{ "id": 139412, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STACEY ANTHONY TYLER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Tyler", "decision_date": "1997-06-06", "docket_number": "No. 11A96", "first_page": "187", "last_page": "211", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "346 N.C. 187" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "63 ALR4th 478", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "88 ALR4th 8", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "66 ALR2d 1082", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "75 ALR4th 199", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "85 L. Ed. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 1009", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6232119 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/1009-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "death sentence proportionate for murder of elderly female where the jury found as the only aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4759870 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "death sentence proportionate for murder of elderly female where the jury found as the only aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 63", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "452 S.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "death sentence proportionate for murder of an acquaintance where the jury found as the only aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cmel" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518476 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "death sentence proportionate for murder of an acquaintance where the jury found as the only aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cmel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 526", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "death sentence proportionate for murder of a four-month-old child where the jury found as the only aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793195 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "death sentence proportionate for murder of a four-month-old child where the jury found as the only aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763650 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761257 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686205 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4758195 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569559 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53878 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694780 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741422 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 1254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39539 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/1254-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530367 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" }, { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 756", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1050", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5473, 5290, 5004, 5103, 4917 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1050-01", "/us/494/1050-04", "/us/494/1050-05", "/us/494/1050-03", "/us/494/1050-02" ] }, { "cite": "375 S.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486627 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 438", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790141 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "prosecutor stated he knew defendant \"was lying the minute he said that\" and referred to defendant as \"habitual storebreaker\" when nothing in the record supported such reference" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566320 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "prosecutor stated he knew defendant \"was lying the minute he said that\" and referred to defendant as \"habitual storebreaker\" when nothing in the record supported such reference" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68-70", "parenthetical": "prosecutor asserted defendant was \"lying through [his] teeth\" and \"playing with a perjury count\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572384 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214-18", "parenthetical": "prosecutor asserted defendant was \"lying through [his] teeth\" and \"playing with a perjury count\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2509584 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "improper to urge jury to convict defendant because other impaired drivers cause other accidents" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4688005 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "improper to urge jury to convict defendant because other impaired drivers cause other accidents" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "improper to urge jury to convict defendant in order to prevent him from killing again" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538619 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "improper to urge jury to convict defendant in order to prevent him from killing again" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 L. Ed. 2d 341", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "510 U.S. 948", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 231682, 233093, 235270, 233531, 235692, 232590, 231374, 230994, 230899, 232630, 234584, 234875, 235740, 233052 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/510/0948-14", "/us/510/0948-04", "/us/510/0948-12", "/us/510/0948-11", "/us/510/0948-13", "/us/510/0948-10", "/us/510/0948-08", "/us/510/0948-09", "/us/510/0948-01", "/us/510/0948-06", "/us/510/0948-07", "/us/510/0948-02", "/us/510/0948-03", "/us/510/0948-05" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549203 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793223 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572408 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518881 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 871", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720550 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778236 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505926 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" }, { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565367 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" }, { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559216 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 818", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515424 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0818-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567356 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 530", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12807 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 805", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6219632 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817" }, { "page": "653-54" }, { "page": "817, 820" }, { "page": "653, 655-56" }, { "page": "822" }, { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" }, { "page": "912" }, { "page": "911" }, { "page": "912" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558726 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" }, { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550409 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4697175 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 46", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187-89", "parenthetical": "trial court did not err by admitting two out-of-court statements of the victim's wife under Rule 804(b)(5)" }, { "page": "189", "parenthetical": "the residual hearsay exception does not qualify as firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes, so the trial court must search for circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558177 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435-39", "parenthetical": "trial court did not err by admitting two out-of-court statements of the victim's wife under Rule 804(b)(5)" }, { "page": "438-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 739", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759-60", "parenthetical": "the trial court did not err by allowing, under Rule 804(b)(5), testimony about statements the victim made and a letter she