{ "id": 793133, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TONY ANTHONY RATLIFF", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Ratliff", "decision_date": "1995-09-08", "docket_number": "No. 273A94", "first_page": "610", "last_page": "619", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "341 N.C. 610" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "764 F.2d 1493", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 378004 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/764/1493-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305171 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4731290 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 S.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misstatements of the law will not be the basis of a new trial unless the defendant shows the error was material and prejudicial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564438 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misstatements of the law will not be the basis of a new trial unless the defendant shows the error was material and prejudicial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563999 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750769 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547740 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517737 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant opened the door where his testimony left a false impression on the jury that could only be cleared up by allowing the State to admit otherwise inadmissible polygraph evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567847 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant opened the door where his testimony left a false impression on the jury that could only be cleared up by allowing the State to admit otherwise inadmissible polygraph evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant opened the door to evidence of prior convictions for violent acts where he presented evidence that tended to show that he was level headed and that victim was violent" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508466 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant opened the door to evidence of prior convictions for violent acts where he presented evidence that tended to show that he was level headed and that victim was violent" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 883", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2527119 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571816 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0173-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 861, "char_count": 20317, "ocr_confidence": 0.714, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.051120833548901e-07, "percentile": 0.5540135737643391 }, "sha256": "a157a094f2c1e17847cd3d2b17cffd0ebf619d0b126170e71d26fab47879e7d4", "simhash": "1:8b775d3635209230", "word_count": 3299 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:14:42.837437+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TONY ANTHONY RATLIFF" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nIn a capital trial, defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. Following a capital sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000, the jury recommended and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction. Defendant was also sentenced to life imprisonment for the first-degree burglary conviction.\nDefendant appeals to this Court making four assignments of error. We reject these assignments of error and uphold defendant\u2019s convictions for first-degree murder and first-degree burglary.\nThe State\u2019s evidence presented at trial tended to show the following facts and circumstances: Sharlene Wilson and the defendant, Tony Anthony Ratliff, were \u201cboyfriend and girlfriend\u201d for ten or eleven years. During this time, they lived together and had three children. Wilson and the children, as well as the defendant at one time, lived in a two-story apartment. During the time Wilson was involved with defendant, he was \u201csomewhat\u201d jealous. Wilson ended the relationship with defendant in April of 1992, after defendant shot her three times in the back. Wilson did not know why defendant shot her. She pressed charges against defendant for the shooting, and he served three months in jail for felonious assault.\nOn 9 October 1992, Wilson had another violent encounter with defendant. Wilson had been dressing in an upstairs bedroom. When she came downstairs, defendant hit her over the head with a glass vase. Wilson did not know that defendant was downstairs in the apartment at the time. After hitting her, defendant used a piece of the broken vase to cut Wilson. Her wounds to the head and neck required medical attention. Defendant told Wilson that he was \u201cgoing to kill [the victim], too.\u201d Wilson pressed charges, and warrants were issued for defendant\u2019s arrest.\nOn 11 October 1992, Billy Ashford (Wilson\u2019s new boyfriend and the victim in this case), Wilson, her brother, and her children spent the day together. Wilson, her brother, and Ashford drank wine, beer, and liquor into the late evening. Shortly after midnight, Wilson and Ashford decided to go to bed. Ashford went upstairs while Wilson checked the downstairs windows and doors. Wilson ascertained that all the windows and doors were locked except for one window in the living room, which had a broken lock. Also present in the apartment was Wilson\u2019s brother, who had passed out on the couch, and the children, who were in their upstairs bedrooms.\nWilson was awakened later that night by noises in her bedroom. She saw Ashford on the floor and defendant standing in the bedroom holding two knives. Defendant came over to the bed and told Wilson to get up. After allowing Wilson to use the bathroom, defendant directed her downstairs and told her not to make any noise. They sat in the kitchen for fifteen to thirty minutes, and Wilson saw defendant put one of the knives away. Wilson asked if she could call an ambulance, and defendant told her \u201cno,\u201d that he was \u201cgoing to make sure he\u2019s dead.