{ "id": 790124, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. AARON WILLETTE BAITY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Baity", "decision_date": "1995-04-07", "docket_number": "No. 403A93", "first_page": "65", "last_page": "74", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "340 N.C. 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "96 ALR2d 1435", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "28 ALR2d 1115", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4762661 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 L.Ed.2d 642", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 S.Ct. 503", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 1080", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6495875 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/1080-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567859 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570986 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561834 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573188 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569559 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 L. Ed. 2d 733", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 1164", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12838, 12486, 12358, 12530, 12506 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/1164-03", "/us/476/1164-04", "/us/476/1164-02", "/us/476/1164-05", "/us/476/1164-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4716135 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719180 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532051 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541929 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" }, { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573124 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573220, 8573198, 8573140, 8573241, 8573119 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0732-04", "/nc/292/0732-03", "/nc/292/0732-02", "/nc/292/0732-05", "/nc/292/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553186 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525007 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569057, 2570019, 2572295, 2569672, 2570462 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0477-03", "/nc/321/0477-05", "/nc/321/0477-02", "/nc/321/0477-01", "/nc/321/0477-04" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358551 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" }, { "page": "632-33" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561787 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386", "parenthetical": "considering witness' testimony on direct and cross-examination when determining if prior statement was admissible as corroborative evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498914 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "considering witness' testimony on direct and cross-examination when determining if prior statement was admissible as corroborative evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212", "parenthetical": "admitting a prior statement which strengthens \"trial testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552935 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "admitting a prior statement which strengthens \"trial testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573-74" }, { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "holding prior statements admissible when they add credibility to \"witness's testimony at trial\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732391 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573591 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 242", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565888 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4733537 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561315 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4752702 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696516 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0152-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 911, "char_count": 21276, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.131614207557831e-08, "percentile": 0.5073612399796281 }, "sha256": "f3c26f48b5ad0c50a92d7cafdb191b2facd2de5faf3de1d9d67c8516ed68d9cd", "simhash": "1:97295268146ece62", "word_count": 3470 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:34:40.112900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. AARON WILLETTE BAITY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Justice.\nDefendant was charged in a bill of indictment proper in form with the first-degree murder of Jerry Martin Evans, Jr. (victim) in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17. Defendant was tried capitally and convicted as charged. In accordance with the jury\u2019s recommendation after a capital sentencing proceeding, the trial court entered judgment sentencing defendant to life imprisonment.