{ "id": 867676, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ELI NAIN OCASIO", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Ocasio", "decision_date": "1996-10-11", "docket_number": "No. 316A95", "first_page": "568", "last_page": "582", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "344 N.C. 568" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "100 ALR Fed. 156", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "A.L.R. Fed.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "50 ALR3d 397", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "40 ALR3d 1341", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "88 ALR3d 449", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "65 ALR3d 283", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "34 ALR Fed. 412", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "A.L.R. Fed.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "19 ALR5th 470", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 5th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565300 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565360 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706-712" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717320 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 727", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552812 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793223 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572408 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518881 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 756", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1050", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5473, 5290, 5004, 5103, 4917 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1050-01", "/us/494/1050-04", "/us/494/1050-05", "/us/494/1050-03", "/us/494/1050-02" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 871", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720550 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 S.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 417, 340 S.E.2d 673, 685, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486627 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 417, 340 S.E.2d 673, 685, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778236 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505926 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" }, { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2567021 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Murphy, 321 N.C. 738, 741, 365 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539039 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Murphy, 321 N.C. 738, 741, 365 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 883", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2527119 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4705131 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 L. E. 2d 1062", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 1092", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6564193, 6564257, 6564067, 6564033, 6564101, 6564166, 6564041, 6564142, 6564239, 6564081, 6564052, 6564278, 6564120, 6564026, 6564220 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/1092-11", "/us/498/1092-14", "/us/498/1092-05", "/us/498/1092-02", "/us/498/1092-07", "/us/498/1092-10", "/us/498/1092-03", "/us/498/1092-09", "/us/498/1092-13", "/us/498/1092-06", "/us/498/1092-04", "/us/498/1092-15", "/us/498/1092-08", "/us/498/1092-01", "/us/498/1092-12" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499305 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 S.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4710863 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558515 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 L. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6468801, 6468547, 6469476, 6468711, 6469608, 6469353, 6468967, 6468624, 6468240, 6468465, 6469044, 6468343, 6469144, 6469246 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/1018-07", "/us/459/1018-04", "/us/459/1018-13", "/us/459/1018-06", "/us/459/1018-14", "/us/459/1018-12", "/us/459/1018-08", "/us/459/1018-05", "/us/459/1018-01", "/us/459/1018-03", "/us/459/1018-09", "/us/459/1018-02", "/us/459/1018-10", "/us/459/1018-11" ] }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 L. Ed. 2d. 292", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551833 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569800 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382-83" }, { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515495 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" }, { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" }, { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541929 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0231-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1284, "char_count": 34539, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.88102130191965e-08, "percentile": 0.49934397719712614 }, "sha256": "5cdac971aeade75866f25558d92555de2b3816ffc90aefb44475dfe34eef848b", "simhash": "1:e37f8022b7568457", "word_count": 5484 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:15:37.608853+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ELI NAIN OCASIO" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nDefendant, Eli Nain Ocasio, was indicted for the murders of Phyllis Aragona and Scott Allen Gasperson. He was also indicted for one count of second-degree burglary, four counts of felonious larceny, four counts of felonious possession of stolen property, two counts of first-degree kidnapping, one count of felonious breaking and entering, and one count of safecracking. He was tried noncapitally to a jury, found guilty of two counts of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to two mandatory terms of life imprisonment. Defendant was sentenced to additional consecutive prison terms of fourteen years for second-degree burglary and larceny; two terms of twelve years for kidnapping; five years for two counts of larceny of a motor vehicle; and nine years for breaking and entering, larceny, and safecracking. Defendant appealed his murder convictions to this Court. We allowed defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to the additional judgments.