purportedly wrote to defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790245 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513-14", "parenthetical": "the trial court did not err by allowing, under Rule 804(b)(5), testimony about statements the victim made and a letter she purportedly wrote to defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 L. Ed. 2d 1077", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "trial court properly admitted statement under Rule 804(b)(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796117 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341-42", "parenthetical": "trial court properly admitted statement under Rule 804(b)(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2519607 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0117-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1677, "char_count": 56400, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5890961521823445e-07, "percentile": 0.8179142876669644 }, "sha256": "b9f66918f42de6a40e0d7546017cfa7acfc347895039e250aa9ddf456b45df91", "simhash": "1:4f6fc0b6360e8d52", "word_count": 9069 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:49:00.247328+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STACEY ANTHONY TYLER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nIn a capital trial, defendant, Stacey Anthony Tyler, was convicted by a jury of the first-degree murder of Mary Jennings Fleetwood. In a capital sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000, the jury recommended and the trial court imposed a sentence of death. For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that defendant\u2019s trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error and that the death sentence is not disproportionate. Accordingly, we uphold defendant\u2019s conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death.\nThe State\u2019s evidence presented at trial tended to show the following facts and circumstances. On numerous occasions, prior to and on 5 November 1993, defendant physically and emotionally abused and battered his girlfriend, Mary Jennings Fleetwood (Fleetwood). Several witnesses testified that this abuse included defendant\u2019s holding Fleetwood by the hair and hitting her in the face with his fist, throwing the full weight of his body on her, kicking her, yelling at her, calling her names, and threatening to kill her. Approximately six months prior to Fleetwood\u2019s death-causing injuries, Fleetwood threatened to call the police and have defendant removed from her home. Defendant told Fleetwood that when she got ready \u201cto go to work in the morning that she better take her clothes and take her children and that they better take their clothes, that he was going to burn the trailer down and said if they are in the trailer, he was going to burn their m \u2014 f-\u2014 a- up in the trailer too.\u201d On 5 November 1993, defendant carried out his threat when he poured gasoline on Fleetwood, set her on fire with a match, and watched her burn. Seventy-five percent of Fleetwood\u2019s skin was burned off her body. She was transported to a burn-trauma center at Sentara Norfolk General Hospital in Norfolk, Virginia, where she died fifteen days later.\nDefendant did not testify and did not present any evidence at trial.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss made at the close of the State\u2019s evidence. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder.\nAt defendant\u2019s capital sentencing proceeding, defendant presented evidence tending to show that he had worked for two years unloading produce trucks and that he had been a good employee. Defendant had been a confidential informant on drug activity for the Murfreesboro Police Department and had provided reliable information on four drug cases. Defendant also presented the testimony of Jean Stacy (Stacy), a nurse and a certified emergency medical technician who assisted in taking Fleetwood to the hospital. Stacy testified that Fleetwood did not want to go to the hospital on 5 November 1993 and that she did not mention any pain. She also testified that defendant had been burned on one or both arms. Further, defendant presented testimony tending to show that he had an alcohol-abuse problem.\nDefendant testified at the capital sentencing proceeding that he was teased as a child for his stuttering problem and because he was poor. His high-school years were difficult because his mother had died and he had been very close to her. He left high school due to depression over her death. He worked as a laborer and later worked unloading produce trucks. Defendant testified that he had adjusted to incarceration and that he had not been punished for any infractions while in prison. His only prior convictions were for driving while impaired. Defendant also testified that he had become a Christian while in prison.\nDefendant denied throwing gasoline on Fleetwood, hitting her, throwing his full body weight on her, calling her names, and threatening to kill her. Defendant testified that he pushed Fleetwood out the back of the trailer when she was on fire and that he helped her inside to the bathtub and turned on the water. Defendant admitted that Fleetwood had attempted to convince him to leave the trailer on several occasions, but he denied threatening to burn the trailer.\nAt the capital sentencing proceeding, the sole aggravating circumstance submitted to and found by the jury was that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9) (Supp. 1996). The jury considered the following statutory mitigating circumstances, rejecting all but the first: (1) defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(l); (2) defendant\u2019s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(6); (3) defendant\u2019s age at the time of this offense is a mitigating circumstance, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(7); and (4) the catchall mitigating circumstance, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(9). The jury also considered twenty-one nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, finding six to exist. The jury unanimously found that the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance and that the aggravating circumstance was sufficiently substantial to call for imposition of the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstances found by one or more of the jurors. Accordingly, the jury unanimously recommended and the trial court imposed a sentence of death. Defendant appeals to this Court as of right from the sentence of death, making twelve arguments based on twenty-one assignments of error.\nDefendant\u2019s most serious challenge to his conviction relates to the admission of evidence under the residual or \u201ccatchall\u201d exception to the hearsay rule. By six assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under North Carolina law by admitting, under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, evidence concerning the victim\u2019s incriminating responses to questions asked by a nurse, Donna Rosenfeld. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting Rosenfeld\u2019s testimony regarding out-of-court statements made by the victim prior to her death in which she identified defendant as the person who poured gasoline on her and set her on fire. Defendant claims that the circumstances surrounding the statements did not have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and that the trial court made improper findings in its determination of trustworthiness. Defendant contends that the trial court relied upon testimony by other witnesses about events leading up to the burning and about previous alleged wrongdoing by defendant in order to find circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, rather than on the inherent trustworthiness of the victim\u2019s nonverbal responses to questions.\nHearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1992). \u201cHearsay testimony is not admissible except as provided by statute or by the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.