{ "id": 551263, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. T.D.R.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. T.D.R.", "decision_date": "1998-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 172PA97", "first_page": "489", "last_page": "507", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "347 N.C. 489" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11866526 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "118 N.C.App. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "160 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575725 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "evidence to support a finding that the witness was an expert" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559216 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "evidence to support a finding that the witness was an expert" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E.2d 839", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559236 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court did not err in permitting witness to testify as an expert without making findings of fact as to her qualifications where defendant did not specifically request that the court make such findings" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750010 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court did not err in permitting witness to testify as an expert without making findings of fact as to her qualifications where defendant did not specifically request that the court make such findings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 L. Ed. 2d 499", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 1047", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6469257, 6469165, 6469074, 6469331, 6469653, 6469557, 6469433, 6468988, 6469759 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/1047-04", "/us/409/1047-03", "/us/409/1047-02", "/us/409/1047-05", "/us/409/1047-08", "/us/409/1047-07", "/us/409/1047-06", "/us/409/1047-01", "/us/409/1047-09" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E.2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574551 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565443 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567546 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793217 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32-33", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570748 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2397427 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4777333 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 L. Ed. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867585 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 S.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606772 ], "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 S.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12166634 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "18", "parenthetical": "denial of continuance not error or abuse of discretion where defendant's oral motion to continue to secure psychiatric evaluation was made on the date set for trial, was not supported by affidavit, and did not set forth detailed proof to establish grounds for further delay" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795977 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" }, { "page": "530" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 U.S. 541", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172664 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557", "parenthetical": "statutory construction \"in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel\"" }, { "page": "95", "parenthetical": "statutory construction \"in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/383/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E.2d 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570660 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558867 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333627 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 358", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054393 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 519", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541745 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528-29" }, { "page": "355", "parenthetical": "noting that the Supreme Court's response to the gap between the originally benign conception of the juvenile court system and its realities \"has been to make applicable in juvenile proceedings constitutional guarantees associated with traditional criminal prosecutions\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1162, "char_count": 44955, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.882510512750288e-07, "percentile": 0.9333297037780968 }, "sha256": "ef551910d3f7de5824cafd6e1a8f21b34e7cbc1615e13a49d0500e162464d65e", "simhash": "1:1b1bb3ab269b3612", "word_count": 7489 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:32:58.211595+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. T.D.R." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MITCHELL, Chief Justice.\nBy juvenile petitions filed 22 August 1996, defendant, then fifteen years old, was alleged to be delinquent by reason of his having committed first-degree rape and first-degree burglary. A hearing was held pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-608 and -609 in District Court, Durham County, on 3 December 1996 before the Honorable Carolyn D. Johnson, District Court Judge. Defendant waived his right to present evidence and stipulated that probable cause did exist. Defendant then requested a two-week continuance in order that independent psychological evaluations could be performed and offered as evidence concerning the issue of whether his case should be transferred to Superior Court for his trial as an adult. The District Court denied the continuance and then proceeded to take evidence on the question of transfer. At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court entered an order finding probable cause as to both rape and burglary and transferring jurisdiction over defendant to Superior Court for defendant\u2019s trial as an adult.\nOn 16 December 1996, defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Durham County for first-degree rape and first-degree burglary. Subsequently, on 21 January 1997, defendant was indicted for first-degree kidnapping.