\u201d Wilson noticed that the other knife appeared to be a butcher knife from her kitchen. During the time they waited, defendant said, \u201cI told you I was going to kill him, didn\u2019t I?\u201d Defendant left through the front door, and Wilson woke her brother. While Wilson called the police, her brother went upstairs to check on Ashford and ascertained that he was dead. The police arrived approximately ten minutes later.\nWhen Wilson gave a statement to the police, she stated that defendant did not have a key to the apartment and that she did not give defendant permission to enter her apartment that evening. She added that the curtain over the downstairs window was rearranged after the incident. A pathologist later determined that the victim had three stab wounds and multiple abrasions. All three stab wounds were in the chest area and had been inflicted by a knife. The victim bled to death as a result of these wounds.\nLater, on the morning of 12 October 1992, defendant called the police and turned himself in. Defendant waived his rights to remain silent and to an attorney and gave a statement to the police in which he admitted killing the victim. At trial, the only contested issue was whether defendant had the requisite intent for first-degree murder.\nDefendant did not testify. However, he presented evidence at trial that he had seen his sister the morning of the killings, after the police had come to her house looking for him, and that she had encouraged him to turn himself in. Defendant also presented evidence that he was functioning within the mildly mentally retarded range and that he was very upset over the recent death of one brother from AIDS and the hospitalization of another brother who was also diagnosed with AIDS.\nAs his first assignment of error, defendant argues that it was prejudicial error to allow the State to present an out-of-court statement made by Sharlene Wilson. We disagree.\nDuring presentation of the State\u2019s case, Wilson testified that on 9 October 1992, defendant entered her apartment and struck her in the head with a vase as she descended her stairs. She added that defendant stated that he was \u201cgoing to kill him, too,\u201d referring to Billy Ashford. The State offered this evidence to show premeditation and deliberation. The State then attempted to enter into evidence a conversation between Wilson and police detective Kim Soban for the purpose of corroborating this evidence. Defendant objected, arguing that the statement contained additional information that Wilson had not testified about and, therefore, that some of the statement was not corroborative. The trial court sustained the objection and excluded the statement.\nOn cross-examination of Detective Soban, defendant sought to introduce a portion of the statement into evidence for the purpose of impeaching Wilson\u2019s testimony that defendant told her that he was going to kill Ashford. The testimony was as follows:\nQ. (Mr. Wannamaker, defense counsel) Detective Soban, on page 9, during the course of discussions with him [sic], you said the following words \u2014 excuse me, to Sharlene \u2014 starting here where I\u2019ve marked and to the middle of the page: Tony (defendant) never threatened him (the victim) in your presence or that you\u2014 then the sentence does not end, and Sharlene responded no, not in my presence\u2014\nA. (Soban) That\u2019s correct.\nQ. \u2014is that correct?\nA. Yes.\nMr. Wannamaker: Nothing further.\nThe State then sought to have the entire statement placed into evidence, arguing that defendant\u2019s counsel had selectively read only a portion of the sentence and that the State should be entitled to admit the whole statement to show that Wilson\u2019s words had been taken out of context. The trial court agreed with the State, thereby overruling defendant\u2019s objection and allowing the following exchange to take place.\nQ. [Mr. Lyle, prosecutor:] Detective Soban, what was the first part of that?\nA. I said, did he \u2014 had\u2014so Billy (the victim) told you that Tony (the defendant) had threatened him but Tony never threatened him in your presence.\nDefendant contends that the comments of Detective Soban are double hearsay and do not fall within the hearsay exceptions. As such, defendant contends the comments are inadmissible. Even assuming arguendo that the comments are hearsay, they are nonetheless admissible.\nThis Court has held that \u201c[w]here one party introduces evidence as to a particular fact or transaction, the other party is entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though such later evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant if it had been offered initially.\u201d State v. Albert, 303 N.C. 173, 177, 277 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1981).\nIn State v. Rose, 335 N.C. 301, 439 S.E.2d 518, cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 129 L. Ed. 2d 883 (1994), the defendant was on trial for murder and had previously been convicted of attempted rape. On direct examination of the defendant, defendant\u2019s counsel selectively read those portions of the trial transcript that were misleading and created inferences favorable to the defendant. This Court held that it was not error to allow the prosecutor to present additional portions of the transcript, including details of the attempted rape, to clear up any misleading information. Id. at 335-38, 439 S.E.2d at 538; see also State v. Garner, 330 N.C. 273, 410 S.E.2d 861 (1991) (defendant opened the door to evidence of prior convictions for violent acts where he presented evidence that tended to show that he was level headed and that victim was violent); State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980) (defendant opened the door where his testimony left a false impression on the jury that could only be cleared up by allowing the State to admit otherwise inadmissible polygraph evidence).