\u201d State v. Wilson, 322 N.C. 117, 131-32, 367 S.E.2d 589, 597 (1988). Rule 804(b)(5) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides for the admission of a hearsay statement when the declarant is unavailable and the statement is not covered by any specific exception but is determined to have \u201cequivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5) (1992); see State v. Chapman, 342 N.C. 330, 341-42, 464 S.E.2d 661, 667 (1995) (trial court properly admitted statement under Rule 804(b)(5)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1996); State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 513-14, 459 S.E.2d 747, 759-60 (1995) (the trial court did not err by allowing, under Rule 804(b)(5), testimony about statements the victim made and a letter she purportedly wrote to defendant), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 133 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1996); State v. Brown, 339 N.C. 426, 435-39, 451 S.E.2d 181, 187-89 (1994) (trial court did not err by admitting two out-of-court statements of the victim\u2019s wife under Rule 804(b)(5)), cert. denied, - U.S. \u2014, 133 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1995).\n\u201cIn State v. Triplett, 316 N.C. 1, 340 S.E.2d 736 (1986), this Court articulated the guidelines for admission of hearsay testimony under Rule 804(b)(5).\u201d State v. Peterson, 337 N.C. 384, 391, 446 S.E.2d 43, 48 (1994). In Triplett, this Court said that a trial court must consider the following factors in determining whether a hearsay statement sought to be admitted under Rule 804(b)(5) is trustworthy: (1) whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the underlying events, (2) the declarant\u2019s motivation to speak the truth or otherwise, (3) whether the declarant has ever recanted the statement, and (4) the practical availability of the declarant at trial for meaningful cross-examination. Triplett, 316 N.C. at 10-11, 340 S.E.2d at 742.\nIn the instant case, before witnesses were allowed to testify as to the victim\u2019s statements that defendant poured gasoline on her and set her on fire with a match, the trial court conducted a hearing on the admissibility of the statements. Following that hearing, the trial court concluded that this evidence fell within the residual hearsay exception of Rule 804(b)(5). In determining that the victim\u2019s hearsay statements possessed the necessary circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to allow their admission, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact:\n1. That the declarant, Mary Jennings Fleetwood, is unavailable as defined in N.C.G.S. section 804(A)4. And that the declarant is now deceased.\n2. That the State of North Carolina has provided the defendant with written notice of the State\u2019s intention to offer the declarant\u2019s statements sufficiently in advance of offering them to provide the defendant with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statements.\n3. That the hearsay statements are not specifically covered under the other exceptions of the hearsay rule.\n4. That the hearsay statements of the victim, Mary Jennings Fleetwood, possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to wit:\nL. On November 18, 1993, at 4:30 a.m. the victim awoke from a surgical procedure and became reoriented to space and time and that she could follow commands like nod your head and wiggle your toes.\nM. That the victim\u2019s attending physicians . . . and her nurses .. . noted in the medical records that the victim\u2019s mental and physical status had dramatically improved, to wit:\n1. On November 18, 1993, the victim became more alert and would nod her head appropriately to yes and no questions and follow commands. She appeared to have no post-operative anesthesia complications and her vital signs were stable.\n2. The victim continued to show significant neurological improvement and became more stable as the day passed.\n3. On November 19, 1993, the victim continued to remain neurologically intact. She was alert and answered questions appropriately by mouthing words in a soft whisper and by shaking or nodding her head.\n4. The victim could also move all extremities appropriately to commands.\nN. The victim\u2019s nurse, Donna Rosenfeld, R.N., who had observed the victim\u2019s progress and worked with the victim closely, felt that the victim was physically and mentally able to speak to law enforcement officers; therefore, when Ernest Sharpe from the Hertford County Sheriff\u2019s Department had come to interview the victim or [when] Chief Deputy Sharpe and Special Agent Kent Parrish of the SBI went to Sentara on November 19, 1993, that Nurse Donna Rosenfeld had been working with the victim all morning.\n[NO SECTION \u201cO\u201d]\nP. That Nurse Donna Rosenfeld assisted the officers in asking the following questions of the victim:\n1. The victim was told by Nurse Rosenfeld that police officers were here to speak to her and if it was okay for them to come in and the victim nodded her head, yes.\n2. The victim was asked if [defendant] had done this to her and after a 15-second hesitation the victim nodded her head, no.\n3. The victim was told that [defendant] was in jail and could not hurt her any longer and she was asked if she understood this and the victim nodded her head, yes.\nThe victim was asked if [defendant] and she had been fighting and the victim nodded her head, yes.\nThe victim was asked if [defendant] had thrown gasoline on her and the victim did not give any response. The victim was then told by Nurse Rosenfeld that they, meaning the police officers, had the clothes that she and [defendant] had been wearing. The victim was then asked did [defendant] throw gasoline on [her] and the victim nodded her head, yes.\nThe victim was then asked if [defendant] had thrown a match on her after pouring gasoline on her and the victim nodded her head, yes.\nQ. That after learning the defendant no longer posed a threat to herself or her children, the victim was motivated to speak the truth about how she was burned.\nR. That the victim ha[d] personal knowledge of circumstances under which she was burned.\n5. That the victim\u2019s statements identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the burning occurred on November 5, 1993, are evidence of material facts. [The statements are evidence of identity, malice, premeditation, and deliberation, and lack of accident.\n6. That the victim\u2019s statements are more probative on the issues of identity, malice, premeditation, and deliberation, and lack of accident, [than] any other evidence which the State can produce through reasonable efforts.\n7. That the general purposes of the Rules of Evidence in interest of justice will best be served by admission of these statements into evidence.\nBased upon its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that the declarant was unavailable because she is deceased; that the State provided timely written notice of its intention to offer the statements; that the hearsay statements were not specifically covered under the other hearsay exceptions; that the hearsay statements possessed circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; that the statements were material and more probative on the issues of identity, malice, premeditation, deliberation, and lack of accident than any other evidence which the prosecution could secure through reasonable efforts; and that justice would be served by admission of the statements into evidence.\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the victim\u2019s statements possessed the requisite circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to be admissible. In making this argument, defendant relies primarily upon this Court\u2019s decision in State v. Swindler, 339 N.C. 469, 450 S.E.2d 907 (1994). In Swindler, the trial court erred by admitting into evidence under the residual hearsay exception of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5) a jail inmate\u2019s letter to a detective concerning statements allegedly made by the defendant about the murder. In that case, we noted that: (1) the trial court failed to make any particularized findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding whether the letter possessed \u201cequivalent guarantees of trustworthiness\u201d; (2) the inmate had no personal knowledge of the events to which he referred in the letter; (3) the inmate was not motivated to speak the truth but rather to say what the police wanted to hear in order to make a deal; (4) while the inmate never recanted his statement, he refused to acknowledge at trial that he wrote the letter, that the letter was in his handwriting, or that he wrote the address on the envelope; (5) the inmate was unavailable because he refused to testify; (6) the letter contained many inaccuracies; (7) the inmate had the opportunity to obtain specific facts about the murder without actually talking with defendant because he was in the courtroom during defendant\u2019s probable cause hearing; and (8) the trial court improperly considered corroborating evidence to support the letter\u2019s trustworthiness. Id. at 475, 450 S.E.2d at 911. Since the author of the letter was not subject to full and effective cross-examination by the defendant, the defendant\u2019s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated by its admission, and the State failed to show that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since the letter contained the only evidence of the defendant\u2019s motive to kill the victim, the letter provided the greatest evidence of premeditation and deliberation, and the letter contained the most specific admission of the defendant\u2019s guilt. Id. at 476, 450 S.E.2d at 912. