{ "id": 798909, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEFFREY LEE BARRETT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Barrett", "decision_date": "1996-05-10", "docket_number": "No. 255A93", "first_page": "164", "last_page": "186", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "343 N.C. 164" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "90 L. Ed. 2d 1001", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "66 ALR4th 417", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "85 ALR2d 1132", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "99 L. Ed. 2d 926", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "14 ALR3d 723", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "58 ALR3d 851", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "32 ALR3d 589", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "31 ALR4th 486", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 939", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782912, 1782720, 1782785, 1782723, 1782762, 1782831, 1782832, 1782961, 1782865, 1782835, 1782868, 1782933, 1782833, 1782813, 1782936, 1782777, 1782941 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0939-06", "/us/408/0939-13", "/us/408/0939-10", "/us/408/0939-16", "/us/408/0939-01", "/us/408/0939-05", "/us/408/0939-02", "/us/408/0939-08", "/us/408/0939-17", "/us/408/0939-12", "/us/408/0939-14", "/us/408/0939-15", "/us/408/0939-07", "/us/408/0939-09", "/us/408/0939-04", "/us/408/0939-11", "/us/408/0939-03" ] }, { "cite": "86 L. Ed. 2d 267", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 1120", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6387653, 6387846, 6387984, 6387541, 6387381 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/1120-03", "/us/471/1120-04", "/us/471/1120-05", "/us/471/1120-02", "/us/471/1120-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "death sentence proportionate where defendant burglarized home and jury found that both murders were committed for pecuniary gain and that they were part of a course of conduct involving violence against another" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2395675 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "death sentence proportionate where defendant burglarized home and jury found that both murders were committed for pecuniary gain and that they were part of a course of conduct involving violence against another" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 L. Ed. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 1230", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12108826, 12108839 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/1230-01", "/us/469/1230-02" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "death sentence proportionate in double murder where jury found course of conduct aggravating circumstance and found that the murders were committed for pecuniary gain" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4680504 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "death sentence proportionate in double murder where jury found course of conduct aggravating circumstance and found that the murders were committed for pecuniary gain" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763650 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761257 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686205 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4758195 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569559 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694780 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741422 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530367 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" }, { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519-20", "parenthetical": "argument that the power of public officials is ordained by God and to resist them is to resist God disapproved" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 NC 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2401681 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501", "parenthetical": "argument that the power of public officials is ordained by God and to resist them is to resist God disapproved" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's argument not improper where prosecutor clearly informed jury to make its capital sentencing decision based on the statute and not the Bible" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796135 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's argument not improper where prosecutor clearly informed jury to make its capital sentencing decision based on the statute and not the Bible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565360 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "452 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556165 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1023", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4836, 5158, 4882, 5207, 5176 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1023-04", "/us/494/1023-03", "/us/494/1023-05", "/us/494/1023-02", "/us/494/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" }, { "page": "500" }, { "parenthetical": "amalgamation of biblical language and statutory citation swings close to impropriety of saying the law of the State codifies divine law" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492599 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 L. Ed. 2d 873", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558011 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 756", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1050", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5473, 5290, 5004, 5103, 4917 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1050-01", "/us/494/1050-04", "/us/494/1050-05", "/us/494/1050-03", "/us/494/1050-02" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 871", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720550 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 S.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "918", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 417, 340 S.E.2d 673, 685, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486627 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 417, 340 S.E.2d 673, 685, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538239 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720164 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2536876 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552791 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 U.S.L.W. 3575", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "U.S.L.W.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575737 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 406", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 970", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 600992, 599913, 599204, 599758 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0970-03", "/us/484/0970-02", "/us/484/0970-01", "/us/484/0970-04" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15-16" }, { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4730916 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199-200" }, { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104", "parenthetical": "holding that there was no error in the admission of statements by an officer that he had contacted thirteen law enforcement officials in six different states before apprehending defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2507321 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420", "parenthetical": "holding that there was no error in the admission of statements by an officer that he had contacted thirteen law enforcement officials in six different states before apprehending defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4744189 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 S.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564484, 8564389, 8564462, 8564441, 8564414 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0622-05", "/nc/284/0622-01", "/nc/284/0622-04", "/nc/284/0622-03", "/nc/284/0622-02" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant dropped codefendants off at country store, stayed with the car, and was later seen with the codefendants and the money" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. App. