{ "id": 139668, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN THOMAS MACON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Macon", "decision_date": "1997-05-09", "docket_number": "No. 146A96", "first_page": "109", "last_page": "118", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "346 N.C. 109" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "88 ALR3d 449", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "126 L. Ed. 2d 341", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "510 U.S. 948", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 231682, 233093, 235270, 233531, 235692, 232590, 231374, 230994, 230899, 232630, 234584, 234875, 235740, 233052 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/510/0948-14", "/us/510/0948-04", "/us/510/0948-12", "/us/510/0948-11", "/us/510/0948-13", "/us/510/0948-10", "/us/510/0948-08", "/us/510/0948-09", "/us/510/0948-01", "/us/510/0948-06", "/us/510/0948-07", "/us/510/0948-02", "/us/510/0948-03", "/us/510/0948-05" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549203 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867676 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818-19", "parenthetical": "defendant's threats to victim shortly before the murder admissible to show victim's then-existing state of mind" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498848 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "defendant's threats to victim shortly before the murder admissible to show victim's then-existing state of mind" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 L. Ed. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "511 U.S. 1046", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1147849, 1147210, 1147863, 1146680, 1147006 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/511/1046-04", "/us/511/1046-02", "/us/511/1046-03", "/us/511/1046-05", "/us/511/1046-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301-02", "parenthetical": "state of mind relevant to show a stormy relationship between victim and defendant prior to the murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531078 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637", "parenthetical": "state of mind relevant to show a stormy relationship between victim and defendant prior to the murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "927", "parenthetical": "conversations relating directly to victim's fear of defendant admissible under the state-of-mind exception to show the nature of victim's relationship with defendant and the impact of defendant's behavior on victim's state of mind prior to her murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867565 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76", "parenthetical": "conversations relating directly to victim's fear of defendant admissible under the state-of-mind exception to show the nature of victim's relationship with defendant and the impact of defendant's behavior on victim's state of mind prior to her murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798758 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549787 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "469 S.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" }, { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798977 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2519607 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500856 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2398536 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530965 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571554 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 L. Ed. 2d 78", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 839", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11992065, 11991511, 11991589, 11992134, 11991687, 11991848, 11991914, 11991307, 11991372, 11991758, 11991442, 11991091, 11991990, 11991158 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0839-13", "/us/469/0839-06", "/us/469/0839-07", "/us/469/0839-14", "/us/469/0839-08", "/us/469/0839-10", "/us/469/0839-11", "/us/469/0839-03", "/us/469/0839-04", "/us/469/0839-09", "/us/469/0839-05", "/us/469/0839-01", "/us/469/0839-12", "/us/469/0839-02" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2399643 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497335 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525245 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" }, { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549971 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 892, "char_count": 22903, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.976301182573949e-07, "percentile": 0.8506874339005864 }, "sha256": "ef630fada5703189b1a9f2f505afc1d4f8c9a9e74401ba26903f4bd9ecc8c67d", "simhash": "1:4f471122557c1475", "word_count": 3764 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:49:00.247328+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN THOMAS MACON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nDefendant, John Thomas Macon, was properly indicted for kidnapping and murder in the first degree of Donna Inman Macon. In the District Court, Randolph County, defendant was tried and convicted of assault by pointing a gun at Phillip Ray Inman. He appealed this conviction to the Superior Court, Randolph County, and the assault charge was tried with the kidnapping and murder charges. Defendant was tried capitally to a jury at the 17 October 1995 Criminal Session of Superior Court. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder by lying in wait, guilty of assault by pointing a gun, and not guilty of kidnapping. Judge L. Todd Burke determined that there were no aggravating circumstances to submit to the jury and thus sentenced defendant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction. Defendant was also sentenced to a concurrent six-month sentence for the assault conviction. Defendant appeals to this Court as of right from the first-degree murder conviction; his motion to bypass the Court of Appeals on the assault conviction was allowed.\nOn appeal to this Court, defendant brings forward four assignments of error. After reviewing the record, transcript, briefs, and oral arguments of counsel in this case, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence presented at trial tended to show the following facts and circumstances. The victim, Donna Inman Macon, and defendant had been married for approximately five years before they separated in March 1994. On 17 March 1994, the victim and defendant separated, and the victim moved into the home of her father, Phillip Inman (Mr. Inman), and his wife, Mary Ethel Inman (Mrs. Inman). The victim and Mrs. Inman worked together at Graybrier Nursing Home in Archdale.\nOn Sunday, 10 April 1994, Mr. Inman drove to the nursing home at 12:50 a.m. to pick up his wife and daughter from work. As his daughter was getting into the automobile, defendant suddenly appeared, grabbed her by the neck, and held a gun to her head. Defendant \u201cstuck\u201d the gun in Mr. Inman\u2019s face, and defendant told Mr. Inman to back off or he would blow Mr. Inman\u2019s head off. As Mr. Inman backed away from defendant, he pleaded with defendant to put the gun down. The victim struggled as defendant, with the gun to victim\u2019s head, forced her back toward the entrance of the nursing home. When defendant and the victim reached the front door of the nursing home, defendant was talking to her and the gun discharged. The victim fell on the grass, and defendant ran toward the road. Mr. Inman testified that about one minute elapsed between the time the victim exited the building and the shooting. The victim died as a result of a single gunshot wound to the right side of her head.\nAt the conclusion of the State\u2019s case, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. After the court held the jury instruction conference, it informed defendant that he would not be allowed to make the final argument to the jury because he had introduced evidence when he cross-examined a police officer about his statement to police. Defendant argued that he had already told the court that he would not introduce any evidence and excepted to the court\u2019s ruling. In light of the court\u2019s ruling on the closing argument, defendant requested that he be allowed to put on evidence. The motion was allowed, and defendant introduced evidence tending to show his relationship with the victim and her family and rumors of threats made by the victim, her family members, and a friend against defendant\u2019s life. Defendant also introduced evidence of the dramatic change in his demeanor after the separation. Defendant did not testify at trial.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss made at the close of all the evidence.\nBy an assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in not allowing him the final argument to the jury. We disagree.\n\u201cRule 10 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts states that \u2018if no evidence is introduced by the defendant, the right to open and close the argument to the jury shall belong to him.\u2019 \u201d State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 31, 446 S.E.2d 252, 268 (1994), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995). In State v. Hall, 57 N.C. App. 561, 291 S.E.2d 812 (1982), Judge (now Justice) Webb noted:\n[W]e believe the proper test as to whether an object has been put in evidence is whether a party has offered it as substantive evidence or so that the jury may examine it and determine whether it illustrates, corroborates, or impeaches the testimony of the witness.\nId. at 564, 291 S.E.2d at 814.\nIn the instant case, Officer Mickey Denny of the Archdale Police Department testified on direct examination by the State as to the sequence of the investigation of the victim\u2019s death, including testimony about the crime scene and a search of defendant\u2019s home. Officer Denny also testified about letters found during a search of defendant\u2019s home. The letters, which were subsequently identified as being authored by defendant, tended to show that defendant planned to kill the victim. Officer Denny read these letters to the jury.\nOn cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Officer Denny about the complete details of the investigation. Defense counsel asked Denny if he and another officer spoke with defendant on 11 April 1994 shortly after the shooting and if the other officer had made notes of the interview. After Officer Denny indicated that the other officer had taken notes of that interview, defense counsel asked Officer Denny to read those notes to the jury. The State objected to the reading of the notes to the jury on the grounds that defendant had not testified and the statement was \u201cself-serving.\u201d The trial court overruled the State\u2019s objection and allowed defense counsel to question Officer Denny regarding the statement defendant gave to the police during the interview. Officer Denny testified from the notes of another officer, who actually conducted the interrogation. The notes were marked as an exhibit but were not offered into evidence and were not published to the jury.