\nOn 15 January 1997, defendant filed a motion in Superior Court, Durham County, to dismiss the indictments against him and to remand jurisdiction of his case to the Juvenile District Court. On 24 January 1997, a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was held in the Superior Court; Durham County, before the Honorable David Q. LaBarre. On 29 January 1997, defendant filed an amended motion to dismiss. On 7 February 1997, the Superior Court entered an order making findings and concluding inter alia that \u201c[t]he District Court . . . [had] denied the Juvenile-Defendant Due Process of law and fundamental fairness by its refusal to hear or consider the juvenile\u2019s evidence with regard to the appropriateness of retaining jurisdiction in the District Court Division.\u201d The order went on to vacate and dismiss the indictments against defendant and to remand jurisdiction to the District Court for a new hearing as to whether the District Court should retain jurisdiction or transfer jurisdiction over the juvenile to the Superior Court.\nOn 10 February 1997, the State filed a petition in the Superior Court, Durham County, for a temporary stay of its 7 February 1997 order. On 13 February 1997, the State filed a notice of appeal to the-Court of Appeals. On 19 February 1997, the State filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for writ of supersedeas and motion for temporary stay. A temporary stay was entered by the Court of Appeals on 27 February 1997. On 28 February 1997, the Superior Court entered an order concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because of the filing of the notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals and denying the State\u2019s motion for reconsideration.\nOn 10 March 1997, the State filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 26 March 1997, the Court of Appeals entered an order as follows:\nBecause orders of the district court transferring the jurisdiction over a juvenile to superior court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-608 (1995) are subject to review only by [the Court of Appeals] after entry of a final judgment by the superior court, the superior court is without authority to review transfer orders. The order entered 7 February 1997 by Judge David Q. LaBarre, reviewing the district court\u2019s order transferring jurisdiction over the juvenile to the superior court, is hereby vacated. The matter is remanded to Superior Court, Durham County, for reinstatement of the indictments dismissed in that order and for further proceedings.\n(Citation omitted.) .\nDefendant filed a notice of appeal of right with this Court asserting that this case directly involves a substantial constitutional question. His petition for discretionary review as to additional issues was allowed by this Court on 8 May 1997.\nDefendant contends on this appeal that the Superior Court had authority under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-954 to review the indictments against him and to dismiss them if it found that defendant\u2019s constitutional rights had been \u201cflagrantly violated and there is such irreparable prejudice to the defendant\u2019s preparation of his case that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution.\u201d Before we can address this argument directly, however, it is necessary that we first address the order of the Court of Appeals which is before us.\nDefendant expressly based his motion in the Superior Court to dismiss the criminal charges against him upon the authority of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-954, and the Superior Court entered its order dismissing the indictments on the authority of this statute. Nevertheless, the order of the Court of Appeals vacating the order of the Superior Court did not address the issue of the Superior Court\u2019s authority to review indictments. Instead, the Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether the Superior Court had authority to directly review District Court orders transferring jurisdiction over juveniles pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-608. The Court of Appeals held that such orders are subject to review only by the Court of Appeals and only after entry of a final judgment by the Superior Court on the criminal charges against the defendant who is to be tried as an adult. This issue was not before the Court of Appeals and is before this Court only by virtue of the appeal from the order of the Court of Appeals addressing the issue. Nevertheless, we must first address this issue before reaching the issues addressed by the parties.\nAlthough the Court of Appeals followed its own precedents, it erred in holding that it is only after the entry of a final judgment by the Superior Court in a criminal case against a juvenile that the juvenile may appeal the earlier order of the District Court transferring jurisdiction. We conclude that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-666 authorizes an immediate direct appeal to the Court of Appeals of a juvenile transfer order. The statute expressly provides:\nUpon motion of a proper party as defined in G.S. 7A-667, review of any final order of the court in a juvenile matter under this Article shall be before the Court of Appeals.... A final order shall include:\n(2) Any order which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which appeal might be taken[.]\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-666(2) (1995). Because the juvenile transfer order terminates the jurisdiction of the District Court by transferring jurisdiction to the Superior Court, a juvenile transfer order entered by the District Court is a final order within the meaning of the statute. The transfer order in effect \u201cdetermines\u201d the District Court juvenile proceeding and prevents any further judgment of the District Court from which appeal might be taken. Although upon entry of a transfer order the Superior Court obtains jurisdiction over the case for trial and related matters, it does not have authority to conduct an appellate review of the District Court transfer order. Proper appellate jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeals \u2014 not with the Superior Court \u2014 for direct appellate review of District Court orders transferring jurisdiction over juveniles to the Superior Court.\nThat part of the order of the Court of Appeals concluding that appellate jurisdiction to directly review juvenile transfers lies only with the Court of Appeals was correct. However, we find no authority for the Court of Appeals\u2019 conclusion in its order that juvenile transfer petitions entered by the District Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-608 are subject to appellate review by the Court of Appeals only \u201cafter entry of a final judgment by the superior court.