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from Swindler.\nIn the instant case, the trial court found that Fleetwood\u2019s statements contained sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible. Fleetwood had personal knowledge of the circumstances under which she was burned. There was no indication that she had any reason to tell anything other than the truth about this matter after learning that defendant was in jail and could no longer hurt her or her children. Nor is there any indication that Fleetwood ever recanted this statement. Finally, the trial court determined that Fleetwood was unavailable because she was deceased at the time of trial. We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the victim\u2019s statements possessed circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Accordingly, we find no error in the admission of the victim\u2019s hearsay statements under Rule 804(b)(5).\nWe next consider whether admitting the statements implicated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant contends, as did the defendant in Swindler, that the trial court erred in relying upon corroborative evidence in admitting the victim\u2019s statements at trial. We agree with defendant\u2019s contention, but we nevertheless conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe United States Supreme Court has stated that an evidentiary rule such as 804(b)(5) is a \u201cresidual\u201d hearsay exception, rather than a \u201cfirmly rooted\u201d one, and that statements admitted under such a rule do not inherently possess indicia of reliability. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 653-54 (1990). However, a statement which falls under the residual hearsay exception can meet Confrontation Clause standards if it is supported by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. Id. at 817, 820, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 653, 655-56. \u201cTo be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.\u201d Id. at 822, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 657; see also Brown, 339 N.C. at 438-39, 451 S.E.2d at 189 (the residual hearsay exception does not qualify as firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes, so the trial court must search for circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness). Further, hearsay evidence that does not fall within a firmly rooted exception is deemed \u201cpresumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes.\u201d Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543, 90 L. Ed. 2d 514, 528 (1986). Accordingly, \u201c[c]orroborating evidence should not be used to support a hearsay statement\u2019s particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.\u201d Swindler, 339 N.C. at 475, 450 S.E.2d at 911.\nIn determining that the victim\u2019s out-of-court hearsay statements in the instant case possessed the requisite degree of trustworthiness, the trial court made the following findings of fact in addition to those set out earlier in this opinion:\n4. That the hearsay statements of the victim, Mary Jennings Fleetwood, possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness[,] to wit:\nA. The defendant beat the victim, Ms. Fleetwood, repeatedly with his fist and jumped on her on November 5, 1993, as witnessed by James Shearn and Ernest Beale, Jr. and that this occurred approximately one hour prior to the victim being burned over 70 percent of her body.\nB. That the defendant told the victim, \u201cI\u2019ll kill you b \u2014 \u201d on November 5, 1993, as witnessed by James Shearn and Ernest Beale, Jr., and this also occurred approximately one hour before the victim was burned.\nC. That the defendant had threatened to burn the victim, her children, and her home on at least two occasions prior to November 5,1993. And that these statements were witnessed by the victim\u2019s 12-year old daughter, Monique Jennings, her 11-year old son, Jermaine Jennings, the victim\u2019s friend, Angie Eley, and Ms. Eley\u2019s daughter, Monica Eley. And that the last threat of this nature was made approximately six days before the victim was burned.\nD. That the defendant told several persons on November 5, 1993, that the victim was burned with a kerosene heater that the victim was refueling and it exploded. The people that [he] told were Roscoe Faison, Roy Robinson, and the Hertford County Sheriff\u2019s Deputy, Keith Williams.\nE. That Roscoe Faison, Roy Robinson, and Deputy Williams inspected the heater and the premises and found no evidence, in their opinion, of an explosion or fire on or near the heater or in the living room area where the defendant alleged that the explosion occurred.\nF. That the defendant also reported to Roscoe Faison, Roy Robinson, and Deputy Williams that the defendant jumped on the victim in an attempt to extinguish her flames and that he pushed her down a hallway. Upon close inspection [by] Hertford County Chief Deputy, Ernest Sharpe, the defendant was found to have suffered minimal burns to his right forearm and the back of his right hand and there were no burns on the palms of his hand.\nG. That a green sweater identified by Ernest Beale, Jr., as being worn by the victim on November 5, 1993, was burned and tested by an expert in forensic chemistry from the SBI lab and was determined to have gasoline on it. And that blue jeans owned by the victim and found in the victim\u2019s bedroom were also burned and tested and that the jeans also had gasoline on them. Strike that \u2014 the victim\u2019s bedroom was also burned.\nH. That a jug of gasoline with the cap unscrewed was found at the back of the trailer. [Within] a few feet from the gasoline there was found a book of matches.\nI. That a few feet from the matches, Chief Deputy Ernest Sharpe located a tree with an area where the leaves were brown unlike the other leaves on the tree and that right below the brown leaves was a spot of burned grass.\nJ. That the victim was transported to the RoanokeChowan Hospital and that nurse Sheri Eubanks asked her what happened and that an EMS person who transported the victim to Roanoke-Chowan answered that the heater exploded causing the victim\u2019s burns. That nurse Eubanks asked the victim if that is what happened and that the victim who had been emphatically answering other questions paused for approximately 15 seconds before answering yes.\nK. That the victim was transported to Norfolk Sentara Hospital after emergency treatment at Roanoke-Chowan Hospital. And that during the transfer Dr. Hunter of the Roanoke-Chowan Hospital also asked the victim if someone had burned her and the victim again paused for some time before shaking her head no.\nWe conclude that the trial court erred in relying upon this corroborating evidence in reaching the conclusion that the statements were trustworthy. These findings of fact did not relate to the inherent trustworthiness of the victim\u2019s statements. They detail corroborative evidence that could not be relied upon in finding the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness required in order to protect defendant\u2019s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. Thus, we conclude that defendant\u2019s rights under the Confrontation Clause were implicated.\n\u201cA violation of the defendant\u2019s rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is upon the State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.