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  "name": "ROSIE J., on her own behalf, and on behalf of all women similarly situated, RALEIGH WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION, and JOHN MARKS, M.D. v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, C. ROBIN BRITT, SR., in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources, and JAMES HUNT, in his official capacity as Governor of North Carolina",
  "name_abbreviation": "Rosie J. ex rel. Raleigh Women's Health Organization v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "ROSIE J., on her own behalf, and on behalf of all women similarly situated, RALEIGH WOMEN\u2019S HEALTH ORGANIZATION, and JOHN MARKS, M.D. v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, C. ROBIN BRITT, SR., in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources, and JAMES HUNT, in his official capacity as Governor of North Carolina"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WEBB, Justice.\nThe plaintiffs first argue that when the General Assembly restricted the use of the State Abortion Fund to eliminate payments for medically necessary abortions, the defendants were obligated to fund such abortions using the State\u2019s contribution to the Medical Assistance Fund. Assuming the defendants could have used the Medical Assistance Fund in this way, we do not believe this was the intent of the General Assembly. We cannot believe the General Assembly intended for the defendants to pay for abortions from another source when it had so radically restricted payments from the Abortion Fund. The question is whether this action of the General Assembly is constitutional.\nThe plaintiffs next say that it was error to grant the motion to dismiss because the allegations of the complaint raised factual issues. They say that they can introduce evidence that without the abortion funding, eighteen to twenty-three percent of Medicaid-eligible women will carry unwanted pregnancies to term. They also say they can show the dramatic effect on the health and well-being of those indigent women who are deprived of medically necessary abortions.\nWhether a woman should carry a pregnancy to term and the asserted dire consequences of the State\u2019s refusal to fund abortions are not determinative of the issues in this case. No person has the constitutional right to have the State pay for medical care. The question in this case is whether the State has violated Rosie J.\u2019s constitutional rights by paying for medical services for some, including childbirth expenses, while refusing to pay for an abortion for Rosie J. This is a legal and not a factual question.\nIn passing on the claim of the plaintiffs, we must first determine whether indigent women who need medically necessary abortions are members of a suspect class or are being deprived of a fundamental right by the refusal of the State to fund abortions for them. If either condition exists, the actions of the State would be subject to strict scrutiny, and the State would have to show a compelling State interest to justify its action. Texfi Industries, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 269 S.E.2d 142 (1980).\nIndigent women are not a suspect class. They have not been subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment so as to command extraordinary protection from the democratic political process. In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that to be a fundamental right, the right must be explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. To have the State pay for an abortion is not a right protected by the North Carolina Constitution and is not a fundamental right.\nThe test we must apply to determine the constitutionality of the State\u2019s action is whether it bears any rational relation to a legiti- . mate governmental objective. State ex rel. Util. Comm\u2019n v. Carolina Util. Cust. Ass\u2019n, 336 N.C. 657, 681, 446 S.E.2d 332, 346 (1994). The encouragement of childbirth is a legitimate governmental objective. Stam v. State, 47 N.C. App. 209, 219, 267 S.E.2d 335, 342-43 (1980), aff\u2019d in part, rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d 439 (1981). The State may encourage childbirth by refusing to fund abortions.\nThe plaintiffs contend that there is not a rational relation between the restrictions on abortions and the Medical Assistance Program, which provides that medical care be provided to indigent persons when it is essential to the health and welfare of such persons. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 108A-55(a) (1994). The plaintiffs also say the restriction on abortions does not bear a rational relation to the basic goal of the Department of Human Resources, which is to \u201cassist all citizens\u2014 as individuals, families, and communities \u2014 to achieve and maintain an adequate level of health, social and economic well-being, and dignity.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143B-137 (1993).\nIt is not necessary that State action be rationally related to all State objectives. It is enough that it is related to some legitimate State objective. That is the case here.\nWe have held here that the action of the General Assembly in placing severe restrictions on the funding of medically necessary abortions for indigent women is valid. It follows that this action does not violate Article I, Section 1; Article I, Section 19; or Article XI, Section 4 of the Constitution of North Carolina.\nWe have not relied on any federal court cases because the plaintiffs based their argument on the Constitution of North Carolina. The federal cases are consistent with this opinion. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 53 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147.\nThe judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed for the reasons stated in this opinion.\nAFFIRMED.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WEBB, Justice."