\nAt trial the evidence tended to show that on 11 August 1992, defendant, Aaron Baity, was in the Stratford Oaks shopping center in Winston-Salem. Around 12:15 p.m., defendant entered Decorative Accents, a store in Stratford Oaks. Cathy Disher saw defendant in her office at Decorative Accents and asked if she could help him. Defendant picked up a fabric sample book and began looking through it and asking about green carpet. Not finding what he wanted, defendant left the store. Shortly before 1:00 p.m. on that same day, defendant entered the office of Hines Shoes, another store in Stratford Oaks. Defendant took money from the safe in the office at Hines Shoes and then left the store. The theft was discovered almost immediately by Darren Waugh, a Hines Shoes\u2019 employee. Darren and his brother, Cameron Waugh, who also worked at the store, began pursuing defendant.\nThe victim worked at a jewelry store located directly across from Hines Shoes in the Stratford Oaks shopping center. The victim heard about the theft and also gave chase.\nDarren and Cameron caught up with defendant, and Cameron began to talk to defendant while Darren went to call Hines Shoes and let them know where Darren, Cameron, and defendant were. Cameron remained with defendant as they crossed Stratford Road and went into a Best parking lot. Cameron was trying to persuade defendant to return the stolen money and talk to the police.\nDarren and the victim joined Cameron and defendant in the Best parking lot. The victim was carrying a gun. Defendant eventually handed the money he had stolen to Cameron, who gave it to the victim. Cameron, defendant, the victim, and Darren then began walking back towards Stratford Road. Cameron told defendant he would have to talk to the police. Cameron was walking next to defendant; the victim and Darren were walking behind defendant and Cameron. Suddenly, defendant turned around and shot the victim two times in the chest with a nine-millimeter pistol. The victim fell to the ground, and Darren and Cameron both ran for cover. Defendant continued to shoot as he ran away. Darren went back to the victim and got his gun, and Darren and Cameron again began chasing defendant. At some point, Darren threw the gun to Cameron. Neither Darren nor Cameron shot at defendant, and defendant escaped. The police arrived at the scene and questioned Darren, Cameron, and other witnesses about the shooting.\nDefendant was arrested later that day by the Special Enforcement Team of the Winston-Salem Police Department. When questioned, defendant claimed he was not at the scene of the shooting and knew nothing about it. The gun used to shoot the victim and the clothes worn by defendant at the time of the murder were never recovered.\nThe victim died from two gunshot wounds to his chest. An expert in pathology testified at trial that either of the two gunshot wounds alone would have been fatal.\nDefendant elected to testify and presented evidence that he was arrested and sent to prison in 1989 and had been released on 7 January 1992. Defendant testified that on the day of the shooting, he was carrying a nine-millimeter pistol in his pants. Defendant saw the victim in the parking lot at Best; the victim was walking with his hand behind his back. Defendant testified that he turned around to look at the victim and saw the victim \u201cpull a gun from behind his back[,] [r]aise it and hold it with both hands[,] and say I don\u2019t think so.\u201d Defendant shot the victim because defendant thought the victim would shoot him in the head if he did not shoot the victim first.\nAdditional facts will be presented as necessary to the understanding of a particular issue.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting a prior statement made by witness Cameron Waugh to Officer B.G. Rodden of the Winston-Salem Police Department. Defendant argues that Cameron Waugh\u2019s prior statement was inconsistent with, rather than corroborative of, his testimony on direct examination at trial. Specifically, the witness did not testify on direct examination that the victim was carrying a gun when he arrived on the scene; whereas, the witness\u2019 statement read into evidence stated that when the victim appeared in the parking lot, he was carrying a gun.\nThis Court has elaborated on the admissibility of prior consistent statements for corroboration as follows:\nIn order to be corroborative and therefore properly admissible, the prior statement of the witness need not merely relate to specific facts brought out in the witness\u2019s testimony at trial, so long as the prior statement in fact tends to add weight or credibility to such testimony. State v. Riddle, 316 N.C. 152, 156-57, 340 S.E.2d 75, 77-78 (1986); State v. Higgenbottom, 312 N.C. 760, 768-69, 324 S.E.2d 834, 840 (1985); State v. Burns, 307 N.C. 224, 231, 297 S.E.2d 384, 388 (1982). See State v. Ollis, 318 N.C. 370, 348 S.E.2d 777 (1986). Our prior statements are disapproved to the extent that they indicate that additional or \u201cnew\u201d information, contained in the witness\u2019s prior statement but not referred to in his trial testimony, may never be admitted as corroborative evidence. Eg., State v. Moore, 301 N.C. 262, 274, 271 S.E.2d 242, 249-50 (1980); State v. Brooks, 260 N.C. 186, 189, 132 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1963). However, the witness\u2019s prior statements as to facts not referred to in his trial testimony and not tending to add weight or credibility to it are not admissible as corroborative evidence. Additionally, the witness\u2019s prior contradictory statements may not be admitted under the guise of corroborating his testimony.