{ "id": 795986, "name": "CUSTOM MOLDERS, INC. v. AMERICAN YARD PRODUCTS, INC., formerly known as ROPER CORPORATION", "name_abbreviation": "Custom Molders, Inc. v. American Yard Products, Inc.", "decision_date": "1995-11-03", "docket_number": "No. 326PA94", "first_page": "133", "last_page": "142", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "342 N.C. 133" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12124284 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521850 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12131711 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4775585, 4775853, 4771860, 4771992, 4775065 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0333-01", "/nc/317/0333-05", "/nc/317/0333-03", "/nc/317/0333-02", "/nc/317/0333-04" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523105 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 S.E.2d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527244 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558770 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575577 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2559053, 2559597, 2556144, 2559347, 2556376 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0736-01", "/nc/339/0736-03", "/nc/339/0736-02", "/nc/339/0736-05", "/nc/339/0736-04" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512423 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 S.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528007 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569642 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575647 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 181", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718547 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4752843 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 369", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12124284 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521850 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0549-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 694, "char_count": 20666, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.730984628506195e-07, "percentile": 0.8311210421920351 }, "sha256": "2f6eb02f0eea49b3f6075f66362358d0335f0dd3474c41e49caa96c768aab88d", "simhash": "1:aa79e3069647f0b2", "word_count": 3410 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:36:26.105751+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CUSTOM MOLDERS, INC. v. AMERICAN YARD PRODUCTS, INC., formerly known as ROPER CORPORATION" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nThe crucial question in this case is whether a judgment for money damages in an action not based on contract bears postjudgment interest. We hold that it does.\nThere seems to have been no doubt regarding this question prior to the enactment of chapter 327 of the 1981 Session Laws. Prior to that time, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5 provided as follows:\n\u00a724-5. Contracts, except penal bonds, and judgments to bear interest; jury to distinguish principal. \u2014 All sums of money due by contract of any kind, excepting money due on penal bonds, shall bear interest, and when a jury shall render a verdict therefor they shall distinguish the principal from the sum allowed as interest; and the principal sum due on all such contracts shall bear interest from the time of rendering judgment thereon until it is paid and satisfied. In like manner, the amount of any judgment or decree, except the costs, rendered or adjudged in any kind of action, though not on contract, shall bear interest till paid, and the judgment and decree of the Court shall be rendered according to this section.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5 (1965) (emphasis added).\nIn 1981, the statute was amended to provide for prejudgment interest on compensatory damages covered by liability insurance and postverdict interest on compensatory damages not covered by liability insurance. Chapter 327, section 1 of the 1981 Session Laws provided in pertinent part:\nAN ACT TO MANDATE THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST ON MONEY JUDGMENTS AWARDED IN ACTIONS OTHER THAN CONTRACT FROM THE FILING OF CLAIM.\nThe General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:\nSection 1. The second sentence of G.S. 24-5 is rewritten to read:\n\u201cThe portion of all money judgments designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages in actions other than contract shall bear interest from the time the action is instituted until the judgment is paid and satisfied, and the judgment and decree of the court shall be rendered accordingly. The preceding sentence shall apply only to claims covered by liability insurance. Interest on an award in an action other than contract shall be at the legal rate. The portion of all money judgments designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages in actions other than contract which are not covered by liability insurance shall bear interest from the time of the verdict until the judgment is paid and satisfied, and the judgment and decree of the court shall be rendered accordingly.