      },
      {
        "text": "Justice Parker\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent. In my view the determinative question in this case is not whether there is a fundamental right to have the State fund an abortion. Clearly, no such right exists. The determinative question is whether the State\u2019s policy of refusing to fund medically necessary abortions for Medicaid eligible women while funding all other medically necessary treatments incident to the pregnancy of Medicaid eligible women impermissibly interferes with a pregnant woman\u2019s right to choose abortion without unduly burdensome governmental interference. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973). Plaintiffs argue, and I agree, that the allegations of the complaint, if proved, would support a constitutional challenge under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nAccordingly, I would reverse the trial court\u2019s order allowing defendants\u2019 Rule 12(b)(6) motion and remand to the trial court.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Justice Parker"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Center for Reproductive Law & Policy, by Eve C. Gartner; and Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter, by Thomas M. Stem, for plaintiff-appellants.",
      "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Belinda A. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant-appellees.",
      "Moore & Van Allen, PLLC, by Jonathan D. Sasser, on behalf of The American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, The South Mountain Women\u2019s Health Alliance, NC Equity, and The National Association of Social Workers on Behalf of Its North Carolina Chapter, amici curiae.",
      "Stam, Fordham & Danchi, P.A., by Paul Siam, Jr., on behalf of North Carolina Right to Life, Inc., amicus curiae."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "ROSIE J., on her own behalf, and on behalf of all women similarly situated, RALEIGH WOMEN\u2019S HEALTH ORGANIZATION, and JOHN MARKS, M.D. v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, C. ROBIN BRITT, SR., in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources, and JAMES HUNT, in his official capacity as Governor of North Carolina\nNo. 232PA96\n(Filed 3 October 1997)\n1. Abortion; Prenatal or Birth-Related Injuries and Offenses \u00a7 3 (NCI4th)\u2014 State Abortion Fund restrictions \u2014 use of Medical Assistance Fund not required\nWhen the General Assembly restricted the use of the State Abortion Fund to eliminate payments for medically necessary abortions, the State was not obligated to fund such abortions using the State\u2019s contribution to the Medical Assistance Fund.\nAm Jur 2d, Abortion and Birth Control \u00a7\u00a7 3, 61, 62, 64.\n2. Abortion; Prenatal or Birth-Related Injuries and Offenses \u00a7 3 (NCI4th)\u2014 medically necessary abortions \u2014 restrictions on State funding \u2014 indigent women \u2014 not suspect class \u2014 not deprivation of fundamental right\nIndigent women who need medically necessary abortions are not members of a suspect class and are not being deprived of a fundamental right by the refusal of the State to fund abortions for them. Therefore, the State\u2019s refusal to fund medically necessary abortions is not subject to strict scrutiny, and the State does not have to show a compelling State interest to justify its action.\nAm Jur 2d, Abortion and Birth Control \u00a7\u00a7 3, 61, 62, 64.\n3. Abortion; Prenatal or Birth-Related Injuries and Offenses \u00a7 3 (NCI4th)\u2014 medically necessary abortions \u2014 restrictions on State funding \u2014 test for determining constitutionality\nThe test that must be applied to determine whether restrictions placed by the General Assembly on State funding of medically necessary abortions for indigent women violate the North Carolina Constitution is whether the restrictions bear any rational relation to a legitimate governmental interest.\nAm Jur 2d, Abortion and Birth Control \u00a7\u00a7 3, 61, 62, 64.\n4. Abortion; Prenatal or Birth-Related Injuries and Offenses \u00a7 3 (NCI4th)\u2014 medically necessary abortions \u2014 restrictions on State funding \u2014 constitutionality\nRestrictions placed by the General Assembly on State funding of medically necessary abortions for indigent women is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of encouraging childbirth; the restrictions are thus valid and do not violate Art. I, \u00a7 1, Art. I, \u00a7 19, or Art. XI, \u00a7 4 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nAm Jur 2d, Abortion and Birth Control \u00a7\u00a7 3, 61, 62, 64.\nJustice Parker dissenting.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 prior to determination by the Court of Appeals of an order entered by Hight, J., at the 12 February 1996 Nonjury Civil Session of Superior Court, Durham County. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 December 1996.\nThis case brings to the Court the question of whether restrictions placed by the G-eneral Assembly on the funding of medically necessary abortions for indigent women violate the Constitution of North Carolina. In 1965, the General Assembly provided for the creation of the State Fund for Medical Assistance. This was done to allow the State to coordinate State action with the federal government\u2019s action to establish a Medicaid program. The federal and state governments as well as the counties of the state contribute to the Medical Assistance Fund. In Noe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that a woman has a constitutional right to an abortion. Following that decision, the State made payments for abortions for indigent women from the State Fund for Medical Assistance.\nIn 1977, Congress adopted the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited the use of any federal funds contributed to the Medicaid program for abortions except when the pregnant woman\u2019s life would be endangered if she were to carry the pregnancy to term. As a result of this loss of federal funds, in 1978 the General Assembly established the State Abortion Fund, from which payments were made for abortions for eligible women. In 1995, the General Assembly drastically reduced payments for abortions by the adoption of the following provision:\n(b) Eligibility for services of the State Abortion Fund shall be limited to women whose income is below the federal poverty level, as revised annually, and who are not eligible for Medicaid. The State Abortion Fund shall be used to fund abortions only to terminate pregnancies resulting from cases of rape or incest, or to terminate pregnancies that, in the written opinion of one doctor licensed to practice medicine in North Carolina, endanger the life of the mother.\nAct of June 26, 1995, ch. 324, sec. 23.27,1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 660, 751, as clarified by Act of July 28, 1995, ch. 507, sec. 23.8A, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1525, 1661. Because of this action by the General Assembly, payment by the State for an abortion when the pregnancy is not the result of rape or incest or when the woman\u2019s life is not in danger has been virtually eliminated.\nThe plaintiffs brought this action to challenge what the State has done. The plaintiffs allege that the action of the State violates (1) Article I, Section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, which provides that all persons are endowed with certain inalienable rights, including \u201clife, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness,\u201d N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 1; (2) Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, which provides that no person shall be \u201cdeprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land\u201d and that \u201c[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws,\u201d N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 19; and (3) Article XI, Section 4 of the North Carolina Constitution, which provides that \u201c[beneficent provision for the poor, the unfortunate, and the orphan is one of the first duties of a civilized and a Christian state. Therefore the General Assembly shall provide for and define the duties of a board of public welfare,\u201d N.C. Const, art. XI, \u00a7 4.\nOn 19 February 1996, the superior court dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 case pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6).\nThe plaintiffs appealed, and we allowed discretionary review prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals.\nCenter for Reproductive Law & Policy, by Eve C. Gartner; and Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter, by Thomas M. Stem, for plaintiff-appellants.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Belinda A. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant-appellees.\nMoore & Van Allen, PLLC, by Jonathan D. Sasser, on behalf of The American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, The South Mountain Women\u2019s Health Alliance, NC Equity, and The National Association of Social Workers on Behalf of Its North Carolina Chapter, amici curiae.\nStam, Fordham & Danchi, P.A., by Paul Siam, Jr., on behalf of North Carolina Right to Life, Inc., amicus curiae."
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