{ "id": 2517420, "name": "GEORGE A. BRYANT v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, GARFIELD B. GWYN, WILLIAM T. EASTER, EDWARD H. MARROW JR., J. MICHAEL SILVER, J. ALAN BARRINGER, WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, and WILLIAM R. HOKE", "name_abbreviation": "Bryant v. North Carolina State Board of Examiners of Electrical Contractors", "decision_date": "1994-11-03", "docket_number": "No. 504PA93", "first_page": "288", "last_page": "292", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "338 N.C. 288" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 875", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524525 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0875-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547754 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12128931 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 875", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524525 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0875-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 503, "char_count": 10953, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.4368922666919963 }, "sha256": "299bb9c42e7e2e04875527c073cd69e3b1cb8d57521e5fe63156956d664cd03d", "simhash": "1:49e9e4db6450ed27", "word_count": 1802 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:54:51.848235+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GEORGE A. BRYANT v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, GARFIELD B. GWYN, WILLIAM T. EASTER, EDWARD H. MARROW JR., J. MICHAEL SILVER, J. ALAN BARRINGER, WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, and WILLIAM R. HOKE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nPlaintiffs complaint alleges that on 11 January 1991, plaintiff George Bryant, who is licensed by the North Carolina State Board of Examiners of Electrical Contractors [hereinafter \u201cthe Board\u201d], filed charges with the Board alleging that another licensee had violated Chapter 87 of the North Carolina General Statutes. On 6 May 1991 the Board\u2019s Disciplinary Review Committee heard plaintiff\u2019s charges and made recommendations to be presented to the Board at its 8 June 1991 meeting. By letter prior to the Board\u2019s June meeting, plaintiff requested that the Board reject the Disciplinary Review Committee\u2019s recommendations and hold an administrative hearing on his charges. At the June meeting the Board voted that an administrative hearing was prohibited because the Board\u2019s members were \u201cprejudiced by prior knowledge of the charges.\u201d Plaintiff gave oral notice of his disagreement with the Board\u2019s action. On 17 June 1991 plaintiff petitioned the Board in writing requesting a contested case hearing before an administrative law judge. The Board did not apply to the Office of Administrative Hearings [hereinafter \u201cOAH\u201d] for a contested case hearing.\nPlaintiff then filed this action in Superior Court, Wake County, seeking to compel the Board to apply for a contested case hearing pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-40(e). Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The superior court granted the motion and entered an order of dismissal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which unanimously affirmed the order of dismissal. On 27 January 1994, we granted discretionary review.\nThe issue is whether plaintiff is entitled to a hearing and proposal for decision from an administrative law judge designated by the Director of the OAH if plaintiff does not receive a hearing and decision from the Board. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff does not have a right under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-40(e) to a contested case hearing before the OAH. It determined that plaintiff\u2019s rights, duties, or privileges are not at stake and therefore his case is not a contested one as defined in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-2(2). The Court of Appeals relied on its decision in Carter v. N.C. State Bd. for Professional Engineers, 86 N.C. App. 308, 357 S.E.2d 705 (1987), wherein it determined that a plaintiff who had brought charges against another licensee lacked standing to seek judicial review of that board\u2019s decision. Based on that holding, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because plaintiff here \u201cwould not have standing to seek judicial review of an administrative decision on his complaint, ... it would be inconsistent to hold that he nonetheless has a right to demand that an administrative decision be reached.\u201d Bryant v. State Bd. of Examiners of Electrical Contractors, 111 N.C. App. 875, 878, 433 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1993).\nWe disagree with the Court of Appeals\u2019 reasoning, and we therefore reverse. Whether plaintiff has standing to seek judicial review of an administrative decision, a question which is not before us and which we therefore do not address, is a distinct issue from whether he has a right to a hearing and decision on the charges he has brought before the Board. We conclude from our review of the applicable statutes that the General Assembly intended that \u201c[a]ny person\u201d who \u201cprefer[s] charges\u201d against, inter alia, a licensee of the Board, be entitled to a hearing and decision on those charges.\nThe statute governing the jurisdiction of the Board provides:\nIn the interest of protecting the public, whenever the Board finds that... (v) a person... to whom ... a certification or license has been issued, is guilty of one or more of the following:\n(7) Malpractice, unethical conduct, fraud, deceit, gross negligence, gross incompetence, or gross misconduct in the practice of electrical contracting;\nthe Board may refuse or revoke certification as a qualified individual, or may refuse to issue or renew a license.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 87-47(a1)(7) (1989). Plaintiff brought his charges, which implicated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 87-47(a1)(7), to the Board pursuant to the following provision:\nThe Board shall, in accordance with Chapter 150B of the General Statutes, formulate rules of procedure governing the hearings of charges against applicants, qualified individuals and licensees. Any person may prefer charges against any applicant, qualified individual, or licensee, and such charges must be sworn to by the complainant and submitted in writing to the Board. In conducting hearings of charges, the Board may remove the hearings to any county in which the offense, or any part thereof, was committed if in the opinion of the Board the ends of justice or the convenience of witnesses require such removal.