{ "id": 795988, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARTIN THOMAS PLEASANT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Pleasant", "decision_date": "1995-12-08", "docket_number": "No. 103A95", "first_page": "366", "last_page": "374", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "342 N.C. 366" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "25 ALR4th 419", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2561633 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 L.Ed.2d 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 960", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11803324, 11803268, 11803117, 11803598, 11803378, 11803827, 11803669, 11803157, 11803512, 11803196, 11803454 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0960-05", "/us/449/0960-04", "/us/449/0960-01", "/us/449/0960-09", "/us/449/0960-06", "/us/449/0960-11", "/us/449/0960-10", "/us/449/0960-02", "/us/449/0960-08", "/us/449/0960-03", "/us/449/0960-07" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560989 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778861 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 L.Ed.2d 261", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "502 U.S. 915", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6486624, 6486433, 6486147, 6486981, 6487301, 6486250, 6487243, 6486734, 6486895, 6487150, 6487058, 6487474, 6486329, 6486526, 6486079 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/502/0915-07", "/us/502/0915-05", "/us/502/0915-02", "/us/502/0915-10", "/us/502/0915-14", "/us/502/0915-03", "/us/502/0915-13", "/us/502/0915-08", "/us/502/0915-09", "/us/502/0915-12", "/us/502/0915-11", "/us/502/0915-15", "/us/502/0915-04", "/us/502/0915-06", "/us/502/0915-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539376 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573920 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567383 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4705131 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4700785 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0558-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 860, "char_count": 19299, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.2085472642727205e-08, "percentile": 0.26806582159809317 }, "sha256": "2aa25c9b932662f62520e7d69441f955f2f9d5397da6362479da6561b43a0be3", "simhash": "1:bb7ba161f26b5c58", "word_count": 3145 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:36:26.105751+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARTIN THOMAS PLEASANT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nIn a proper indictment, defendant, Martin Thomas Pleasant, was charged with the murder of his father, Jerry Thomas Pleasant. Defendant was tried in a noncapital trial on the charge of murder after entering a plea of not guilty. Defendant appeals from a sentence of life imprisonment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of first-degree murder on the theories of malice, premeditation, and deliberation and of lying in wait. We conclude that defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nMost of the evidence at trial was essentially uncontradicted. Defendant lived in a separate dwelling on his parents\u2019 farm. Defendant worked for his parents on their farm, which is located outside of Angier, North Carolina.\nOn 2 May 1993, Jerry Pleasant left home at approximately 9:00 p.m. to turn off the irrigation system on the farm. The victim watered his tobacco beds every night at dusk for about forty-five minutes to an hour using an irrigation system that pumped water from a pond located on his property. Defendant\u2019s apartment was located south of this pond.\nAt approximately 9:30 or 9:45 p.m., defendant called his parents\u2019 house and asked to speak to his father. Mrs. Pleasant told defendant that his father had gone to turn off the irrigation system. Defendant asked her to have his father call him about planting tobacco the next day.\nAfter speaking with defendant, Mrs. Pleasant attempted to contact the victim on the telephone in his truck, but there was no answer. Mrs. Pleasant did not find this unusual since the telephone often did not work close to the house. She attempted to telephone him two other times during the evening. Also during the evening, she went onto the front porch, where she noticed that the irrigation system had been turned off and that no lights were visible in the field. Mrs. Pleasant retired to bed at about 11:15 p.m., annoyed that her husband had not called but not worried because it was not unusual for the local farmers to sit and talk late into the night during this time of year.\nAt approximately 2:10 a.m. on 3 May 1993, Mrs. Pleasant awoke and realized that her husband was not in bed. Feeling that something was wrong, she looked outside and saw no lights in the field or in defendant\u2019s apartment. She got her flashlight and drove to the tobacco bed, where she found the victim\u2019s pickup truck parked. Mrs. Pleasant noticed that the truck door was open, the engine was not running, and the headlights were off. She found her husband lying on the ground on the backside of the irrigation pump, next to the pond. He was lying on his side, and his body was cold and motionless. Mrs. Pleasant noticed what appeared to be two bumps on her husband\u2019s head.\nMrs. Pleasant was shaking and was unable to figure out how to use the telephone in the truck. She drove to defendant\u2019s apartment to call for help. She knocked on the door, saying, \u201cMark, open the door. Your daddy is dead.\u201d Defendant was drunk and refused to allow her to use the telephone, saying, \u201cOh Mother, he\u2019s not dead.