\nState v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 573-74 (1986).\nApplying this analysis, we conclude that the statement at issue in this case tended to add weight or credibility to the trial testimony given by Cameron Waugh and was admissible. The only evidence in Cameron Waugh\u2019s statement that defendant argues was inconsistent with Cameron\u2019s trial testimony was that portion stating that the victim was carrying a gun. Although Cameron Waugh did not testify during direct examination that the victim was carrying a gun, Cameron never testified on direct examination that the victim was not carrying a gun. On direct examination Cameron testified that his brother, Darren, had a gun that he threw to Cameron after the shooting; but Cameron never testified on direct examination whose gun Darren threw to him. Hence, nothing in Cameron\u2019s testimony about the victim\u2019s gun on direct examination contradicted his previous statement to Officer Rodden. Moreover, on cross-examination by defendant, Cameron did testily that when the victim arrived in the parking lot, he was carrying a gun in his right hand. Thus, the only inconsistency that delendant argues between Cameron\u2019s testimony and his prior statement was in fact part of Cameron\u2019s trial testimony.\nDefendant argues that Cameron\u2019s testimony on cross-examination, that the victim was carrying a gun, only served to confuse the jury. Defendant seems to imply, without citing any authority, that a witness\u2019 testimony on cross-examination should not be considered when determining whether a prior statement is consistent with a witness\u2019 testimony. We have held that a witness\u2019 prior consistent statements may be admitted to corroborate the witness\u2019 \u201ctrial\u201d testimony. See State v. McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 384, 407 S.E.2d 200, 212 (1991) (admitting a prior statement which strengthens \u201ctrial testimony\u201d); State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. at 469, 349 S.E.2d at 573 (holding prior statements admissible when they add credibility to \u201cwitness\u2019s testimony at trial\u201d). A witness\u2019 testimony during cross-examination is part of a witness\u2019 \u201ctrial\u201d testimony. See State v. Adams, 331 N.C. 317, 329, 416 S.E.2d 380, 386 (1992) (considering witness\u2019 testimony on direct and cross-examination when determining if prior statement was admissible as corroborative evidence).\nBased on our review of Cameron Waugh\u2019s testimony at trial and his previous statement that was read into evidence by Officer Rodden, we conclude that the statement tended to add weight or credibility to Cameron\u2019s trial testimony and was admissible to strengthen and confirm the witness\u2019 testimony at trial. Any variations between the statement to Officer Rodden and Cameron\u2019s trial testimony were slight and reflect on the credibility, not the admissibility, of the evidence. The jury was specifically instructed that the evidence was \u201coffered for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of an earlier witness.\u201d Accordingly, we find no error in the admission of the statement.\nNext, defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence concerning fingerprints taken from defendant in 1989. Defendant had been fingerprinted in 1989 in connection with a previous arrest. On 11 August 1992, a fingerprint had been lifted from a fabric book at Decorative Accents. When compared with the fingerprint on the 1989 fingerprint card, the lifted fingerprint was identified as defendant\u2019s. The prosecutor attempted to admit into evidence the fingerprint card from 1989. Defendant objected. After the prosecutor deleted any reference to the date when the fingerprints were taken, the trial court allowed the card to be admitted.\nThis Court addressed the admissibility of fingerprint cards made during previous arrests in State v. Jackson, 284 N.C. 321, 200 S.E.2d 626 (1973). In Jackson, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a fingerprint card made in 1962, ten years before the crime at issue had taken place. Id. at 331, 200 S.E.2d at 632. The exhibit was introduced for the purpose of identifying a latent fingerprint lifted from the victim\u2019s apartment at the time of the crime for which defendant was on trial. Id. The defendant argued admission of the fingerprint from 1962 was prejudicial because it was evidence that he had committed an earlier crime. Id. at 331, 200 S.E.2d at 632-33.\nIn Jackson, this Court concluded that the fingerprint card as altered prior to its introduction did not disclose the defendant\u2019s criminal record and was admissible. Id. at 333, 200 S.E.2d at 634. The card as altered did not list a single arrest, indictment, or conviction. Id. The Court concluded that the admission of the card did not \u201cprejudicially influence the jury in [its] consideration of the question of defendant\u2019s innocence or guilt.\u201d Id.\nSince this Court\u2019s decision in Jackson, fingerprint cards made pursuant to prior, unrelated arrests have been held admissible. See State v. McKnight, 87 N.C. App. 458, 461, 361 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1987), cert. denied, 321 N.C. 477, 364 S.E.2d 663 (1988); State v. Scober, 74 N.C. App. 469, 472, 328 S.E.2d 590, 591-92 (1985); State v. Gainey, 32 N.C. App. 682, 687, 233 S.E.2d 671, 674, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 732, 235 S.E.2d 786 (1977).