{ "id": 1659938, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSEPH EARL BATES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bates", "decision_date": "1998-04-03", "docket_number": "No. 145A91-3", "first_page": "29", "last_page": "39", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "348 N.C. 29" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "514 U.S. 419", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1339057 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police.\"" }, { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 F.3d 1305", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7414808 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/57/1305-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567833 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558677 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565402 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 L. Ed. 2d 339", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867609 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" }, { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 225", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9475 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236-39" }, { "page": "152-54" }, { "page": "238" }, { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" }, { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561617 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" }, { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2493733 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 873", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798967 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 L. Ed. 2d 438", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "510 U.S. 984", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 235683, 234148, 230694, 232045, 231533, 235597, 235534, 231643, 233427, 232858, 230587, 231517 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/510/0984-03", "/us/510/0984-12", "/us/510/0984-05", "/us/510/0984-07", "/us/510/0984-11", "/us/510/0984-01", "/us/510/0984-06", "/us/510/0984-04", "/us/510/0984-10", "/us/510/0984-09", "/us/510/0984-02", "/us/510/0984-08" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2544591 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 389", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 847, "char_count": 25625, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.268973801952297e-06, "percentile": 0.9959495708050933 }, "sha256": "50266d4798855535112002b4c781f5f407f1279c06d93a1499156a7e32105634", "simhash": "1:eeeda512576ab273", "word_count": 4054 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:11:06.764212+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSEPH EARL BATES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nOn 21 June 1996, the General Assembly ratified \u201cAn Act to Expedite the Postconviction Process in North Carolina.\u201d Ch. 719, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 389, 397. Among other things, the Act amended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415 to add this new subsection:\n(f) In the case of a defendant who has been convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death, the defendant\u2019s prior trial or appellate counsel shall make available to the capital defendant\u2019s counsel their complete files relating to the case of the defendant. The State, to the extent allowed by law, shall make available to the capital defendant\u2019s counsel the complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant. If the State has a reasonable belief that allowing inspection of any portion of the files by counsel for the capital defendant would not be in the interest of justice, the State may submit for inspection by the court those portions of the files so identified. If upon examination of the files, the court finds that the files could not assist the capital defendant in investigating, preparing, or presenting a motion for appropriate relief, the court in its discretion may allow the State to withhold that portion of the files.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) (1997).\nThe sole question presented here is the extent of disclosure of prosecution and law enforcement investigative files mandated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f). We emphasize at the outset that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) applies only to the post-conviction process and only to defendants who have been convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death.\nDefendant, Joseph Earl Bates, was indicted on 29 October 1990 for the kidnapping and murder of Charles Edwin Jenkins. He was tried capitally in February 1991, found guilty on one count of first-degree murder and one count of first-degree kidnapping, and sentenced to death for the murder conviction. On appeal, this Court found error and ordered a new trial. State v. Bates, 333 N.C. 523, 428 S.E.2d 693, cert, denied, 510 U.S. 984, 126 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1993). Defendant was retried capitally in October 1994 and was found guilty on one count of first-degree kidnapping and one count of first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. The jury again recommended, and the trial court imposed, a sentence of death. On appeal, this Court found no error. State v. Bates, 343 N.C. 564, 473 S.E.2d 269 (1996), cert, denied,U.S. -, 136 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1997). For the purpose of reviewing the issue presented here, it is unnecessary to further recite the circumstances of the crimes or the evidence presented at defendant\u2019s two trials.