name is not Jerome Gorham.\u201d According to Mark Gorham, defendant shot Jerome Hopkins at close range.\nDemetrice Williams, who was charged with conspiring to murder Jerome Hopkins, testified that he was drinking with defendant, Costa, and Ellis the day of the shooting, but they were \u201cnot drinking to get drunk.\u201d Williams testified further that when he saw defendant after the shooting, defendant told him, \u201cI had capped the M-F.\u201d Williams understood defendant to be referring to Jerome Hopkins.\nDetective Best, an investigating officer for the Greenville Police Department, was called as a witness for the State. Detective Best and his colleague, Detective Thomas Ne\u2019Velle, interviewed several witnesses. Detective Best testified that he was sitting close to defendant during the interrogation and he smelled \u201cno alcohol\u201d and \u201cno body odor.\u201d Best testified that defendant was coherent and appeared to know what he was doing.\nDetective Best further testified that he read the Miranda warnings to defendant and defendant signed an acknowledgement in the presence of Detectives Best and Ne\u2019Velle. Detective Best testified that defendant made a written statement in his own handwriting and gave an oral statement as well. Best read the following handwritten statement into the record:\n4-12-92. On April 10, 1992, some guy I know had some drugs tooken from him by a guy named Jerome. So they chased him, but couldn\u2019t find him. So on April 11th, 1992, at about 10:45 p.m., a friend named Willie came and told us he knew where Jerome was and bring us to him and that\u2019s when I shot him. Troy P. Herring 4-12-92.\nTestifying on his own behalf, defendant stated that he and his four associates sold cocaine together. Defendant\u2019s testimony indicated that the day before the murder, 10 April 1992, he consumed between forty and sixty ounces of a fortified wine named \u201cSisco,\u201d which is also known as \u201cliquid crack.\u201d He also drank four cans of a malt liquor beer, known as \u201cBull,\u201d and smoked marijuana. Defendant testified that on the day of the murder he began drinking and smoking around two o\u2019clock in the afternoon; he drank another forty ounces of \u201cSisco,\u201d four twelve-ounce malt liquor beers, and smoked three \u201cmarijuana joints.\u201d Defendant further testified that he was \u201cmessed up,\u201d he \u201cwasn\u2019t sober,\u201d that he was \u201cdrunk,\u201d and that his state of intoxication continued up until the time of the shooting.\nDefendant thought Costa, Ellis, and Jones shared his intentions to get either his money or his drugs back from Jerome Gorham. According to defendant, it was Costa who shot the victim. Defendant indicated he did not remember giving a statement to Detective Best because his intoxication rendered him impaired.\nDefendant also called Tony Costa, Anthony Ellis, and Detective Best as witnesses. Both Costa and Ellis refused to answer the majority of defendant\u2019s questions and invoked their Fifth Amendment rights. Detective Best read into evidence a statement taken from Ellis on 12 April 1992. Ellis\u2019 statement to Detective Best corroborated defendant\u2019s statement that he had been drinking \u201cSisco\u201d and beer the night of the shooting.\nThe jury was given the choice of finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder or not guilty. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder.\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication as a defense to first-degree murder. We disagree.\nDefendant contends that he became intoxicated after consuming large amounts of alcohol and smoking marijuana in the forty-eight hour period preceding the shooting. Defendant further argues that his inability to remember giving a statement to the police is evidence of his intoxication at the time of the shooting. Additionally, defendant contends that his attempts to elicit testimony regarding his intoxication from his witnesses were thwarted by the witnesses\u2019 invocation of the Fifth Amendment.\nA defendant who wants to raise the issue of whether he was so intoxicated by the voluntary consumption of alcohol or other drugs \u201cthat he did not form a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill has the burden of producing evidence, or relying on the evidence produced by the state, of his intoxication.\u201d State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 346, 372 S.E.2d 532, 536 (1988). \u201cEvidence of mere intoxication\u201d does not meet this burden. Id. The defendant \u201cmust produce substantial evidence which would support a conclusion by the judge that he was so intoxicated that he could not form a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill.\u201d Id. The evidence on which the defendant relies\nmust show that at the time of the killing the defendant\u2019s mind and reason were so completely intoxicated and overthrown as to render him utterly incapable of forming a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill. State v. Shelton, 164 N.C. 513, 79 S.E. 883 (1913). In absence of some evidence of intoxication to such degree, the court is not required to charge the jury thereon. State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 213 S.E.2d 238 (1975).\nMash, 323 N.C. at 346, 372 S.E.2d at 536 (quoting State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 41, 361 S.E.2d 882, 888 (1987)).\nIn State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979), this Court rejected the defendant\u2019s claim that the trial court erred in not giving an instruction on voluntary intoxication. In reaching its decision, the Goodman Court relied on evidence which showed that the defendant could drive, give directions, lead a search, and participate \u201cin planning a scheme for disposing of the victim\u2019s body.\u201d Id. at 14, 257 S.E.2d at 579.\nThe evidence in this case is analogous to that in Goodman; it disclosed a defendant with a detailed memory, a defendant in control of his actions. Defendant was able to testify regarding the details of the evening of the murder. Defendant recalled who his companions were that evening. He was able to describe what he was wearing and he was certain Costa fired the gun. Defendant had the presence of mind to flee the scene and remembered the getaway route. He remembered the make and model of the getaway car, the name of the gas station where they stopped; who hid the gun, and the time the shooting occurred. Detective Best testified that defendant had no odor of alcohol when he made his statement five hours later.\nViewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, the evidence shows that defendant may have been intoxicated but the evidence does not show defendant was \u201cutterly incapable of forming a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill.\u201d State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 41, 361 S.E.2d 882, 888 (1987). For this reason we reject defendant\u2019s first assignment of error and hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit a voluntary intoxication charge to the jury.\nDefendant\u2019s second assignment of error is related to his first. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to submit, as an alternative verdict, second-degree murder on the theory that defendant\u2019s intoxication negated the elements of premeditation and deliberation. Defendant also argues that because the evidence of premeditation and deliberation was entirely circumstantial, the jury was at liberty to disregard it; therefore, the jury should have been given the opportunity to consider second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder.\nWe find no merit in defendant\u2019s contention that the jury could have disregarded the evidence of premeditation and deliberation because it was circumstantial. This Court has often acknowledged \u201cthat it is difficult to prove premeditation and deliberation and that these factors are usually proven by circumstantial evidence because they are mental processes that are not readily susceptible to proof by direct evidence.\u201d State v. Thomas, 332 N.C. 544, 556, 423 S.E.2d 75, 82 (1992). \u201cThe law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. Nor is a greater degree of certainty required of circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence.\u201d State v. Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 36, 310 S.E.2d 587, 607 (1984).\nFor the reasons stated in conjunction with defendant\u2019s first assignment of error, we conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing to submit second-degree murder based on voluntary intoxication. \u201cSecond-degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, but without premeditation and deliberation.\u201d State v. Robbins, 309 N.C. 771, 775, 309 S.E.2d 188, 190 (1983). The absence of premeditation and deliberation distinguishes second-degree murder from first-degree murder. State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 316, 389 S.E.2d 66, 76 (1990).\nIn this case the evidence, while circumstantial, tended to show that defendant was guilty of either first-degree murder or not guilty. Some of the evidence supporting first-degree murder included: (1) Demetrice Williams\u2019 testimony that on 11 April 1992, the day of the shooting, defendant \u201ckept saying when I find him [the man defendant believed had stolen his cocaine] I am going to do something to him.\u201d (2) Two detectives testified that when they informed defendant that he shot the wrong \u201cJerome,\u201d defendant responded, \u201cHe said his name was Jerome. He probably needed killing anyway.\u201d There was no evidence tending to show that defendant shot and killed the victim with malice, but without premeditation and deliberation; therefore, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on second-degree murder.\nFor his third assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury on acting in concert. Defendant argues that while the evidence shows that Costa, Jones, and Ellis were with defendant before and after the shooting, it does not show that anyone other than defendant did any act constituting first-degree murder. Therefore, none of the actions of Costa, Jones, and Ellis should be attributable to defendant under a theory of acting in concert.\nIn support of his argument, defendant directs this Court to the following question, which was asked by the jury: \u201cIf he [defendant] conspired is he guilty of murder whether or not he pulled the trigger?\u201d Defendant contends that this question makes it clear that the jury was speculating upon a theory of guilt not supported by the evidence, and the jury could have convicted defendant on a theory that someone other than defendant committed the murder. We reject defendant\u2019s argument.\nDefendant\u2019s testimony, and the testimony of other witnesses, support the acting in concert instruction. When referring to the sale of cocaine defendant testified: \u201cAin\u2019t nobody sold none separate; we was altogether [sic].\u201d Defendant testified that he and his associates searched for the man who stole his cocaine and when Willie Jones offered to lead defendant, Costa, and Ellis to Jerome \u201ceverybody was like, yeah.\u201d Although defendant claimed Costa actually did the shooting, he conceded that he knew Costa had a gun and he went with Ellis and Costa willingly. Additionally, defendant conceded that the three men together approached the victim.\nFurthermore, there was testimony from Demetrice Williams about the joint pursuit of Jerome Gorham on the night before the shooting. Mark Gorham testified that, while he \u201cnever saw the pistol,\u201d there were three people, including defendant, around the victim when he was shot.\nThe evidence presented at trial was sufficient to justify an acting in concert instruction. Accordingly we reject defendant\u2019s argument and find no error.\nAs his final assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court expressed an improper and prejudicial opinion as to defendant\u2019s guilt. Defendant objects to the inclusion of the word \u201cand\u201d in the first sentence of the following instruction:\nThere is evidence which tends to show that the defendant confessed and \u2014 that he committed the crime charged in this case. If you find that the defendant made that confession, then you should consider all of the circumstances under which it was made in determining whether it was a truthful confession and the weight you will give to it.\nDefendant argues that the instruction implied to the jury that the court believed the evidence showed defendant was guilty. We disagree.