\u201d Mrs. Pleasant got back into her car, went home, and called for assistance. The police responded to the Pleasant residence at approximately 2:40 a.m. on 3 May 1993.\nAn agent from the State Bureau of Investigation interviewed Mrs. Pleasant and defendant. Defendant consented to a gunshot residue test on his hands after being interviewed. The investigators who searched the field where the victim\u2019s truck was found observed that the truck\u2019s engine was not running and that its headlights were off. The autopsy report revealed that the victim had died from multiple gunshot wounds.\nOn 3 May 1993, Mrs. Pleasant went to defendant\u2019s apartment with Robin and Steve Marks, defendant\u2019s sister and brother-in-law. Defendant had not visited his mother since his father\u2019s body was found that morning. Defendant was still drinking alcohol. Mrs. Pleasant had defendant involuntarily committed to Dorothea Dix Hospital for substance abuse.\nOn 5 May 1993, defendant was released to attend his father\u2019s funeral. Before leaving for the funeral, defendant met with a friend, Kent Butterfield, at defendant\u2019s parents\u2019 residence. Defendant and Butterfield observed a law enforcement dive team searching for the murder weapon in a pond near the residence.\nDefendant asked Butterfield to accompany him across the road to defendant\u2019s apartment. At the apartment, defendant excused himself, went into a downstairs bathroom, and emerged a few minutes later. Defendant was drinking a soft drink and spitting repeatedly. Butterfield and defendant then walked back across the road to the residence of defendant\u2019s parents. Defendant began vomiting and sat down on the ground. He then told Butterfield, \u201cKent, I killed my father. I want to die. Don\u2019t tell anybody.\u201d\nAlmost immediately after making this statement, defendant began to shake and sweat and was foaming from the mouth. After suffering convulsions, defendant lost consciousness. An ambulance transported defendant to Good Hope Hospital in Erwin, North Carolina, and he was transferred from there to Duke University Medical Center in Durham, North Carolina. At Duke University Medical Center, defendant was placed in the intensive care unit, where he was treated for organophosphate pesticide poisoning. Defendant remained unconscious and in critical condition for several days.\nButterfield reported to the police the statements defendant made to him. Defendant had taken out a $125,000 universal life insurance policy on his father for which he paid $100.00 per month. Defendant, prior to the death of his father, told another friend, Milton Godwin, that he did not like his mother having to work at a convenience store, that he had taken out an insurance policy on his father, and that he was going to kill his father or kill himself.\nOn 13 May 1993, a member of the dive team from Fort Bragg found a .25- or .22-caliber revolver belonging to the victim in the pond near defendant\u2019s apartment. The State Bureau of Investigation crime laboratory determined that this pistol was the murder weapon.\nOn 19 May 1993 at approximately 1:00 p.m., defendant was visited in his room at Duke University Medical Center by his mother; his sister, Robin Marks; and her husband, Stephen Marks. Defendant had not been able to talk before that date because he was on a ventilator with a breathing tube inserted in his throat. During the visit, defendant, in response to a question from his mother, acknowledged that he had killed his father. Defendant then said, among other things, that he had taken a revolver from his parents\u2019 attic at about 2:30 p.m. on Sunday, 2 May 1993; that he had waited in a field for his father to come to turn off the irrigation pump; that when his father arrived, defendant shot him without being seen; that he had turned off the engine and the headlights of his father\u2019s pickup truck; and that he had thrown the gun in the pond.\nAt trial, defendant testified that he did not murder his father and that he believed that his uncle, Donnie Hunter, killed his father. Defendant testified that he drank the pesticide because he thought he was going to be blamed for the murder and had mentally \u201cgiven up.\u201d Defendant admitted telling Kent Butterfield that he had killed his father, saying that he felt responsible and wanted to take the blame since he had taken his father\u2019s gun and attempted to sell it to Hunter. Despite the fact that defendant did not sell the gun to Hunter, defendant testified that he believed that Hunter then used that gun to kill his father. Defendant also admitted that while he was at Duke University Medical Center, he told his family members that he had killed his father. Defendant again testified that he felt responsible for the death and wanted to take the blame for it.\nDefendant offered evidence at trial that he suffered from alcohol dependency and a \u201cschizoid personality disorder.\u201d Defendant had a history of alcohol abuse. Further, defendant offered some evidence that he was suffering from a memory impairment and depression. Defendant\u2019s expert witness concluded that, based on defendant\u2019s alcohol dependency, his alcohol consumption on 2 May 1993, and his personality disorder, defendant\u2019s ability to make and carry out plans could have been affected.