{ "id": 790156, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SHAWN DELAMAR TRUESDALE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Truesdale", "decision_date": "1995-05-05", "docket_number": "No. 319A94", "first_page": "229", "last_page": "235", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "340 N.C. 229" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "96 ALR2d 1435", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "86 ALR2d 656", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "85 L. Ed. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 1009", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6232119 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/1009-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4759870 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554614 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569699 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Biggs, 292 N.C. 328, 337, 233 S.E.2d 512, 517 (1977)" }, { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555749 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Biggs, 292 N.C. 328, 337, 233 S.E.2d 512, 517 (1977)" }, { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 S.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556466 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 L. Ed. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 1077", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6549932, 6549836, 6549806, 6549711, 6549744, 6549978, 6549687, 6550010, 6550043, 6549885 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/1077-07", "/us/479/1077-05", "/us/479/1077-04", "/us/479/1077-02", "/us/479/1077-03", "/us/479/1077-08", "/us/479/1077-01", "/us/479/1077-09", "/us/479/1077-10", "/us/479/1077-06" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827" }, { "page": "827" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779521 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 224", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 916", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 600294, 599751, 602122, 600429, 600879, 602321, 600978, 601233, 601012, 600727, 599257, 602043, 601182, 601279 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0916-06", "/us/484/0916-10", "/us/484/0916-07", "/us/484/0916-12", "/us/484/0916-01", "/us/484/0916-11", "/us/484/0916-05", "/us/484/0916-02", "/us/484/0916-14", "/us/484/0916-09", "/us/484/0916-13", "/us/484/0916-04", "/us/484/0916-03", "/us/484/0916-08" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725713 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276, 295, 357 S.E.2d 641, 653, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 916, 98 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2519058 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276, 295, 357 S.E.2d 641, 653, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 916, 98 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734", "parenthetical": "evidence supported premeditation and deliberation example of \"grossly excessive force\" where unarmed victim was shot twice from close range" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2540746 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137-38", "parenthetical": "evidence supported premeditation and deliberation example of \"grossly excessive force\" where unarmed victim was shot twice from close range" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306390 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517275 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154-55", "parenthetical": "discussing preservation of assignments of error in jury instructions under Rule 10(b)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2559246 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552-55", "parenthetical": "discussing preservation of assignments of error in jury instructions under Rule 10(b)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0545-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 715, "char_count": 15252, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.0573654598889683e-07, "percentile": 0.8563748311194977 }, "sha256": "893d1953120ca7eb4eec2f73b985cc76b99c330b86933b2b61a0c9d8899d9e3f", "simhash": "1:df7a7932c27d9e5a", "word_count": 2548 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:34:40.112900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SHAWN DELAMAR TRUESDALE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nDefendant was indicted for one count of first-degree murder, was tried noncapitally and found guilty, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. We find no prejudicial error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following:\nAlisa Rucker testified that she and her husband lived in Charlotte in November 1993. Alisa met the victim, Ronald Moore, about three months prior to his death. They were involved in the use and sale of narcotics with a person known as Flat Top. Alisa testified that two weeks before Moore\u2019s death, Flat Top allotted him a small amount of crack cocaine. Moore was to intercept people going to Alisa\u2019s house to buy drugs because inside she and Flat Top had a large amount of cocaine which they wished to conceal.\nAlisa\u2019s husband, Donald Rucker, testified that in the early morning of 15 November 1993, he awoke to a ruckus outside his bedroom window. He looked out and saw two shadows. He heard a male voice say, \u201cI want to speak to Alisa,\u201d and he responded that she was sleeping. Moore, the victim, who was outside the window, then told Donald he had to talk to Alisa because \u201c[t]here\u2019s a man out here got a gun and he\u2019s going to shoot me.\u201d Donald let Moore and the other man inside.\nAlisa testified that on 15 November 1993, she awoke and saw defendant standing in her living room with Moore. Moore bent down and asked her to tell defendant he had paid her Flat Top\u2019s money. Alisa stated, \u201cNo,\u201d and then defendant asked her whether Moore had paid her Flat Top\u2019s money; she responded, \u201cHell, no.\u201d Defendant pulled out a silver handgun, pointed it toward the lower portion of Moore\u2019s body, and fired.\nAccording to Alisa, after that shot Moore ran to the bedroom and defendant followed him. Alisa heard two or three more shots, and then defendant returned and said, \u201cExcuse me, Lisa,\u201d and left the house.\nDonald\u2019s testimony corroborated Alisa\u2019s. He found Moore on the floor in the bedroom closet. He testified that there were no bullet holes in the closet door.\nDr. J.M. Sullivan, a forensic pathologist, testified Moore had been shot three times \u2014 once in the back, once in the left wrist, and once in the upper left leg. Dr. Sullivan stated that the wound in Moore\u2019s back was consistent with being shot from behind.