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549348 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant dropped codefendants off at country store, stayed with the car, and was later seen with the codefendants and the money" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/20/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant dropped the codefendants off at the store to be robbed, drove some three miles, came back, and picked them up" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525515 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant dropped the codefendants off at the store to be robbed, drove some three miles, came back, and picked them up" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant waited in the car outside the store which was robbed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526507 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant waited in the car outside the store which was robbed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant was down the street from the residence when the crime occurred" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526033 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant was down the street from the residence when the crime occurred" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2506498 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 L. Ed. 2d 761", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565554 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575714 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 L. Ed. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 915", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12001440, 12001636, 12000708, 12000837, 12000970, 12001711, 12001073, 12001394, 12001500, 12001300, 12001559, 12000604, 12001183 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0915-09", "/us/506/0915-12", "/us/506/0915-02", "/us/506/0915-03", "/us/506/0915-04", "/us/506/0915-13", "/us/506/0915-05", "/us/506/0915-08", "/us/506/0915-10", "/us/506/0915-07", "/us/506/0915-11", "/us/506/0915-01", "/us/506/0915-06" ] }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2502533, 2498248, 2500400, 2499516, 2497727 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0290-01", "/nc/331/0290-04", "/nc/331/0290-05", "/nc/331/0290-02", "/nc/331/0290-03" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522544 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4743418 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190-91" }, { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553398 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" }, { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542427 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382-83" }, { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515495 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" }, { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" }, { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541929 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793223 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572408 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518881 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 U.S. 211", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1519759 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/417/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 F.2d 685", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1318140 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/481/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556750 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1686, "char_count": 53165, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6790361245566446e-07, "percentile": 0.697201844586306 }, "sha256": "f52b9a7d5d647adc1be604b0d03b4ee58fdb17d10d7f8fcdfc1ae61f0136897a", "simhash": "1:0f67c52264961cd6", "word_count": 8835 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:14:44.802104+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEFFREY LEE BARRETT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nDefendant, Jeffrey Lee Barrett, was indicted for two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery with a dangerous weapon [hereinafter armed robbery]. He was tried capitally. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts of first-degree murder based on theories of premeditation and deliberation and felony murder. Defendant was also found guilty of the felony of armed robbery.\nAfter a capital sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000, the jury recommended death for both first-degree murder convictions. As to both first-degree murder convictions, the jury found as aggravating circumstances that the murders were committed for pecuniary gain and that each murder was part of a course of conduct of other crimes of violence against another person. No juror found any mitigating circumstances. The trial judge arrested judgment as to the armed robbery conviction and, in accordance with the jury recommendation, imposed sentences of death for each of the murder convictions.\nDefendant makes thirteen arguments on appeal to this Court. We reject each of these arguments and conclude that defendant\u2019s trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error and that the death sentences are not disproportionate. Accordingly, we uphold defendant\u2019s convictions for first-degree murder and sentences of death.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show the following facts and circumstances: On 5 August 1989, defendant offered to sell Mitchell Turner a kilogram of cocaine for $17,000. The going price for this amount of cocaine was between $27,000 and $30,000. The men decided to exchange the cocaine for the money on 6 August 1989 at Turner\u2019s Auto Sales (the car lot), a business owned by Lawrence Turner, father of the victims Mitchell and Michael Turner. On the way to meet defendant, Mitchell picked up McGarrett Clanton, told him of the deal, and stated that he wanted Clanton to come along so that he could \u201ccook the cocaine\u201d to determine if it was real.\nMitchell and Clanton met defendant and two other men, who were described by witnesses as a tall man and an older man, at the car lot. Defendant and his companions arrived in a red T-1000 Pontiac automobile. The men decided to go inside to transact their business. Defendant asked where the money was, and Mitchell informed him that his brother Michael would be bringing it later. Once inside, defendant stated that he was uncomfortable and asked Mitchell to go with him to the woods, to make the deal. Mitchell suggested that they go to the house of Ella Williams (Mitchell\u2019s girlfriend). Mitchell then called his brother Michael with instructions to meet them at Williams\u2019 house with the money.\nDefendant and his companions travelled in the red Pontiac, while Clanton and Mitchell took Mitchell\u2019s Chevy Blazer truck. After arriving at Williams\u2019 house, defendant and Mitchell went into the bedroom, while Clanton and the other two men waited in the living room. After two or three minutes, Mitchell and defendant left the bedroom and exited the house through the back door. After a while, Mitchell and defendant reentered the house, and all of the men left the house. Mitchell and defendant did not transact the deal at Williams\u2019 house and returned to the car lot. As they drove back to the car lot, Mitchell told Clanton that defendant was trying to fool them. Mitchell again phoned Michael and made him aware of the change in plans.\nWhen defendant and his companions drove into the car lot, defendant parked the Pontiac automobile so that it was facing the street. The men then entered the office. Not long after they were in the office, Michael arrived in a burgundy van. Once inside, Mitchell decided they needed to buy some baking soda, an ingredient needed to test the cocaine. Defendant suggested that he and the tall man accompany Clanton and Michael to purchase the baking soda, leaving Mitchell and the older man in the car lot office. Defendant, Clanton, Michael, and the tall man travelled in the burgundy van to Brookhaven Shop and Wash, a store located approximately a mile and a half from the car lot. As they drove to the store, Clanton noticed a clear plastic bag containing money between the front seats of the van.