\u2019\u2019 N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (1992); Swindler, 339 N.C. at 476, 450 S.E.2d at 912. The State has met its burden in this case. We note first that the trial court did not commit error in concluding that the victim\u2019s statements were inherently trustworthy and therefore admissible under the residual hearsay exception. The error was in relying, in part, upon the corroborating evidence in reaching the conclusion of law that the statements were inherently trustworthy. This conclusion of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal, is fully supported by the evidence and the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and is clearly correct. Therefore, we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(b). Accordingly, defendant is entitled to no relief on these assignments of error.\nBy three assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by permitting a nurse, Donna Rosenfeld, to give an opinion about the cause of the victim\u2019s death and about the effects of a sedative medication administered to the victim. Rosenfeld testified that Fleetwood \u201cdied as a result of her burns causing overwhelming sepsis,\u201d that is, bacteria was allowed to enter Fleetwood\u2019s body and cause \u201cmassive infection\u201d since her skin had been burned away. Rosenfeld also testified that the dose of the sedative medication Versed given to the victim would have affected the victim\u2019s mental condition for about thirty minutes. Defendant argues that Rosenfeld was unqualified to render her opinions as to these matters.\nThe State notes, however, that defendant made only general objections to Rosenfeld rendering her opinions as to the cause of the victim\u2019s death and the effect of the sedative medication. \u201cAn objection to a witness\u2019s qualifications as an expert in a given field or upon a particular subject is waived if it is not made in apt time upon this special ground, and a mere general objection to the content of the witness\u2019s testimony will not ordinarily suffice to preserve the matter for subsequent appellate review.\u201d State v. Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 243, 287 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1982). In this case, defendant failed to make a specific objection about Rosenfeld\u2019s expertise in diagnosing the victim\u2019s cause of death. \u201cOur Court has adhered to the position that, in the absence of a special request by the defense for qualification of a witness as an expert, such a finding will be deemed implicit in the trial court\u2019s admission of the challenged opinion testimony.\u201d Id. \u201cMoreover, since defendant did not object on the grounds that the testifying witnesses were not qualified as experts, he has waived his right to later make the challenge on appeal.\u201d State v. Aguallo, 322 N.C. 818, 821-22, 370 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1988).\nIn any event, it is clear in this case that Rosenfeld was, in fact, properly qualified to state an opinion as to whether the bums she observed on the victim were similar to other bums of this type which she had seen before. Prior to stating such an opinion, Rosenfeld testified to the following: (1) she was a registered nurse in the burn-trauma unit at Sentara Norfolk General Hospital; (2) she had been working there for over eight years in November 1993; (3) she had worked one-on-one with Fleetwood while she was in the burn-trauma unit; (4) she was familiar with the medications administered to Fleetwood, the reasons for their use, and the reasons for any change in medications; and (5) she had administered Versed to patients for over eight years. \u201cThe essential question in determining the admissibility of opinion evidence is whether the witness, through study or experience, has acquired such skill that he was better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the subject matter to which his testimony applies.\u201d State v. Mitchell, 283 N.C. 462, 467, 196 S.E.2d 736, 739 (1973); see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (1992). The evidence in the present case clearly indicates that Rosenfeld, through both study and experience, was better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the cause of Fleetwood\u2019s death and on the effect of the sedative medication Versed. Rosenfeld\u2019s position as a nurse was merely a factor to be considered by the jury in evaluating the weight and credibility of her testimony.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred by allowing Rosenfeld to rely upon the hearsay opinions of other medical personnel in rendering her opinion as to the victim\u2019s cause of death. Defendant notes that Rosenfeld \u201ctestified that she based her opinion on her observations of [the victim] and the notes made by other medical personnel in the hospital records about [the victim]\u2019s death.\u201d\n\u201cHospital records, when offered as primary evidence, are hearsay. However, we think they come within one of the well recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule \u2014 entries made in the regular course of business.\u201d Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 35, 125 S.E.2d 326, 328 (1962). Thus, the hospital records offered at the trial are hearsay, but they fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(6) (1992). Nevertheless,\n[i]n instances where hospital records are legally admissible in evidence, proper foundation must, of course, be laid for their introduction. The hospital librarian or custodian of the record or other qualified witness must testify to the identity and authenticity of the record and the mode of its preparation, and show that the entries were made at or near to the time of the act, condition or event recorded, that they were made by persons having knowledge of the data set forth, and that they were made ante litem mo tarn. The court should exclude from jury consideration matters in the record which are immaterial and irrelevant to the inquiry, and entries which amount to hearsay on hearsay.\nSims, 257 N.C. at 35, 125 S.E.2d at 328.\nIn the instant case, the records detailed the victim\u2019s treatment, progress, deterioration, and death. Rosenfeld testified that she was a registered nurse working in the burn-trauma unit of Sentara Norfolk General Hospital, that she was familiar with Fleetwood\u2019s medical records, that the records were made during Fleetwood\u2019s stay at Sentara Norfolk General Hospital, that the records were kept contemporaneously with Fleetwood\u2019s care, and that the records were kept by the hospital in the regular course of the hospital\u2019s business. Thus, the State laid a proper foundation for the introduction into evidence of Fleetwood\u2019s medical records. Accordingly, we reject these assignments of error.\nBy two assignments of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by permitting a prosecutor to make grossly improper statements during closing argument. Defendant objected to only one of these allegedly improper statements.\nThe arguments of counsel are left largely to the control and discretion of the trial judge, and counsel will be granted wide latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases. State v. Soyars, 332 N.C. 47, 60, 418 S.E.2d 480, 487 (1992). \u201cCounsel is permitted to argue the facts which have been presented, as well as reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom.\u201d State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 481, 346 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1986). Where a defendant does not object at trial, \u201creview is limited to an examination of whether the argument was so grossly improper that the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to intervene ex mero motu.\" State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 417, 340 S.E.2d 673, 685, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986). Therefore, this Court\u2019s duty is limited as follows:\nWhere defendant fails to object to an alleged impropriety in the State\u2019s argument and so flag the error for the trial court, \u201cthe impropriety . . . must be gross indeed in order for this court to hold that a trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero motu an argument which defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when he heard it.