\u201d\nAct of 5 May 1981, ch. 327, sec. 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 369, 369-70. In actions other than contract, this amendment provided for prejudgment interest on damages designated by the fact finder as compensatory, such interest to continue until the judgment is paid and satisfied. In such cases, the compensatory damages covered by liability insurance would bear interest from the date the action was instituted, while those not covered by liability insurance would bear interest from the date of the verdict. Id.\nChapter 327 of the 1981 Session Laws was unsuccessfully challenged in the courts as being unconstitutionally vague, uncertain, and indefinite and as violating fundamental principles by favoring plaintiffs who recover judgments against defendants who were covered by liability insurance. See Lowe v. Tarble, 312 N.C. 467, 323 S.E.2d 19 (1984), aff\u2019d on rehearing, 313 N.C. 460, 329 S.E.2d 648 (1985).\nIn 1985, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) was amended to remove the distinction between noncontract judgments covered by liability insurance and those not covered by liability insurance, and to clarify the law with respect to interest on judgments generally. Chapter 214 of the 1985 Session Laws provides in pertinent part:\nAn ACT TO CLARIFY INTEREST RELATING TO JUDGMENTS AND PROVIDE FOR INTEREST ON NONCONTRACT JUDGMENTS REGARDLESS OF INSURANCE COVERAGE.\nThe General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:\nSection 1. G.S. 24-5 is rewritten to read:\n\u201c\u00a7 24-5. Contracts, except penal bonds, and judgments to bear interest. \u2014 (a) Contracts. In an action for breach of contract\n(b) Other actions. In an action other than contract, the portion of money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest from the date the action is instituted until the judgment is satisfied. Interest on an award in an action other than contract shall be at the legal rate.\u201d\nSec. 2. This act shall become effective October 1, 1985. This act shall not affect pending litigation and shall not affect the law as it existed before the enactment of Chapter 327 of the 1981 Session Laws.\nAct of 21 May 1985, ch. 214, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 181. The 1985 amendment thus removed the distinction between compensatory damages covered by liability insurance and those not covered by liability insurance as it relates to the beginning date for the accrual of interest. Under the 1981 amendment, interest began to accrue on such damages on the date the action was instituted if covered by insurance, while interest began to accrue on such damages on the date the verdict was rendered if not covered by insurance. Under the 1985 amendment, the compensatory damages earn interest from the date the action is instituted whether or not such damages are covered by liability insurance.\nSection 2 of the 1985 amendment provides that the act \u201cshall not affect the law as it existed before the enactment of chapter 327 of the 1981 Session Laws.\u201d Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5 as it existed prior to the enactment of chapter 327 of the 1981 Session Laws, judgments generally, whether in contract or noncontract actions, bore interest from the date of the judgment until the judgment was paid. The distinctions between contract and noncontract actions related to the rate of interest and when prejudgment interest, if any, began to accrue. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5 (1965). Thus, under the law as it existed before the enactment of chapter 327 of the 1981 Session Laws, both contract and noncontract damage awards accrued postjudgment interest until the judgment was paid.\nThe current version of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5, entitled Contracts, except penal bonds, and judgments to bear interest, provides in pertinent part:\n(b) Other Actions. \u2014 In an action other than contract, the portion of money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest from the date the action is instituted until the judgment is satisfied. Interest on an award in an action other than contract shall be at the legal rate.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) (1991). The codifiers of the current statute placed section 2 of chapter 214 of the 1985 Session Laws as an editor\u2019s note to the statute rather than including it as a part of the statute itself. Thus, the Court of Appeals, in the instant case and in Love v. Keith, 95 N.C. App. 549, 383 S.E.2d 674 (1989), gave no effect to section 2 of chapter 214 of the 1985 Session Laws. However, we have held that the statement of a legislative enactment contained in the Session Laws is controlling over the statement codified in the General Statutes. See Schofield v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 299 N.C. 582, 264 S.E.2d 56 (1980); Wright v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 270 N.