\nAfter purchasing the baking soda and a beer, defendant, the tall man, Clanton, and Michael headed back towards the car lot. Defendant asked Michael, who was driving, to turn off the road. Michael refused to do so. As they approached the car lot, defendant requested that Michael continue past the car lot. Ignoring defendant\u2019s request, Michael turned into the car lot and parked the van so that it faced the office door.\nDefendant exited the van first and proceeded to the front of the van, while the tall man went to the passenger side of the Pontiac T-1000 automobile. Michael grabbed the clear plastic bag containing money, and he and Clanton exited the van. Michael and Clanton noticed a white powder on the ground outside the office door. The powder had not been there before they left, and Clanton told Michael that something was wrong. Defendant approached Clanton and Michael and attempted to put his arms around them. He asked Michael to drive him down the road, and Michael again refused. Clanton backed away while Michael took out his key and approached the office. Michael was standing very close to defendant. Clanton turned around and started running away from the car lot. The tall man pursued Clanton. Clanton heard a shot, and when he turned around noticed that the tall man had stopped chasing him. Shortly thereafter, Clanton saw the Pontiac automobile leaving the car lot.\nClanton ran to the house of Clifford Joyner and requested a ride to Turner\u2019s Grocery, another business owned by th\u00e9 victims\u2019 family. Upon arriving at the grocery store, Clanton told Randy Turner, a brother of the victims, and Mr. and Mrs. Turner, the victims\u2019 parents, that he thought Mitchell and Michael were dead. Randy and Mrs. Turner travelled to the car lot where they found the bodies of Michael and Mitchell. Michael was outside of the office with his back against the open screen door, and Mitchell was lying on the floor inside the office. The police, dispatched because of a report of gunfire, arrived while the family was in the office.\nWhen the police entered the office, they found two packages wrapped in duct tape and containing a powdery white substance. One package had been cut open. The substance was found on the floor under Mitchell\u2019s body and on the desk. Laboratory tests revealed that the white powdery substance found on the floor and in packages in the office was starch, not cocaine. Police also discovered an electric frying pan with a liquid in it and a bag from a video rental store in Richmond, Virginia. The bag contained a roll of duct tape and a package of baking soda. Another bag containing a package of baking soda and a beer was found in the burgundy van.\nAutopsies revealed that both victims died of gunshot wounds. Michael was shot once in the head, and Mitchell was shot twice, once in the back and once in the lower abdominal region. Michael\u2019s wound to the head and Mitchell\u2019s wound to the abdomen were made with the gun placed firmly against their skin, while the shot to Mitchell\u2019s back was made while Mitchell was bent over. It was not possible to determine which of Mitchell\u2019s wounds was inflicted first. The differences in the areas around the two contact wounds, the one to Mitchell\u2019s abdomen and the one to Michael\u2019s head, suggested that the wounds were caused by different guns.\nDefendant did not testify and presented no evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of his trial. Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, made at the close of the evidence and renewed after the jury verdicts were announced, was denied by the trial court.\nAs defendant\u2019s first argument, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to convict him of the first-degree murders of Mitchell and Michael Turner. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury and to support jury verdicts finding defendant guilty on both counts of murder in the first degree.\nOn a defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991). What constitutes substantial evidence is a question of law for the court. Id. To be \u201csubstantial,\u201d evidence must be existing and real, not just \u201cseeming or imaginary.\u201d State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1982). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Vause, 328 N.C. at 236, 400 S.E.2d at 61. \u201cIf there is substantial evidence\u2014 whether direct, circumstantial, or both \u2014 to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.\u201d State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 382-83 (1988).\nIn ruling on a motion to' dismiss, the trial court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference and intendment that can be drawn therefrom. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). The determination of the witnesses\u2019 credibility is for the jury. See Locklear, 322 N.C. at 358, 368 S.E.2d at 383.\n\u201c [Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case \u2014 they are for the jury to resolve.\u201d Earnhardt, 307 N.C. at 67, 296 S.E.2d at 653; accord State v. Small, 328 N.C. 175, 180-81, 400 S.E.2d 413, 415-16 (1991), quoted instate v. Quick, 329 N.C. 1, 19, 405 S.E.2d 179, 190-91 (1991). \u201c \u2018The trial court\u2019s function is to determine whether the evidence will permit a reasonable inference that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged.\u2019 \u201d Quick, 329 N.C. at 19, 405 S.E.2d at 191 (quoting Vause, 328 N.C. at 237, 400 S.E.2d at 61).\nFirst, we will address defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of first-degree murder for the death of Michael Turner. Defendant was convicted under the theories of both felony murder and premeditation and deliberation. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him under either theory. We disagree.\nFirst, defendant contends that, as to the felony murder theory, there was no evidence presented that he was armed or that he intended to rob the victims. Defendant was found guilty of the felony of armed robbery. This Court has defined- armed robbery as \u201cthe taking of personal property from the person or presence of another, by the use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, whereby the victim\u2019s life is endangered or threatened.\u201d State v. Rasor, 319 N.C. 577, 587, 356 S.E.2d 328, 334 (1987); see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1437(a) (1993).\nThe State presented evidence that Michael Turner had a bag of money in his possession when he exited the burgundy van. This bag was not found when Michael\u2019s body was discovered at the door of the car lot a short time later. Defendant was last seen standing next to Michael just before a gunshot was heard. The autopsy revealed that Michael died from a gunshot wound to the head and that the gun was placed firmly against his skull when it was fired. From this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that defendant had a gun which he placed against Michael\u2019s skull and that he took the bag containing the money either shortly before or immediately after he shot the victim. This certainly is sufficient evidence to constitute armed robbery. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence of armed robbery and, therefore, that defendant\u2019s conviction under the felony murder rule was proper.\nAs to the conviction under the theory of premeditation and deliberation, defendant contends that there was no evidence that he shot Michael. The State produced evidence that defendant was seen standing next to Michael seconds before the shot was heard, that Michael\u2019s gunshot wound was made with the gun placed firmly against his head, that the tall man was pursuing Clanton and the older man was inside the office with Mitchell when the shot was fired, that Michael was found with his back against the open screen door of the office, and that Michael and Mitchell were not shot with the same gun. A jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that defendant shot Michael at the door of the office.\nWe now turn to defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree murder for the death of Mitchell Turner. Defendant was convicted on theories of both premeditation and deliberation and felony murder. Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him under either theory. Again, we disagree.