\nDefendant brings forward ten assignments of error. After reviewing the record, transcript, briefs, and oral arguments of counsel, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence presented at trial tended to show the following facts and circumstances: On 12 July 1990, defendant lived in a mobile home in Jacksonville, North Carolina, with his mother, Maria Monserrata (Monserrata), and Gary Fernandez (Fernandez), Monserrata\u2019s boyfriend. Also living in. the mobile home were Fernandez\u2019s son Orlando; Orlando\u2019s wife, Lissette; the baby of Orlando and Lissette; Fernandez\u2019s son Charlie; and Monserrata\u2019s other son, Bruce. Near the beginning of July, Fernandez and Orlando were planning to rob Woodson Music and Pawn Store, which was located in Piney Green Shopping Center in Jacksonville. Fernandez asked Monserrata to participate in the robbery. Fernandez and Monserrata solicited defendant\u2019s participation. Fernandez and Monserrata also solicited the participation of Monserrata\u2019s daughter, Jeanette, but she refused. Defendant told his friend Mark Watkins about the plans for the robbery, but Watkins declined to participate. The plan consisted of waiting at the home of Scott Gasperson, the store\u2019s manager, and Phyllis Aragona, Gasperson\u2019s girlfriend who was also a store employee, until they came home from work one evening, kidnapping them, and forcing Gasperson to assist them in taking money and property from the store. On the night of 12 July 1990, the plan was executed.\nMonserrata, Fernandez, Orlando, and defendant went to the victims\u2019 residence, pried open the front door with a screwdriver, and went inside. Monserrata left, but the three men remained inside. When Aragona arrived at her home, the men bound her with duct tape. Defendant guarded Aragona while Fernandez and Orlando pillaged the house. When Gasperson arrived, they bound him with duct tape as well. At some point, Monserrata returned, and they all went back to the mobile home. Defendant drove Aragona\u2019s Chevrolet Blazer and transported the victims, who were still bound with duct tape. Once back at the mobile home, defendant guarded the victims.\nOn the morning of 13 July 1990, Fernandez left with Gasperson and returned without him. Gasperson\u2019s lifeless body was found later that day beside his automobile in a wooded area. Gasperson had suffered a shotgun blast to the head. On 13 July 1990, Monserrata, Fernandez, Orlando, and defendant travelled in two automobiles to Miami, Florida. The State\u2019s evidence showed that the most direct route from Jacksonville to Miami would be south on Highway 53, crossing Highway 41 in Pender County, and then to Interstate 95. Upon their arrival in Miami, the group stayed a couple of weeks and then went to the Dominican Republic. Aragona\u2019s decayed body was found approximately nine months later near Highway 53 in Pender County, approximately thirty-five to forty-five miles from Jacksonville.\nThe evidence also tended to show that two different types of duct tape were used to bind the victims. Pieces of both types were found at the victims\u2019 residence and at defendant\u2019s residence as well as at the scenes where the victims\u2019 bodies were ultimately located. The screwdriver that was used to pry open the front door to the victims\u2019 residence was also found at defendant\u2019s residence, along with homemade hoods of the type attached to Gasperson\u2019s body and of the type found in the trunk of the automobile in which defendant rode to Florida. Property owned by Gasperson and duct tape consistent with the type used to bind the victims were found in a storage unit rented by Orlando. Monserrata, Fernandez, and Orlando were arrested when they fled to the Dominican Republic; however, defendant was not arrested until 1994, when he was taken into custody in New York by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. While in custody in New York, defendant gave a statement to an Onslow County police officer and an agent of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation. Defendant was ultimately extradited to North Carolina.\nDefendant did not testify at trial but presented the testimony of the bail bondsman who had posted bail for Monserrata and Fernandez to be released from jail on narcotics charges prior to the commission of the crimes charged in this case.\nDefendant made motions to dismiss all charges against him at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence. Except for the charges of felonious possession of stolen goods on which the State did not proceed, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss.\nDefendant assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motions to dismiss all the charges against him. Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he possessed the requisite intent to commit any of the charged crimes.\nOn a defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991). What constitutes substantial evidence is a question of law for the court. Id. To be \u201csubstantial,\u201d evidence must be existing and real, not just \u201cseeming or imaginary.\u201d State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1982). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Vause, 328 N.C. at 236, 400 S.E.2d at 61. \u201cIf there is substantial evidence\u2014 whether direct, circumstantial, or both \u2014 to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.\u201d State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 382-83 (1988).\nIn ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference that can be drawn therefrom. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). \u201cThe defendant\u2019s evidence, unless favorable to the State, is not to be taken into consideration.\u201d State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 60, 66, 184 S.E.2d 862, 866 (1971). The determination of the witnesses\u2019 credibility is for the jury. See Locklear, 322 N.C. at 358, 368 S.E.2d at 383.\n\u201c[Cjontradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case \u2014 they are for the jury to resolve.\u201d Earnhardt, 307 N.C. at 67, 296 S.E.2d at 653. \u201cThe trial court\u2019s function is to determine whether the evidence will permit a reasonable inference that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged.\u201d Vause, 328 N.C. at 237, 400 S.E.2d at 61.\nIn the instant case, defendant does not contend that he is not the perpetrator of the crimes charged. Instead, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that he possessed the requisite mens rea for the crimes charged. We disagree.\nThe State\u2019s evidence showed that defendant agreed to commit the crimes charged with Monserrata, Fernandez, and Orlando. The evidence further shows that defendant suggested to Mark Watkins that he could participate in the planned robbery. The evidence also shows that defendant told Watkins that if either of the victims saw their faces, they would be killed. The evidence shows that defendant stood guard over the victims both at their apartment and at the mobile home. Additionally, we note that defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder solely on the basis of the felony murder rule with the underlying felonies being two counts of kidnapping. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the charges of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of second-degree burglary, two counts of larceny, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of larceny of motor vehicle, one count of breaking and entering, and one count of safecracking. The evidence was clearly sufficient to show that defendant acted in concert with Fernandez, Monserrata, and Orlando in committing these offenses. Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.\nDefendant also assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his pretrial motion to disclose evidence of prior crimes or bad acts by defendant that the State intended to introduce pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process including his right to effective cross-examination of Mark Watkins regarding Watkins\u2019 written statement to the police containing an assertion that defendant had previously broken into other homes and burglarized them.\nAt trial, Watkins, a witness for the State, did not testify as to his written statement to the police on direct examination. However, after being cross-examined by defendant about his statement to police, Watkins testified on redirect examination about the written statement. After authenticating the statement, the State requested that the statement be read into evidence rather than passed to the jury. Without objection, the trial court allowed the State\u2019s request. In addition to describing the robbery plans of defendant and his family, Watkins\u2019 written statement read into evidence stated that defendant told Watkins that defendant had also broken into a house on Lakewood Drive. Watkins stated that defendant told Watkins that defendant had stolen \u201ca camera, some liquor and some old, possibly valuable coins.\u201d\nRule 404(b) governs the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts and provides:\nEvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1992). In State v. Payne, 337 N.C. 505, 448 S.E.2d 93 (1994), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 131 L. Ed. 2d. 292 (1995), we said that Rule 404(b) \u201caddresses the admissibility of evidence; it is not a discovery statute which requires the State to disclose such evidence as it might introduce thereunder.\u201d Id. at 516, 448 S.E.2d at 99. The statute governing disclosure of evidence by the State, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903 (1988), requires the prosecutor\n[t]o divulge, in [writing], the substance of any oral statement relevant to the subject matter of the case made by the defendant, regardless of to whom the statement was made, within the possession, custody or control of the State ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(a)(2).\nIn the instant case, defendant concedes that the \u201crecord reveals that the State provided the substance of the testimony of Mark Watkins.\u201d Nevertheless, defendant argues that \u201cthere is nothing in the record to show that the defendant was ever provided information regarding the statement of Mark Watkins that defendant supposedly committed break-ins.\u201d Defendant contends that it is this specific information that he requested in his motion. We conclude, however, that the State complied with the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903 by providing defendant with the substance of Watkins\u2019 statement. Nothing in the discovery statute or Rule 404(b) obligated the State to provide defendant with Watkins\u2019 written statement prior to trial. Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.