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 100 (1967). This rule is applicable to the instant case.\nPlaintiff argues that according to Section 2 of Chapter 214 of the 1985 Session Laws, the current language of the statute does not affect the law as it existed before the enactment of chapter 327 of the 1981 Session Laws. The statute prior to the 1981 amendment provided in pertinent part that \u201cthe amount of any judgment ... in any kind of action . . . shall bear interest till paid.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5 (1965). Therefore, plaintiff contends that North Carolina law provides for postjudgment interest on judgments for money damages generally, including a judgment fbr treble damages, until the judgment is paid. We agree.\nTo interpret N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) as the Court of Appeals does in Love v. Keith, 95 N.C. App. 549, 383 S.E.2d 674, and in the instant case gives no effect to section 2 of chapter 214 of the 1985 Session Laws. Reading N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) as a whole, and giving full effect to the provision in section 2 of chapter 214 of the 1985 Session Laws that \u201c[t]his act. . . shall not affect the law as it existed before the enactment of Chapter 327 of the 1981 Session Laws,\u201d we hold that, as stated in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5 as it existed prior to 1981, \u201cthe amount of any judgment or decree, except the costs . . . shall bear interest till paid.\u201d\nWe now review the procedural and substantive history of the case before this Court. On 26 May 1988, in the case of Custom Molders, Inc. v. Roper Corporation, Judge J. Milton Read, Jr., entered a judgment in Superior Court, Durham County, which provided in pertinent part as follows:\nIt is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff Custom Molders, Inc. shall have and recover from the defendant Roper Corporation the sum of $747,048, together with reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees in the amount of $49,000 and interest as provided by law from the date of entry of this judgment.\nTo stay execution of the judgment pending appeal, defendant\u2019s surety, The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, executed and filed a supersedeas bond in the amount of $1,003,020.48. On 19 February 1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment. Custom Molders, Inc. v. Roper Corp., 101 N.C. App. 606, 401 S.E.2d 96 (1991). On 7 November 1991, this Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Custom Molders, Inc. v. Roper Corp., 330 N.C. 191, 410 S.E.2d 55 (1991) (per curiam).\nOn 14 February 1992, defendant tendered payment in the amount of $940,447.53 to the Clerk of Superior Court, Durham County, in satisfaction of the judgment. Defendant calculated this sum as follows:\nJudgment of $249,016 Trebled ............ $747,048.00\nPreappeal Attorneys\u2019 Fees ............... 49,000.00\nPostjudgment Attorneys\u2019 Fees ............ 70,300.00\nPostjudgment Interest on Compensatory Award through 2-14-92 [$54.58 per day] .............. 74,053.53\nCourt Costs ........................... 46.00\nTOTAL ..........................$940,447.53\nThe Clerk of Superior Court designated defendant\u2019s payment as a partial payment of the judgment.\nOn 9 October 1992, plaintiff filed a motion for judgment against defendant\u2019s surety, The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, for the remaining amount owed on plaintiff\u2019s judgment plus additional attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1 in connection with filing the motion against the surety for protecting its judgment. On 16 November 1992, the trial court held a hearing on plaintiff\u2019s motion. By order entered 5 January 1993, the trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion, concluding that plaintiff was not entitled to postjudgment interest on the portion of its judgment not designated by the jury as compensatory damages. The trial court accordingly denied plaintiff\u2019s request for additional attorneys\u2019 fees in connection with its motion against the surety. Plaintiff appealed the denial of its motion to the Court of Appeals.\nThe Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion for postjudgment interest on the portion of its judgment not designated by the jury as compensatory damages and affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s request for attorneys\u2019 fees. Custom Molders, Inc. v. American Yard Products, Inc., 115 N.C. App. 156, 444 S.E.2d 224 (1994). Discretionary review of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision was allowed ex mero motu by this Court on 2 March 1995. Custom Molders, Inc. v. American Yard Products, Inc., 339 N.C. 736, 462 S.E.2d 813 (1995).