\u201d\nState v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 338, 451 S.E.2d 131, 143 (1994) (quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)) (alteration in original). In determining whether the prosecutor\u2019s argument was grossly improper, this Court must examine the argument in the context in which it was given and in light of the overall factual circumstances to which it refers. State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 461 S.E.2d 687 (1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996).\nIn the instant case, during his closing argument, the prosecutor stated, \u201cAnd I submit to you that if that child had seen her mother\u2019s face and start[ed] going off [sic] in there, who knows what would have happened to them. That\u2019s what the evidence shows.\u201d Defendant did not object to this argument at trial. However, on appeal, defendant maintains that this argument is entirely speculative, with no basis in the record. Defendant further argues that there is no evidence to support an inference that the victim concealed her face from her children to prevent a scene in which defendant might assault her children. We conclude that the prosecutor\u2019s argument was not so grossly improper as to require the trial judge to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to another portion of the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument. The prosecutor said:\nLadies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant may come to you and argue that this is a murder trial, that we put on evidence of domestic abuse, but this isn\u2019t a domestic abuse trial. Well, I would submit to you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that it is always going to be about domestic abuse until they kill them.\n[Defense]: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled.\n[Prosecutor]: Until they kill them. And that\u2019s what he\u2019s done. He\u2019s killed her.\nDefendant contends that the prosecutor\u2019s argument sought to use public sentiment against domestic abuse to enlist the jurors help in a general effort to deter abusive spouses and boyfriends from escalating the level of abuse to murder. We find no reversible error.\nThe prosecutor\u2019s argument did not exceed the wide latitude allowed counsel in stating contentions and drawing inferences from the evidence. Cf. State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 398-99, 428 S.E.2d 118, 144 (finding no gross impropriety even though the prosecutor\u2019s argument touched upon facts not testified to and finding that the arguments were reasonable inferences based on the evidence and were within the wide latitude properly given counsel in argument), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993). The guilt-phase evidence of defendant\u2019s abuse of the victim, both physical and emotional, was clear and uncontradicted. The prosecutor never suggested that the jury should convict defendant in order to prevent him from killing or battering again or that the jury should convict him because other batterers kill their victims. See State v. Payne, 328 N.C. 377, 402 S.E.2d 582 (1991) (improper to urge jury to convict defendant in order to prevent him from killing again); State v. Scott, 314 N.C. 309, 333 S.E.2d 296 (1985) (improper to urge jury to convict defendant because other impaired drivers cause other accidents). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s argument.\nBy another assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by conducting unrecorded bench conferences with defense counsel and counsel for the State. Defendant contends that these unrecorded bench conferences violated his state and federal constitutional rights even though he was present in the courtroom and made no request to be present at the bench and made no objection to his absence. Defendant acknowledges that we have previously rejected similar contentions. See State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 410 S.E.2d 832 (1991). Having considered defendant\u2019s argument with regard to this issue, we find no compelling reason to depart from our prior holding. Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.\nBy an assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero mo tu to prevent the prosecutor from claiming during the penalty-phase closing argument that defendant had lied during his testimony. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is directed to the prosecutor\u2019s comment, \u201cWell, putting the hand on the Bible and told about 35,000 whoppers and then he walked on it and did it.\u201d This comment, standing alone, does not equate to the type of specific, objectionable language referring to defendant as a liar that would require that defendant be granted a new capital sentencing proceeding. Cf. State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 214-18, 241 S.E.2d 65, 68-70 (1978) (prosecutor asserted defendant was \u201clying through [his] teeth\u201d and \u201cplaying with a perjury count\u201d); State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 157 S.E.2d 335 (1967) (prosecutor stated he knew defendant \u201cwas lying the minute he said that\u201d and referred to defendant as \u201chabitual storebreaker\u201d when nothing in the record supported such reference).\nIn the instant case, many eyewitnesses described defendant\u2019s physical and emotional abuse of the victim. Yet, defendant denied such abuse. Given this context, the prosecutor\u2019s argument was \u201cno more than an argument that the jury should reject the defendant\u2019s testimony\u201d because \u201chis version of the events [was] unbelievable.\u201d State v. Solomon, 340 N.C. 212, 220, 456 S.E.2d 778, 784, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 133 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1995). Clearly, this argument was not so grossly improper as to require the trial court to intervene ex mero motu. State v. McNeil, 324 N.C. 33, 48, 375 S.E.2d 909, 924 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1050, 108 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1990). Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s final assignment of error.\nPRESERVATION ISSUES\nDefendant raises six additional arguments which he concedes have been decided against him by this Court: (1) the trial court erred by granting the State\u2019s motion to prohibit defense counsel from discussing parole eligibility for a life sentence during penalty-phase closing arguments; (2) the trial court erred by allowing defendant\u2019s jury to determine that the murder was \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious, or cruel\u201d based upon unconstitutionally vague instructions that failed to distinguish death-eligible murders from murders that are not death-eligible; (3) the trial court\u2019s capital sentencing jury instructions that defined defendant\u2019s burden of persuasion to prove mitigating circumstances as evidence that \u201csatisfies\u201d each juror constituted plain error and violated due process and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because that definition did not adequately guide the jury\u2019s discretion regarding the requisite degree of proof; (4) the trial court committed plain error that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by allowing the jury to refuse to give effect to mitigating evidence if the jury deemed the evidence not to have mitigating value; (5) the trial court committed plain error by allowing jurors not to give effect to mitigating circumstances found by the jurors; and (6) the trial court erred by sentencing defendant to death because the death penalty is inherently cruel and unusual, and the North Carolina capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.\nDefendant raises these issues for the purpose of permitting this Court to reexamine its prior holdings and also for the purpose of preserving them for any possible further judicial review of this case. We have carefully considered defendant\u2019s arguments on these issues and find no compelling reason to depart from our prior holdings. Accordingly, we reject these arguments.