{
  "id": 53851,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAMONT ARMSTRONG",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Armstrong",
  "decision_date": "1996-12-06",
  "docket_number": "No. 41A96",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:52:16.077233+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Justice Frye did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAMONT ARMSTRONG"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nDefendant was tried noncapitally for the first-degree murder of Ernestine Crowder Compton. The jury found defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to a mandatory term of life imprisonment.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show that on 9 July 1988 defendant asked Charles Blackwell to give him a ride to the victim\u2019s house so that defendant could borrow money from her. Blackwell testified that he drove defendant to the house and sat on the front porch while defendant went inside. Blackwell went inside when he heard, defendant and the victim arguing. The victim told defendant he could not borrow more money until he repaid what he already owed her. Upon hearing this, defendant grabbed the victim by the neck and pushed her to the ground. Blackwell testified that he left at this point and told defendant that he should leave as well. Defendant caught up with him outside the house a short time later. After they were back in Blackwell\u2019s vehicle, defendant pulled from his pocket some money and a watch he had taken from the victim.\nTimothy McCorkle testified that he saw Blackwell and defendant parked in front of the victim\u2019s house. According to McCorkle, defendant went in the house while McCorkle talked to Blackwell. McCorkle left briefly, and when he returned, he saw Blackwell and defendant running out of the victim\u2019s house. He heard Blackwell, who came out first, say \u201cDamn Lamont.\u201d\nWilliam Davis testified that he had been incarcerated with defendant in Asheville in 1992 and later in McLeansville. Davis stated that defendant was concerned that his codefendant, Blackwell, was \u201ctrying to snitch on him\u201d in exchange for money. Defendant told Davis that he went to the victim\u2019s house to borrow money but got into a struggle with her when she refused to advance him a loan. Defendant put a drop cord around the victim\u2019s neck while Blackwell searched the house. Defendant told Davis that he felt sure no one would believe he had committed the crime because the victim was his mother\u2019s close friend.\nWayne Blockem also testified for the State. Blockem was serving a prison sentence at the time of defendant\u2019s trial and had shared a holding cell with defendant and Charles Blackwell. According to Blockem, while he and defendant were alone in the cell, defendant had talked about the murder, imparting more information than anyone not present at the murder scene should have known. Defendant told Blockem that he \u201chad sense enough to do it by [him]self,\u201d that the investigating officer was wrong when he said where various items were located in the victim\u2019s house, and that he (defendant) was going to be \u201cproof that he beat the system.\u201d\nDefendant also presented evidence at trial. His first witness, Dolphus Cates, testified that he had been incarcerated with Blackwell and that Blackwell had told him defendant did not have anything to do with the murder. Defendant\u2019s brother, Kermit Armstrong, testified as well. He stated that if defendant needed money, he could have gotten it from their parents. Defendant would not have attempted to borrow money from the victim because she was a close friend of defendant\u2019s mother and would have reported defendant\u2019s activities to her. Finally, defendant testified in his own behalf. He maintained that he knew nothing about the murder, was at a Winston-Salem barber shop at the time, and fully cooperated with the investigation. He further maintained that he had met Blackwell in prison and had not associated with him outside of jail. He said he knew nothing of the victim\u2019s practice of loaning money and that he had never borrowed from her.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss made at the close of all the evidence. Defendant does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that the crime of first-degree murder was committed but contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was the perpetrator. We disagree.\nThe question presented on such a motion is whether, upon consideration of all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is substantial evidence that the crime charged in the bill of indictment was committed and that defendant was the perpetrator. State v. Franklin, 327 N.C. 162, 171, 393 S.E.2d 781, 787 (1990). Substantial evidence is that amount of \u201crelevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 583-84, 461 S.E.2d 655, 663 (1995). \u201cIf there is substantial evidence \u2014 whether direct, circumstantial, or both \u2014 to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.\u201d State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 382-83 (1988).\nReview of the record reveals that the State presented plenary evidence to support a finding that defendant was the perpetrator of the murder of Ernestine Compton. Charles Blackwell testified that he drove defendant to the victim\u2019s house and that he was present when defendant began to attack the victim physically. Timothy McCorkle placed defendant at the scene of the crime, testifying that he saw defendant enter the victim\u2019s house about the time of the murder and exit a short while later. William Davis testified that defendant told him that he went to the victim\u2019s house to borrow money, got into a struggle with the victim when she refused to advance him a loan, and consequently put a drop cord around her neck. Wayne Blockem testified that defendant talked about the murder, imparting more information than anyone not present at the murder scene should have known, and that defendant said that he \u201chad sense enough to do it by [him]self,\u201d and was going to be \u201cproof that he beat the system.