\nPlaintiff contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion for interest on the treble damages portion of the trial court\u2019s judgment from the date of judgment until paid. Plaintiff bases its argument on an exhaustive review of the legislative history of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5. The Court of Appeals \u201c[did] not find it necessary to examine the statute in such detail because the plain language of G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b), as well as a recent decision of [that] [c]ourt, squarely rebut[s] plaintiff\u2019s argument.\u201d Custom Molders, 115 N.C. App. at 158, 444 S.E.2d at 225.\nThe recent decision referred to by the Court of Appeals is Love v. Keith, 95 N.C. App. 549, 383 S.E.2d 674. In Love, a different panel of the Court of Appeals addressed the application of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) to verdicts trebled pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16 and held:\nThe defendants finally argue the trial judge erred in imposing interest on the portion of the judgment in excess of $3,400. We agree. Since the defendants\u2019 conduct violated N.C.G.S. Sec. 75-1.1 et seq., the trial judge properly trebled the jury\u2019s $3,400 verdict. N.C.G.S. Sec. 75-16. The trial judge then ordered interest on the full $10,200. In this the trial judge erred since N.C.G.S. Sec. 24-5(b) (1986) only provides for interest on compensatory damages as designated by the fact finder. The fact finder here, the jury, specified compensatory damages of only $3,400. The plaintiffs may receive interest only on $3,400, calculated as specified in N.C.G.S. Sec. 24-5(b).\nLove, 95 N.C. App. at 557-58, 383 S.E.2d at 679. We disavow the holding in Love to the extent that it precludes the recovery of postjudgment interest on the full amount of the judgment under the current version of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) and as \u00a7 24-5 existed prior to 1981.\nThe judgment in this case provided that plaintiff \u201cshall have and recover from the defendant. . . $747,048 . . . and interest as provided by law from the date of entry of this judgment.\u201d The Clerk of Court correctly designated defendant\u2019s payment of postjudgment interest on only a portion of the amount of the judgment as a partial payment of the judgment. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court\u2019s reversal of that designation by denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for judgment against defendant\u2019s surety. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue.\nPlaintiff next contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court\u2019s denial of additional attorneys\u2019 fees for pursuing a motion to protect its judgment and for pursuing the present appeal. Plaintiff also contends it is entitled to attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1 in connection with services performed in the present proceedings which were necessary in order to protect plaintiff\u2019s right to postjudgment interest. Plaintiff argues that because defendant refused to pay postjudgment interest on the full amount of its judgment and made only a partial payment on the judgment, plaintiff was compelled to bring forward a motion to protect its judgment.\n\u201cThe general rule in this State is that, in the absence of statutory authority therefor, a court may not include an allowance of attorneys\u2019 fees as part of the costs recoverable by the successful party to an action or proceeding.\u201d In re King, 281 N.C. 533, 540, 189 S.E.2d 158, 162 (1972). \u201cExcept as so provided by statute, attorneys\u2019 fees are not allowable.\u201d Baxter v. Jones, 283 N.C. 327, 330, 196 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1973). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1 provides in pertinent part:\nIn any suit instituted by a person who alleges that the defendant violated G.S. 75-1.1, the presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the prevailing party, such attorney fee to be taxed as a part of the court costs and payable by the losing party, upon a finding by the presiding judge that:\n(1) The party charged with the violation has willfully engaged in the act or practice, and there was an unwarranted refusal by such party to fully resolve the matter which constitutes the basis of such suit; or\n(2) The party instituting the action knew, or should have known, the action was frivolous and malicious.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1 (1983).\nAs the Court of Appeals said in Cotton v. Stanley, 94 N.C. App. 367, 380 S.E.2d 419 (1989), N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1 allows attorneys\u2019 fees for services rendered at all stages of litigation, including appeals. Accordingly, since plaintiff is now the prevailing party in this case, we must reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 holding that plaintiff is not entitled to reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees with regard to pursuing its motion and this appeal.