\u201d As we have concluded that juvenile transfer orders entered by the District Court are \u201cfinal\u201d orders of the court in the juvenile matter within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-666(2), we further conclude that such orders are immediately appealable to the Court of Appeals. To the extent that it may be read as holding to the contrary, In re Green, 118 N.C. App. 336, 453 S.E.2d 191 (1995), is overruled. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion in the present case that the juvenile transfer order was not immediately appealable to the Court of Appeals.\nWe next turn to the issue raised on appeal by defendant, which was before the Court of Appeals but was not addressed in its order in the present case. The juvenile defendant argues that the Superior Court had the authority under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-954 to review and dismiss the criminal indictments against him and to remand his case to the District Court for a new hearing on the issue of whether jurisdiction over his case should be transferred to the Superior Court. Although we have concluded that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction to directly review the District Court\u2019s transfer order, we nevertheless conclude that the Superior Court had authority, on motion of defendant, to review the indictments against defendant and to dismiss those charging instruments if defendant\u2019s rights were \u201cflagrantly violated and there is such irreparable prejudice to the defendant\u2019s preparation of his case that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-954(a)(4) (1997). To the extent the Court of Appeals\u2019 order in the present case may be read to imply that the Superior Court may not review criminal pleadings filed against a juvenile in Superior Court, that' order is in error. Criminal pleadings against a juvenile in such situations are neither more nor less subject to review by the Superior Court than criminal pleadings against an adult.\nBy another argument, defendant contends that the Superior Court\u2019s order vacating the indictments against him and remanding his case to District Court was correct. He contends that this is so because the District Court violated his rights to due process of law and to the law of the land by transferring jurisdiction over him to the Superior Court without granting him an opportunity to present evidence. The Court of Appeals appears to have vacated the order of the Superior Court on the mistaken assumption that the Superior Court had conducted direct appellate review of the District Court\u2019s transfer order. Instead, we conclude that the Superior Court conducted an appropriate review of the proceedings in District Court that ultimately resulted in the indictments against defendant, which review was authorized by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-954. The Court of Appeals did not address the issue raised by defendant in this argument. Accordingly, it would be proper for this Court to remand this case to the Court of Appeals for it to consider and decide whether the Superior Court erred in its exercise of the jurisdiction granted it under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-954. Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, we now address that issue which was properly before the Court of Appeals and is properly before this Court.\nThe procedure for finding probable cause and transferring a juvenile to Superior Court for trial as an adult is governed by three provisions of the Juvenile Code. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-608 to -610 (1995). The authority of the District Court to transfer jurisdiction over a juvenile to Superior Court for trial as in the case of an adult is provided by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-608 as follows:\nThe court after notice, hearing, and a finding of probable cause may transfer jurisdiction over a juvenile to superior court if the juvenile was 13 years of age or older at the time the juvenile allegedly committed an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult. If the alleged felony constitutes a Class A felony and the court finds probable cause, the court shall transfer the case to the superior court for trial as in the case of adults.\nFurther, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-609 provides that the District Court \u201cshall conduct a hearing to determine probable cause in all felony cases in which a juvenile was 13 years of age or older when the offense was allegedly committed.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-609(a). However, \u201c[c]ounsel for the juvenile may waive in writing the right to the hearing and stipulate to a finding of probable cause.\u201d Id. At the probable cause hearing, the juvenile must be represented by counsel in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-584 and may testify as a witness in his own behalf, call and examine other witnesses, and produce other evidence in his behalf. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-609(b).\nAlthough the State argues that the rights accorded a juvenile by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-609 apply only to the District Court\u2019s determination of probable cause, we conclude that the legislature intended that such rights also be accorded the juvenile with regard to the District Court\u2019s consideration and decision as to whether to transfer jurisdiction over the juvenile to Superior Court for trial as an adult. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-610 appears clearly to contemplate that the decision as to whether to transfer jurisdiction ordinarily will be made as a part of the same hearing at which probable cause is determined. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-608, if the alleged felony constitutes a Class A felony and the District Court finds probable cause, the District Court is required to transfer the case to Superior Court for trial and would do so automatically as part of the order finding probable cause. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-610, if probable cause is found and a transfer of jurisdiction to Superior Court is not required by reason of the alleged crime being a Class A felony, the prosecutor or the juvenile may immediately move that the case be transferred to Superior Court for trial as in the case of an adult. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-610(a). The District Court may then immediately proceed to determine whether the needs of the juvenile or the best interest of the State will be served by transfer of the case to Superior Court. Id. We simply do not believe that the legislature intended that the rights accorded the juvenile by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-609 would apply only with regard to the District Court\u2019s determination of probable cause and not to its decision to transfer the case, since the District Court is authorized to make both those determinations in a single hearing and, in the great run of cases, does so.\nAdditionally, to hold that a juvenile did not have the right to a hearing and to produce evidence in his own behalf on the issue of transfer of jurisdiction to the Superior Court for his trial as an adult would unnecessarily raise substantial questions as to the constitutionality of our procedures for conducting the transfer hearing contemplated by the statutes under consideration here. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-29, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346, 355 (1975) (noting that the Supreme Court\u2019s response to the gap between the originally benign conception of the juvenile court system and its realities \u201chas been to make applicable in juvenile proceedings constitutional guarantees associated with traditional criminal prosecutions\u201d); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967). Where one of two reasonable constructions of a statute will raise a serious constitutional question, it is well settled that our courts, should adopt the construction that avoids the constitutional question. In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642, 231 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1977); In re Appeal of Arcadia Dairy Farms, Inc., 289 N.C. 456, 465-66, 223 S.E.2d 323, 328-29 (1976); cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84, 95 (1966) (statutory construction \u201cin the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel\u201d). Accordingly, we conclude that when read in pari materia, N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-608, -609, and -610 were intended by our legislature to provide a juvenile the right to a hearing on the issue of whether his case should be transferred to the Superior Court for his trial as in the case of an adult and the rights, among others, to be represented by counsel in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-584, to testify as a witness in his own behalf, to call and examine witnesses, and to produce other evidence in his own behalf.\nWe next turn to the application of the foregoing principles to the facts presented by the record in this case. In the present case, the juvenile petitions were filed against the juvenile defendant, T.D.R., on 22 August 1996. Thereafter, continuances resulting from no fault on the part of the juvenile or the State prevented the holding of the probable cause hearing required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-609 until 3 December 1996 \u2014 more than three months after the juvenile petitions had been filed. At the hearing, counsel for the juvenile waived the right to a hearing on the issue of probable cause and stipulated to a finding of probable cause. Counsel for defendant then requested a continuance of the hearing until 17 December 1996 in order to obtain forensic psychological evaluations of defendant and to gather evidence concerning treatment alternatives if the District Court retained jurisdiction over the juvenile. The State objected to the motion for continuance, and the District Court proceeded to take evidence on the issue of transfer. The district attorney put on evidence concerning the manner in which the victim alleged that the juvenile defendant had forcibly broken into her home, armed with a knife. The district attorney also presented evidence that defendant forced the victim to enter the bedroom of the home at knifepoint and take off her clothes and that defendant attempted to have sex with her. The district attorney then stated, \u201cYour Honor, that would be all for the foundation of evidence for the Court.\u201d\nCounsel for defendant renewed defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance to be allowed to gather evidence to present at a later time as to whether the District Court should retain jurisdiction. The district attorney then called Carolyn Cordasco, a coordinator of the Adolescent Sex Offender Program for Durham County Mental Heaith. She testified that she had worked exclusively with adolescent sex offenders for three years. She further testified:\nI\u2019ve spent approximately twelve years with sex offenders and I spent five years in the prison system in Kansas, starting sex offender programs and working there, and then five years here in North Carolina. And I started the adult sex offender program and then went to Central Prison for the last couple of years to work with violent offenders and rapists in a combination program.\n[District Attorney:] Okay. So you would say over the last twelve years this has been your specialty?\n[Ms. Cordasco:] Absolutely.\nThe district attorney then asked if Ms. Cordasco had heard the evidence presented at the hearing concerning the factual basis of the charges against the juvenile defendant. She indicated that she had. The following colloquy then occurred between the district attorney and the witness:\n[District Attorney:] And in the consideration, this juvenile was fifteen years old. What would your opinion or could you give one \u2014 do you have enough information to give an opinion regarding the nature of this act and the feasibility of this juvenile being treated as a juvenile or by the nature of this act, in your opinion, do you believe he would \u2014 is a threat to the community and should be transferred as an adult and treated as an adult? If you can answer that.\n[Ms. Cordasco:] I listened to the facts that the detective presented and based on my experience, working with both adults and juveniles and working in North Carolina\u2019s juvenile and adult system, it\u2019s, you know, my opinion that this young man committed a very sophisticated sexual crime based on the use of a weapon. It was obviously planned. I mean, he had a bandana. He was out there. He also interjected putting his arm around her neck, which at any time, I don\u2019t know if he actually cut her air off, but that certainly is very frightening because the victim would not know would he [sic] do that. And then putting her in a closet- \u2014 in a dark closet. All these things are very, very sophisticated for someone so young.