{
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  "name": "ROGER FRED SOUTHERLAND, Plaintiff v. B.V. HEDRICK GRAVEL & SAND COMPANY, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Carrier",
  "name_abbreviation": "Southerland v. B.V. Hedrick Gravel & Sand Co.",
  "decision_date": "1997-04-11",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:52:16.077233+00:00",
  "provenance": {
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "ROGER FRED SOUTHERLAND, Plaintiff v. B.V. HEDRICK GRAVEL & SAND COMPANY, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Carrier"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nThis case involves the liability of defendant-contractor for a workers\u2019 compensation claim filed by plaintiff-subcontractor as the result of an on-the-job injury suffered by the subcontractor on 12 December 1990. The injury resulted from plaintiffs fall at a construction site in Asheville while he was engaged in the performance of roofing work under a subcontract with Buncombe Construction Company, Inc. (Buncombe), a subsidiary of defendant B.V. Hedrick Gravel & Sand Company. Plaintiff fell approximately thirty-three feet from a masonry wall to a concrete floor below. He sustained injuries to his left foot, left leg, pelvis, teeth, left ear, left wrist, left arm, and left shoulder and was out of work from 12 December 1990 through 18 March 1991.\nAt the time of his injury, plaintiff was an independent subcontractor of Buncombe, the general contractor on the project. Plaintiff, d/b/a Southern Construction Company, entered into a contract with Buncombe to perform the installation of a standing seam roof system with miscellaneous trims and accessories, including all equipment and labor on the project. The contract provided that the subcontractor would carry workers\u2019 compensation insurance at his own expense and furnish a certificate of insurance to the general contractor prior to commencing work under the contract. Prior to entering into this contract, plaintiff advised Buncombe that he maintained workers\u2019 compensation insurance coverage, but he did not provide Buncombe with a certificate of insurance, nor did Buncombe obtain a certificate from any other source.\nPlaintiff filed a claim with his workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier, which was denied because the policy covered his employees but did not cover plaintiff. He also filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim with Buncombe\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier, which was denied. Plaintiff then filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim with the Industrial Commission. The claim was heard before Deputy Commissioner Tamara R. Nance upon stipulated facts and stipulated documentary evidence. In her conclusions of law based upon the stipulated record, Deputy Commissioner Nance concluded:\n1. Plaintiff\u2019s contractual agreement to carry workers\u2019 compensation insurance at his own expense did not constitute a written waiver of his right to coverage under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19.\n2. Defendants\u2019 argument that by contracting with plaintiff to the effect that plaintiff shall furnish a certificate of insurance, defendants \u201crequired\u201d from plaintiff a certificate of insurance and therefore satisfied N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19, regardless of whether defendants ever actually received a certificate from plaintiff, is without merit. The undersigned is of the opinion that the word \u201crequire\u201d in this instance means in fact actually obtain a certificate.\n3. Even though a certificate of insurance would not have shown that plaintiff failed to elect to cover himself as a sole proprietor, and even though plaintiff had complied with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-93 by having coverage for his employees, the undersigned is of the opinion that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 must be strictly construed, and that by failing to require and obtain a certificate of insurance from plaintiff, defendants are liable for all compensation and benefits due under the Act for plaintiff\u2019s injury by accident.\nBased upon these conclusions of law, Deputy Commissioner Nance awarded plaintiff workers\u2019 compensation benefits under the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 (as in effect between 5 August 1987 and 10 June 1996). Defendants appealed to the full Commission, and on 8 February 1995, the Commission affirmed, adopting the holding of the deputy commissioner as its own. Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals, in a unanimous decision, vacated the Commission\u2019s opinion and award, holding\nthat plaintiff, a sole proprietor, failed to elect to be included as an employee under the workers\u2019 compensation coverage of his business. Consequently, plaintiff has not established that an employer-employee relationship existed, at the time of injury either by electing coverage under G.S. \u00a7 97-2(2), or by being an employee under G.S. \u00a7 97-19. Therefore, because no employer-employee relationship existed the Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff\u2019s claim and we vacate the Commission\u2019s opinion and award.\nSoutherland v. B.V. Hedrick Gravel & Sand Co., 123 N.C. App. 120, 124, 472 S.E.2d 216, 219-20 (1996). We allowed plaintiff\u2019s petition for discretionary review.\nThis case involves the interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 as it existed at the time of plaintiff\u2019s injury, 12 December 1990. We note that this statute, enacted in 1929, was amended several times prior to the 1987 amendment that controls this case. The statute was also amended in 1989, 1991, 1994, 1995, and 1996. However, the sole issue before this Court is whether N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 (as in effect between 5 August 1987 and 10 June 1996) extends workers\u2019 compensation benefits to subcontractors under the same conditions as it extends coverage to employees of subcontractors, thereby giving the Industrial Commission jurisdiction over a claim by plaintiff, a subcontractor, which arose on 12 December 1990. We hold that it does, and therefore, we must reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\n\u201cIn resolving issues of statutory construction, we look first to the language of the statute itself.\u201d Hieb v. Lowery, 344 N.C. 403, 409, 474 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1996). It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that \u201c \u2018[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\u2019 \u201d State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 152, 209 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1974) (quoting 7 Strong\u2019s North Carolina Index 2d Statutes \u00a7 5 (1968)).\nPrior to the 1987 amendment, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 specifically provided in pertinent part:\nAny . . . contractor . . . who shall sublet any contract for the performance of any work without requiring from such subcontractor or obtaining from the Industrial Commission a certificate, issued by the Industrial Commission, stating that such subcontractor has complied with G.S. 97-93 [requiring that employers carry workers\u2019 compensation insurance] . . . shall be liable ... to the same extent as such subcontractor would be if he were subject to the provisions of this Article for the payment of compensation and other benefits under this Article on account of the injury or death of any employee of such subcontractor due to an accident arising out of and in the course of the performance of the work covered by such subcontract. If the . . . contractor . . . shall obtain such certificate at the time of subletting such contract to subcontractor, he shall not thereafter be held liable to any employee of such subcontractor for compensation or other benefits under this Article.