\nDefendant first assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress certain incriminating statements made by him to his friend and his relatives. Defendant made two confessions: (1) to Kent Butterfield after ingesting the poison that caused his hospitalization, and (2) to family members in the hospital when he regained consciousness. Defendant does not argue that he did not make the statements but instead contends that those statements were not given freely, voluntarily, and understandingly by him. Defendant argues that the State did not meet its burden of proof as to either alleged confession.\nPrior to ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court held an extensive voir dire. At the suppression hearing, defendant presented evidence that he had ingested organophosphate pesticide poison on 5 May 1993. Within seconds, the poison took effect, causing him to become very sick and lose consciousness. Defendant argues that it was only after the pesticide began to take effect that he made the statement to Butterfield that he had killed his father. Those were his last words before he lapsed into unconsciousness. Therefore, defendant contends that the statements were a product of the effects of the poisonous chemical and were not made by him voluntarily and understandingly.\nLikewise, defendant argues that the statements made by him to his mother, sister, and brother-in-law in the hospital were not voluntarily and understandingly made due to the medications defendant was taking; defendant\u2019s depression, alcohol dependency, organophosphate pesticide poisoning, anoxia, and insult to the brain; and the effects of all the foregoing on defendant\u2019s ability to think and remember.\nFollowing the hearing, the trial court found as fact that \u201c[a]t the time [defendant] made this statement to Butterfield, defendant was conscious, alert and appeared to be in control of his mental faculties. He made the statement spontaneously to Butterfield, addressing him by name.\u201d The court also found that \u201c[a]lmost immediately after making this statement, defendant began suffering convulsions and lost consciousness.\u201d\nAs to the statements made to his family at the hospital, the trial court found as fact that \u201c[a]t the time [defendant] made these statements to his mother, sister, and brother-in-law, defendant\u2019s voice was weak, but he was conscious and alert and in control of his mental faculties. His response [s] to questions propounded by these same family members were coherent and rational.\u201d The court further found that although defendant had been treated with a number of drugs during his stay in the hospital, \u201c[w]ithin the twenty-four hours preceding these statements, defendant had received haldol, an anti-psychotic drug, and ativan, an anti-anxiety drug, within prescribed and medically acceptable dosages. The effect of these drugs was to render defendant more coherent and rational than he likely would have been without these drugs,\u201d and \u201c[a]ny organophosphate herbicides defendant may have consumed on May 5, 1993 had been metabolized and eliminated by his body by May 19, 1993.\u201d The trial court concluded as a matter of law that \u201c[e]ach of defendant\u2019s statements was made knowingly, willfully and voluntarily at a time when defendant was rational and coherent.\u201d\nIn State v. Massey, 316 N.C. 558, 573, 342 S.E.2d 811, 820 (1986), this Court s\u00e1id:\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact following a voir dire hearing on the voluntariness of a confession are conclusive on appeal if they are supported by competent evidence in the record. State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 304 S.E.2d 134 (1983); see also State v. [Rook], 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981). \u201cNo reviewing court may properly set aside or modify those findings if so supported. This is true even though the evidence is conflicting.\u201d State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 569, 304 S.E.2d at 145. Thus, we must determine whether the findings are supported by the record.\nIn the instant case, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by the record and, therefore, are conclusive on this appeal. The evidence indicates that defendant, of his own free will, admitted his participation in the shooting to Butterfield and to his family without coercion from them. Defendant testified on direct examination that he told Butterfield, \u201cI killed him, I killed my father,\u201d and that he may have said, \u201cI want to die.\u201d He further testified that he made those statements to Butterfield because he felt responsible and wanted to take the blame for his father\u2019s death.\nFurthermore, defendant\u2019s expert witness in psychiatry, Dr. Valerie Holmes, testified on cross-examination that defendant was awake and able to communicate with the medical staff prior to 19 May 1993. Dr. Holmes confirmed that all of the drugs administered to defendant, other than Haldol, Ativan, and Benadryl, were out of defendant\u2019s system by 19 May 1993. She further testified that she talked with defendant on 19 May 1993 about his suicide attempt and that he appeared coherent and engaged in logical conversation, giving appropriate answers to questions. Dr. Holmes testified that defendant\u2019s medication was having a positive effect on his cognitive abilities and that she could not say that defendant\u2019s cognitive abilities were impaired to the extent that he did not understand or appreciate what he was saying when he talked to his family on 19 May 1993. Additionally, defendant testified on direct examination that he remembered making the statements to his family while in the hospital. The State argues that the very fact that defendant not only remembers making the statements, but testified as to his motivation for making those statements, belies any claim that the statements were not voluntary based on defendant\u2019s mental capacity. We agree.