\nIn the juvenile system they do not have the capacity to treat this serious an offense. The adult system does. Unfortunately he would go into the youth system first and he would have to wait until he was twenty-two to get sex offender treatment. However, I do think the crime, in and of itself, puts him at extremely high risk to re-offend. There\u2019s usually a time thing. He apparently, from what I hear, has done fairly good in the community. But I think he\u2019s a very high risk for re-offending and I don\u2019t think the juvenile system \u2014 not my program, nor the one at Dillon or at Swannanoa \u2014 would be equipped to handle this serious of a crime.\nHe also needs some time within \u2014 away from the community, within the system, to be seasoned enough to even be amenable to this kind of treatment.\nCounsel for defendant then cross-examined the witness. During cross-examination, Ms. Cordasco testified that based on her twelve years\u2019 experience working with men who rape, such men were usually given standard psychological tests to reveal depression or psychosis, but that she did not know of any test that would assist in predicting the possibility of such a person\u2019s reentry into the community or the risks he posed to the community.\nCounsel for defendant offered no evidence at the conclusion of the evidence for the State. The District Court then ruled as follows:\nOn what I\u2019ve already heard, I have to consider that if T.D.R. were to remain in the Juvenile Court jurisdiction and [be] sent to C.A. Dillon or some other training school, I believe that at age eighteen he would be released, whether he had improved or he had not improved, whether he had been treated or not.\nAnd with the \u2014 just with the evidence that I have now, I feel that we have been about as thorough and lenient as we can be on him. I\u2019m going to have him transferred to Superior Court.\nThe District Court denied the motion and entered an order finding probable cause and transferring jurisdiction over the juvenile defendant to the Superior Court and giving the reasons for the transfer. In its order, the District Court stated that the needs of the juvenile, or the best interests of the State, or both, would be served by transfer of the case to Superior Court. The order also stated as reasons for the transfer that\n[t]he attorney for the juvenile waived probable cause after having received laboratory results which the juvenile\u2019s attorney had processed. The Court finds that juvenile services would not be adequate to rehabilitate the juvenile and/or protect the community. The fact that this juvenile would automatically be released from Division of Youth Services at age 18 weighs heavily on the Court & would be inappropriate in this case to retain at the juvenile level.\nThereafter, the grand jury of Durham County indicted defendant for the crimes charged. The juvenile defendant then moved under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-954(a) that the Superior Court dismiss the indictments and remand the case against him to the District Court \u201cfor a full and meaningful transfer hearing.\u201d After reviewing the transcript of the hearing before the District Court and other documents in the District and Superior Court files, the Superior Court made findings and conclusions and ordered that the indictments against defendant be vacated. Defendant contends that the Superior Court properly entered this order. For the following reasons, we disagree.\nIn one of its conclusions of law in support of its order, the Superior Court concluded that \u201c[t]he District Court in this case denied the Juvenile-Defendant Due Process of law and fundamental fairness by its refusal to hear or consider the juvenile\u2019s evidence with regard to the appropriateness of retaining jurisdiction in the District Court Division.\u201d This conclusion by the Superior Court does not find support either in the Superior Court\u2019s findings of fact or in the transcript of the hearing held by the District Court on the issue of transfer. The only finding by the Superior Court related to this issue was that the juvenile defendant had been denied the opportunity to present evidence contradicting the expert testimony of the State\u2019s witness, Ms. Cordasco. Specifically, the Superior Court found that \u201c[c]ounsel was denied an opportunity to do so by [the denial of] a two-week continuance.\u201d This finding was in response to the only argument made by defendant before the Superior Court and before this Court as to why his constitutional rights were violated.\nDefendant did not contend before the Superior Court, and does not argue before this Court, that the District Court refused to hear or consider any evidence he sought to introduce. The transcript of the District Court hearing does not reflect that defendant was ever prevented from introducing evidence. Instead, the transcript reveals that at each point at which defendant could have offered any evidence he had on the issue of transfer, defendant, through counsel, renewed his motion for a continuance to gather such evidence. The argument defendant made before the Superior Court and here is that the District Court\u2019s order violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion for a continuance of the hearing to gather evidence.\nWhether to allow or deny a motion to continue any legal proceeding is a matter ordinarily addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling is not reversible on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 342 N.C. 523, 530, 467 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1996). We recognize that numerous decisions of the appellate courts of this state have indicated that, in such situations, the appealing party must demonstrate a \u201cgross abuse\u201d or \u201cmanifest abuse\u201d of discretion. We further recognize that our use of such phrases has created some confusion as to whether there is more than one standard for, or type of, abuse of discretion; there is not. Our use of phrases such as \u201cgross abuse\u201d and \u201cmanifest abuse\u201d of discretion originated in earlier cases, before the term \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d had been given any definitive meaning. E.g., State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948); State v. Farrell, 223 N.C. 321, 26 S.E.2d 322 (1943). More recently, however, we have given a more complete and definite meaning to the legal term \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d by holding that an abuse of discretion is established only upon a showing that a court\u2019s actions \u201care manifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985). Further, we have emphasized that any \u201cruling committed to a trial court\u2019s discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Id. Any such abuse of discretion is a fortiori \u201cgross\u201d or \u201cmanifest\u201d as those terms have been used in prior cases of the appellate courts of this state. There is but one type of abuse of discretion.