\nAt trial, the judge instructed the jury that it could find defendant guilty under a theory of premeditation and deliberation if it found that defendant had acted in concert with the other two men to murder Mitchell. Defendant argues that the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient to show that he was either actually or constructively present at the time of the murder of Mitchell; therefore, he could not have been convicted under a theory of premeditation and deliberation.\nIn State v. Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 410 S.E.2d 226 (1991), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 331 N.C. 290, 416 S.E.2d 398, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915, 121 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1992), our Court of Appeals stated:\nOur Supreme Court in State v. Williams, 299 N.C. 652, 263 S.E.2d 774 (1980), specifically delineated two essential elements of acting in concert: 1) presence at the scene of the crime, and 2) acting together with another who does the acts necessary to constitute the crime pursuant to a common plan or purpose. Williams, 299 N.C. at 656-57, 263 S.E.2d at 777-78. The presence required for acting in concert can be either actual or constructive. State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 41-42, 181 S.E.2d 572, 586 (1971), vacated in part on other grounds, Westbrook v. North Carolina, 408 U.S. 939, 33 L. Ed. 2d 761 (1972).\nWallace, 104 N.C. App. at 504, 410 S.E.2d at 230. We have stated that \u201c[a] person is constructively present during the commission of a crime if he or she is close enough to be able to render assistance if needed and to encourage the actual perpetration of the crime.\u201d State v. Willis, 332 N.C. 151, 175, 420 S.E.2d 158, 169 (1992). It should be noted that constructive presence does not require that defendant be physically present at the scene of the crime; that would be actual presence. See State v. Ruffin, 90 N.C. App. 712, 370 S.E.2d 279 (1988) (defendant was down the street from the residence when the crime occurred); State v. Hockett, 69 N.C. App. 495, 317 S.E.2d 416 (1984) (defendant waited in the car outside the store which was robbed); State v. Pryor, 59 N.C. App. 1, 295 S.E.2d 610 (1982) (defendant dropped the codefendants off at the store to be robbed, drove some three miles, came back, and picked them up); State v. Torain, 20 N.C. App. 69, 200 S.E.2d 665 (1973) (defendant dropped codefendants off at country store, stayed with the car, and was later seen with the codefendants and the money), cert. denied, 284 N.C. 622, 202 S.E.2d 278 (1974).\nIn the instant case, defendant left the scene momentarily to go about a mile and a half from the crime scene. It was at defendant\u2019s suggestion that he, the tall man, Michael, and Clanton left the car lot to get baking soda despite the fact that defendant already had baking soda with him. On the ride back from the store, defendant suggested that they not return directly to the car lot. Once arriving at the car lot, he again attempted to hamper Michael\u2019s return to the office. Defendant expressed no surprise at seeing the powdery substance strewn outside the office. From the evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that defendant was providing assistance to the older man, who he knew was alone inside the office with Mitchell. The jury could infer that the shooting of Mitchell was part of defendant\u2019s and his companions\u2019 plan. The evidence showed that defendant planned to sell fake cocaine to the victims and that Mitchell intended to test the cocaine to see if it was real. A jury could infer that once it became apparent that the victims intended to test the cocaine, the men decided to kill Mitchell and Michael and that defendant provided assistance to the older man by momentarily removing Clanton and Michael from the scene but by returning to provide a means for the men to flee the scene. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that defendant was constructively present.\nDefendant also alleges that there was no evidence that he had a gun or that he intended to rob anyone; therefore, there was insufficient evidence of armed robbery, the underlying felony for his first-degree murder conviction. As we discussed above, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of armed robbery. Since Mitchell was killed during the perpetration of the robbery, \u201c[w]hether there is sufficient evidence to show that the defendant either committed the killing himself, intended that the killing take place or even knew that the killing would take place is irrelevant for purposes of determining defendant\u2019s guilt under the felony murder rule.\u201d State v. Reese, 319 N.C. 110, 145, 353 S.E.2d 352, 372 (1987). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial judge was correct in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nIn his second argument, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible constitutional error by permitting the prosecutor to introduce inadmissible hearsay on the question of defendant\u2019s flight. Detective Wheeler, who was in charge of the investigation, testified that he obtained warrants for defendant\u2019s arrest and that he had defendant\u2019s name entered into the National Police Information Network so that defendant would be arrested if he was stopped for a traffic violation. He also testified that he talked to a number of law enforcement officials in his attempt to find defendant and that they had difficulty finding defendant. Defendant contends that Detective Wheeler\u2019s testimony contained inadmissible hearsay. In support of this contention, he argues that Detective Wheeler, the only witness who testified concerning defendant\u2019s alleged flight, did not go to Virginia or Georgia to apprehend defendant; therefore, his testimony was hearsay to the extent that it relied upon the statements of others.\nDuring the exchange between Wheeler and the prosecutor quoted in defendant\u2019s brief, the trial court sustained two of defendant\u2019s objections and overruled only one. The trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objection to Wheeler\u2019s statement that defendant was not found at an address in Richmond, Virginia, when police arrived there. Assuming arguendo that the admission of this statement was error, we are satisfied that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Ample evidence was presented that defendant was not apprehended until 20 May 1992, almost three years after the murder, although defendant was an immediate suspect and had already left Northampton County for an unknown destination. Wheeler also presented admissible flight evidence that showed that he contacted law enforcement officials in at least two other states in an attempt to find defendant. See State v. Patterson, 332 N.C. 409, 420, 420 S.E.2d 98, 104 (1992) (holding that there was no error in the admission of statements by an officer that he had contacted thirteen law enforcement officials in six different states before apprehending defendant). Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s second argument.\nDefendant\u2019s third and fourth arguments concern the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. First, defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly commented on defendant\u2019s failure to testify by making the following statements in closing arguments:\nAnd ladies and gentlemen of the jury, he does not care. I hope you\u2019ve watched his demeanor during this trial, how he\u2019s been bored with the proceedings, how at times they were comical to him. I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, he doesn\u2019t care about what he did at that car lot on August the 6th, 1989. He didn\u2019t care then and he doesn\u2019t care now because that doesn\u2019t suit him. He does not care.\nWe hear [a lot] about rights of defendants. That\u2019s what all of this process is about, the rights of the defendants. If defendant\u2019s [sic] didn\u2019t have certain rights, we wouldn\u2019t be here, ladies and gentlemen. And that\u2019s what this case is all about. His rights are protected throughout this trial. Mitchell and Michael Turner had no rights on August the 6th, 1989.1 submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the most important right that any of us have [sic] is the right to live.