{ "id": 790163, "name": "NAEGELE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING INC., d/b/a Naegele Outdoor Advertising Company of the Triad v. CITY OF WINSTON-SALEM", "name_abbreviation": "Naegele Outdoor Advertising Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem", "decision_date": "1995-06-02", "docket_number": "No. 158A94", "first_page": "349", "last_page": "351", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "340 N.C. 349" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 758", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524541 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 L. Ed. 2d 593", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 931", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11757093, 11757158, 11756798, 11756914, 11756850, 11757237, 11757308, 11756990 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0931-05", "/us/504/0931-06", "/us/504/0931-01", "/us/504/0931-03", "/us/504/0931-02", "/us/504/0931-07", "/us/504/0931-08", "/us/504/0931-04" ] }, { "cite": "947 F.2d 1158", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10525307 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/947/1158-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551889, 2549546, 2549156 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0807-03", "/nc/337/0807-02", "/nc/337/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552615 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0150-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 331, "char_count": 5237, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.2517320620208356e-08, "percentile": 0.2692583621670607 }, "sha256": "e8e23fc0c3268fc23ab924780e436d1d06e9804c67a2108e041f7c07bbfc328d", "simhash": "1:ee55f576073da738", "word_count": 837 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:34:40.112900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NAEGELE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING INC., d/b/a Naegele Outdoor Advertising Company of the Triad v. CITY OF WINSTON-SALEM" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PER CURIAM.\nOn 15 April 1985 the Winston-Salem Board of Aldermen adopted a zoning ordinance regulating signs. The part of the ordinance which is the subject of this appeal is the portion dealing with \u201coff-premise grounded signs,\u201d defined in the ordinance by reference to size, zones, height, spacing, setback, distance from residential zones, number of faces, measurement, illumination, and view corridors. All signs not in compliance with this portion of the ordinance were required to be removed or brought into compliance within a seven-year amortization period from the date the ordinance was adopted.\nBy letters dated 22 November 1991 and 22 April 1992, plaintiff was notified to remove its nonconforming signs. Criminal sanctions were threatened for noncompliance with the zoning ordinance. On 11 May 1992 plaintiff filed this action against defendant seeking damages arising out of the enactment of this zoning ordinance regulating signs within the City of Winston-Salem. On defendant\u2019s motion pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), the trial court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s action for the reason that it was time-barred by the statute of limitations. On 1 March 1994 a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. On 24 March 1994 plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with this Court.\nPlaintiff contends that its cause of action did not arise until 15 April 1992, the end of the amortization period when the signs were required to be removed, and that the statute of limitations began to run on that date. We disagree.\nIn light of this Court\u2019s holding in Capital Outdoor Advertising v. City of Raleigh, 337 N.C. 150, 446 S.E.2d 289, reh\u2019g denied, 337 N.C. 807, 449 S.E.2d 566 (1994), applying National Advertising Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931, 118 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1992), we conclude that plaintiff\u2019s cause of action based on an alleged regulatory taking accomplished by enactment of the Winston-Salem zoning ordinance arose on 15 April 1985, the date the zoning ordinance at issue was enacted. Capital Outdoor Advertising v. City of Raleigh and National Advertising Co. v. City of Raleigh were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and not pursuant to state law. However, assuming without deciding that the zoning ordinance constituted a taking, we conclude the holding of those cases, that a cause of action for an alleged regulatory taking pursuant to a zoning ordinance accrues upon the enactment of the ordinance, is equally applicable to this action alleging a taking and seeking damages for inverse condemnation pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-51. Any injury to plaintiff\u2019s property occurred at the time the statute was enacted. Enactment of the zoning ordinance made plaintiff\u2019s billboards nonconforming, thereby subjecting them to removal after the amortization period of seven years. As of 15 April 1985, the consequences of the existence of nonconforming billboards were conclusively set, and the expected useful life of plaintiff\u2019s billboards was shortened. We also conclude, contrary to plaintiff\u2019s contention, that the sign regulation ordinance was not a project within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-51.\nHaving determined that plaintiff\u2019s cause of action accrued on 15 April 1985, we do not reach the question whether the nine-month statute of limitations found in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-364.1 or the two-year statute of limitations found in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-51 applies. Plaintiff did not file suit until 11 May 1992, over seven years after the enactment of the zoning ordinance at issue. Therefore, regardless of which statute is applied, plaintiff\u2019s action is barred.\nFor the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.", "type": "majority", "author": "PER CURIAM." } ], "attorneys": [ "Smith Helms Mullis & Moore, L.L.P., by William Sam Byassee and J. Donald Hobart, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.", "City Attorney\u2019s Office, by Ronald G. Seeber, City Attorney, and Charles C. Green, Jr., Assistant City Attorney; and Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Roddey M. Lig\u00f3n, Jr., for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NAEGELE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING INC., d/b/a Naegele Outdoor Advertising Company of the Triad v. CITY OF WINSTON-SALEM\nNo. 158A94\n(Filed 2 June 1995)\nLimitations, Repose, and Laches \u00a7 86 (NCI4th); Zoning \u00a7 24 (NCI4th)\u2014 municipal sign ordinance \u2014 inverse condemnation \u2014 accrual of claim\nPlaintiff\u2019s inverse condemnation claim for the taking of its advertising signs by the enforcement of defendant city\u2019s zoning ordinance regulating signs accrued on the date the ordinance was enacted, not at the end of the seven-year amortization period when, the nonconforming signs were required to be removed. Therefore, plaintiff\u2019s claim was barred by the statute of limitations, whether the applicable statute was the nine-month period in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-364.1 or the two-year period in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-51, where it was filed more than seven years after the enactment of the ordinance.\nAm Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning \u00a7\u00a7 322 et seq.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from a divided decision of the Court of Appeals, 113 N.C. App. 758, 440 S.E.2d 842 (1994), affirming the order entered 14 August 1992 by Webb, J., in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Supreme Court 8 May 1995.\nSmith Helms Mullis & Moore, L.L.P., by William Sam Byassee and J. Donald Hobart, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.\nCity Attorney\u2019s Office, by Ronald G. Seeber, City Attorney, and Charles C. Green, Jr., Assistant City Attorney; and Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Roddey M. Lig\u00f3n, Jr., for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0349-01", "first_page_order": 381, "last_page_order": 383 }