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence tended to show the following:\nOfficer E.M. Corwin testified that defendant confessed to him that he shot Moore. Corwin took a lengthy written statement from defendant. He read from defendant\u2019s statement to the jury:\nI asked [Moore] where my money was, and ... he said, I gave it to Lisa, I gave it to Lisa. She said, no, you didn\u2019t, g-dd-it, no, you didn\u2019t. I believed Lisa, so I shot [Moore] in the leg. When he grabbed his leg and then came towards me like he was going to take the pistol, ... I stepped back and shot him again. When he turned and started to go in the hallway, that\u2019s when I shot the third time, when he ran into the back room and got in the closet.\nDefendant testified in his own behalf. He stated that Moore charged at him and that he pulled out his gun and tried to shoot at Moore\u2019s leg. After he did so, Moore jumped at him, threw his body at him, and two more shots just went off. Moore then ran to the bedroom closet. Defendant testified that there was very little time between when the victim came towards him and when he turned towards the bedroom. He indicated that it all happened in a matter of seconds.\nDefendant first assigns as error the instructions given on first-degree murder and second-degree murder, specifically, the use of the phrase \u201ctime, no matter how short\u201d to describe premeditation. The trial court gave the pattern jury instruction on first-degree murder with a deadly weapon, N.C.P.I.\u2014Crim. 206.10 (1989), which defendant specifically requested. After the instruction was given and the jury was excused for deliberations, the trial court asked whether there were any objections to the instructions as delivered. Defendant did not object to the premeditation and deliberation portion of the instruction to which he now assigns error. He thus failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2); see also State v. Allen, 339 N.C. 545, 552-55, 453 S.E.2d 150, 154-55 (1995) (discussing preservation of assignments of error in jury instructions under Rule 10(b)(2)). Further, Rule 10(c)(4) provides:\nAssigning Plain Error. In criminal cases, a question which was not preserved by objection noted at trial and which is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action, nevertheless may be made the basis of an assignment of error where the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.\nN.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4) (emphasis added). Defendant has failed specifically and distinctly to contend that the trial court\u2019s instruction on first- and second-degree murder constituted plain error. Accordingly, he has waived his right to appellate review of this issue. See State v. Hamilton, 338 N.C. 193, 208, 449 S.E.2d 402, 411 (1994).\nIn this assignment of error, defendant also argues that the trial court\u2019s instructions on premeditation and deliberation were erroneous because the court instructed the jury that it could determine premeditation and deliberation from\ncircumstances . . . such as the lack of provocation by the victim, the conduct of the Defendant before, during and after the killing, use of grossly excessive force, infliction of lethal wounds after the victim is felled and any other manner in which or means by which the killing was done.\nAfter the court instructed the jury and asked whether there were any objections to the delivered instructions, defendant objected to the recitation of two circumstances from which premeditation and deliberation could be shown: the use of grossly excessive force and the infliction of lethal wounds after the victim is felled. He argues that these examples are confusing and are not supported by the evidence. We disagree.\nThe court gave the pattern jury instruction on premeditation and deliberation. See N.C.P.I. \u2014 Crim. 206.10. We previously have stated: \u201cThe elements listed [there] are merely examples of circumstances which, if found, the jury could use to infer premeditation and deliberation. It is not required that each of the listed elements be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury may infer premeditation and deliberation.\u201d State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 315, 389 S.E.2d 66, 76 (1990).\nAs to \u201cthe use of grossly excessive force,\u201d the evidence supports this example. The pathologist\u2019s testimony supports an inference that excessive force was used because the unarmed victim had been shot three times. See State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 137-38, 400 S.E.2d 712, 734 (1991) (evidence supported premeditation and deliberation example of \u201cgrossly excessive force\u201d where unarmed victim was shot twice from close range). As to \u201cthe infliction of lethal wounds after the victim is felled,\u201d the evidence also supports this example. We recently noted:, \u201cUnder the \u2018felled victim theory\u2019 of premeditation and deliberation, \u2018when numerous wounds are inflicted, the defendant has the opportunity to premeditate from one shot to the next.\u2019 \u201d State v. Watson, 338 N.C. 168, 179, 449 S.E.2d 694, 701 (1994) (quoting State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276, 295, 357 S.E.2d 641, 653, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 916, 98 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1987)). Alisa and Donald Rucker both testified that defendant continued to shoot the victim after the first shot as the victim ran away from defendant and into a closet. The victim was shot three times. The evidence therefore supported this example. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn defendant\u2019s next assignment of error, he contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury on first-degree murder based on the theory of premeditation and deliberation because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Defendant moved to dismiss the first-degree murder charge at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all the evidence. The trial court denied the motions.\nIn ruling on a motion to dismiss a first-degree murder charge, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the State every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. State v. Jackson, 317 N.C. 1, 22, 343 S.E.2d 814, 827 (1986), judgment vacated on other grounds, 479 U.S. 1077, 94 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1987). Substantial evidence must be introduced tending to prove the essential elements of the crime charged and that defendant was the perpetrator. Id. The evidence may contain contradictions or discrepancies; these are for the jury to resolve and do not require dismissal. Id. at 22-23, 343 S.E.2d at 827.