\nDefendant concedes that this Court has held that the State may comment on the demeanor of the defendant during closing arguments of a trial. State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 199-200, 358 S.E.2d 1, 15-16, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987). He calls attention, however, to the fact that in the instant case, this argument was made during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, while in Brown the argument was made during the capital sentencing phase. Defendant notes that the jury may consider the remorse of the defendant during the sentencing phase as a mitigating circumstance, and therefore, an argument made during the sentencing phase regarding the defendant\u2019s demeanor is proper for showing lack of remorse. However, he continues, during the guilt/innocence phase, the argument simply draws attention to the fact that defendant did not testify at trial; therefore, it violates the defendant\u2019s right not to testify.\nIn Brown, we relied on State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 680, 263 S.E.2d 768, 774 (1980), which held that prosecutorial statements made during closing arguments regarding defendant\u2019s demeanor were admissible. While noting that the State is given wide latitude during closing arguments, this Court said that the demeanor of the defendant was before the jury at all times. Id. Accordingly, we see no reason to distinguish between arguments regarding the defendant\u2019s demeanor that are made during the sentencing proceeding and those made during the guilt/innocence phase.\nWe hold that the State\u2019s argument was not a comment on defendant\u2019s failure to testify. As we stated in State v. Rouse, 339 N.C. 59, 451 S.E.2d 543 (1994), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 133 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1995), \u201c[a] prosecutor violates [this rule] if \u2018the language used [was] manifestly intended to be, or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be[,] a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 95-96, 451 S.E.2d at 563 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 701 (4th Cir. 1973), aff\u2019d, 417 U.S. 211, 41 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1974)). A comment on the defendant\u2019s demeanor does not naturally or necessarily amount to a comment on the failure of the accused to take the stand. Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s contention.\nDefendant also assigns error to a later portion of the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument on the basis that it was a comment on defendant\u2019s failure to testify. The prosecutor argued:\nI can\u2019t tell you. You know, some things, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the State of North Carolina is not going to be able to tell you, using your reason and your own common sense. We can say probably what happened, but there are a few things we\u2019re not going to be able to say. The \u25a0 only one that knows is that man right there and his two buddies.\n(Emphasis added.)\nDefendant made no objection to this argument at trial. Therefore, this Court\u2019s duty is limited as follows:\nWhere defendant fails to object to an alleged impropriety in the State\u2019s argument and so flag the error for the trial court, \u201cthe impropriety . . . must be gross indeed in order for this court to hold that a trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero motu an argument which defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when he heard it.\u201d\nState v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 338, 451 S.E.2d 131, 143 (1994) (quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)) (alteration in original). In determining whether the prosecutor\u2019s argument was grossly improper, the Court must examine the argument in the context in which it was given and in light of the overall factual circumstances to which it refers. State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 461 S.E.2d 687 (1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, - L. Ed. 2d \u2014, 64 U.S.L.W. 3575 (1996). Before making the comments mentioned by defendant, the prosecutor argued:\nWhere were the keys \u2014 where were Michael\u2019s keys? The keys to the van were scattered right here. Right down there. You saw the pictures of the keys to the van, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. You didn\u2019t see the keys. Right down there is [sic] the keys. Right down there where Dr. Ziph said he\u2019d been killed instantly. Instantly killed, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. Instantly killed. And don\u2019t you know that when he got popped with a bullet through his brain, he didn\u2019t do anything but drop as that bullet went through his brain, curtsey [sic] of defendant. Michael with the keys \u2014 would Michael have been inside the office? I submit to you nobody knows, but I submit to you that he was getting ready to poke them in or perhaps put them in when the door got kicked in and then went into the door and fell out. I can\u2019t tell you ....\nFrom examining the prosecutor\u2019s argument in context, it is clear that he was stating that he could not explain every detail of the crime to the jury and that defendant had failed to refute the State\u2019s theory of how Michael was killed. This Court has held that the prosecutor can comment on the defendant\u2019s failure to present evidence that refutes the State\u2019s theory of the case and that such an argument is not a comment on the defendant\u2019s failure to testify. State v. Taylor, 337 N.C. 597, 613, 447 S.E.2d 360, 370-71 (1994); State v. Morston, 336 N.C. 381, 406, 445 S.E.2d 1, 15 (1994); State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 732, 340 S.E.2d 430, 436 (1986). Clearly, there was no gross impropriety in the prosecutor\u2019s argument.\nDefendant next assigns error to another portion of the prosecution\u2019s closing statement. The prosecutor first argued:\nMembers of the jury, when you go back into the jury room, I ask that you think of these events as something that you have seen on television. You see these things in movies. You see them on news reports happening in big cities. But; this is something real, ladies and gentlemen, it is reality. This, ladies and gentlemen, is reality. This is a reality that took place on August the 6th, 1989 at Turners\u2019 Car Lot. This is reality. This is real. This is not a T.V. movie with special effects. This is real. This is reality, ladies and gentlemen. This is the reality of what took place at Turner\u2019s Auto on August the 6th, 1989. These are the real clothes that real people wore as they were gunned downed [sic] on that Sunday afternoon. So, don\u2019t think of it as something that is not real. This is real. This is as real as it gets, ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you. Mrs. Virginia Turner, ladies and gentlemen, had five children when she went to work on August the 6th, 1989. Five children. Mr. Turner had five children as he prepared to get ready to go to church that afternoon. Nancy Turner Garner had four brothers as she arose that morning to take care of her day\u2019s business. Shorty and Randy had two other brothers as they got up to take case of their personal affairs on that day. But, because of this man sitting right over here, the man famous for his gold teeth and his white tee shirts, that is gone now. Killing Mitchell and Michael Turner helped him accomplish his goal of stealing thirty four thousand dollars. Helped him fulfill his agenda that he had money for August the 6th of 1989.\nMany times you hear about events like this, shootings, murders and you say, well somebody ought to do something about that. Well, ladies and gentlemen, you are that somebody that everybody talks about. Today you speak for the people of Northampton County. You are Northampton County. Today you send a message, a thunderous message, to those who would even think of coming to this county and committing acts like the defendant and his friends did on August the 6th, 1989. The buck stops here, ladies and gentlemen, and you cannot pass it along. It\u2019s in your laps. The police can\u2019t do anymore, the Judge can do no more. It\u2019s up to you to decide.