{ "id": 790118, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES FREDERICK LEACH", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Leach", "decision_date": "1995-05-05", "docket_number": "No. 399A93", "first_page": "236", "last_page": "242", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "340 N.C. 236" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "18 ALR4th 961", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562950 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 ALR4th 118", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306390 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558515 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570059 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 S.E.2d 461", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559824 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Freeman, 275 N.C. 662, 668, 170 S.E.2d 461, 465 (1969)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2528464 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Freeman, 275 N.C. 662, 668, 170 S.E.2d 461, 465 (1969)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535876 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4759556 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575737 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 S.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556466 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515495 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87-88" }, { "page": "87-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562950 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420-22" }, { "page": "420-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0408-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 676, "char_count": 14593, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.737057567091147e-07, "percentile": 0.7064523839034631 }, "sha256": "558a963ef71a8cb46e5a26551570cd04abde54c40e1cd5605d10945c2763089d", "simhash": "1:376e41a212271e6e", "word_count": 2346 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:34:40.112900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES FREDERICK LEACH" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MITCHELL, Chief Justice.\nDefendant was tried capitally and convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, discharging a firearm into occupied property and assault with a deadly weapon. After a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a life sentence for the murder, and the trial court entered sentence accordingly.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on Sunday, 7 June 1992, Ronald Roseboro, David Rose and defendant James Frederick Leach met at the Luxbury Hotel near Interstate 85 in Charlotte. The three men left the hotel and drove to LeNita Weldon\u2019s apartment in Roseboro\u2019s car. Weldon was Roseboro\u2019s ex-girlfriend and the mother of his daughter.\u2019 Weldon had called Roseboro earlier in the day to discuss putting their daughter in day care. Defendant carried a loaded pistol wrapped in a white towel into Weldon\u2019s home. While the three men were in Weldon\u2019s apartment, Weldon\u2019s current boyfriend, Leonard Livingston, and the victim, Ronald Lumpkin, arrived. Weldon, Livingston and Lumpkin went upstairs. Weldon and Livingston argued about Roseboro being in Weldon\u2019s home.\nRoseboro, Rose and defendant left the apartment after hearing a pistol cock. A short time later, Lumpkin, Weldon and Livingston emerged from the apartment and went to Lumpkin\u2019s car. Livingston and Lumpkin got in the car. Roseboro approached Livingston and spoke to him for a moment before leaving. Roseboro returned to Lumpkin\u2019s car when Livingston opened the passenger door of the car. Defendant, following Roseboro, approached Lumpkin\u2019s car on the driver\u2019s side. Defendant told Livingston that he was there just to make sure everything was \u201ccool.\u201d Livingston turned to see defendant point a gun at him and then pull the gun back toward Lumpkin. Defendant stated that he would \u201cice\u201d Lumpkin right there. Livingston turned away from defendant to locate Roseboro. As he turned, he heard a gunshot. During this entire time, Lumpkin was seated in the driver\u2019s seat of his car, watching the parties converse, with his hands on the steering wheel. Lumpkin never spoke to defendant, and defendant never spoke directly to him.\nAfter hearing the gunshot, Livingston turned back toward Lumpkin. Livingston saw defendant standing next to the car, pulling his gun out of the car window. Lumpkin had been shot in the head. Livingston jumped out of the car and exchanged fire with defendant as defendant ran away. Roseboro and Rose also fled the scene. No one else was hurt.\nAn autopsy revealed powder bums around the entrance of the victim\u2019s wound indicating that the gun had been fired within two or three feet of the victim. The police recovered a .45-caliber bullet from the trunk of a car parked next to the victim\u2019s vehicle. That bullet had been fired from the same gun as the bullet removed from the victim during the autopsy.\nDefendant argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder due to insufficiency of the evidence. On a motion to dismiss, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference. State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1988). We recently defined first-degree murder as follows:\nFirst-degree murder is the unlawful killing \u2014 with malice, premeditation and deliberation \u2014 of another human being. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17 (1993); State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 77, 405 S.E.2d 145, 154 (1991). Premeditation means that defendant formed the specific intent to kill the victim for some length of time, however short, before the actual killing. State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 677, 263 S.E.2d 768, 772 (1980). Deliberation means that defendant carried out the intent to kill in a cool state of blood, \u201cnot under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by lawful or just cause or legal provocation.\u201d State v. Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162, 170, 321 S.E.2d 837, 842-43 (1984).\nState v. Arrington, 336 N.C. 592, 594, 444 S.E.2d 418, 419 (1994).\nThe evidence in the present case tended to show that defendant arrived at Weldon\u2019s home with a loaded gun. He left the home and waited in Roseboro\u2019s car, eventually following Roseboro to the victim\u2019s car. Defendant pointed the gun at Livingston and then at the victim, stating that he would \u201cice\u201d the victim. The evidence showed that the victim in no way provoked the shooting. The bullet that killed Lumpkin was fired from close range. Livingston saw defendant pulling his gun from the car window. Defendant exchanged gunfire with Livingston as he left the scene. This evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, was substantial evidence that defendant committed premeditated and deliberate murder. This assignment of error is without merit.\nIn another assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. It is unnecessary to decide whether the evidence supported a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Assuming arguendo it was error not to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, a review of the possible verdicts submitted to the jury and the jury\u2019s ultimate verdict reveals that such error was harmless. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find defendant (1) guilty of first-degree murder, based either on the theory of premeditation and deliberation or the theory of felony murder; (2) guilty of second-degree murder; or (3) not guilty. The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder on both theories submitted. This Court, addressing the identical argument presented by defendant, has said:\n\u201cA verdict of murder in the first degree shows clearly that the jurors were not coerced, for they had the right to convict in the second degree. That they did not indicates their certainty of his guilt of the greater offense. The failure to instruct that they could convict of manslaughter therefore could not have harmed the defendant.\u201d\nState v. Shoemaker, 334 N.C. 252, 271, 432 S.E.2d 314, 324 (1993) (quoting State v. Freeman, 275 N.C. 662, 668, 170 S.E.2d 461, 465 (1969)). Thus, even if it was error to fail to instruct the jury in this case regarding voluntary manslaughter, such error was harmless.\nIn another assignment of error, defendant notes that he asked the trial court to give an instruction regarding the credibility of Livingston and Roseboro in light of evidence that they were his accomplices. On appeal, defendant properly concedes that on the evidence presented, Livingston and Roseboro did not fall within the definition of \u201caccomplices\u201d and that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury regarding accomplice testimony. Nevertheless, defendant argues that his request should have alerted the trial court that Livingston and Roseboro were interested parties and that the trial court should have instructed the jury concerning testimony of interested parties. Defendant contends that such an instruction was warranted because Livingston and Roseboro had not been charged for any crime related to the shooting of Ronald Lumpkin. Therefore, he concludes, it was in their best interests to testify in a manner favorable to the State so they would not be charged.\nThe idea that defendant\u2019s request for an instruction regarding testimony by accomplices encompassed a request that the trial court also instruct the jury on the credibility of interested witnesses is not supported by the record. The transcript clearly shows that the colloquy between defense counsel and the trial court concerning defendant\u2019s request for an instruction on accomplice testimony could in no way be construed to include a request for an instruction on the testimony of interested witnesses. Thus, defendant essentially argues that the trial court should have, sua sponte, instructed the jury on the credibility of interested witnesses. The law is otherwise; \u201can instruction as to the credibility of an interested witness relates to a subordinate feature of the case and the court is not required to charge thereon absent a request.\u201d State v. Eakins, 292 N.C. 445, 447, 233 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1977). As defendant did not request such an instruction in the present case, this assignment of error is without merit.\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that when deciding whether the killing was done with premeditation and deliberation, it could consider whether (1) the defendant used grossly excessive force, or (2) the circumstances of the murder were brutal or vicious. Defendant argues that neither of those circumstances was supported by the evidence and that the prejudice he suffered due to the trial court\u2019s instruction entitles him to a new trial. See State v. Buchanan, 287 N.C. 408, 420-22, 215 S.E.2d 80, 87-88 (1975).\nThe trial court instructed the jury on premeditation and deliberation as follows:\nNeither premeditation or deliberation is usually susceptible of direct proof. They may be proved by proof of a circumstance from which they may be inferred such as a lack of provocation by the Victim; conduct of the Defendant before, during and after the killing; threats and declarations of the defendant; use of grossly excessive force or vicious circumstances of the killing or the manner or means by which the killing was done.