\nOn 10 April 1997, Judge Melzer A. Morgan appointed defendant\u2019s present counsel to represent defendant in post-conviction proceedings. On 1 May 1997, defendant\u2019s counsel filed a motion for discovery of all investigative and prosecution files pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f); Article I, Sections 19 and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution; and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The State filed a response in opposition to this motion, arguing that the qualifying language in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f), \u201cto the extent allowed by law,\u201d manifested a legislative intent to require disclosure, upon request, only of evidence favorable to a defendant and did not require the disclosure of all investigative files. The State also argued that this language shielded from discovery the work product of the attorney for the State and his agents.\nFollowing a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion and arguments by the parties, Judge Morgan entered an order on 13 June 1997 that contained the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:\n1) That the North Carolina General Assembly recently enacted revisions to the post conviction review process in this state, part of which revision included the addition of paragraph (f) to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415. The provisions of subsection (f) became effective June 21, 1996, and apply to this case.\n2) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) provides for broader discovery for a capital defendant\u2019s counsel in the post conviction review process than previously existed, specifically including the discovery of the complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant.\n3) That if the State has a reasonable belief that allowing inspection of any portion of the State\u2019s files by counsel for the capital defendant would not be in the interest of justice the State may submit for inspection by the court those portions of the files so identified for the court\u2019s review, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f).\n4) The defendant is entitled to have made available to his present counsel the complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant, including but not limited to any files in possession of the Forsyth County Sheriffs Department, the Yadkin County Sheriffs Department, the Iredell County Sheriffs Department, the State Bureau of Investigation, and any other law enforcement or investigative agencies involved in the investigation into the death and alleged kidnapping of Charles Jenkins, irrespective of the prosecutorial district involved, including the District Attorney\u2019s files regarding the prosecutions of Joseph Earl Bates\u2019 codefendants Hal \u201cTink\u201d Eddleman (who was prosecuted by the District Attorney for the 23rd Prosecutorial District for his involvement in the events which led to the conviction of Joseph Earl Bates in the present matter) and Gary Shavers, who was prosecuted in Iredell County.\nThe order decreed that a full and complete copy of the above-referenced files would be made available at the office of the Yadkin County Clerk of Superior Court for inspection by defendant\u2019s counsel, subject to in camera review of those portions of the files for which the State reasonably believes that inspection by defendant would not be in the interest of justice.\nThe State petitioned for a writ of certiorari on 18 June 1997 for review of the discovery order entered by Judge Morgan. This Court allowed the State\u2019s petition on 27 June 1997.\nThe State presents to this Court two challenges to Judge Morgan\u2019s order for discovery under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f): that the trial court erred by ordering the State to produce its work product and that, in the absence of service upon the individual agencies involved, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order such discovery. We address these challenges seriatim.\nThe State asserts that its work product is not subject to disclosure pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) because the General Assembly, by including the phrase \u201cto the extent allowed by law,\u201d meant to retain the established common law and statutory rules against the production of work product. Although the plain language of the statute refers to the \u201ccomplete files,\u201d the State contends that it is not required to disclose rqaterials that are privileged or otherwise protected by law, specifically work product. The State further argues that there is no exception to the policy objectives of the work-product doctrine for capital cases and that disclosure of the State\u2019s complete files in post-conviction would have a chilling effect on the \u2022 preparation of capital cases. Finally, the State contends that the process of preparing and producing the files for inspection would be onerous and time-consuming. After carefully examining the statute and considering each of the State\u2019s arguments, we conclude that the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) is clear and unambiguous and that Judge Morgan\u2019s order must be affirmed in its entirety.\nWhile no right of discovery in criminal cases existed at common law, see State v. Taylor, 327 N.C. 147, 153, 393 S.E.2d 801, 806 (1990), limited rights of pretrial discovery for both the defendant and the State exist under the United States Constitution, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and by statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-901 to -910 (1997). The work-product doctrine is a qualified privilege against discovery that applies in criminal as well as civil cases. See State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 126, 235 S.E.2d 828, 840 (1977); see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-39, 45 L. Ed. 2d 141, 152-54 (1975). In codifying pretrial discovery rules, the General Assembly explicitly protected \u201creports, memoranda, or other internal documents made by the prosecutor, law-enforcement officers, or other persons acting on behalf of the State in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-904(a). In other words, pretrial discovery statutes do not require the State to produce its work product or investigative files. See, e.g., State v. Heatwole, 344 N.C. 1, 23, 473 S.E.2d 310, 321 (1996), cert, denied,-U.S.-, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997). However, the statute at issue in the instant case was enacted to address the specific circumstance of a capitally sentenced defendant in post-conviction proceedings. Case law applying the work-product privilege to pretrial discovery and statutes governing pretrial discovery in criminal cases do not control the interpretation or application of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f).\nIt is well settled that the meaning of any legislative enactment is controlled by the intent of the legislature and that legislative purpose is to be first ascertained from the plain language of the statute. See Electric Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991); Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990); State ex rel. Hunt v. N. C. Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 288, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (1981). \u201cWhen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect and its clear meaning may not be evaded . . . under the guise of construction.\u201d State ex rel. Utilities Comm\u2019n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 451, 465, 232 S.E.2d 184, 192 (1977).\nThe statute at issue here provides that \u201c[t]he State, to the extent allowed by law, shall make available to the capital defendant\u2019s counsel the complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) (emphasis added). The statute contains no express provision for withholding work product. On the contrary, the statute mandates that the State \u201cshall make available . . . the complete files\u201d of prosecution and law enforcement agencies. However, the State contends that the phrase \u201cto the extent allowed by law\u201d must protect work product from disclosure at post-conviction. Thus, we will address each of the State\u2019s specific arguments for this position.\nA statute must be construed, if possible, so as to give meaning to all its provisions. See Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 556, 276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981). The State argues that to give full effect to all parts of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f), the phrase \u201cto the extent allowed by law\u201d must limit the required disclosure so as to exclude materials traditionally protected by the work-product doctrine. We agree that this language is intended as some limitation on the information which the State is required to make available to the capital defendant in post-conviction proceedings. However, we read this phrase as allowing the State to exclude from its \u201ccomplete files\u201d only specific types of information which the State is elsewhere prohibited by law from disclosing. For example, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-675 prohibits the disclosure without court order of confidential juvenile court records. Nothing in existing law prohibits disclosure to a defendant of the State\u2019s complete files, including work-product materials. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-904(b) (\u201cNothing in this section prohibits a prosecutor from making voluntary disclosures in the interest of justice.\u201d); Hardy, 293 N.C. at 124, 235 S.E.2d at 840 (holding that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-904(a) does not bar discovery of prosecution witnesses\u2019 statements at trial).\nThe only mechanism by which the State may withhold any portion of its complete files, apart from information which it is not allowed by law to disclose, is contained within N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) itself. If the State has a reasonable belief that inspection of any part of its files by the capital defendant would not be in the interest of justice, the State may submit those portions of the files for inspection by the court. The court may allow the State to withhold those portions of its files upon a finding that the material could not assist the capital defendant in investigating, preparing, or presenting a motion for appropriate relief. This mechanism permits the State the opportunity to protect certain sensitive information, but it carves out no special exception for work product. As Judge Morgan correctly stated in his order, \u201cN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) provides for broader discovery for a capital defendant\u2019s counsel in the post conviction review process than previously existed.\u201d Such a change is well within the General Assembly\u2019s authority.\nThe State contends that \u201cthe general rule that the work product or investigative files of the district attorney, law enforcement agencies, or others assisting in the preparation of the case are not open to discovery,\u201d Heatwole, 344 N.C. at 23, 473 S.E.2d at 321, applies with equal force in capital cases. We do not disagree that the general rule protecting work product from pretrial discovery contains no exception for capital cases. However, the State\u2019s contention is inapposite to the specific issue before us. The superior court in this case entered an order in post-conviction proceedings pursuant to the specific provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f), which mandate in explicit language that the prosecution and investigative files of the State shall be made available to counsel for a defendant who has been sentenced to death. Because the clear language of this statute demands disclosure in post-conviction proceedings, the \u201cgeneral rule\u201d governing pretrial discovery is not applicable.