\nAt the conclusion of the State\u2019s case-in-chief, defense counsel notified the trial court that defendant would not be offering any evidence. The trial court ruled that when Officer Denny read the notes to the jury, defendant had offered evidence, and therefore, defendant could not have the final argument to the jury. Defendant excepted to the court\u2019s ruling and then requested that he be allowed to \u201cput forth further evidence.\u201d The trial court granted defendant\u2019s request and allowed him to present additional evidence.\nDefendant argues that, based on the court\u2019s erroneous conclusion that he had offered evidence through the testimony of Officer Denny, he was deprived of his substantial legal right to make the final argument to the jury. Defendant argues that the statement simply gave more information about the investigation and that it neither impeached Officer Denny\u2019s veracity nor illustrated or corroborated his testimony. Thus, defendant argues that he had not \u201coffered\u201d evidence at that point. We conclude, however, that the testimony of Officer Denny regarding the notes taken during the interview of defendant following the shooting was actually offered into evidence; thus, defendant lost his right to open and close jury argument. See Skipper, 337 N.C. at 31, 446 S.E.2d at 269; State v. Reeb, 331 N.C. 159, 180, 415 S.E.2d 362, 374 (1992); State v. Hinson, 310 N.C. 245, 257, 311 S.E.2d 256, 264, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839, 83 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1984); State v. Knight, 261 N.C. 17, 30, 134 S.E.2d 101, 109 (1964).\nDuring defendant\u2019s cross-examination of Officer Denny, and before the State had presented any evidence regarding defendant\u2019s postarrest statement to police, defense counsel asked Officer Denny to read notes of defendant\u2019s statement to the police given shortly after the shooting. Although the writing was not itself introduced into evidence by defendant, Officer Denny\u2019s reading of its contents to the jury satisfies the requirement in Rule 10 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts that evidence has to be introduced by defendant in order to deprive him of the opening and closing arguments to the jury. The jury received the contents of defendant\u2019s statement as substantive evidence without any limiting instruction, not for corroborative or impeachment purposes, as defendant did not testify at trial and the statement did not relate in any way to Officer Denny. Therefore, we reject defendant\u2019s assignment of error.\nBy another assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court deprived him of his federal and state constitutional rights to present a defense when it excluded evidence of alleged threats and misconduct directed toward him by the victim, her family members, and a friend. The court excluded this evidence on the ground that it was irrelevant.\nDefendant argues that this evidence was relevant to show why defendant felt that he needed to carry a gun with him when he was going to see the victim and to show defendant\u2019s state of mind as it related to premeditation and deliberation. We agree.\nEvidence is relevant if it has \u201cany tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (1992). Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 402 (1992). We have said that \u201cin a criminal case every circumstance calculated to throw any light upon the supposed crime is admissible and permissible.\u201d State v. Collins, 335 N.C. 729, 735, 440 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1994). This Court has also said that\nit is not required that the evidence bear directly on the question in issue, and it is competent and relevant if it is one of the circumstances surrounding the parties, and necessary to be known to properly understand their conduct or motives, or to weigh the reasonableness of their contentions.\nState v. Stanley, 310 N.C. 353, 365, 312 S.E.2d 482, 490 (1984).\nIn the instant case, defendant sought to introduce evidence that the victim, her family members, and a friend had threatened defendant\u2019s life and that, for this reason, he carried a gun with him when he went to see the victim on the night of the shooting. We conclude that the evidence was relevant to explain defendant\u2019s conduct on the night of the shooting. The evidence was also relevant to rebut the State\u2019s contention that the fact that defendant carried a gun with him on the night of the shooting was evidence of premeditation and deliberation and of lying in wait. We therefore conclude that the evidence was competent and relevant to show the circumstances surrounding the parties, that it may have been helpful to properly understand the parties\u2019 conduct or motives, and that it would have been helpful to the jury in weighing the reasonableness of defendant\u2019s contentions.\nHowever, the trial court may exclude relevant evidence \u201cif its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992). \u201cWhether to exclude relevant but prejudicial evidence under Rule 403 is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court.\u201d State v. Handy, 331 N.C. 515, 532, 419 S.E.2d 545, 554 (1992). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the alleged threats in this case. Since defendant was not relying upon self-defense or other legal provocation as a defense, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the admission of the proffered evidence would have substantially prejudiced the State and would have served only to delay the proceedings, to inflame the jury, or to confuse the issues. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence, and we reject this assignment of error.