\nThis instruction is based upon the North Carolina Pattern Instructions. N.C.P.I.\u2014Crim. 206.10 (1989). This Court said in State v. Weathers, 339 N.C. 441, 451 S.E.2d 266 (1994), that \u201c \u2018[t]he elements listed [in this pattern jury instruction] are merely examples of circumstances which, if found, the jury could use to infer premeditation and deliberation. It is not required that each of the listed elements be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury may infer premeditation and deliberation.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 454, 451 S.E.2d at 273 (quoting State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 315, 389 S.E.2d 66, 76 (1990)).\nThe instruction in question informs a jury that the circumstances given are only illustrative; they are merely examples of some circumstances which, if shown to exist, permit premeditation and deliberation to be inferred. The instruction tells jurors that they \u201cmay\u201d find premeditation and deliberation from certain circumstances, \u201csuch as\u201d the circumstances listed. The instruction does not preclude a jury from finding premeditation and deliberation from direct evidence or other circumstances; more importantly, it does not indicate to the jury that the trial court is of the opinion that evidence exists which would support each or any of the circumstances listed. Therefore, the trial court did not err by giving the instruction at issue here, even in the absence of evidence to support each of the circumstances listed. Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error. To the extent that State v. Buchanan, 287 N.C. 408, 420-22, 215 S.E.2d 80, 87-88, may be construed to be inconsistent with our holding on this issue, it is disapproved.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "MITCHELL, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John G. Barnwell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Harry C. Martin, J. Matthew Martin, and John A. Martin, for the defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES FREDERICK LEACH\nNo. 399A93\n(Filed 5 May 1995)\n1. Homicide \u00a7 232 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 premeditation and deliberation \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction of first-degree murder based upon premeditation and deliberation where it tended to show that defendant had a loaded gun when he and two other men went to the home of Weldon, the ex-girlfriend of one of his companions; defendant left the home, waited in his companion\u2019s car, and eventually followed the companion to the victim\u2019s car, which was also occupied by Weldon\u2019s current boyfriend; defendant pointed a gun at Weldon\u2019s current boyfriend and then at the victim, stating that he would \u201cice\u201d the victim; defendant then fired a shot into the victim\u2019s head at close range; the victim in no way provoked the shooting; Weldon\u2019s current boyfriend saw defendant pull his gun from the car window; and defendant then exchanged gunfire with the current boyfriend.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 425 et seq.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 706 (NCI4th)\u2014 failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter \u2014 error cured by first-degree murder verdict\nAssuming that the trial court\u2019s failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter was error, such error was harmless where the court instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 527 et seq.\nModern status of law regarding cure of error, in instruction as to one offense, by conviction of a higher or lesser offense. 15 ALR4th 118.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 818 (NCI4th)\u2014 interested witness instruction \u2014 necessity for request\nDefendant\u2019s request for an instruction on accomplice testimony could not be construed as including a request for an instruction on the testimony of interested witnesses, and the trial court was not required to instruct on the credibility of interested witnesses absent a request by defendant.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1406 et seq.\n4. Homicide \u00a7 489 (NCI4th)\u2014 instructions \u2014 circumstances showing premeditation and deliberation \u2014 supporting evidence unnecessary\nThe trial court did not err by instructing the jury that it \u201cmay\u201d find premeditation and deliberation from certain circumstances, \u201csuch as\u201d circumstances listed by the court, even in the absence of evidence to support each of the circumstances listed, since the instruction did not preclude the jury from finding premeditation and deliberation from direct evidence or other circumstances, and it did not indicate to the jury that the trial court was of the opinion that evidence existed which would support each or any of the circumstances listed. The decision of State v. Buchanan, 287 N.C. 408, 215 S.E.2d 80 is disapproved to the extent that it may be construed to be inconsistent with this holding.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 501.\nModern status of the rules requiring malice \u201caforethought,\u201d \u201cdeliberation,\u201d or \u201cpremeditation,\u201d as elements of murder in the first degree. 18 ALR4th 961.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Gaines, J., at the 25 January 1993 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 16 February 1995.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John G. Barnwell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nHarry C. Martin, J. Matthew Martin, and John A. Martin, for the defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0236-01", "first_page_order": 268, "last_page_order": 274 }