\nIn the present case, the fingerprint card as admitted contained no evidence of any prior criminal arrests, indictments, or convictions. The card as admitted did not even indicate on what date the fingerprints were taken. While there was testimony that the card was made in 1989, that testimony was objected to, and the jury was specifically instructed to \u201cdisregard any testimony of any fingerprints or any incident in 1989.\u201d \u201c[T]he law presumes the jury followed the judge\u2019s instructions.\u201d State v. Long, 280 N.C. 633, 641, 187 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1972).\nDefendant also argues that prejudicial error occurred when the prosecutor attempted to admit the card into evidence with the date on it and then attempted to remedy the situation by \u201cwhiting out\u201d the date, while the jury was present in the courtroom. Defendant objected \u201cto the big show of whiting it [the date] out while we were objecting to it.\u201d The discussion and \u201cwhiting out\u201d of the date took place during a conference at the bench which the court reporter noted was \u201cout of the hearing of the jury.\u201d In response to defendant\u2019s objection, the trial court stated that \u201c[t]he jury doesn\u2019t know what was whited out. They weren\u2019t even watching what you were doing.\u201d The prosecutor was instructed by the trial court to delete all reference to the date. The trial court then conducted a voir dire of Officer Carl Schulte of the Winston-Salem Police Department, an expert in the field of identification. The trial court made findings of fact that the exhibit contained no information about any prior arrest, indictment, or conviction. The only thing on the card was defendant\u2019s fingerprints without a date as to when they were taken. The card was then admitted into evidence.\nOn this record, we conclude no error occurred in the admission of the card into evidence or in the manner in which the date on the card was deleted from the card.\nFinally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the first-degree murder charge because there was insufficient evidence to show that the killing was premeditated and deliberate.\nWe have previously set forth the standard for determining a motion to dismiss thusly:\nWhen a defendant moves for dismissal, the trial court is to determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1982). Whether evidence presented constitutes substantial evidence is a question of law for the court. Id. at 66, 296 S.E.2d at 652. Substantial evidence is \u201csuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). The term \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d simply means \u201cthat the evidence must be existing and real, not just seeming or imaginary.\u201d State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980).\nState v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991). In passing upon a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference. Id. at 237, 400 S.E.2d at 61.\nPremeditation means that \u201cdefendant contemplated killing for some period of time, however short, before he acted.\u201d State v. Williams, 334 N.C. 440, 447, 434 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1993). Deliberation means that \u201cdefendant acted \u2018in a cool state of blood,\u2019 free from any \u2018violent passion suddenly aroused by some lawful or just cause or legal provocation.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Fields, 315 N.C. 191, 200, 337 S.E.2d 518, 524 (1985)). \u201cPremeditation and deliberation relate to mental processes and ordinarily are not readily susceptible to proof by direct evidence. Instead, they usually must be proved by circumstantial evidence.\u201d State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 59, 337 S.E.2d 808, 822-23 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 90 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1986), rev\u2019d on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).\nAmong the circumstances which may be considered as tending to show premeditation and deliberation are: (1) the want of provocation on the part of the victim, (2) the defendant\u2019s conduct and statements before and after the killing, (3) threats made against the victim by the defendant, (4) ill will or previous difficulty between the parties, (5) evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner. See State v. Calloway, [305 N.C. 747, 751, 291 S.E.2d 622, 625-26 (1982)]; State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, [130,] 244 S.E.2d 397[, 401] (1978); State v. Thomas, 294 N.C. 105, [119,] 240 S.E.2d 426[, 436] (1978). The nature and number of the victim\u2019s wounds is also a circumstance from which an inference of premeditation and deliberation may be drawn, State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, [174,] 293 S.E.2d 569, [584,] cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 103 S.Ct. 503, 74 L.Ed.2d 642 (1982).\nState v. Myers, 309 N.C. 78, 84, 305 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1983).