\nBy another assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing Mark Watkins to testify about the prior burglary because it constituted a prior bad act purportedly committed by defendant. Defendant did not object to Mark Watkins\u2019 reading of his 4 September 1990 statement to the police at trial and now asks this Court to order a new trial under the plain error rule. As we have stated previously:\n[T]he plain error rule ... is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a \"fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,\u201d or \u201cwhere [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused,\u201d or the error has \u201c \u2018resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial\u2019 \u201d or where the error is such as to \u201cseriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings\u201d or where it can be fairly said \u201cthe . . . mistake had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u201d\nState v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)) (footnote omitted in original), quoted in State v. Weathers, 339 N.C. 441, 450, 451 S.E.2d 266, 271 (1994). Although Odom dealt with jury instructions, we have applied the plain error rule to the admission of evidence. State v. Black, 308 N.C. 736, 741, 303 S.E.2d 804, 806 (1983).\nThe prosecutor introduced the written statement only on redirect examination of Mark Watkins in response to defense counsel\u2019s questioning of Watkins about a statement that he had made to police. The State was entitled to clear up any confusion that may have been created by defense counsel\u2019s questioning regarding a statement that Watkins had made to the police. Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in not intervening ex mero motu to exclude that portion of Mark Watkins\u2019 statement which referred to the prior bad act, we conclude that the court\u2019s error did not result in manifest injustice and did not amount to plain error.\nBy another assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying his motion to suppress and to exclude from evidence defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement. By pretrial motion filed 4 August 1994, defendant moved to suppress his statement to police on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained. The trial court conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion at which defendant presented evidence.\nIn State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 394 S.E.2d 158 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1092, 112 L. E. 2d 1062 (1991), this Court said:\nNorth Carolina law is well established regarding this Court\u2019s role in reviewing a trial court\u2019s determination of the voluntariness of a confession.\nFindings of fact made by a trial judge following a voir dire hearing on the voluntariness of a confession are conclusive upon this Court if the findings are supported by competent evidence in the record. No reviewing court may properly set aside or modify those findings if so supported. This is true even though the evidence is conflicting.\nId. at 208-09, 394 S.E.2d at 166 (quoting State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 569, 304 S.E.2d 134, 145 (1983)) (citations omitted in original). In the instant case, the trial court made extensive findings of fact regarding defendant\u2019s interrogation in New York. The court found as fact that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, that defendant stated that he understood his rights and was willing to waive those rights, that defendant waived those rights both orally and in writing, that defendant then gave the investigating officers an oral statement regarding the charges pending against him in North Carolina, and that one of the officers then wrote a brief summary of the statement made by defendant. Defendant does not challenge any of these findings.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings support its conclusion that defendant freely, knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel after being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The conclusions support the judgment denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.\nBy another assignment, defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in overruling his objection to and in permitting the introduction of prejudicial and inflammatory photographs which he argues were presented solely to inflame the passions of the jury. We disagree.\nIn State v. Rose, 335 N.C. 301, 439 S.E.2d 518, cert. denied, -U.S.-, 129 L. Ed. 2d 883 (1994), we said that\n\u201c[pjhotographs of homicide victims are admissible at trial even if they are \u2018gory, gruesome, horrible, or revolting, so long as they are used by a witness to illustrate his testimony and so long as an excessive number of photographs are not used solely to arouse the passions of the jury.\u2019 \u201d State v. Thompson, 328 N.C. 477, 491, 402 S.E.2d 386, 394 (1991) (quoting State v. Murphy, 321 N.C. 738, 741, 365 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1988)). \u201cPhotographs may also be introduced in a murder trial to illustrate testimony regarding the manner of killing so as to prove circumstantially the elements of murder in the first degree.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 284, 372 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1988).\nRose, 335 N.C. at 319, 439 S.E.2d at 528.\nAdmissible evidence may be excluded, however, under Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence if the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. \u201cWhether the use of photographic evidence is more probative than prejudicial and what constitutes an excessive number of photographs in light of the illustrative value of each . . . lies within the discretion of the trial court.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. at 285, 372 S.E.2d at 527.