\nFor clarity, we reemphasize that a motion for continuance is ordinarily addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In such cases, the trial court\u2019s ruling will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unsupported by reason, which is to say it is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. Id.; State v. Wooten, 344 N.C. 316, 337, 474 S.E.2d 360, 372 (1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 137 L. Ed. 2d 348 (1997); State v. Mutakbbic, 317 N.C. 264, 273, 345 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1986). However, if the motion to continue is based on a constitutional right, the trial court\u2019s ruling thereon presents a question of law that is fully reviewable on appeal. Jones, 342 N.C. at 530, 467 S.E.2d at 17; State v. Smith, 310 N.C. 108, 112, 310 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1984). Here, defendant has argued, as he argued in the Superior Court, that the District Court\u2019s denial of his motion for a continuance to gather evidence on the issue of whether jurisdiction over him should have been transferred to the Superior Court denied him the constitutional right of presenting evidence on his own behalf.\nDefendant contends that the denial of his motion for a continuance prevented his introducing evidence in his own behalf because he simply did not have adequate time to gather such evidence. The record indicates that defendant gave no reason at the hearing before the District Court as to why the time he had been allowed to gather evidence and prepare for its presentation had not been sufficient. The record indicates that defendant was on notice of the allegations against him from the date of the filing of the juvenile petitions on 22 August 1996. The holding of a probable cause hearing was delayed in part because of the District Court\u2019s accommodation of defendant\u2019s request that his own experts be permitted to conduct DNA testing on the State\u2019s evidence prior to a determination of probable cause. The State relinquished custody of its as-yet-unanalyzed evidence for such testing by defendant\u2019s experts in response to a court order. A probable cause hearing was set for 18 November 1996. On 4 November 1996, defendant moved for a continuance of that hearing. The District Court granted his motion and continued the probable cause hearing until 3 December 1996.\nDefendant made no further motion for a continuance until after he had appeared at the 3 December 1996 hearing and stipulated that probable cause existed. His motion to continue was made orally at that time. Defendant offered no explanation as to why the more than three months from 22 August 1996 until 3 December 1996 had not been a sufficient time for him to secure any necessary evidence. Further, defendant submitted no affidavits to the District Court indicating any fact that might be proved by any witness if the continuance were granted.\nThis Court has stated that \u201cbefore ruling on a motion to continue the judge should hear the evidence pro and con, consider it judicially and then rule with a view to promoting substantial justice.\u201d Shankle v. Shankle, 289 N.C. 473, 483, 223 S.E.2d 380, 386 (1976). Here, the District Court allowed both defendant and the State to be heard on the motion to continue before ruling. No evidence was offered with regard to the motion. In light of the fact that defendant had more than three months to prepare and that the District Court continued the hearing date more than once and entered orders assisting defendant in gathering evidence when requested, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion or commit any constitutional error in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a further continuance. See Jones, 342 N.C. at 531, 467 S.E.2d at 18 (denial of continuance not error or abuse of discretion where defendant\u2019s oral motion to continue to secure psychiatric evaluation was made on the date set for trial, was not supported by affidavit, and did not set forth detailed proof to establish grounds for further delay); State v. McGullers, 341 N.C. 19, 32-33, 460 S.E.2d 163, 171 (1995) (same); State v. Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 105, 291 S.E.2d 653, 657 (1982) (same); State v. Searles, 304 N.C. 149, 155, 282 S.E.2d 430, 434 (1981) (same); State v. Cradle, 281 N.C. 198, 208, 188 S.E.2d 296, 303 (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047, 34 L. Ed. 2d 499 (1972).\nDefendant further argues that the District Court erred in denying a continuance because he did not have notice that the issue of transfer of jurisdiction to Superior Court would be considered at the probable cause hearing. We disagree. The applicable statutes themselves give notice that upon a finding of probable cause, either the juvenile or the prosecutor may make a motion for transfer of jurisdiction to the Superior Court and that the District Court may immediately proceed to a ruling on such motion. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-608, -610(a). Further, the transcript of the hearing reveals that defendant had notice in fact that the hearing on the issue of transfer of jurisdiction would or might be held immediately upon a finding of probable cause. Counsel for defendant implicitly acknowledged being on such notice when she stated during the hearing, \u201c[W]e are waiving probable cause at this time and we\u2019re going to ask, Judge, that we have a continuance of the transfer hearing until December 17th.\u201d Additionally, after the District Court had announced that it would enter an order transferring defendant to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, counsel for defendant indicated actual prior notice that the issue of transfer would be considered by stating:\nYour Honor, I know you\u2019ve made your ruling on this and I would ask you to reconsider for this one reason. Ms. Cordasco testified that one of the things they look for when they have people coming to their program is an MMPI and some of the same testing that he\u2019s going through right now. We don\u2019t have \u2014 we\u2019ve not had an opportunity to present any evidence to show whether or not there is anything in the juvenile system that could help him and we would have recommendations from our forensic psychologist that could tell the Court and give the Court more of a basis in which whether or not this thing should be transferred to adult court.