\nFurthermore, \u201c[a]s a general rule, voluntary admissions of guilt are admissible in evidence in a trial. To render them inadmissible, incriminating statements must be made under some sort of pressure.\u201d State v. Boykin, 298 N.C. 687, 696, 259 S.E.2d 883, 889 (1979). Defendant makes no claim of coercion by his friend or his family members. Therefore, defendant had no basis for suppression of his statements to Butterfield or to his family members. The trial court was correct in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress these statements. Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s first assignment of error.\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s excluding from evidence statements by third parties, taken by law enforcement officers, implicating a person other than defendant as the perpetrator of the murder of Jerry Pleasant. Defendant expressly abandoned this assignment of error.\nDefendant further assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all the evidence. After the denial of his motion to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence, defendant proceeded to offer evidence, thereby waiving his motion to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence. State v. Lane, 328 N.C. 598, 403 S.E.2d 267, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 915, 116 L.Ed.2d 261 (1991); State v. Saunders, 317 N.C. 308, 345 S.E.2d 212 (1986); State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 266 S.E.2d 631, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960, 66 L.Ed.2d 227 (1980). We, therefore, consider only defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss made at the close of all the evidence.\nAs to the denial of his motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence, defendant argues that without the statements made by him to Butterfield and to his family members, the State did not have sufficient evidence to submit the matter to the jury on the issue of first-degree murder. Since we have held that the statements made by defendant to Butterfield and his family members were properly admitted into evidence, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty of first-degree murder. We note, however, that, in ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence, all evidence actually admitted, whether competent or incompetent, may be considered. State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 373 S.E.2d 430 (1988). Defendant admits that if the statements made by him to Butterfield and to his family are included, the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Gail E. Weis, Associate Attorney General, for the State.", "Patrick H. Pope for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARTIN THOMAS PLEASANT\nNo. 103A95\n(Filed 8 December 1995)\n1. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1298 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 defendant\u2019s inculpatory statements \u2014 mental condition of defendant\nThere was no error in a first-degree murder prosecution in the admission of defendant\u2019s incriminating statements where defendant drank an organophosphate pesticide and told a friend shortly before losing consciousness that he had killed his father, and described the killing to his family after he regained consciousness in the hospital. The trial court\u2019s findings that defendant was conscious, alert and appeared in control of his faculties at the time the statements were made, that the organophosphates had metabolized when he made the statement to his family, and that the drugs with which he was treated rendered him more coherent and rational were supported by the record. Furthermore, defendant\u2019s psychiatric expert testified that defendant was awake and able to communicate with the medical staff prior to the statement to his family, that defendant had appeared coherent and engaged in logical conversation with her, and that his medication was having a positive effect on his cognitive abilities. The very fact that defendant not only remembers making the statements but testified as to his motivation for making those statements belies any claim that the statements were not voluntary based on his mental capacity. Finally, defendant makes no claim of coercion by his friend or family members and therefore had no basis for suppression of his statements.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 744.\nSufficiency of showing that voluntariness of confession or admission was affected by alcohol or other drugs. 25 ALR4th 419.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 610 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder\u2014 motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence \u2014 incompetent evidence\nIt was noted that all evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, may be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 1435.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from judgment imposing sentence of life imprisonment entered by Stephens (Ronald L.), J., at the 22 August 1994 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Harnett County, upon a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder in a case in which defendant was not tried capitally. Heard in the Supreme Court 17 November 1995.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Gail E. Weis, Associate Attorney General, for the State.\nPatrick H. Pope for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0366-01", "first_page_order": 398, "last_page_order": 406 }