\nIn this case, defendant questioned the witness about only a portion of the sentence in the statement. From the part that was read aloud, the jury could infer that Wilson had made inconsistent statements, an inference that would be favorable to defendant. A full reading of the sentence, however, suggests an alternative interpretation of Wilson\u2019s answer and shows that her response was consistent with her testimony at trial. As such, the trial court did not err in admitting the remaining portion of the out-of-court statement.\nAs defendant\u2019s second assignment of error, he argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing the State to make an incorrect statement of law in closing arguments. While we agree that the trial court erred in overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s arguments, we find that the error was not prejudicial.\nUpon his arrest, defendant made a statement to the police. This statement was not introduced at trial. Defendant\u2019s counsel argued in closing argument that the State\u2019s failure to proffer the statement strongly suggested that the evidence was not presented because it would show defendant did not have the requisite intent for first-degree murder. Defendant now assigns error to a portion of the State\u2019s closing argument. The prosecutor argued as follows:\nNow, on the other hand, what they didn\u2019t say was, if it showed, if his statement was so damaging to the State and showed that it was second-degree or less, why didn\u2019t they put it on for him?\nMr. Bryson: (defense counsel): Object.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nMr. Lyle (prosecutor): Why didn\u2019t they have this officer come up here and read the statement? You ever think of that?\nMr. Bryson: Object.\nDefendant contends that the State was making an improper statement of the law. We agree. Defendant\u2019s statement to the police was a self-serving declaration, and it could not be admitted into evidence if offered by defendant. State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 367 S.E.2d 895 (1988). Incorrect statements of law in closing arguments are improper, and upon defendant\u2019s objection, the trial judge should have instructed the jury that the State\u2019s argument was improper. The trial court\u2019s failure to sustain defendant\u2019s objection and instruct the jury to disregard the statement was error. State v. Beach, 333 N.C. 733, 430 S.E.2d 248 (1993).\nDefendant contends that the prosecutor\u2019s misstatement was so closely connected to defendant\u2019s right not to testify that this error violated his constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. Accordingly, defendant argues that this Court must determine whether this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.\nThe Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids comment by the prosecutor on the defendant\u2019s failure to testify. See State v. Randolph, 312 N.C. 198, 205, 321 S.E.2d 864, 869 (1984). This right is also protected under Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. State v. Castor, 285 N.C. 286, 291, 204 S.E.2d 848, 852 (1974). In the instant case, the prosecutor was directly responding to the argument made by defendant relating to a specific piece of evidence. The argument did not relate to whether defendant himself sought to testify. As such, it simply constituted a misstatement regarding the parties\u2019 relative rights to introduce the statement, not a comment on defendant\u2019s failure to testify.\nBecause the error does not rise to the level of a violation of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights, this Court need not examine the error under a \u201charmless beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d standard. Instead, in order to award defendant a new trial, we must find that\nthere is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial.... The burden of showing such prejudice ... is upon the defendant.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1988); see also State v. Harris, 290 N.C. 681, 228 S.E.2d 437 (1976) (holding that prosecutorial misstatements of the law will not be the basis of a new trial unless the defendant shows the error was material and prejudicial).\nThe State contends that to the extent that the prosecutor\u2019s argument misstated the law, there is no reasonable possibility, in light of the overwhelming evidence showing defendant\u2019s guilt of first-degree murder, that had the argument not been made the jury would have acquitted defendant of the crime of first-degree murder. We agree.\nThe State presented substantial evidence that defendant had the intent necessary for first-degree murder. First, defendant made three damaging comments to Wilson. Three days prior to the murder, he stated his intent to kill the victim. The night of the murder, he would not let Wilson call an ambulance, stating that he wanted to make sure the victim was dead. Defendant also reminded Wilson on the night of the murder that he had stated earlier that he would kill the victim. The circumstances of the crime also strongly suggest premeditation. Defendant entered Wilson\u2019s apartment through a broken window, went to the kitchen and got a knife, and then proceeded upstairs, where he attacked the victim as he slept. Also, the prosecutor\u2019s misstatement went to a minor evidentiary issue in the case and not to the truth or falsity of any evidence in the case or the validity of the law under which defendant was being prosecuted. The combination of the overwhelming evidence against defendant and the nature of the error leads this Court to conclude there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome in this case. Thus, we find the error nonprejudicial.\nDefendant\u2019s third and fourth assignments of error relate to defendant\u2019s April 1992 assault of Wilson. Defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing the State to introduce evidence that defendant had previously shot Sharlene Wilson, as well as by allowing the State to present evidence of defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence arising out of the shooting of Wilson. Defendant argues that the evidence was inadmissible because it could have only been used as character evidence. We disagree.