\nDefendant contends that the purpose of this argument was to appeal to the sympathy and fears of the jury rather than to appeal to reason. He argues that in the preceding portion of the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument, the prosecutor impermissibly urged guilty verdicts based on general deterrence and community fear of crime. Defendant also argues that the second prosecutor reenforced this theory of general deterrence and community fear by arguing:\nLadies and gentlemen of the jury, the State of North Carolina \u2014 the State of North Carolina is not a big thing. What it amounts to is the District Attorney, is me[,] elected by the people of Hertford, Bertie and Northampton County.\nAgain, we note that defendant did not object at trial to these arguments. It is well established that \u201c[c]ontrol of closing arguments is in the discretion of the trial court.\u201d State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 186, 443 S.E.2d 14, 39-40, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994). Moreover, \u201c[b]ecause defendant did not object to the portions of the argument to which he now assigns error, \u2018review is limited to an examination of whether the argument was so grossly improper that the trial [court] abused [its] discretion in failing to intervene ex mero mo tu.\u2019 \u201d State v. McNeil, 324 N.C. 33, 48, 375 S.E.2d 909, 918 (1989) (quoting State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 417, 340 S.E.2d 673, 685, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986)) (alteration in original), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1050, 108 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1990).\nAfter careful examination of the prosecutors\u2019 arguments, we conclude that they were not grossly improper. The first prosecutor was commenting on the seriousness of the crime and the importance of the jury\u2019s duty. We have previously held that the prosecutor is allowed to argue the seriousness of the crime. See State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 451 S.E.2d 826 (1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1995); State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 329, 384 S.E.2d 470, 499 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990); State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 203, 358 S.E.2d 1, 18. It should also be noted that, in another part of his argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury that it was not to base the verdict on sympathy. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutors\u2019 comments were not grossly improper and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not intervening ex mero motu. Therefore, we reject defendant\u2019s argument.\nDefendant next contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding because of alleged errors committed during his capital sentencing proceeding. Defendant\u2019s first argument is contingent upon this Court finding the evidence insufficient to convict him of the murder of Mitchell Turner. Since this Court has found that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the murder of Mitchell Turner, we need not address this argument.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State to produce evidence of defendant\u2019s prior offenses. During the sentencing phase, on cross-examination, the State questioned defendant\u2019s mother about prior bad acts of defendant. Defendant objected, stating that it was improper character evidence. The questions were allowed over defendant\u2019s objections. Defendant contends now that the submission of evidence regarding his prior criminal behavior was improper. We disagree.\nThis Court has held that the State, during the capital sentencing proceeding, may introduce evidence of prior bad acts where the defendant presents testimony of his good character. State v. Williams, 339 N.C. 1, 50, 452 S.E.2d 245, 274 (1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 133 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1995); State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 273, 275 S.E.2d 450, 484 (1981). In the instant case, defendant\u2019s mother testified on direct examination that defendant was basically a good child who began to have problems with drug abuse because his father was absent. She stated that, despite these problems, defendant was not a murderer. The State, on cross-examination, questioned defendant\u2019s mother about rumors that defendant had killed two other people as well as wounded a third person. The evidence was being presented to rebut evidence of good character that was presented by defendant through the testimony of his mother. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by admitting this evidence.\nAs defendant\u2019s third argument concerning the capital sentencing proceeding, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to make biblical arguments during closing arguments. The prosecutor argued:\nYou know the Almighty established certain laws of nature. There was a time to be bom, there was a time to live, and there\u2019s a time to die. All in nature\u2019s way. All in nature\u2019s way. How dare Jeffrey Lee Barrett defy the laws of nature.\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nHow dare he defy the laws established by the Almighty. Just imagine, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, how Michael Turner must have felt as this now convicted murder said to him, \u201cI have decided that you will die. I have decided that you will die because it suits my purposes.\u201d Not God\u2019s purpose, not nature\u2019s purpose, but mine. I have decided. I\u2019ve decided the manner in which you will die. I have decided the place which you will die. I have decided the time in which you will die. Not God, not nature, but me.\u201d\nImagine how Mitchell Turner must have felt as Barrett\u2019s partner said the same words to him. How dare Jeffrey Barrett play God and snuff the life of two brothers. Two sons. Contrary to the laws of nature.\nIn State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 384 S.E.2d 470, we stated:\nNeither the \u201claw\u201d nor the \u201cfacts in evidence\u201d include biblical passages, and, strictly speaking, it is improper for a party either to base or to color his arguments with such extraneous material. However, this Court has repeatedly noted the wide latitude allowed counsel in arguing hotly contested cases, and it has found biblical arguments to fall within permissible margins more often than not. This Court has distinguished as improper remarks that state law is divinely inspired or that law officers are \u201cordained\u201d by God.\nId. at 331, 384 S.E.2d at 500.\nDefendant contends that the prosecutor argued that the State law is divinely inspired and, therefore, that the argument was improper. The argument in the instant case does not contain the extensive references to religion, including copious readings from the Bible urging that murderers be put to death, against which we have cautioned in the past. See id. (amalgamation of biblical language and statutory citation swings close to impropriety of saying the law of the State codifies divine law); see also, State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 61, 463 S.E.2d 738, 770 (1995) (prosecutor\u2019s argument not improper where prosecutor clearly informed jury to make its capital sentencing decision based on the statute and not the Bible); cf. State v. Moose, 310 NC 482, 501, 313 S.E.2d 507, 519-20 (1984) (argument that the power of public officials is ordained by God and to resist them is to resist God disapproved).\nHowever, assuming arguendo that the prosecutor\u2019s argument constitutes error and that the error implicates defendant\u2019s constitutional rights, defendant is not entitled to relief even under the constitutional standard of review. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (1988). Given the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt and because the prosecutor\u2019s remarks were made in anticipation of contrasting biblical arguments actually made by defendant, we are convinced that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nPreservation Issues\nDefendant also raises six additional arguments that he concedes have been decided contrary to his position previously by this Court: (1) the trial court erred by failing to inform jurors of parole eligibility; (2) the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion for individual jury voir dire; (3) the trial court\u2019s instruction that all the evidence presented in both phases of the trial was competent for the jurors\u2019 consideration violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to comment on defendant\u2019s demeanor during closing arguments during the sentencing phase; (5) the trial court\u2019s instructions defining the burden of proof applicable to mitigating circumstances violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (6) the trial court\u2019s instructions permitted the jury to reject submitted mitigation on the basis that it had no mitigating value.