\nPROPORTIONALITY REVIEW\nHaving concluded that defendant\u2019s trial and separate capital sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error, we turn to the duties reserved by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) exclusively for this Court in capital cases. It is our duty in this regard to ascertain: (1) whether the record supports the jury\u2019s findings of the aggravating circumstances on which the sentence of death was based; (2) whether the death sentence was entered under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary consideration; and (3) whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2).\nIn this case, the sole aggravating circumstance submitted to and found by the jury was that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9). After thoroughly examining the record, transcripts, and briefs in the present case, we conclude that the record fully supports the sole aggravating circumstance submitted to and found by the jury. Further, we find no indication that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary consideration. We must turn then to our final statutory duty of proportionality review.\nIn our proportionality review, it is proper to compare the present case with other cases in which this Court has concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate. State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 162 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994). We have found the death penalty disproportionate in seven cases. State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).\nWe conclude that this case is not substantially similar to any case in which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate. Distinguishing features of this case are: (1) defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under the theory of premeditation and deliberation; (2) the first-degree murder was preceded by prior physical and mental abuse of the victim; (3) the aggravating circumstance submitted to and found by the jury was \u201cthat the killing was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,\u201d N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(e)(9); (4) defendant killed the victim by intentionally setting her on fire and watching her bum; and (5) defendant showed no remorse for his actions and appeared in full control of his mental and physical condition. Although the jury considered twenty-five mitigating circumstances, it found only seven. Of these seven, only one was a statutory mitigating circumstance, that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(l).\nIt is also proper to compare this case to those where the death sentence was found proportionate. McCollum, 334 N.C. at 244, 433 S.E.2d at 164. Although we have repeatedly stated that we review all of the cases in the pool when engaging in our statutory duty, it is worth noting again that \u201cwe will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each time we carry out our duty.\u201d Id. It suffices to say here that we conclude the present case is more similar to certain cases in which we have found the death sentence proportionate than to those in which we have found the sentence disproportionate or to those in which juries have consistently returned recommendations of life imprisonment. See, e.g., State v. Burr, 341 N.C. 263, 461 S.E.2d 602 (1995) (death sentence proportionate for murder of a four-month-old child where the jury found as the only aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 134 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1996); State v. Spruill, 338 N.C. 612, 452 S.E.2d 279 (1994) (death sentence proportionate for murder of an acquaintance where the jury found as the only aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cmel), cert. denied, - U.S. \u2014, 133 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1995); State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 428 S.E.2d 118 (death sentence proportionate for murder where the jury found as the only aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and where defendant was convicted solely under the theory of premeditation and deliberation); State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984) (death sentence proportionate for murder of elderly female where the jury found as the only aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 85 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1985).\nAfter comparing this case to other roughly similar cases as to the crime and the defendant, we conclude that this case has the characteristics of first-degree murders for which we have previously upheld the death penalty as proportionate. Accordingly, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court must be and is left undisturbed.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by David F. Hoke, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Benjamin Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STACEY ANTHONY TYLER\nNo. 11A96\n(Filed 6 June 1997)\n1. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1009 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital murder \u2014 victim\u2019s statements \u2014 guarantees of trustworthiness\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by admitting testimony from a nurse under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5) regarding the victim\u2019s statements that defendant had poured gasoline on her and set her on fire. Although defendant contended that the court erred in concluding that the victim\u2019s statements possessed the requisite circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, the victim had personal knowledge of the circumstances in which she was burned; there was no indication that she had any reason to tell anything other than the truth after she learned that defendant was in jail and could no longer hurt her or her children, there is no indication that the victim ever recanted this statement, and she was unavailable.\nAun Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 701, 702.\nResidual hearsay exception where declarant unavailable: Uniform Evidence Rule 804(b)(5). 75 ALR4th 199.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1009 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital murder \u2014 victim\u2019s statements \u2014 residual hearsay exception\u2014 Confrontation Clause violation \u2014 not prejudicial\nThere was no prejudicial error in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder in the admission of testimony from a nurse regarding the victim\u2019s statements that defendant had poured gasoline on her and set her on fire where defendant contended that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment was implicated. Although the trial court relied upon corroborating evidence in concluding that the victim\u2019s out-of-court hearsay statements possessed the requisite degree of trustworthiness and hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness and not by reference to other evidence at trial to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, the trial court did not err in concluding that the victim\u2019s statements were inherently trustworthy. The error was in relying in part upon the corroborating evidence and the conclusion is correct.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 701, 702.\nResidual hearsay exception where declarant unavailable: Uniform Evidence Rule 804(b)(5). 75 ALR4th 199.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7\u00a7 2159, 2271 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital murder \u2014 treating nurse \u2014 opinion concerning cause of death and effect of sedative\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by permitting a nurse to give an opinion about the cause of the victim\u2019s death and about the effects of a sedative medication administered to the victim. Defendant made only general objections to the nurse rendering her opinions and failed to make a specific objection about her expertise in diagnosing the victim\u2019s cause of death. In any event, it is clear that the witness was properly qualified to state an opinion as to whether the burns she observed on the victim were similar to other burns of this type which she had seen before and the evidence clearly indicates that, through study and experience, she was better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the cause of death and the effect of the sedative medication. Her position as a nurse was merely a factor to be considered by the jury in evaluating the weight and credibility of her testimony.\nAm Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 60-62, 248.\nAdmissibility of opinion evidence as to cause of death, disease, or injury. 