\nWe must also reject the State\u2019s final policy arguments for granting some work-product protection within the scope of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f). The State contends that the burden of organizing and producing work product in a capital case would be onerous and time-consuming and, thus, would frustrate the goal of expediting post-conviction review. This argument is unpersuasive, as we can imagine equally time-consuming efforts to remove all work-product materials from prosecution and law enforcement files prior to making them available to defendant\u2019s counsel. Moreover, allowing the State to unilaterally purge its files of work-product materials would render meaningless the-provisions in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) for in camera review by the court.\nThe State also argues that permitting disclosure of work product at the post-conviction phase of a capital case would have a chilling effect on the preparation of capital cases. We note that the essence of the work-product privilege in criminal cases is that the \u201cinterests of society and the accused in obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case.\u201d Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 153. The State asserts that the policy concerns for protecting work product are equally relevant in the post-conviction setting. However, as we have stated above, the clear and unambiguous meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) contemplates disclosure of the complete files, and this argument by the State only challenges the wisdom of the enactment. This Court, even if persuaded by the State\u2019s concerns, may not substitute its judgment for that of the General Assembly and craft a work-product exception into this statute where the Legislative Branch has clearly mandated disclosure of the complete files. Moreover, the interest of the State in protecting its work product once the case has reached post-conviction review is diminished.\nViewing subsection (f) of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415 in light of other amendments enacted as part of \u201cAn Act to Expedite the Postconviction Process in North Carolina,\u201d we discern an intent on the part of the General Assembly to expedite the post-conviction process in capital cases while ensuring thorough and complete review. In addition to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f), we note several newly enacted provisions which apply only to capital cases. For example, the Act sets a 120 day time limitation for filing a post-conviction motion for appropriate relief in capital cases, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(a); gives priority of review to capital cases in both direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1441 (1997); requires appointment of two counsel to prepare a motion for appropriate relief for indigent capital defendants, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-451(c) (Supp. 1997); and requires the State to file an answer to defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief in capital cases within sixty days, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1420(bl)(2) (1997). The broad post-conviction discovery required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) logically fits into this statutory scheme by providing early and full disclosure to counsel for capital defendants so that they may raise all potential claims in a single motion for appropriate relief.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the post-conviction disclosure contemplated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) for capitally sentenced defendants does not provide an express or implied protection for work product of the prosecutor or law enforcement agencies. We hold that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) requires the State to make available to counsel for a capital defendant in post-conviction proceedings the complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant, subject only to the specific withholding mechanism contained within that statute and specific prohibitions against disclosure contained in other law.\nThe State also challenges Judge Morgan\u2019s order on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to order discovery from independent constitutional agencies not represented by the district attorney. The State\u2019s position is that the various sheriffs\u2019 departments and the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) were not served with defendant\u2019s motion for discovery or otherwise notified of the hearing on the motion, thus denying them notice and an opportunity to be heard in order to defend their respective positions. Service of defendant\u2019s motion upon the district attorney and the Attorney General is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over these independent constitutional agencies, so the State contends.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) requires \u201cthe State\u201d to make the complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies available to the capital defendant\u2019s counsel. It does not further describe the procedure by which this is to be accomplished. We note, however, that, under our constitution, the district attorneys are responsible for the prosecution of criminal cases \u201con behalf of the State.\u201d N.C. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 18. For purposes of disclosing exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, the State\u2019s liability is \u201cnot limited to information in the actual possession of the prosecutor and certainly extends to any in the possession of state agencies subject to judicial control.\u201d Love v. Johnson, 57 F.3d 1305, 1314 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 508 (1995) (\u201c[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government\u2019s behalf in the case, including the police.\u201d).\nThe disclosure requirement of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) was enacted by the General Assembly in order to assist counsel for the capitally sentenced defendant in investigating, preparing, and presenting a motion for appropriate relief. We note that, in a capital case, a motion for appropriate relief must be served on both the district attorney for the district where the defendant was indicted and the Attorney General. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1420(bl)(1). In this case, defendant served the District Attorney for the Twenty-Third Judicial District and the Attorney General with his motion for discovery of investigative and prosecution files. As a matter of practicality it may be advisable, in some circumstances, to serve each entity which holds material subject to disclosure under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f). However, we can find no statutory requirement for doing so, nor has the State presented any compelling reason to justify individual service in this case. We hold that the superior court did not lack jurisdiction for its discovery order.\nFor the reasons stated herein, the order of the superior court is affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Barry S. McNeill, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Walter K. Burton and David K. Williams, Jr., for defendantappellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSEPH EARL BATES\nNo. 145A91-3\n(Filed 3 April 1998)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 112 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital post-conviction review \u2014 discovery of State\u2019s files \u2014 work product included\nThe trial court did not err by ordering that a capital defendant have available to him in the post-conviction review process the complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes or prosecution of defendant, including files regarding the prosecution of codefendants. Although the State contends that it is not required to disclose work product, case law applying the work-product privilege to pretrial discovery and statutes governing pretrial discovery in criminal cases do not control the interpretation or application of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f), which contains no express provision for withholding work product. The phrase \u201cto the extent allowed by law\u201d allows the State to exclude only specific types of information which the State is elsewhere prohibited by law from disclosing and nothing in existing law prohibits disclosure to a defendant of the State\u2019s complete files, including work-product materials.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 98 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital post-conviction review \u2014 discovery of all investigative and prosecution files \u2014 general discovery rules not applicable\nThe only mechanism by which the State may withhold any portion of its complete files on post-conviction capital review, apart from information which it is not allowed by law to disclose, is contained within N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f). The general rule governing pretrial discovery is not applicable to that statute because its clear language demands disclosure in post-conviction proceedings. The argument that organizing and producing work product in a capital Case would be onerous and time-consuming is unpersuasive, as the effort to remove all work-product materials prior to making files available would be equally time consuming, and allowing the State to unilaterally purge its files of work-product materials would render meaningless the provisions in the statute for in camera review by the court. Although the State contends that disclosure of work product will have a chilling effect on the preparation of capital cases, the clear and unambiguous meaning of the statute contemplates disclosure of the complete files and this argument only challenges the wisdom of the enactment. Finally, the broad and complete discovery required by this statute logically fits into a statutory scheme to expedite the post-conviction process by providing early and full disclosure to counsel for capital defendants so that they may raise all potential claims in a single motion for capital relief.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 98 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital post-conviction review \u2014 discovery of all investigation and prosecution files \u2014 agencies not served\nThe trial court did not lack jurisdiction on a capital post-conviction motion for discovery to order discovery from independent constitutional agencies not represented by that district attorney where the court ordered disclosure of the complete files of all prosecutorial and investigatory agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes or the prosecution of defendant, irrespective of prosecutorial districts and including files from the SBI and other counties\u2019 sheriffs\u2019 departments. Although the State contended that the various sheriffs\u2019 departments and the SBI were not served with the motion for discovery or otherwise notified of the hearing and that service upon the district attorney and the Attorney General is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over these independent constitutional agencies, there is no statutory requirement to serve each entity which holds material subject to disclosure under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) and the State has not presented compelling evidence to justify individual service in this case, although, as a matter of practicality, it may be advisable to do so in some circumstances.\nOn writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-32(b) to review an order entered 13 June 1997 by Morgan (Melzer A., Jr.), J., in Superior Court, Yadkin County, granting defendant\u2019s motion for discovery under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f). Heard in the Supreme Court 16 December 1997.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Barry S. McNeill, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nWalter K. Burton and David K. Williams, Jr., for defendantappellee." }, "file_name": "0029-01", "first_page_order": 77, "last_page_order": 87 }