{ "id": 798897, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICKY CARLTON EXUM", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Exum", "decision_date": "1996-05-10", "docket_number": "No. 310A95", "first_page": "291", "last_page": "296", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "343 N.C. 291" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "23 ALR4th 955", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "85 ALR2d 1111", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555965 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499251 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500375 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 L. Ed. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 853", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6398657, 6398434, 6397925, 6398022, 6398342, 6398215, 6397447, 6398759, 6398123, 6398544, 6397653, 6397790, 6397567 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/0853-12", "/us/498/0853-10", "/us/498/0853-05", "/us/498/0853-06", "/us/498/0853-09", "/us/498/0853-08", "/us/498/0853-01", "/us/498/0853-13", "/us/498/0853-07", "/us/498/0853-11", "/us/498/0853-03", "/us/498/0853-04", "/us/498/0853-02" ] }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306762 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538619 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" }, { "page": "163" }, { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555500 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" }, { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2509584 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" }, { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" }, { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5309049 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794" }, { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 794, 392 S.E.2d 362, 363 (1990)" }, { "page": "218" }, { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2506815 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73-74", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 794, 392 S.E.2d 362, 363 (1990)" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1023", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4836, 5158, 4882, 5207, 5176 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1023-04", "/us/494/1023-03", "/us/494/1023-05", "/us/494/1023-02", "/us/494/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492599 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.C. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2090113 ], "year": 1866, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/61/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 L. Ed. 2d 777", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 1021", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6268812, 6267060, 6268214, 6267352, 6267610, 6266778, 6268507, 6267902 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/1021-08", "/us/497/1021-02", "/us/497/1021-06", "/us/497/1021-03", "/us/497/1021-04", "/us/497/1021-01", "/us/497/1021-07", "/us/497/1021-05" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" }, { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2487626 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4728771 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558305 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1525264 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0400-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 599, "char_count": 10842, "ocr_confidence": 0.701, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.991433011783158e-08, "percentile": 0.5383968331744438 }, "sha256": "9878288f96086a60e35b14d5f7306fc845db9b6cb9d0b83b29ec6afac958827f", "simhash": "1:756e8668243f0072", "word_count": 1815 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:14:44.802104+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICKY CARLTON EXUM" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PER CURIAM.\nOn 27 June 1993, Delores Joyner Exum was stabbed to death by her estranged husband, the defendant, Ricky Carlton Exum, after an altercation at their home. Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and common law attempted murder, which was ultimately dismissed by the State. He was tried capitally at the 31 October 1994 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Greene County, and was found guilty of first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.\nDuring the capital sentencing proceeding, the jury was unable to unanimously agree on its sentencing recommendation, and the trial court imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for the conviction of first-degree murder. The trial court also imposed a sentence of twenty years\u2019 imprisonment on defendant\u2019s conviction of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious bodily injury.\nA complete presentation of the evidence is unnecessary to understand the legal issue involved in this case. In summary, however, the State presented evidence tending to show that defendant and Mrs. Exum had experienced domestic problems over several years and were separated at the time of the killing. On the morning of 27 June 1993 at approximately 8:00 a.m., defendant went to the family home and began arguing with Mrs. Exum about a warrant and restraining order that Mrs. Exum had taken out against defendant approximately two weeks earlier for assaulting her. The argument resulted in defendant stabbing Mrs. Exum several times with a knife. In an attempt to take the knife from defendant during the struggle between defendant and Mrs. Exum, Kisha Joyner, one of the couple\u2019s four children, was cut on four of her fingers on her right hand. The State\u2019s evidence also tended to show that on the day of the incident, defendant had not been drinking alcohol.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence tends to show that he killed Mrs. Exum in a jealous rage after Mrs. Exum had told him the day before the killing that the baby that she had been carrying when she had a miscarriage in 1992 was not his baby. Defendant\u2019s evidence also shows that defendant is an acute, chronic alcoholic and that he had been drinking the night before the killing.\nDefendant brings forth numerous issues for review, but we need only focus on defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court violated his nonwaivable constitutional right to be present at all stages of his capital trial. Beginning with jury selection and continuing through the jury instruction stage of defendant\u2019s capital murder trial, the trial court conducted several bench and in-chambers conferences in defendant\u2019s absence. However, we address specifically only the unrecorded in-chambers conference that took place with the attorneys in defendant\u2019s absence at the conclusion of testimony by Dr. Thomas Brown, defense expert in the area of forensic psychiatry and substance abuse.\nArticle I, section 23 of the Constitution of North Carolina provides: \u201cIn all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has the right to be informed of the accusation and to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony . . . .\u201d The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives an accused the same protection. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965). This protection guarantees an accused the right to be present in person at every stage of his trial. State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 208, 166 S.E.2d 652, 659 (1969).\nState v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138, 139, 357 S.E.2d 612, 613 (1987). Similarly, as we have often stated:\n\u201cThe confrontation clause of the Constitution of North Carolina guarantees the right of this defendant to be present at every stage of the trial. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 29, 381 S.E.2d 635, 651 (1989)[, sentence vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990)]; N.C. Const. Art. I, \u00a7 23 (1984). This state constitutional protection afforded to the defendant imposes on the trial court the affirmative duty to insure the defendant\u2019s presence at every stage of a capital trial. The defendant\u2019s right to be present at every stage of the trial \u2018ought to be kept forever sacred and inviolate.\u2019 State v. Blackwelder, 61 N.C. 38, 40 (1866)[, overruled on other grounds by State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635]. In fact, the defendant\u2019s right to be present at every stage of his capital trial is not waivable. State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 297, 384 S.E.2d 470, 480 (1989)[, sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990)]; State v. Huff, 325 N.C. at 31, 381 S.E.2d at 652.\u201d\nState v. Moss, 332 N.C. 65, 73-74, 418 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1992) (quoting State v. Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 794, 392 S.E.2d 362, 363 (1990)).\nThe transcript shows that the following exchange occurred during defendant\u2019s trial:\nThe Court: All right. Members of the jury, we\u2019re going to take our lunch break now \u2014 well, let me confer with the lawyers a minute.\nSheriff, take the jury back in the jury room.\n(The jury is absent.)\nThe Witness: Can I be excused, Judge?\nThe Court: Wait just a moment.\n(A discussion off the record in chambers with the Court and all four counsel. The defendant was not present.)\nThe Court: All right. Let\u2019s \u2014 I think you\u2019re excused, Dr. Brown.\nAn in-chambers conference is a \u201ccritical stage\u201d of a defendant\u2019s capital trial at which he has a constitutional right to be present. See State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 221, 410 S.E.2d 832, 843 (1991). In State v. Brogden, 329 N.C. 534, 407 S.E.2d 158 (1991), this Court concluded that it was error for the trial court to conduct an in-chambers conference with the attorneys but without the defendant. Id. at 541, 407 S.E.2d at 163. Thus, in the instant case, the trial court erred in conducting the in-chambers conference with the attorneys, out of the hearing of the defendant.\nHowever, error caused by the absence of the defendant at some portion of his capital trial does not require automatic reversal. This Court has adopted the \u201charmless error\u201d analysis in cases where a defendant is absent during a portion of his capital trial. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635. The State has the burden of establishing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; State v. Payne, 328 N.C. 377, 402 S.E.2d 582 [(1991)].\nBrogden, 329 N.C. at 541, 407 S.E.2d at 163. \u201c \u2018Unless the State proves that the denial of the defendant\u2019s right, under article I, section 23 of the Constitution of North Carolina, to be present at this stage of his capital trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we must order a new trial.\u2019 \" Moss, 332 N.C. at 74, 418 S.E.2d at 218 (quoting Smith, 326 N.C. at 794, 392 S.E.2d at 363).\nIn State v. Wise, 326 N.C. 421, 390 S.E.2d 142, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853, 112 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1990), this Court, under similar circumstances, found harmless error where a charge conference was held out of the presence of the defendant and was not recorded, but where defendant was represented by counsel at the conference and the trial court subsequently reported the proposed instructions on the record and gave counsel an opportunity to be heard. Likewise, in Brogden, this Court held that the error in conducting an informal meeting in chambers to discuss jury instructions, outside the presence of defendant, prior to the formal charge conference held in open court, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the court\u2019s subsequent actions in open court. Brogden, 329 N.C. at 542, 407 S.E.2d at 163.\nIn this case, however, we are left uninformed as to the substance of the in-chambers discussion held with the attorneys in defendant\u2019s absence and are consequently unable to determine whether the error committed is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. \u201cNotwithstanding an accused\u2019s right to be present, certain violations of this right may be harmless if such appears from the record.\u201d Buchanan, 330 N.C. at 222, 410 S.E.2d at 844. Thus, because the in-chambers conference was not recorded and the nature and content of the private discussion cannot be gleaned from the record, the State failed to meet its burden of showing the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we are, therefore, required to order a new trial. Moss, 332 N.C. at 74, 418 S.E.2d at 219.\nWe have often held that under similar circumstances where the defendant has a constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of his trial and the trial court conducts private conferences or discussions in the defendant\u2019s absence, but the substance of the private discussions is not revealed in the record, a new trial is required. State v. Johnston, 331 N.C. 680, 417 S.E.2d 228 (1992); State v. Cole, 331 N.C. 272, 415 S.E.2d 716 (1992); State v. McCarver, 329 N.C. 259, 404 S.E.2d 821 (1991); Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 392 S.E.2d 362. As a result and for the foregoing reasons, defendant in this case must also receive a new trial.\nNEW TRIAL.", "type": "majority", "author": "PER CURIAM." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John J. Aldridge, III, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Margaret Creasy Ciardellafor defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICKY CARLTON EXUM\nNo. 310A95\n(Filed 10 May 1996)\nConstitutional Law \u00a7 342 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital trial \u2014 in-chambers conference with attorneys \u2014 absence of defendant\u2014 nonwaivable right to be present \u2014 prejudice\nThe trial court violated defendant\u2019s nonwaivable right to be present at all stages of his capital trial by conducting an unrecorded in-chambers conference during the trial with the attorneys present but out of the hearing of the defendant. Because the in-chambers conference was not recorded and the nature and content of the private discussion cannot be gleaned from the record, the State failed to meet its burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendant is entitled to a new trial. N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 23.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 692 et seq., 901 et seq.\nExclusion or absence of defendant, pending trial of criminal case, from courtroom, or from conference between court and attorneys, during argument on question of law. 85 ALR2d 1111.\nRight of accused to be present at suppression hearing or at other hearing or conference between court and attorneys concerning evidentiary questions. 23 ALR4th 955.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Wright, J., at the 31 October 1994 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Greene County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals for a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury was allowed 1 November 1995. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 April 1996.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John J. Aldridge, III, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMargaret Creasy Ciardellafor defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0291-01", "first_page_order": 339, "last_page_order": 344 }