\nBy another assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting statements of the victim regarding her fear of defendant. Over defendant\u2019s objection, the trial court allowed two witnesses to testify that the victim said she thought defendant had made some \u201chang up\u201d calls and that she was afraid. Defendant argues that \u201c[t]here was no evidence that the defendant made the calls, and in any event, the victim\u2019s fear was not relevant to any issue in this particular case.\u201d Also, defendant argues that the evidence was improperly used to show his state of mind.\n\u201cHearsay testimony is not admissible except as provided by statute or by the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.\u201d State v. Wilson, 322 N.C. 117, 131-32, 367 S.E.2d 589, 597 (1988). In the instant case, the trial court found the statements admissible under Rule 803(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Rule 803(3) provides that \u201c[a] statement of the declarant\u2019s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health)\u201d is not excluded by the hearsay rule. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(3) (1992). Thus, evidence tending to show a declarant\u2019s then-existing state of mind is an exception to the hearsay rule. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(3); State v. Burke, 343 N.C. 129, 142, 469 S.E.2d 901, 907, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 136 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1996).\n\u201c[E]vidence tending to show the state of mind of the victim is admissible as long as the declarant\u2019s state of mind is relevant to the case.\u201d State v. Jones, 337 N.C. 198, 209, 446 S.E.2d 32, 38 (1994). \u201cIt is well established in North Carolina that a murder victim\u2019s statements falling within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule are highly relevant to show the status of the victim\u2019s relationship to the defendant.\u201d State v. Scott, 343 N.C. 313, 335, 471 S.E.2d 605, 618 (1996); see State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 76, 472 S.E.2d 920, 927 (1996) (conversations relating directly to victim\u2019s fear of defendant admissible under the state-of-mind exception to show the nature of victim\u2019s relationship with defendant and the impact of defendant\u2019s behavior on victim\u2019s state of mind prior to her murder); State v. McHone, 334 N.C. 627, 637, 435 S.E.2d 296, 301-02 (1993) (state of mind relevant to show a stormy relationship between victim and defendant prior to the murder), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046, 128 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1994); State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 222, 393 S.E.2d 811, 818-19 (1990) (defendant\u2019s threats to victim shortly before the murder admissible to show victim\u2019s then-existing state of mind).\nAssuming, as defendant contends, that neither the victim\u2019s state of mind nor the relationship of the victim and defendant is relevant to the shooting in this case, we nevertheless conclude that the admission of evidence that defendant may have made \u201chang up\u201d calls to the victim was not prejudicial error. The failure of a trial court to admit or exclude evidence will not result in the granting of a new trial absent a showing by the defendant that a reasonable possibility exists that a different result would have been reached absent the error. Burke, 343 N.C. at 142-43, 469 S.E.2d at 907; see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1988). In the instant case, defendant has failed to make such a showing. The State introduced at trial overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. The evidence clearly showed that when Mr. Inman arrived at the nursing home to pick up his wife and daughter from work, neither defendant nor defendant\u2019s automobile was anywhere in sight. Indeed, defendant\u2019s automobile was found in a nearby wooded area. Defendant suddenly appeared with a handgun and grabbed the victim by the neck, pointing the gun at her head. After shooting the victim, defendant fled towards the road where his automobile was found. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder based on the theory of lying in wait and rejected verdicts of guilty of first-degree murder based on theories of premeditation and deliberation and of felony murder. Defendant has not met his burden of showing that a reasonable possibility exists that a different result would have been reached absent the alleged error. Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.\nBy his final assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to sustain an objection to the prosecutor\u2019s argument. We disagree.\nDefendant objected to portions of the prosecutor\u2019s argument which he contends demeaned defense counsel and the defense. Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it overruled defendant\u2019s objection to these arguments. The prosecutor argued that it was not likely that defendant\u2019s automobile just happened to run out of gas in a wooded area near the place where he would soon kill his estranged wife. The prosecutor also argued that self-defense was not a defense in this case. Defendant argues on appeal that \u201c[t]he prosecutor\u2019s argument was a sarcastic swipe at [defense counsel] and the defense.\u201d\nWe conclude, however, that defendant has not shown error in this instance. \u201cThe arguments of counsel are left largely to the control and discretion of the trial judge, and counsel will be granted wide latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases.\u201d State v. Ocasio, 344 N.C. 568, 579, 476 S.E.2d 281, 287 (1996). \u201cCounsel are entitled to argue to the jury all the law and facts in evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, but may not place before the jury incompetent and prejudicial matters and may not travel outside the record by interjecting facts of their own knowledge or other facts not included in the evidence.\u201d State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 398, 428 S.E.2d 118, 144, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993).\nApplying these principles, the prosecutor\u2019s argument was well within the wide latitude allowed counsel in stating contentions and drawing inferences from the evidence. Further, the trial court instructed the jurors that if their recollection of the evidence differed from that of the court, the district attorney, or the defense attorney, they were to rely solely upon their recollection of the evidence in their deliberations. We conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling defendant\u2019s objections to the prosecutor\u2019s argument. Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s final assignment of error.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Francis W. Crawley, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Nora Henry Hargrove for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN THOMAS MACON\nNo. 146A96\n(Filed 9 May 1997)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 420 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 cross-examination\u2014 officer\u2019s reading of notes \u2014 introduction of evidence \u2014 loss of right to last argument\nAlthough an officer\u2019s notes taken during an interview of defendant following the shooting of defendant\u2019s estranged wife were not themselves introduced into evidence, the officer\u2019s reading of those notes to the jury during cross-examination by defendant constituted the introduction of evidence by defendant which deprived defendant of the right to make the final argument to the jury where the jury received the contents of defendant\u2019s statement as substantive evidence without any limiting instruction. Rule 10, General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 539-542.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 167 (NCI4th)\u2014 possession of gun \u2014 threats by victim and family \u2014 relevancy to rebut premeditation and deliberation \u2014 exclusion not prejudicial\nEvidence that a murder victim, her family members, and a friend had threatened defendant\u2019s life and that, for that reason, he carried a gun with him when he went to see the victim the night the victim was shot was relevant to explain defendant\u2019s . conduct on the night of the shooting and to rebut the State\u2019s contention that the fact defendant carried a gun with him was evidence of premeditation and deliberation. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the alleged threats where defendant did not rely upon self-defense or other legal provocation as a defense, and the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the admission of this evidence would have substantially prejudiced the State and would have served only to delay the proceedings, to inflame the jury, or to confuse the issues. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 340, 347.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 876 (NCI4th)\u2014 fear of defendant \u2014 state-of-mind hearsay exception \u2014 irrelevancy\u2014 admission not prejudicial\nEven if evidence of statements by a murder victim that she thought defendant had made some \u201chang-up\u201d calls and she was afraid was improperly admitted under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(3) because neither the victim\u2019s state of mind nor the relationship of the victim and defendant was relevant to the shooting in this case, the admission of this evidence was not prejudicial error where the State introduced overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder based on the theory of lying in wait, and defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that a reasonable possibility exists that a different result would have been reached absent the alleged error.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 556-558.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 467 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 murder case \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s arguments \u2014 proper contentions and inferences\nThe prosecutor\u2019s arguments in a first-degree murder prosecution that it was not likely that defendant\u2019s automobile just happened to run out of gas in a wooded area near the place where he would soon kill his estranged wife and that self-defense was not a defense in this case were well within the wide latitude allowed counsel in stating contentions and drawing inferences from the evidence and did not improperly demean the defense and defense counsel.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 632-639.\nPropriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor\u2019s argument to jury indicating his belief or knowledge as to guilt of accused \u2014 modern state cases. 88 ALR3d 449.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Burke, J., at the 17 October 1995 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Randolph County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to an additional judgment for assault was allowed 7 November 1996. Heard in the Supreme Court 20 March 1997.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Francis W. Crawley, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nNora Henry Hargrove for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0109-01", "first_page_order": 147, "last_page_order": 156 }