{ "id": 793198, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRIAN DESMOND WORTHY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Worthy", "decision_date": "1995-10-06", "docket_number": "No. 618A94", "first_page": "707", "last_page": "712", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "341 N.C. 707" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "88 ALR4th 209", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4728091 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 650", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535633 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 L. Ed. 2d 1031", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 1189", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6541568, 6541613, 6541774, 6541520 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/1189-02", "/us/459/1189-03", "/us/459/1189-04", "/us/459/1189-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 L. Ed. 2d 622", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 1056", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6487664, 6487779 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/1056-01", "/us/459/1056-02" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567373 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538239 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569066 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778236 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505926 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0047-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 641, "char_count": 11820, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.652978107708385e-08, "percentile": 0.5280545313645699 }, "sha256": "d9ed5093f1174e8f10df078ffabaf52643c04926764e2bcb5302786b874bb9b1", "simhash": "1:2f59453294111609", "word_count": 1914 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:14:42.837437+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRIAN DESMOND WORTHY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LAKE, Justice.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that during the early morning hours of 5 August 1993, defendant shot and killed Robert Alan Burns. Two of defendant\u2019s friends, seventeen-year-old Brian Carroll and ten-year-old Darius Phillips, witnessed the murder. During the evening of 4 August 1993, defendant was selling crack cocaine from the yard of Brian Carroll\u2019s grandmother\u2019s house. According to Phillips, two white customers took cocaine from defendant and drove off without paying for it. After selling his drugs, defendant asked Carroll and Phillips if they wanted to ride around in defendant\u2019s Malibu. The two agreed. Defendant drove, and during the ride, defendant told Carroll and Phillips he was going to kill a white person. While driving on Franklin Boulevard, the group spotted two white males walking down the road. Defendant said he was going to \u201cget them,\u201d but then realized a policeman was behind the car.\nThe trio continued to drive and eventually encountered the victim, Robert Burns, a young white male who was riding a bicycle. Defendant pulled his Chevrolet into a parking lot beside a launderette and asked the victim for directions to Camelot Apartments. The victim gave defendant the correct directions. Defendant drove down the road but then turned around and drove back up to Burns, stopped the car so the victim\u2019s bicycle was beside the driver\u2019s window, and according to witness Carroll, said, \u201cThat wasn\u2019t the right directions.\u201d Defendant pulled out a nine-millimeter handgun, and the victim said, \u201cOh, no.\u201d Defendant pulled the trigger, shooting the victim once in the chest, and then drove away. According to Phillips, defendant said, \u201cGuess what,\u201d to Bums before shooting him.\nThe victim dropped his bicycle in the road and ran to a nearby house where he collapsed and died on the porch.\nThe defendant presented evidence and elected to testify on his own behalf. According to defendant, it was Brian Carroll who urged defendant to shoot the victim. Defendant could not remember what he asked the victim concerning Camelot Apartments, but he did remember Brian Carroll saying, \u201cWhy didn\u2019t you shoot him?\u201d as they drove away. When they returned to the victim, defendant pulled out the handgun, pointed it at the ground, told the victim to run, and shot the handgun. After he shot, he noticed the victim was leaning over. Defendant testified he panicked and drove away, not realizing the victim had been shot. Defendant admitted to selling crack cocaine, but he could not recall being cheated during a \u201csale.\u201d\nIn his sole assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error in overmling defendant\u2019s objection to the State\u2019s closing argument that Darius Phillips had no interest in testifying except concern for his future safety. Defendant contends this argument was unsupported by the evidence and amounted to nothing more than the prosecutor\u2019s personal opinion. Accordingly, defendant argues his right to a fair trial was violated. We do not agree.\nIt is well settled that arguments of counsel rest within the control and discretion of the presiding trial judge. State v. Soyars, 332 N.C. 47, 418 S.E.2d 480 (1992); State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 346 S.E.2d 405 (1986). In the argument of hotly contested cases, counsel is granted wide latitude. Williams, 317 N.C. at 481, 346 S.E.2d at 410. While it is not proper for counsel to \u201ctravel outside the record\u201d and inject his or her personal beliefs or other facts not contained within the record into jury arguments, or place before the jury incompetent or prejudicial matters, counsel may properly argue all the facts in evidence as well as any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 212 S.E.2d 125 (1975).\nAdditionally, as this Court has previously pointed out, \u201cfor an inappropriate prosecutorial comment to justify a new trial, it \u2018must be sufficiently grave that it is prejudicial error.\u2019 \u201d In order to reach the level of \u201cprejudicial error\u201d in this regard, it now is well established that the prosecutor\u2019s comments must have \u201cso infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.\u201d\nState v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 186, 443 S.E.2d 14, 40 (citations omitted), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994). Moreover, \u201cprosecutorial statements are not placed in an isolated vacuum on appeal.\u201d State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 24, 292 S.E.2d 203, 221, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056, 74 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1982), reh\u2019g denied, 459 U.S. 1189, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1031 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988), and by State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306 (1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995).\nDefendant contends that the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument was based upon a mischaracterization of the following portion of Darius Phillips\u2019 testimony on direct examination:\nQ. Why was it that you didn\u2019t tell the police officers earlier about what had happened?