\nIn this case, the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence established that defendant was walking alongside Cameron Waugh while the victim and Darren Waugh were walking behind defendant and Cameron. Cameron, Darren, and the victim were walking with defendant to take him to talk to the police about the money he had stolen. The four men had been walking together for \u201csome length of time\u201d when defendant pulled out his nine-millimeter pistol, turned around, and shot the victim two times in the chest. Nothing in the State\u2019s evidence suggests any action on the part of the victim or the Waugh brothers to provoke defendant to start shooting. Defendant then fled the scene, shooting at Cameron and Darren as he ran. Defendant disposed of the weapon he used to kill the victim and the clothes he was wearing when the victim was shot. The clothes and weapon were never recovered. The victim died from the two gunshot wounds to the chest. From this evidence a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot the victim with premeditation and deliberation and is guilty of first-degree murder.\nHaving reviewed the trial transcript and defendant\u2019s assignments of error, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John G. Barnwell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Lisa S. Costner for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. AARON WILLETTE BAITY\nNo. 403A93\n(Filed 7 April 1995)\n11. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 3169 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 prior statement of witness admissible\u2014 corroborative\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by admitting a prior statement by a witness where defendant argued that the prior statement was inconsistent with his testimony on direct examination at trial in that the witness did not testify on direct examination that the victim was carrying a gun when he arrived on the scene and the statement said that the victim was carrying a gun when he appeared in the parking lot. Nothing in his testimony about the gun on direct examination contradicted his previous statement; any variations between the statement and the trial testimony were slight and reflect on the credibility, not the admissibility, of the evidence. Moreover, on cross-examination, the witness testified that the victim was carrying a gun when he arrived in the parking lot; a witness\u2019s testimony during cross-examination is a part of a witness\u2019s trial testimony and a witness\u2019s prior consistent statements may be admitted to corroborate the witness\u2019s trial testimony. This statement tended to add weight or credibility to the witness\u2019s trial testimony and was admissible to strengthen and confirm the witness\u2019s testimony at trial.\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7\u00a7 641 et seq.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2203 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 fingerprint card \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by admitting evidence concerning fingerprints taken from defendant in 1989 where the prosecutor deleted any reference to the date when the fingerprints were taken after defendant objected. The fingerprint card as admitted contained no evidence of any prior criminal arrests, indictments, or convictions. Moreover, there was no prejudicial error in the manner in which the card was admitted, even though defendant contended that there was prejudice in attempting to admit the card with the date, then whiting out the date in the jury\u2019s presence.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 569.\nFingerprints, palm prints, or bare footprints as evidence. 28 ALR2d 1115.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 244 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 evidence of premeditation and deliberation \u2014 sufficient\nThere was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation in a first-degree murder prosecution where, taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence established that defendant was walking alongside Cameron Waugh while the victim and Darren Waugh were walking behind defendant and Cameron; they were going to talk to the police about money defendant had stolen; they had been walking for some time when defendant pulled a pistol, turned around, and shot the victim in the chest; nothing suggests any action on the part of the victim or the Waugh brothers to provoke defendant to start shooting; defendant fled the scene, shooting at the Waugh brothers as he ran; and defendant disposed of the weapon and the clothes he was wearing.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 437 et seq.\nHomicide: presumption of deliberation or premeditation from the circumstances attending the killing. 96 ALR2d 1435.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Cornelius, J., at the 24 May 1993 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Forsyth County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 13 February 1995.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John G. Barnwell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nLisa S. Costner for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0065-01", "first_page_order": 97, "last_page_order": 106 }