\nIn State v. Young, 324 N.C. 489, 380 S.E.2d 94 (1988), the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder after a trial that included evidence of his confession. In rejecting defendant\u2019s argument that a similar instruction, without the word \u201cand\u201d in the first sentence, constituted an expression of opinion by the trial court, we said:\nThe use of the words \u201ctending to show\u201d or \u201ctends to show\u201d in reviewing the evidence does not constitute an expression of the trial court\u2019s opinion on the evidence. State v. Allen, 301 N.C. 489, 272 S.E.2d 116 (1980); State v. Huggins, 269 N.C. 752, 153 S.E.2d 475 (1967). Nor did the trial court\u2019s statement that the evidence tended to show that the defendant had \u201cconfessed\u201d that he \u201ccommitted the crime charged\u201d amount to an expression of opinion by the trial court, because evidence had been introduced which in fact tended to show that the defendant had confessed and to the crime charged, first degree murder.\nState v. Young, 324 N.C. at 495, 380 S.E.2d at 98.\nWe are convinced the inadvertent addition of the word \u201cand\u201d did not mislead the jury to believe that the trial court was expressing an opinion as to defendant\u2019s guilt. We have held \u201ca mere slip of the tongue by the trial judge in his charge to the jury . . . will not constitute prejudicial error when it is apparent from the record that the jury was not misled thereby.\u201d State v. Simpson, 303 N.C. 439, 450, 279 S.E.2d 542, 549 (1981). It is clear from the instructions as a whole that the jury was not misled. Accordingly, we find no prejudicial error in the instructions.\nDefendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John G. Barnwell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Mark A. Ward for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TROY PEREASE HERRING\nNo. 44A94\n(Filed 3 November 1994)\n1. Homicide \u00a7 393 (NCI4th)\u2014 noncapital first-degree murder \u2014 intoxication\u2014evidence insufficient\nThe trial court did not err in a noncapital first-degree murder prosecution by refusing to submit voluntary intoxication to the jury where defendant was able to testify regarding the details of the evening of the murder; he recalled who his companions were that evening; he was able to describe what he was wearing and he was certain of who fired the gun; he had the presence of mind to flee and remembered the getaway route; he remembered the make and model of the getaway car, the name of the gas station where they stopped, who hid the gun, and the time the shooting occurred; and a detective testified that defendant had no odor of alcohol when he made his statement five hours later. The evidence shows that defendant may have been intoxicated but does not show that he was utterly incapable of forming a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 447.\nModern status of the rules as to voluntary intoxication as defense to criminal charge. 8 ALR3d 1236.\nModern status of test of criminal responsibility \u2014 state cases. 9 ALR4th 526.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 245 (NCI4th)\u2014 noncapital first-degree murder \u2014 premeditation and deliberation \u2014 circumstantial evidence \u2014 intoxication\nDefendant in a noncapital first-degree murder prosecution was not entitled to an instruction on second-degree murder on the theory that his intoxication negated the elements of premeditation and deliberation and that the jury was free to disregard the evidence of premeditation and deliberation because it was entirely circumstantial. The trial court did not err by refusing to submit second-degree murder based on voluntary intoxication and the evidence, while circumstantial, tended to show that defendant was guilty either of first-degree murder or not guilty. There was no evidence tending to show that defendant shot and killed the victim with malice but without premeditation and deliberation.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 437 et seq.\nHomicide: presumption of deliberation or premeditation from the circumstances attending the killing. 96 ALR2d 1435.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 794 (NCI4th)\u2014 noncapital first-degree murder \u2014 acting in concert \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThe evidence presented at a noncapital first-degree murder trial was sufficient to justify an acting in concert instruction where, when referring to the sale of cocaine, defendant testified, \u201cAin\u2019t nobody sold none separate; we was altogether\u201d; defendant testified that he and his associates searched for the man who stole his cocaine and that \u201ceverybody was like, yeah\u201d when someone offered to lead them; defendant claimed that Costa did the shooting but conceded that he knew that Costa had a gun and went with Costa and another willingly; defendant also conceded that the three men approached the victim together; and there was other testimony about the joint pursuit of the cocaine thief and that there were three people, including defendant, around the victim when he was shot.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1255 et seq.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 724 (NCI4th)\u2014 noncapital first-degree murder \u2014 expression of opinion by court on guilt\u2014 inadvertent\nThere was no prejudicial error in the instructions to the jury in a noncapital first-degree murder trial where the court instructed the jury that \u201cThere is evidence which tends to show that the defendant confessed and \u2014 that he committed the crime charged in this case.\u201d The inadvertent addition of the word \u201cand\u201d did not mislead the jury to believe that the trial court was expressing an opinion as to defendant\u2019s guilt and it is clear from the instructions as a whole that the jury was not misled.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1195 et seq.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Strickland, J., at the 11 October 1993 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Pitt County. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 October 1994.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John G. Barnwell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMark A. Ward for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0271-01", "first_page_order": 301, "last_page_order": 309 }