\nWe understand this is a serious crime and we understand we have waived probable cause and that\u2019s one of the things we took a chance on when we waived it. .. .\n(Emphasis added.) This argument by defendant is without merit.\nThe Superior Court also based its order vacating the indictments against defendant and purporting to remand jurisdiction to the District Court upon another ground. The Superior Court concluded as a matter of law that the District Court order transferring jurisdiction \u201cwas not supported by competent evidence\u201d to the extent that it was based upon the reason that there was \u201ca lack of rehabilitative services for this juvenile in the Juvenile Court Division.\u201d This conclusion by the Superior Court is not supported by the transcript of the District Court hearing or by any other document that was before the Superior Court. Instead, it seems that the Superior Court\u2019s conclusion was based on its disagreement with the testimony of the State\u2019s expert and with the District Court\u2019s action based on that evidence. Therefore, the Superior Court erred in this conclusion.\nThe State\u2019s expert, Ms. Cordasco, testified in detail as to her lengthy experience and qualifications. Defendant never objected to her testimony and never requested that the court make any findings of fact. Cf. State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 370 (1984) (trial court did not err in permitting witness to testify as an expert without making findings of fact as to her qualifications where defendant did not specifically request that the court make such findings). In the absence of a request by defendant for the trial court to make a finding concerning the qualifications of a witness as an expert, it is not necessary that the record show an express finding on this issue \u2014 the finding being deemed implicit in the ruling admitting or rejecting the opinion testimony of the witness. State v. Perry, 275 N.C. 565, 169 S.E.2d 839 (1969). This is particularly true where, as here, there is ample evidence to support a finding that the witness is an expert or where, as here, defendant does not object to the witness\u2019 being found to be an expert. State v. Mitchell, 283 N.C. 462, 196 S.E.2d 736 (1973) (evidence to support a finding that the witness was an expert); Perry, 275 N.C. 565, 169 S.E.2d 839 (no objection to witness\u2019 being treated as an expert). Where, as here, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the witness was an expert, it is presumed that the court found the witness to be an expert before admitting the testimony, notwithstanding the absence of a specific finding to this effect. Olan Mills, Inc. v. Cannon Aircraft Executive Terminal, Inc., 273 N.C. 519, 160 S.E.2d 735 (1968). Therefore, the Superior Court erred in its findings and conclusion to the effect that there was no competent expert evidence before the District Court on the issue of the availability of rehabilitative services for defendant as a juvenile and that the order of the District Court must be vacated for that reason.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the Superior Court vacating and dismissing the indictments against defendant and purporting to remand jurisdiction to the District Court was in error and must be reversed. However, the order of the Court of Appeals did not reverse the order of the Superior Court. Instead, the Court of Appeals, proceeding on the mistaken assumption that the Superior Court acted without jurisdiction, vacated the order of the Superior Court. The Court of Appeals erred in vacating the order of the Superior Court rather than reversing that order.\nAs previously explained in this opinion, once the District Court has transferred jurisdiction over a juvenile to the Superior Court, the Superior Court has complete jurisdiction, including jurisdiction and authority to hear and dispose of motions to dismiss the charges stated in the criminal pleadings against the defendant in the Superior Court. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-954(a). Here, the Superior Court had jurisdiction; it simply committed reversible error. Therefore, the order of the Court of Appeals also must be reversed.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the Court of Appeals vacating the order of the Superior Court is reversed. The order of the Superior Court vacating and dismissing the indictments against defendant and purporting to remand jurisdiction over the juvenile defendant to the District Court is also reversed. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for its further remand to the Superior Court, Durham County, for reinstatement of the indictments against defendant and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: REVERSED;\nORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT: REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR REINSTATEMENT OF INDICTMENTS AND FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.", "type": "majority", "author": "MITCHELL, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Gail-E. Weis, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Kevin P. Bradley for defendant-appellant.", "American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, by Sandy S. Ma and Deborah K. Ross, Children\u2019s Law Center, by Phillip H. Redmond, Jr., amici curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. T.D.R.\nNo. 172PA97\n(Filed 6 February 1998)\n1. Infants or Minors \u00a7 141 (NCI4th) \u2014 jurisdiction over juvenile \u2014 transfer to superior court for trial as adult \u2014 order immediately appealable\nThe Court of Appeals erred by holding that an order entered by the district court transferring jurisdiction over a juvenile to superior court for trial as an adult pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-608 is subject to appellate review by the Court of Appeals only \u201cafter entry of a final judgment by the superior court.