\nIn this case, defendant moved to exclude three photographs from being introduced into evidence. Although some of the photographs were gruesome, they were relevant to show the circumstances of the killing and tended to establish the extent of Gasperson\u2019s head wound. Each photograph was used to illustrate the testimony of the pathologist as to the victim\u2019s cause of death. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not excluding these three photographs from evidence under Rule 403.\nBy four assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument. Defendant contends that the prosecutor\u2019s argument contained misstatements of law, matters not in evidence, and personal opinions injected solely to arouse the passions of the jury.\nThe arguments of counsel are left largely to the control and discretion of the trial judge, and counsel will be granted wide latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases. State v. Soyars, 332 N.C. 47, 60, 418 S.E.2d 480, 487 (1992). \u201cCounsel is permitted to argue the facts which have been presented, as well as reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom.\u201d State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 481, 346 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1986). \u201cBecause defendant did not object to the portions of the argument to which he now assigns error, \u2018review is limited to an examination of whether the argument was so grossly improper that the trial [court] abused [its] discretion in failing to intervene ex mero motu.\u2019 \u201d State v. McNeil, 324 N.C. 33, 48, 375 S.E.2d 909, 924 (1989) (quoting State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 417, 340 S.E.2d 673, 685, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986)) (alteration in original), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1050, 108 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1990). Therefore, this Court\u2019s duty is limited as follows:\nWhere defendant fails to object to an alleged impropriety in the State\u2019s argument and so flag the error for the trial court, \u201cthe impropriety . . . must be gross indeed in order for this court to hold that a trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero mo tu an argument which defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when he heard it.\u201d\nState v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 338, 451 S.E.2d 131, 143 (1994) (quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)) (alteration in original). In determining whether the prosecutor\u2019s argument was grossly improper, the Court must examine the argument in the context in which it was given and in light of the overall factual circumstances to which it refers. State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 461 S.E.2d 687 (1995), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996).\nIn the instant case, during his closing argument, the prosecutor, after directing the jury\u2019s attention to the abrasions on the nose of the victim, argued that Scott Gasperson was beaten at the mobile home. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor misstated the testimony of Mark Watkins in arguing that Watkins had testified that he was going to help defendant break into a house. Further, defendant argues that the prosecutor\u2019s arguments that defendant \u201cwent hunting with the pack,\u201d that Phyllis Aragona was not provided with a \u201cChristian burial,\u201d and that the victims had a right to go to their homes without being killed were grossly improper. Also, defendant argues that in disputing defendant\u2019s testimony as to defendant\u2019s participation in the crimes charged, the prosecutor implicitly called defendant a \u201cliar\u201d and that the prosecutor bolstered the testimony of State\u2019s witness Jeannette Ocasio by stating that she was courageous because she told \u201cthe truth about [her] own mother and [her] own brother.\u201d Finally, defendant argues that during closing arguments, the prosecutor misstated the law as to \u201cmere presence\u201d at the scene of a crime and as to whether the jury could consider defendant\u2019s age as a factor in his culpability. After reviewing the transcript, record, and briefs in this case, we conclude that the prosecutor\u2019s argument was not so grossly improper as to require the trial judge'to intervene ex mero mo tu during the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument.\nBy another assignment of error, defendant contends, and the State agrees, that the trial court erred in failing to arrest judgments on the first-degree kidnapping convictions when these convictions were the underlying felonies for the felony murder convictions. Because defendant\u2019s convictions of first-degree murder rest solely on a felony-murder theory, with kidnapping as the underlying felony, the kidnapping convictions merge with the murder convictions, and defendant may not be separately sentenced for kidnapping. State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543, 563, 447 S.E.2d 727, 739 (1994); State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 450-60, 340 S.E.2d 701, 706-712 (1986); State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 261-62, 275 S.E.2d 450, 477 (1981). Accordingly, we arrest judgment on defendant\u2019s two convictions for kidnapping.\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to give sufficient credit to the substantial assistance defendant gave that enabled the State to secure guilty pleas of defendant\u2019s codefendants. At defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, the State stipulated that defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the State\u2019s cases against Orlando Fernandez and Maria Monserrata, in voluntarily submitting \u201can extensive statement of facts and proper testimony in both those cases, which was instrumental in the immediate nonjury disposition of those impending trials.