66 ALR2d 1082.\n4. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2242 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital murder \u2014 testimony of treating nurse \u2014 partial reliance on hospital records\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by allowing a nurse who treated the victim before she died and who testified as to the victim\u2019s cause of death to base her opinion in part on the notes made by other medical personnel in the hospital records. The records detailed the victim\u2019s treatment, progress, deterioration, and death, the witness testified that she was a registered nurse working in the burn trauma unit and familiar with the victim\u2019s medical records, the records were made during the victim\u2019s stay at the hospital and were kept contemporaneously with the victim\u2019s care, and the records were kept by the hospital in the regular course of the hospital\u2019s business. Thus, the State laid a proper foundation for the introduction into evidence of the victim\u2019s medical records.\nAm Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 237, 238.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 475 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital murder \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 no error\nThere was no error requiring intervention ex mero motu in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder where the prosecutor argued that the victim had concealed her face from her children to prevent a scene in which defendant might assault her children.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 631.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 438 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital murder \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 defendant as batterer\nThere was no error requiring intervention ex mero motu in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder where defendant contended that the prosecutor\u2019s argument sought to use public sentiment against domestic abuse to enlist jurors\u2019 help in a general effort to deter abusive spouses and boyfriends from escalating the level of abuse to murder. The guilt-phase evidence of defendant\u2019s abuse of the victim, both physical and emotional, was clear and uncontradicted and the prosecutor never suggested that the jury should convict defendant in order to prevent him from killing or battering again or that the jury should convict him because other batterers kill their victims.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 648, 649, 655.\n7. Constitutional Law \u00a7 342 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital murder\u2014 unrecorded bench conferences \u2014 defendant in courtroom\u2014 no objection\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first degree murder by conducting unrecorded bench conferences with defense counsel and counsel for the State where defendant was present in the courtroom but made no request to be present at the bench and made no objection to his absence.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 695, 698, 699, 905, 925.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 444 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital murder \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 defendant\u2019s truthfulness\nThe trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the penalty phase closing argument in a first-degree murder prosecution where the prosecutor said, \u201cWell, putting the hand on the Bible and told about 35,000 whoppers and then he walked on it and did it.\u201d This comment, standing alone, does not equate to the type of specific, objectionable language referring to defendant as a liar that would require that defendant be granted a new capital sentencing proceeding. Many eyewitnesses described the defendant\u2019s physical and emotional abuse of the victim, which defendant denied. The prosecutor\u2019s argument was no more than an argument that the jury should reject defendant\u2019s testimony because his version of events was unbelievable.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 632.\nNegative characterization or description of defendant, by prosecutor during summation of criminal trial, as ground for reversal, new trial, or mistrial \u2014 modern cases. 88 ALR4th 8.\n9. Criminal Law \u00a7 466 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital murder\u2014 penalty phase \u2014 closing arguments \u2014 parole eligibility\nThe trial court did not err during a capital first-degree murder prosecution by granting the State\u2019s motion to prohibit defense counsel from discussing parole eligibility for a life sentence during penalty-phase closing argument.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 575.\n10.Criminal Law \u00a7 1370 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 especially heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance \u2014 instructions\nThe trial court in a first-degree murder prosecution did not allow the jury to find the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance based on an unconstitutionally vague instruction.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598, 599.\nSufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that murder was heinous, cruel, depraved, or the like \u2014 post-Gregg cases. 63 ALR4th 478.\n11. Criminal Law \u00a7 1352 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing \u2014 instructions\u2014mitigating circumstances \u2014 burden of persuasion\nThe trial court did not err in its instructions defining defendant\u2019s burden of persuasion to prove mitigating circumstances in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1120, 1121.\n12. Criminal Law \u00a7 1375 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 mitigating evidence \u2014 mitigating value\nThe trial court did not commit plain error that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by allowing the jurors not to give effect to mitigating evidence if the jury deemed the evidence not to have mitigating value.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598, 599.\n13. Criminal Law \u00a7 1375 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 mitigating circumstances given no effect\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by allowing jurors not to give effect to mitigating circumstances found by the jurors.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598, 599.\n14. Constitutional Law \u00a7 371 (NCI4th)\u2014 death penalty \u2014 not unconstitutional\nThe death penalty is not inherently cruel and unusual and the North Carolina capital sentencing scheme is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.\nAm Jur 2d, Crimimal Law \u00a7\u00a7 625, 628.\n15. Criminal Law \u00a7 1402 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 death sentence \u2014 not disproportionate\nA sentence of death was not disproportionate where the record fully supports the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury, there was no indication that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary consideration, this case was not substantially similar to any case in which a death sentence was found disproportionate, and it is more similar to certain cases in which the death sentence was found to be proportionate. Distinguishing features of this case are that defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under the theory of premeditation and deliberation; the first-degree murder was preceded by prior physical and mental abuse of the victim; the aggravating circumstance submitted to and found by the jury was \u201cthat the killing was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel\u201d; defendant killed the victim by setting her on fire and watched her burn; defendant showed no remorse; and the jury only found seven of twenty-five mitigating circumstances and only one of those was statutory, that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 628.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Grant (Cy A.), J., at the 16 October 1995 Special Criminal Session of Superior Court, Hertford County. Heard in the Supreme Court 16 April 1997.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by David F. Hoke, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Benjamin Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0187-01", "first_page_order": 225, "last_page_order": 249 }