\u201d Rather, a juvenile transfer order entered by the district court is a \u201cfinal\u201d order of the court in the juvenile matter within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-666(2) so that such order is immediately appealable to the Court of Appeals. The case of In re Green, 118 N.C.App. 336, 453 S.E.2d 191 is overruled to the extent that it may be read as holding to the contrary.\n2. Infants or Minors \u00a7 99 (NCI4th); Criminal Law \u00a7 586 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 juvenile defendant \u2014 superior court \u2014 flagrant violation of rights \u2014 dismissal of indictment\nOnce the district court has transferred jurisdiction over a juvenile to the superior court, the superior court has authority, on motion of the juvenile defendant, to review criminal pleadings filed against the defendant in superior court and to dismiss those charging instruments if defendant\u2019s rights were \u201cflagrantly violated and there is such irreparable prejudice to the defendant\u2019s preparation of his case that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-954(a)(4).\n3. Infants or Minors \u00a7 99 (NCI4th)\u2014 juvenile \u2014 transfer to superior court for trial \u2014 right to hearing\nWhen read in pari materia, N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-608, -609, and -610 were intended by our legislature to provide a juvenile the right to a hearing on the issue of whether his case should be transferred to the superior court for trial as in the case of an adult and the rights, among others, to be represented by counsel in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-584, to testify as a witness in his own behalf, to call and examine witnesses, and to produce other evidence in his own behalf.\n4. Appeal and Error \u00a7 471 (NCI4th)\u2014 abuse of discretion defined\nAn abuse of discretion is established only upon a showing that a court\u2019s actions are manifestly unsupported by reason; further, any ruling committed to a trial court\u2019s discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. Any such abuse of discretion is a fortiori \u201cgross\u201d or \u201cmanifest\u201d as those terms have been used in prior cases of the appellate courts of this state, there being but one type of abuse of discretion.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 246 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 motion for continuance \u2014 discretion of court \u2014 appellate review\nA motion for continuance is ordinarily addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court\u2019s ruling thereon will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unsupported by reason, which is to say it is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. However, if the motion to continue is based on a constitutional right, the trial court\u2019s ruling thereon presents a question of law that is fully reviewable on appeal.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 276 (NCI4th Rev.); Infants or Minors \u00a7 99 (NCI4th)\u2014 juvenile defendant \u2014 hearing on transfer to superior court \u2014 denial of further continuance \u2014 no abuse of discretion or constitutional error\nThe district court did not abuse its discretion or commit any constitutional error in denying a juvenile defendant\u2019s motion for a further continuance of his hearing on whether jurisdiction of rape and burglary charges should be transferred to superior court for trial of defendant as an adult in order that independent psychological evaluation could be performed and offered as evidence at the hearing where the. district court allowed both defendant and the State to be heard on the motion to continue before ruling; defendant offered no explanation as to why the three months he had to prepare for the hearing was insufficient time for him to secure any necessary evidence; defendant submitted no affidavits to the district court indicating any fact that might be proved if the continuance were granted; and the district court had continued the hearing date more than once and entered orders assisting defendant in gathering evidence when requested.\n7. Infants or Minors \u00a7 99 (NCI4th)\u2014 juvenile defendant\u2014 probable cause hearing \u2014 transfer issue \u2014 statutory and actual notice \u2014 continuance properly denied\nThe district court did not err in denying a continuance of a transfer hearing on the ground that the juvenile defendant did not have notice that the issue of transfer of jurisdiction to the superior court would be considered at the probable cause hearing since the applicable statutes give notice that, upon a finding of probable cause, either the juvenile or the prosecutor may make a motion for transfer of jurisdiction to the superior court and that the district court may immediately proceed to a ruling on such motion, and statements by defendant\u2019s counsel indicated that defendant had notice in fact that the hearing on the issue of transfer of jurisdiction would or might be held immediately upon a finding of probable cause.\n8. Infants or Minors \u00a7 99 (NCI4th)\u2014 juvenile defendant\u2014 transfer of jurisdiction to superior court \u2014 improper remand of jurisdiction to district court\nThe superior court erred by vacating indictments against a juvenile and purportedly remanding jurisdiction to the district court on the basis of its findings and conclusion that there was no competent expert evidence before the district court on the issue of the availability of rehabilitative services for defendant as a juvenile where an expert witness for the State testified on this issue; defendant failed to object to her testimony or to request that the court make findings of fact; there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the witness was an expert; and it will be presumed that the court found the witness to be an expert before admitting her testimony even though there was no specific finding to this effect.\nOn appeal of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(1) of an order of the Court of Appeals, 125 N.C. App. 209, 483, S.E.2d 193 (1997), vacating an order entered on 7 February 1997 by LaBarre, J., in Superior Court, Durham County. On 8 May 1997, the Supreme Court allowed discretionary review of additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 October 1997.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Gail-E. Weis, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nKevin P. Bradley for defendant-appellant.\nAmerican Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, by Sandy S. Ma and Deborah K. Ross, Children\u2019s Law Center, by Phillip H. Redmond, Jr., amici curiae." }, "file_name": "0489-01", "first_page_order": 529, "last_page_order": 547 }