\u201d Additionally, Officer Lee Stevens testified that defendant\u2019s \u201cstatement and offer to testify [constituted] substantial assistance to the law enforcement officers in the case.\u201d\nWe note, however, that for the two first-degree murder convictions, defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum terms of life imprisonment. The second-degree burglary conviction and one of the felonious larceny convictions were consolidated for judgment and defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum term of fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment for the burglary conviction. The trial court consolidated for judgment the two counts of larceny of a motor vehicle, each of which carried a three-year presumptive sentence, and sentenced defendant to five years\u2019 imprisonment, the judge finding as a mitigating factor that defendant had rendered substantial assistance. The trial court also consolidated for judgment the breaking and entering conviction, the safecracking conviction, and the remaining larceny conviction, each of which carried a three-year presumptive sentence, and sentenced defendant to a term of nine years\u2019 imprisonment, the judge again finding as a mitigating factor that defendant had rendered substantial assistance.\n\u201cWhile [a trial judge] is required to justify a sentence which deviates from a presumptive term to the extent that he must make findings in aggravation and mitigation properly supported by the evidence and in accordance with the [Fair Sentencing] Act, a trial judge need not justify the weight he attaches to any factor.\u201d State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 596-97, 300 S.E.2d 689, 697 (1983). In the instant case, the trial court sentenced defendant to the mandatory minimum sentences of life imprisonment for his first-degree murder convictions. Additionally, the court consolidated several convictions for judgment and gave minimum or presumptive sentences for those convictions. Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s final argument.\nIn conclusion, our holdings on appeal in the present case are as follows:\nNo. 92CRS13020 \u2014 First-Degree Murder \u2014 NO ERROR.\nNo. 92CRS13021 \u2014 First-Degree Murder \u2014 NO ERROR.\nNo. 92CRS13022 \u2014 Second-Degree Burglary and Larceny \u2014 NO ERROR.\nNo. 92CRS13023 \u2014 Kidnapping\u2014JUDGMENT ARRESTED.\nNo. 92CRS13024 \u2014 Kidnapping\u2014JUDGMENT ARRESTED.\nNo. 92CRS11964 \u2014 Larceny of Motor Vehicle \u2014 NO ERROR.\nNo. 92CRS11965 \u2014 Larceny of Motor Vehicle \u2014 NO ERROR.\nNo. 92CRS11966 \u2014 Breaking and Entering and Larceny \u2014 NO ERROR.\nNo. 92CRS11967 \u2014 Safecracking\u2014NO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Jill Ledford Cheek, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Margaret Creasy Ciardellafor defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ELI NAIN OCASIO\nNo. 316A95\n(Filed 11 October 1996)\n1. Homicide \u00a7 283 (NCI4th)\u2014 felony murder \u2014 kidnapping\u2014 acting in concert \u2014 intent\u2014evidence sufficient\nThe trial court did not err in a noncapital prosecution for first-degree murder by denying defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss charges of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, larceny, kidnapping, larceny of a motor vehicle, breaking and entering, and safecracking where defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to show that he possessed the requisite intent. The evidence showed that defendant agreed to commit the crimes with three others and suggested to another that he could participate in the planned robbery, defendant told that person that the victims would be killed if either saw their faces, and defendant stood guard over the victims. Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder solely on the basis of felony murder with the underlying felonies being kidnapping; the evidence was clearly sufficient to show that defendant acted in concert in committing these offenses.\nAm Jur 2d, Conspiracy \u00a7\u00a7 13, 20; Evidence \u00a7 837; Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 34-36, 445; Trial \u00a7 1286.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 106 (NCI4th)\u2014 noncapital murder\u2014 defendant\u2019s prior bad acts \u2014 statement of State\u2019s witness\u2014 discovery\nThe trial court did not err in a noncapital first-degree murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to disclose evidence of prior crimes or bad acts by defendant that the State intended to introduce where a witness for the State testified about his written statement on redirect examination, the statement was read into evidence, and the statement contained an assertion that defendant had burglarized other homes. The State complied with the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903 by providing defendant with the substance of the statement; nothing in the discovery statute or N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) obligated the State to provide defendant with the written statement prior to trial.\nAm Jur 2d, Depositions and Discovery \u00a7\u00a7 438, 443.