\nWhether to award or deny attorneys\u2019 fees is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Concrete Service Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 678, 688, 340 S.E.2d 755, 761, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346 S.E.2d 137 (1986). Once the trial court decides to award attorneys\u2019 fees, however, it must award a reasonable fee. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1 (1987); Morris v. Bailey, 86 N.C. App. 378, 387, 358 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1987). Therefore, the trial court on remand must determine, in its sound discretion, whether to award reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision and remand the case to that court for further remand to the trial court for further proceedings and entry of judgment not inconsistent with this opinion.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\n. The lawsuit in Love was instituted on 22 August 1985, before 1 October 1985, the effective date of chapter 214 of the 1985 Session Laws, but after the effective date of chapter 327 of the 1981 Session Laws. Thus, section 2 of chapter 214 of the 1985 Session Laws did not apply to this case and was not cited or referred to by the Court of Appeals in its opinion in Love.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bentley & Kilzer, P.A., by Susan B. Kilzer and, Charles A. Bentley, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.", "Brown & Bunch, by M. LeAnn Nease, for defendant-appellee.", "Berry & Byrd, by Wade E. Byrd; and Mary Ann Tally, General Counsel, on behalf of North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CUSTOM MOLDERS, INC. v. AMERICAN YARD PRODUCTS, INC., formerly known as ROPER CORPORATION\nNo. 326PA94\n(Filed 3 November 1995)\n1. Statutes \u00a7 24 (NCI4th)\u2014 Session Laws \u2014 control over General Statutes\nThe statement of a legislative enactment contained in the Session Laws controls over the statement codified in the General Statutes.\nAm Jur 2d, Statutes \u00a7\u00a7 142 et seq.\n2. Judgments \u00a7 651 (NCI4th)\u2014 treble damages award \u2014 post-judgment interest\nSince Section 2 of the 1985 amendment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5 by Chapter 214 of the 1985 Session Laws provides that the act \u201cshall not affect the law as it existed before the enactment of Chapter 327 of the 1981 Session Laws,\u201d and \u00a7 24-5 as it existed prior to 1981 provided that \u201cthe amount of any judgment or decree, except the costs . . . shall bear interest till paid,\u201d North Carolina law provides for postjudgment interest on judgments for money damages generally, including a judgment for treble damages, until the judgment is paid. The decision of Love v. Keith, 95 N.C. App. 549 (1989), is disavowed to the extent that it precludes the recovery of postjudgment interest on the full amount of the judgment under the current version of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5 and as \u00a7 24-5 existed prior to 1981.\nAm Jur 2d, Interest and Usury \u00a7\u00a7 59, 60.\n3. Judgments \u00a7 651 (NCI4th)\u2014 failure to pay interest on treble damages \u2014 partial payment of judgment \u2014 judgment against surety\nWhere the judgment provided that plaintiff shall recover trebled damages of \u201c$747,048 . . . and interest as provided by law from the date of entry of this judgment,\u201d the clerk of court correctly designated defendant\u2019s payment of the trebled damages and interest only on the portion of the judgment designated by the jury as compensatory damages as a partial payment of the judgment, and the trial court erred by denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for judgment against the surety on defendant\u2019s supersedeas bond for the remaining amount owed on the judgment for interest on the treble damages portion thereof.\nAm Jur 2d, Interest and Usury \u00a7\u00a7 59, 60.\n4. Unfair Competition \u00a7 53 (NCI4th)\u2014 unfair practice \u2014 prevailing party \u2014 attorney fees for motion to protect judgment and appeal\nWhere the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion for postjudgment interest on the treble damages portion of its judgment for an unfair and deceptive practice, plaintiff is now the prevailing party, and the trial court has the discretion under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1 to award plaintiff reasonable attorney fees with regard to pursuing its motion in the trial court and its appeal in the appellate courts.\nAm Jur 2d, Appellate Review \u00a7 912.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 115 N.C. App. 156, 444 S.E.2d 224 (1994), affirming an order entered 5 January 1993 by Thompson, J., in Superior Court, Durham County. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 October 1995.\nBentley & Kilzer, P.A., by Susan B. Kilzer and, Charles A. Bentley, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.\nBrown & Bunch, by M. LeAnn Nease, for defendant-appellee.\nBerry & Byrd, by Wade E. Byrd; and Mary Ann Tally, General Counsel, on behalf of North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0133-01", "first_page_order": 165, "last_page_order": 174 }