\nFirst-degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, premeditation, and deliberation. See N.C.G.S. 14-17 (1993); State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 77, 405 S.E.2d 145, 154 (1991). \u201cPremeditation\u201d means that the defendant formed the specific intent to kill the victim \u201cfor some length of time, however short,\u201d before the murderous act. State v. Joyner, 329 N.C. 211, 215, 404 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1991) (quoting State v. Biggs, 292 N.C. 328, 337, 233 S.E.2d 512, 517 (1977)). \u201cDeliberation\u201d means that the defendant formed the intent to kill in a cool state of blood and not as a result of a violent passion due to sufficient provocation. State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 323, 406 S.E.2d 876, 902 (1991). Premeditation and deliberation usually are not proved by direct evidence but \u201cby actions and circumstances surrounding the killing.\u201d Joyner, 329 N.C. at 215, 404 S.E.2d at 655. Examples are:\n(1) want of provocation on the part of the deceased; (2) the conduct and statements of the defendant before and after the killing; (3) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the course of the occurrence giving rise to the death of the deceased; (4) ill-will or previous difficulty between the parties; (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased has been felled and rendered helpless; and (6) evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner.\nState v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 109-10, 322 S.E.2d 110, 121 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 85 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1985).\nTaken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence tended to show that the victim and defendant, who were drug dealers, appeared at the home of Alisa Rucker, a drug distributor, during the early morning of 15 November 1993. They awakened Donald Rucker. The victim identified himself, stated that the person with him had a gun with which he was going to shoot him, and said he needed to talk to Alisa. After entering the house, the victim approached Alisa and asked her to lie to defendant so he would not think the victim had misappropriated drug money. Alisa refused. Defendant then pulled out his handgun and fired three shots into the victim, who was unarmed. One bullet struck the victim in the back. Two struck him as he attempted to flee. Defendant then apologized to Alisa and left.\nUnder these facts, reasonable jurors could conclude that defendant acted with the purpose to kill the victim and formed the intent to kill before he acted. The victim\u2019s statement to Donald that defendant had a gun and was going to kill him supports .a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Further, his plea to Alisa to lie about the whereabouts of the drug money suggested that he feared he was going to suffer serious harm at the hands of defendant unless she did so. This evidence also supports a finding that defendant must have \u201cformed the intent to kill the victim over some period of time, however short,\u201d before he acted. Finally, defendant\u2019s firing of three shots into the victim, who was unarmed, also supports premeditation and deliberation. The trial corut properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by James P. Erwin, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Thomas H. Eagan for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SHAWN DELAMAR TRUESDALE\nNo. 319A94\n(Filed 5 May 1995)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 155 (NCI4th)\u2014 assignment of error to instructions \u2014 failure to preserve issue for appeal \u2014 waiver\nDefendant failed to preserve for appellate review an issue as to an instruction by the trial court on premeditation where he did not object to the instruction to which he now assigns error. Furthermore, defendant waived his right to appellate review of this issue by failing specifically and distinctly to contend that the court\u2019s instruction constituted plain error. N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4).\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 562 et seq.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 494 (NCI4th)\u2014 instructions \u2014 circumstances showing premeditation and deliberation \u2014 supporting evidence\nThe trial court\u2019s instructions that premeditation and deliberation could be shown by the use of grossly excessive force and by the infliction of lethal wounds after the victim was felled were supported by the evidence where the pathologist\u2019s testimony showed that the unarmed victim had been shot three times, and two eyewitnesses testified that defendant continued to shoot the victim after the first shot as the victim ran away from defendant and into a closet.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 501 et seq.\nHomicide: presumption of deliberation or premeditation from the fact of killing. 86 ALR2d 656.\nHomicide: presumption of deliberation or premeditation from the circumstances attending the killing. 96 ALR2d 1435.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 253 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation\nThe State presented sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support the trial court\u2019s submission of an issue of defendant\u2019s guilt of first-degree murder to the jury where the evidence tended to show that the victim and defendant, who were drug dealers, appeared at the home of a drug distributor during the early morning hours; the victim stated that the person with him had a gun with which he was going to shoot him, and said he needed to talk with the distributor; the victim asked the distributor to lie to defendant so he would not think the victim had misappropriated drug money, but the distributor refused; defendant than pulled out his handgun and fired three shots into the unarmed victim; one bullet struck the victim in the back, and two shots struck him as he attempted to flee. A finding of premeditation and deliberation was supported by the victim\u2019s statement that defendant had a gun and was going to kill him, the victim\u2019s plea to the distributor to lie about the whereabouts of the drug money because he feared serious harm at the hands of defendant unless she did so, and defendant\u2019s firing of three shots into the unarmed victim.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 437 et seq.\nAppeal of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Ross, J., at the 4 April 1994 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, on a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 April 1995.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by James P. Erwin, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nThomas H. Eagan for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0229-01", "first_page_order": 261, "last_page_order": 267 }