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2902 (NCI4th)\u2014 noncapital murder \u2014 prior burglary by defendant \u2014 admitted on redirect\u2014 no plain error\nThere was no plain error in a noncapital first-degree murder prosecution where a State\u2019s witness was allowed to testify about a prior burglary by defendant. The prosecutor introduced the statement only on redirect examination in response to defense counsel\u2019s questioning of the witness; the State was entitled to clear up any confusion that may have been created by defense counsel\u2019s questioning. Even assuming that the trial court erred by not intervening ex mero mo tu, that error did not amount to manifest injustice and did not amount to plain error.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 564.\n4. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1262 (NCI4th)\u2014 noncapital murder \u2014 inculpatory statement by defendant \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a noncapital first-degree murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motion to exclude his inculpatory statement. The trial court found that defendant was advised of his rights during his interrogation in New York and stated that he was willing to waive those rights; that he waived his rights orally and in writing and gave investigating officers an oral statement regarding the charges pending against him in North Carolina; and that one of the officers wrote a brief summary of the statement. The findings support its conclusion that defendant freely, knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel after being advised of his rights, and the conclusions support the judgment denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 716, 717; Trial \u00a7 1426.\nState constitutional requirements as to exclusion of evidence unlawfully seized \u2014 post-Leon cases. 19 ALR5th 470.\nWhat constitutes statement against interest admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) of Federal Rules of Evidence. 34 ALR Fed. 412.\n5. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1700 (NCI4th)\u2014 noncapital murder \u2014 autopsy photographs \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a noncapital first-degree murder prosecution by permitting the introduction of three photographs which were used to illustrate the testimony of the pathologist as to the victim\u2019s cause of death. Although some of the photographs were gruesome, they were relevant to show the circumstances of the killing and tended, to establish the extent of one victim\u2019s head wound.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 963, 964; Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 276, 434.5; Trial \u00a7 507.\nNecessity and effect, in homicide prosecution, of expert medical testimony as to cause of death. 65 ALR3d 283.\nEvidence offered by defendant at federal criminal trial as inadmissible, under Rule 403 of Federal Rules of Evidence, on ground that probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. 76 AIR Fed. 700.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 468 (NCI4th)\u2014 noncapital murder \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in a noncapital murder prosecution by not intervening ex mero mo tu in the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument where defendant contended that the prosecutor\u2019s argument contained misstatements of law, matters not in evidence, and personal opinions injected solely to arouse the passions of the jury, but the prosecutor\u2019s argument was not so grossly improper as to require the trial judge to intervene ex mero mo tu during the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 555, 566, 609, 648.\nPropriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor\u2019s argument to jury indicating his belief or knowledge as to guilt of accused \u2014 modern state cases. 88 ALR3d 449.\n7. Homicide \u00a7 727 (NCI4th)\u2014 felony murder \u2014 underlying conviction \u2014 failure to arrest \u2014 error\nThe trial court erred in a noncapital murder prosecution which resulted solely in felony murder convictions by failing to arrest judgments on the underlying convictions for kidnapping.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 72; Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1427, 1428.\nApplication of felony-murder doctrine where the felony relied upon is an includible offense with the homicide. 40 ALR3d 1341.\nWhat felonies are inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life for purposes of felony-murder doctrine. 50 ALR3d 397.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 1237 (NCI4th)\u2014 sentencing \u2014 credit for assistance in obtaining guilty pleas \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant for noncapital first-degree murder, burglary, and larceny by failing to give sufficient credit for the assistance defendant gave the State that enabled the State to secure guilty pleas from defendant\u2019s codefendants where the trial court sentenced defendant to the mandatory minimum for his first-degree murder convictions, consolidated several convictions for judgment, and gave minimum or presumptive sentences for those convictions.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 1760.\nWhat constitutes playing \u201cmitigating role\u201d in offense allowing decrease in offense level under United States Sentencing Guideline sec. 3B1.2, 18 USCS Appendix. 100 ALR Fed. 156.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from two judgments imposing sentences of life imprisonment entered by Strickland, J., at the 16 January 1995 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Onslow County, upon jury verdicts of guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to additional judgments was allowed 12 February 1996. Heard in the Supreme Court 10 September 1996.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Jill Ledford Cheek, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMargaret Creasy Ciardellafor defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0568-01", "first_page_order": 600, "last_page_order": 614 }