\nId. \u00a7 87-47(a3) (emphasis added). Under the \u201cany person\u201d language of this statute, plaintiff qualifies as a proper person to prefer charges against a licensee. Though the language is not explicit in requiring that the Board hold a hearing on the charges, such a requirement is implicit both in the language referring to \u201chearings of charges\u201d and in the stated purpose of the statute governing the jurisdiction of the Board to hear such charges. It would be contrary to the intent expressed in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 87-47(al), that of protecting the public, to determine that plaintiff is not entitled to a hearing and decision on charges brought to effectuate that very purpose. We must adhere to the intent of the legislature in matters of statutory interpretation. State ex rel. Cobey v. Simpson, 333 N.C. 81, 90, 423 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1992). Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to a hearing and decision from the Board on the charges.\nThe provisions of Article 3A of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter \u201cNCAPA\u201d] apply to occupational licensing agencies, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-38(a)(l) (Supp. 1993), of which the Board is one. When an agency such as the Board determines that it is unable to provide a hearing or chooses not to do so, the NCAPA mandates the following:\nWhen a majority of an agency is unable or elects not to hear a contested case, the agency shall apply to the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings for the designation of an administrative law judge to preside at the hearing of a contested case under this Article.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-40(e) (1991). When a contested case must be transferred due to an agency\u2019s inability or refusal to hear the case, the legislature has prescribed the administrative law judge\u2019s role as follows:\nThe administrative law judge assigned to hear a contested case under this Article shall sit in place of the agency and shall have the authority of the presiding officer in a contested case under this Article. The administrative law judge shall make a proposal for decision, which shall contain proposed findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law.\nId. Thus, where an agency is unable or refuses to hear a case, the administrative law judge serves the function that the agency would have, had it been able and willing to hear the case. In this situation the administrative law judge does not review the agency\u2019s decision because one has not yet been reached; rather, the OAH provides what the party who initiated the contested case is entitled to under the statute and has not yet received: a hearing and a proposal for decision.\nThe definition of \u201ccontested case\u201d found in Article 1 of the NCAPA applies to those uses of that phrase in Chapter 150B, including Article 3A. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-2 (1991) (providing definitions of words \u201c[a]s used in this Chapter\u201d). A contested case is \u201can administrative proceeding pursuant to this Chapter to resolve a dispute between an agency and another person that involves the person\u2019s rights, duties, or privileges, including licensing or the levy of a monetary penalty.\u201d Id. \u00a7 150B-2(2). We have determined above that the legislature intended that plaintiff, who is qualified to prefer charges against another licensee, have a hearing and decision from the Board on those charges. Plaintiff\u2019s right to that hearing and decision is involved in the present dispute between plaintiff and the Board. Plaintiff\u2019s case therefore is a contested case as that term is used in Article 3A, Section 150B-40(e). Accordingly, the statutory mandate that the Board transfer the contested case to the OAH when it determines that it is unable or unwilling to provide plaintiff with a hearing and decision is applicable to this case.\nBecause plaintiff is entitled to a hearing and decision on his charges brought pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 87-47(a3), we reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision and remand the case to that court for further remand to the Superior Court, Wake County. If the superior court determines that plaintiff has not received a hearing and decision from the Board, as appears to be the case from the somewhat unartful allegations of plaintiff\u2019s pro se complaint, it shall order the Board either to hear the charges and render a decision thereon or to request that the OAH designate an administrative law judge to \u201csit in place of the agency and . . . make a proposal for decision.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-40(e).\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "George A. Bryant, plaintiff-appellant, pro se.", "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by James E. Magner, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGE A. BRYANT v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, GARFIELD B. GWYN, WILLIAM T. EASTER, EDWARD H. MARROW JR., J. MICHAEL SILVER, J. ALAN BARRINGER, WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, and WILLIAM R. HOKE\nNo. 504PA93\n(Filed 3 November 1994)\nContractors \u00a7 31 (NCI4th); Administrative Law and Procedure \u00a7 38 (NCI4th)\u2014 charges against electrical contractor\u2014 refusal of State Board to hear and decide \u2014 right to hearing toy AL J\nA plaintiff who filed charges implicating N.C.G.S. \u00a7 87-47(al)(7) against another licensed electrical contractor with the State Board of Examiners of Electrical Contractors was entitled to a hearing and decision from the Board on the charges. Where the Board was unable or unwilling to provide plaintiff with a hearing and decision, plaintiff had a right under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-40(e) to a contested case hearing and a proposal for decision on the charges by an administrative law judge designated by the Director of the OAH. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 87-47(a3).\nAm Jur 2d, Administrative Law \u00a7\u00a7 340-375; Occupations, Trades, and Professions \u00a7\u00a7 65, 68.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a decision of a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals, 111 N.C. App. 875, 433 S.E.2d 814 (1993), affirming an order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint entered 10 July 1992 by Allen (W. Steven, Sr.), J., in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 September 1994.\nGeorge A. Bryant, plaintiff-appellant, pro se.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by James E. Magner, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0288-01", "first_page_order": 318, "last_page_order": 322 }