\nDefendant raises these issues for the purpose of permitting this Court to reexamine its prior holdings and also for the purpose of preserving them for any possible further judicial review of this case. We have carefully considered defendant\u2019s arguments on these issues and find no compelling reason to depart from our prior holdings. Accordingly, we reject these arguments.\nProportionality Review\nHaving concluded that defendant\u2019s trial and separate capital sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error, we turn to the duties reserved by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) exclusively for this Court in capital cases. It is our duty in this regard to ascertain: (1) whether the record supports the jury\u2019s findings of the aggravating circumstances on which the sentence of death was based; (2) whether the death sentence was entered under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary consideration; and (3) whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) (Supp. 1995).\nAs to both murders, the jury found as aggravating circumstances that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(6), and that the murder was part of a course of conduct in which defendant engaged which included the commission of other crimes of violence against another person or persons, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(11). None of the jurors found any of the mitigating circumstances. After thoroughly examining the record, transcripts, and briefs in the present case, we conclude that the record fully supports the two aggravating circumstances found by the jury. Further, we find no indication that the sentence of death in this case was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary consideration. We must turn then to our final statutory duty of proportionality review.\nIn our proportionality review, it is proper to compare the present case with other cases in which this Court has concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate. State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 162 (1993), cert. denied, - U.S. \u2014, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994). We have found the death penalty disproportionate in seven cases. State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983). We conclude that this case is not substantially similar to any case in which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate in that none of these, cases involved a double murder.\nIt is also proper to compare this case to those where the death sentence was found proportionate. McCollum, 334 N.C. at 244, 433 S.E.2d at 164. Although we have repeatedly stated that we review all of the cases in the pool when engaging in our statutory duty, it is worth noting again that \u201cwe will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each time, we carry out our duty.\u201d Id. It suffices to say here that we conclude the present case is similar to certain cases in which we have found the death sentence proportionate.\nThe aggravating circumstances found in this case have been present in other cases where this Court has found the sentence of death proportionate. See State v. Gardner, 311 N.C. 489, 319 S.E.2d 591 (1984) (death sentence proportionate in double murder where jury found course of conduct aggravating circumstance and found that the murders were committed for pecuniary gain), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 84 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1985); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984) (death sentence proportionate where defendant burglarized home and jury found that both murders were committed for pecuniary gain and that they were part of a course of conduct involving violence against another), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120, 86 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1985). It is also relevant that no juror found the existence of any mitigating circumstances.\nAfter comparing this case to other similar cases as to the crime and the defendant, we conclude that this case has the characteristics of first-degree murders for which we have previously upheld the death penalty as proportionate. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the death sentences are excessive or disproportionate. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court must be and are left undisturbed.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Ellen B. Scouten, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Staples Hughes, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEFFREY LEE BARRETT\nNo. 255A93\n(Filed 10 May 1996)\n1. Homicide \u00a7 266 (NCI4th)\u2014 armed robbery \u2014 felony murder \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThere was sufficient evidence of armed robbery to support defendant\u2019s conviction of felony murder of Michael Turner where the State presented evidence tending to show that defendant and his companions planned to sell fake cocaine to the victim and his brother at a used car lot; the victim had a bag of money in his possession when he exited a van at the car lot; this bag was not found when the victim\u2019s body was discovered at the door of the car lot office a short time later; defendant was last seen standing next to the victim just before a gunshot was heard; the victim died from a gunshot wound to the head; and the gun was placed firmly against the victim\u2019s skull when it was fired.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 442.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 226 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 premeditation and deliberation \u2014 defendant as shooter \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe jury could infer from the evidence that defendant shot the victim so as to support his conviction of first-degree murder under the theory of premeditation and deliberation where the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant and his companions planned to sell fake cocaine to the victim and his brother at a used car lot; defendant was seen standing next to the victim seconds before a shot was heard; the victim died from a gunshot wound made with the gun placed firmly against his head; when the shot was fired one of defendant\u2019s companions was inside the car lot office with the victim\u2019s brother and defendant\u2019s other companion was pursuing a friend of the victim who fled the scene; the victim was found with his back against the open screen door of the office, and the victim\u2019s brother was shot in the'office; and the victim and his brother were not shot with the same gun.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 286.\nAdmissibility of testimony that bullet could or might have come from particular gun. 31 ALR4th 486.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 374 (NCX4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 acting in concert \u2014 constructive presence \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant was constructively present at the time of the killing of Mitchell Turner so as to support his conviction of first-degree premeditated and deliberated murder under the theory of acting in concert where the evidence tended to show that defendant and his two companions (an older man and a tall man) planned to sell fake cocaine to the victim and his brother at a used car lot; the victim intended to test the powder to determine if it was cocaine; at defendant\u2019s suggestion, defendant, the tall man, the victim\u2019s brother and a friend of the victim left the car lot and went about a mile and a half from the crime scene to buy baking soda for use in the testing, although defendant had baking soda with him; the older man stayed at the car lot office with the victim; on the ride back from the store, defendant suggested that they not return directly to the car lot; upon arriving at the car lot, defendant attempted to hamper the return of the victim\u2019s brother to the office; defendant expressed no surprise at seeing a powdery substance strewn outside the office; and the victim was shot in the back and in the lower abdominal region. The jury could infer from this evidence that defendant and his companions decided to kill the victim and his brother when it became apparent that the victim intended to test the powder and that defendant provided assistance to the older man by momentarily removing the victim\u2019s brother and his friend from the scene and by returning to provide a means for the men to flee the scene.