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 (1985) (emphasis added). This statute was interpreted by our Court of Appeals to protect the employees of a subcontractor, not the subcontractor himself. Doud v. K&G Janitorial Servs., 69 N.C. App. 205, 316 S.E.2d 664, disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 492, 322 S.E.2d 554 (1984). However, the General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19, effective 5 August 1987, by inserting \u201cany such subcontractor, any principal or partner of such subcontractor or\u201d in the first and second sentences of the first paragraph of the statute immediately preceding the phrase \u201cany employee of such contractor.\u201d Act of Aug. 5, 1987, ch. 729, sec. 4, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 1335, 1337-38 (amending the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act). The amended statute, as in effect on the date of plaintiff\u2019s accident, reads in pertinent part as follows:\nAny . . . contractor . . . who shall sublet any contract for the performance of any work without requiring from such subcontractor or obtaining from the Industrial Commission a certificate, issued by the Industrial Commission, stating that such subcontractor has complied with G.S. 97-93 [requiring that employers carry workers\u2019 compensation insurance] . . . shall be liable ... to the same extent as such subcontractor would be if he were subject to the provisions of this Article for the payment of compensation and other benefits under this Article on account of the injury or death of any such subcontractor, any principal or partner of such subcontractor or any employee of such subcontractor due to an accident arising out of and in the course of the performance of the work covered by such subcontract. If the . . . contractor . . . shall obtain such certificate at the time of subletting such contract to subcontractor, he shall not thereafter be held liable to any such subcontractor, any principal or partner of such subcontractor or any employee of such subcontractor for compensation or other benefits under this Article.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). The 1987 amendment clearly extended the class of persons protected by this provision to include not only employees of the subcontractor but also the subcontractor himself. Because the language of the statute itself is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and we must give it its plain and definite meaning.\nIn the instant case, prior to the time of subcontracting the performance of the roofing work, the general contractor, Buncombe, did not require from the subcontractor, plaintiff, a certificate of insurance, and Buncombe did not obtain from the Industrial Commission a certificate stating that plaintiff had complied with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-93. Therefore, having failed to require or to obtain a certificate, Buncombe may be held liable for plaintiffs injuries, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 as it existed at the time of plaintiff\u2019s accident. We note that this is the result reached by Deputy Commissioner Nance and by the Industrial Commission, the agency charged with carrying out the responsibilities of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Since plaintiff is a member of the class of subcontractors entitled to individual coverage under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 as it existed at the time of his accident, the statute extended workers\u2019 compensation benefits to plaintiff under the same conditions as it extended coverage to plaintiff\u2019s employees. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s claim.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, which vacated the opinion and award entered by the Industrial Commission.\nREVERSED.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "FRYE, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Scott E. Jarvis & Associates, by Scott E. Jarvis, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Russell & King, RA., by Gene Thomas Leicht, for defendantappellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "ROGER FRED SOUTHERLAND, Plaintiff v. B.V. HEDRICK GRAVEL & SAND COMPANY, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Carrier\nNo. 331PA96\n(Filed 11 April 1997)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 46 (NCI4th)\u2014 injury to subcontractor \u2014 insurance certificate not obtained by general contractor \u2014 liability of general contractor\nThe Court of Appeals erred by holding that the Industrial Commission lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff s workers\u2019 compensation claim where plaintiff fell while doing roofing work under a subcontract; plaintiff\u2019s contract for the work required that the subcontractor carry workers\u2019 compensation insurance and furnish a certificate of insurance to the general contractor; plaintiff advised the general contractor that he maintained workers\u2019 compensation insurance but did not provide a certificate and the general contractor did not obtain a certificate from any other source; plaintiff\u2019s claim was denied by his carrier because the policy covered his employees but did not cover him; plaintiff\u2019s claim with the general contractor\u2019s carrier was denied; plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial Commission and the Commission awarded benefits; and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that no employer-employee relationship existed and that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous; a 1987 amendment to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 clearly extended the class of persons protected by this provision to include not only employees of the subcontractor but also the subcontractor himself, thereby giving the Industrial Commission jurisdiction (under the version of the statute then in effect) over a claim by a subcontractor. In this case, -the general contractor did not require from the subcontractor a certificate or obtain a certificate from the Industrial Commission and may be held liable for plaintiffs injuries.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 143-145, 166, 171, 172, 228, 229.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 123 N.C. App. 120, 472 S.E.2d 216 (1996), vacating an opinion and award entered 8 February 1995 by the Industrial Commission. Heard in the Supreme Court 18 March 1997.\nScott E. Jarvis & Associates, by Scott E. Jarvis, for plaintiff-appellant.\nRussell & King, RA., by Gene Thomas Leicht, for defendantappellees.\n. While the disposition line of the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion reads \u201cvacated and reversed,\u201d in fact the opinion only vacated the Commission\u2019s opinion and award on grounds of lack of jurisdiction."
  },
  "file_name": "0739-01",
  "first_page_order": 793,
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}