\nA. I was. My mama was going to take me, but we forgot.\nQ. Were you scared?\nA. Not really.\nViewed in context, we do not believe the prosecutor\u2019s argument was improper. The prosecutor argued, in part:\nBut you\u2019ve got to look and see what the interest of the person has in the outcome of the case . . . and whether or not that interest is such that [it] would [influence their testimony.\nAnd what interest do you think Darius Phillips has got in the outcome of this case other than his thoughts of his possible future safety there.\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection to that also, your Honor.\nThe Court: Just a minute. Objection is overruled.\n[The Prosecutor]: And what interest do you think Brian Carroll\u2019s got in the outcome of this case? I\u2019ll tell you the person that\u2019s got an interest [in] this case is Brian Worthy.\nFirst, we do not subscribe to defendant\u2019s interpretation that the prosecutor mischaracterized Phillips\u2019 testimony when the prosecutor argued that Phillips\u2019 only interest in testifying was perhaps a concern for his personal safety. Defendant would have us read the testimony to mean that Phillips was \u201cnot really\u201d afraid of testifying at trial, and thus the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument, that Phillips\u2019 only interest in testifying was his concern for his future personal safety, twisted and mischaracterized the evidence of the case. We do not accept this interpretation and instead read Phillips\u2019 testimony in the context of the line of questioning which produced the response, i.e., whether Phillips was afraid of talking to the police. Thus, Phillips\u2019 answer \u201cnot really\u201d meant he was \u201cnot really\u201d afraid to talk with the police, rather than he was \u201cnot really\u201d afraid of testifying against defendant.\nFurther, we cannot agree that, as contended by defendant, the record is devoid of any evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that Darius Phillips had thoughts concerning his future safety. We note in this regard that Phillips testified that prior to the murder, he had intended to spend the night with defendant. However, after witnessing defendant shoot a man in the manner he described, Phillips decided to go home to his mother instead. Based upon this evidence, it is certainly a reasonable inference that Phillips, who at the time of trial was eleven years old, was afraid of the prospects of facing defendant and giving testimony against him. This would hardly be an uncommon emotion for any witness to such a sight, regardless of his or her age. Thus, there was no mischaracterization of testimony when the prosecutor argued that Phillips had no interest in testifying other than concerns for his future safety.\nAdditionally, during defendant\u2019s closing argument, he attacked the credibility of Phillips as a State\u2019s eyewitness. Defendant reminded the jury that when Phillips testified, he denied talking with the police even though he had. Defendant reminded the jury that Phillips claimed he told his mother about the shooting, but she did not believe him. Defendant rhetorically asked the jury why the State had not called Phillips\u2019 mother as a witness if Phillips really had told her about the shooting.\n\u201c[C]ounsel is allowed to respond to arguments made by defense counsel and restore the credibility of a witness who has been attacked in defendant\u2019s closing argument.\u201d State v. Perdue, 320 N.C. 51, 62, 357 S.E.2d 345, 352 (1987). The prosecutor\u2019s argument simply sought to shore-up Darius Phillips\u2019 credibility in the eyes of the jury after his credibility had been attacked. In context, the argument pointed out to the jury that in deciding a witness\u2019 credibility, it is important to consider why a witness might be motivated to testify in a certain way. The prosecutor simply told the jury that Phillips had no ulterior motive or hidden agenda for testifying against defendant, thus inferring to the jury that it had no reason to disbelieve Phillips\u2019 testimony. The prosecutor then contrasted Phillips\u2019 lack of motivation to fabricate testimony with defendant\u2019s, who was faced with a first-degree murder charge and so had strong reason to fabricate testimony. Accordingly, as its full context reveals, the prosecutor\u2019s argument did not mischaracterize the testimony at trial. Rather, the argument was but a common and proper argument attempting to bolster a witness\u2019 attacked credibility.\nFurthermore, even if the prosecutor\u2019s argument could, in some way, be construed as improper, defendant fails to demonstrate any prejudice. Two eyewitnesses testified defendant shot an innocent stranger and then left the scene. Only a short while earlier, defendant told both eyewitnesses he wanted to shoot a white person. His own testimony shows he was the shooter. We thus conclude that in view of the overwhelming evidence against defendant, any possible impropriety in the remark of the prosecutor was not sufficiently grave to amount to prejudicial error. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFor the reasons stated herein, we conclude defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "LAKE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by R. Kendrick Cleveland, Associate Attorney General, for the State.", "James A. Jackson, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRIAN DESMOND WORTHY\nNo. 618A94\n(Filed 6 October 1995)\nCriminal Law \u00a7 439 (NCI4th)\u2014 closing argument \u2014 interest of witness in testifying \u2014 no mischaracterization of evidence\nThe prosecutor\u2019s closing argument in a first-degree murder trial that an eleven-year-old State\u2019s witness had no interest in testifying except his concern for his future safety was not a mischaxacterization of the evidence or a personal opinion and was supported by the evidence where the witness\u2019s answer that he was \u201cnot really\u201d afraid referred to talking to the police rather than to testifying against defendant; a reasonable inference that the witness was afraid of facing defendant and testifying against him could be drawn from his testimony that he had intended to spend the night with defendant, but after witnessing defendant shoot the victim, he decided to go home to his mother; and the argument simply sought to restore the credibility of the witness after his credibility had been attacked during closing argument by defense counsel.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 692 et seq.\nPropriety and prejudicial effect of counsel\u2019s negative characterization or description of witness during summation of criminal trial \u2014 modern cases. 88 ALR4th 209.\nAppeal as of right by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Lamm, J., at the 4 August 1994 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Gaston County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 September 1995.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by R. Kendrick Cleveland, Associate Attorney General, for the State.\nJames A. Jackson, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0707-01", "first_page_order": 741, "last_page_order": 746 }