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 168-171; Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 28, 29, 445.\n4. Homicide \u00a7 267 (NCI4th)\u2014 killing during robbery \u2014 guilt of robbery \u2014 guilt of felony murder\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction of felony murder of Mitchell Turner where it tended to show that defendant was guilty of armed robbery and that the victim was killed during perpetration of the robbery. Whether there is sufficient evidence to show that defendant either committed the killing himself, intended that the killing take place or even knew that the killing would take place is irrelevant for purposes of determining defendant\u2019s guilt under the felony murder rule.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 72-75.\nHomicide: Criminal liability for death resulting from unlawfully furnishing intoxicating liquor or drugs to another. 32 ALR3d 589.\nWhat constitutes termination of felony for purpose of felony-murder rule. 58 ALR3d 851.\n5. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 222 (NCI4th)\u2014 flight \u2014 hearsay testimony \u2014 harmless error\nAssuming arguendo that the trial court erred by permitting the investigating officer\u2019s hearsay testimony on flight that defendant was not found at an address in Richmond, Va. when police arrived there seeking to arrest him for a murder in this state, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where ample evidence was presented that defendant was not apprehended until almost three years after the murder although defendant was an immediate suspect, and the officer also presented admissible flight evidence that he contacted law enforcement officials in at least two other states in an attempt to find defendant.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 532-535.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 427 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital trial \u2014 guilt phase\u2014 closing argument \u2014 defendant\u2019s demeanor \u2014 not comment on failure to testify\nThe prosecutor\u2019s comment on defendant\u2019s demeanor in the closing argument of the guilt/innocence phase of a first-degree murder trial did not constitute an improper comment on defendant\u2019s failure to testify.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 577-587.\nComment or argument by court or counsel that prosecution evidence is uncontradicted as amounting to improper reference to accused\u2019s failure to testify. 14 ALR3d 723.\nSupreme Court\u2019s views as to what comments by prosecuting attorney violate accused\u2019s privilege against self-incrimination under Federal Constitution\u2019s Fifth Amendment. 99 L. Ed. 2d 926.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 427 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital trial \u2014 closing argument \u2014 defendant\u2019s knowledge of facts \u2014 not comment on failure to testify\nThe prosecutor\u2019s comment during his closing argument in a first-degree murder trial that \u201c[t]he only one that knows is that man right there and his two buddies\u201d did not constitute an improper comment on defendant\u2019s failure to testify where it is clear that the prosecutor was stating that he could not explain every detail of the crime to the jury and that defendant had failed to refute the State\u2019s theory of how the victim was killed.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 577-587.\nComment or argument by court or counsel that prosecution evidence is uncontradicted as amounting to improper reference to accused\u2019s failure to testify. 14 ALR3d 723.\nSupreme Court\u2019s views as to what comments by prosecuting attorney violate accused\u2019s privilege against self-incrimination under Federal Constitution\u2019s Fifth Amendment. 99 L. Ed. 2d 926.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 442 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital trial \u2014 closing argument \u2014 comment on seriousness of crimes and jury\u2019s duty\nThe prosecutor\u2019s closing argument in a trial for two first-degree murders did not impermissibly urge guilty verdicts based on general deterrence and community fear of crime; rather, the prosecutor was commenting on the seriousness of the crimes and the importance of the jury\u2019s duty, and there was no gross impropriety in these comments which required the trial court to intervene ex mero mo tu.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 567-569.\nPrejudicial effect of prosecuting attorney\u2019s argument to jury that people of city, county, or community want or expect a conviction. 85 ALR2d 1132.\n9. Criminal Law \u00a7 1312 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital sentencing \u2014 good character evidence \u2014 rebuttal by prior bad acts\nThe State could properly cross-examine defendant\u2019s mother in a capital sentencing proceeding about rumors that defendant had killed two other persons and wounded a third person in order to rebut evidence of good character presented by defendant through the testimony of his mother.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598, 599.\n10. Criminal Law \u00a7 454 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital sentencing \u2014 closing argument \u2014 biblical references \u2014 harmless error\nAssuming arguendo that it was improper for the prosecutor to argue in a capital sentencing proceeding that defendant violated the laws of nature established by God when he, rather than God, decided the time and place of the victims\u2019 deaths and that this error implicates defendant\u2019s constitutional rights, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where there was overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt and where the prosecutor\u2019s remarks were made in anticipation of contrasting biblical arguments made by defense counsel.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 572.\n11. Criminal Law \u00a7 1373 (NCI4th)\u2014 death sentences not disproportionate\nSentences of death imposed upon defendant for two first-degree murders were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases where the jury found the course of conduct and pecuniary gain aggravating circumstances for each murder; no juror found the existence of any mitigating circumstance; and the evidence showed that defendant and his companions planned to sell fake cocaine to the victims, the victims indicated an intent to test the substance to determine if it was cocaine, and defendant shot one victim and one of his companions shot the second victim in order to steal money possessed by the victims.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 628.\nSufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that murder was committed for pecuniary gain, as consideration or in expectation of receiving something of monetary value, and the like \u2014 post-Gregg cases. 66 ALR4th 417.\nSupreme Court\u2019s views on constitutionality of death penalty and procedures under which it is imposed or carried out. 90 L. Ed. 2d 1001.\nValidity of death penalty, under Federal Constitution, as affected by consideration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances \u2014 Supreme Court cases. Ill L. Ed. 2d 947.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from two judgments imposing sentences of death entered by Albright, J., at the 10 May 1993 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Northampton County, upon jury verdicts of guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 8 May 1995.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Ellen B. Scouten, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Staples Hughes, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0164-01", "first_page_order": 212, "last_page_order": 234 }