\u201d\nConfronted with this testimony, defendant nevertheless argues that the State\u2019s physical evidence did not link him to the murder scehe. The existence of inculpatory physical evidence is not a requirement for overcoming a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, however. Rather, contradictions, discrepancies, and omissions are for the jury to resolve. The evidence presented here, considered cumulatively and in the light most favorable to the State, clearly permitted a jury to find that a crime was committed and that defendant was the perpetrator. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, and this assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Joseph Whitt of the Greensboro Police Homicide Unit to testify about the frequency of finding identifiable fingerprints. Detective Whitt testified on direct examination that it was common not to find identifiable fingerprints at a crime scene. Defendant contends that in admitting this testimony, the trial court erroneously permitted Detective Whitt to give his opinion without first qualifying him as an expert. We conclude that Detective Whitt\u2019s testimony was nothing more than a statement of fact which his employment and experience qualified him to give. We therefore find no merit to defendant\u2019s argument.\nBy his last assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Whitt to testify as to whether a suspect\u2019s blood was left at the crime scene. Defendant contends the testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial. Our review of the transcripts convinces us that defendant misapprehends the nature of Detective Whitt\u2019s testimony and that considering its intended meaning, the testimony was admissible.\nDetective Whitt testified that he requested that bloodied items recovered from the crime scene be tested for a possible DNA match with blood samples from defendant and Charles Blackwell. He stated that he did not have any reason to suspect that the perpetrator shed blood in the house, only that he wanted the test performed. The witness was merely explaining that his request to have DNA comparisons made of various blood samples found at the scene was routine and not based on any particular expectation or belief that the perpetrator\u2019s blood was in fact left at the scene. He was not speculating about the actual presence of blood, as defendant contends. The testimony was the foundation for the introduction of several of the State\u2019s exhibits; as such, it was clearly relevant and admissible. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error on these grounds is overruled.\nWe conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.\nJustice Frye did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WHICHARD, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Norma S. Harrell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.",
      "Henry E. Frye, Jr., for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAMONT ARMSTRONG\nNo. 41A96\n(Filed 6 December 1996)\n1. Homicide \u00a7 226 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 defendant as perpetrator \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State presented plenary evidence to support a jury finding that defendant was the perpetrator of a first-degree murder where a witness testified that he drove defendant to the victim\u2019s house and that he was present when defendant began to attack the victim physically; a second witness testified that he saw defendant enter the victim\u2019s house about the time of the murder and exit a short while later; a third witness testified that defendant told him that he went to the victim\u2019s house to borrow money, got into a struggle with the victim when she refused to advance him a loan, and consequently put a drop cord around her neck; and another witness testified that defendant talked about the murder, imparting more information than anyone not present at the murder scene should have known, and that defendant said that he \u201chad the sense to do it by [him]self\u201d and was going to be \u201cproof that he beat the system.\u201d\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 425 et seq.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2055 (NCI4th)\u2014 absence of fingerprints \u2014 detective\u2019s qualifications\nA detective\u2019s testimony that it was common not to find identifiable fingerprints at a crime scene was nothing more than a statement of fact which his employment and experience qualified him to give without his being qualified as an expert.\nAm Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 279 et seq.\nFingerprints, palm prints, or bare footprints as evidence. 28 ALR2d 1115.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2054 (NCI4th)\u2014 request for DNA testing of bloodied items \u2014 not speculation about perpetrator\u2019s blood \u2014 admissibility as foundation for exhibits\nA detective did not improperly speculate about the actual presence of the perpetrator\u2019s blood at the crime scene by his testimony that he requested that bloodied items recovered from the crime scene be tested for a possible DNA match with blood samples from defendant and a codefendant and that he did not have any reason to suspect that the perpetrator shed blood in the victim\u2019s house, and this testimony was admissible as the foundation for the introduction of several of the State\u2019s exhibits.\nAm Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7 300.\nAdmissibility of DNA identification evidence. 84 ALR4th 313.\nJustice Frye did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAppeal of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Freeman, J., at the 14 August 1995 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Guilford County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 November 1996.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Norma S. Harrell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nHenry E. Frye, Jr., for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0161-01",
  "first_page_order": 215,
  "last_page_order": 220
}