\nEvidence of another offense or prior bad act \u201cis admissible so long as it is relevant to show any other fact or issue other than the character of the accused.\u201d State v. Weaver, 318 N.C. 400, 403, 348 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1986). This Court has held that prior bad acts are admissible to show a chain of events. State v. Agee, 326 N.C. 542, 391 S.E.2d 171 (1990). In Agee, we said that\n\u201c[ejvidence, not a part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime, is properly admitted if linked in time and circumstance with the charged crime, or [if it] forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.\u201d\nId. at 548, 391 S.E.2d at 174 (quoting United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985)). In the instant case, defendant killed his ex-girlfriend\u2019s new boyfriend, just three months after their breakup and ten days after defendant\u2019s release from jail for the events surrounding their breakup. The circumstances behind the dissolution of defendant\u2019s relationship with Wilson created a complete picture for the jury. They provided a \u201cbackdrop\u201d for defendant\u2019s jealousy and anger toward Wilson and the victim.\nJust as the facts surrounding the shooting of Wilson were used to show the chain of events that led to this crime, defendant\u2019s subsequent conviction and sentence also illustrate the events preceding the murder of the victim. Thus, we reject defendant\u2019s third and fourth assignments of error.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find no prejudicial error in defendant\u2019s trial.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F Easley, Attorney General, by Mary Jill Ledford, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "John Bryson for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TONY ANTHONY RATLIFF\nNo. 273A94\n(Filed 8 September 1995)\n1. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2904 (NCI4th)\u2014 redirect examination \u2014 hearsay\u2014competency to rebut cross-examination evidence\nWhere a witness testified at trial that defendant had stated that he was going to kill the victim, and defense counsel impeached the witness by questioning a detective about only a portion of a sentence in the witness\u2019s out-of-court statement to the effect that defendant never threatened the victim in her presence, the State was properly allowed to rebut the inference that the witness had made inconsistent statements by having the detective read the entire sentence stating that the victim had told the witness that defendant had threatened him but defendant had never threatened him in her presence, even if such testimony was hearsay.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 675; Witnesses \u00a7 1025.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 465 (NCI4th)\u2014 closing argument \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s misstatement of law \u2014 no comment on defendant\u2019s failure to testify \u2014 harmless error\nIn a homicide prosecution in which defense counsel stated in closing argument that the State\u2019s failure to introduce at trial defendant\u2019s pretrial statement to the police strongly suggested that it would show defendant did not have the requisite intent for first-degree murder, the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument asking why the defense \u201cdidn\u2019t have this officer come up here and read the statement\u201d constituted a misstatement of the law because defendant\u2019s statement to the police was a self-serving declaration that was inadmissible when offered by defendant, and the trial court erred by failing to sustain defendant\u2019s objection and instruct the jury to disregard the statement. This misstatement did not constitute a comment on defendant\u2019s failure to testify and thus did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights so that the \u201charmless beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d standard for judging prejudicial error did not apply. The combination of the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt of first-degree murder and the fact that the misstatement concerned a minor evidentiary issue in the case lead to the conclusion that there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial and that it was not prejudicial.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 463; Trial \u00a7\u00a7 564, 611.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 364 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder of ex-girlfriend\u2019s boyfriend \u2014 prior shooting of ex-girlfriend\u2014 admissibility to show chain of events\nEvidence of defendant\u2019s shooting of his former girlfriend at the time of their breakup and his conviction and sentence arising out of that shooting was admissible to show the chain of events that led to defendant\u2019s murder of his former girlfriend\u2019s new boyfriend just three months after their breakup and ten days after defendant\u2019s release from jail for the events surrounding their breakup.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 341, 342, 435, 437; Federal Rules of Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 93, 119; Trial \u00a7 526.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing life imprisonment entered by Cornelius, J., at the 4 October 1993 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Guilford County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to an additional judgment imposed for first-degree burglary was allowed 17 June 1994. Heard in the Supreme Court 10 April 1995.\nMichael F Easley, Attorney General, by Mary Jill Ledford, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nJohn Bryson for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0610-01", "first_page_order": 644, "last_page_order": 653 }