{ "id": 1659863, "name": "SMITH CHAPEL BAPTIST CHURCH; FELLOWSHIP BAPTIST CHURCH, INC.; LAYMAN'S CHAPEL BAPTIST CHURCH; and CALVARY BAPTIST CHURCH OF DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA v. CITY OF DURHAM, a North Carolina Municipal Corporation", "name_abbreviation": "Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham", "decision_date": "1998-07-30", "docket_number": "No. 250PA97", "first_page": "632", "last_page": "643", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "348 N.C. 632" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538018 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798865 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 U.S. 52", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11329751 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" }, { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/493/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572076 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4757989 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 1763", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547754 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508179 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798865 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" }, { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0093-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 902, "char_count": 26157, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.9545418563042006e-08, "percentile": 0.3710376550910883 }, "sha256": "d18db010fd2348ac43ff58624b279144f9f311dfa77fba94f00dd170894d76b4", "simhash": "1:ae3d8735174d887a", "word_count": 4174 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:11:06.764212+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Frye concurs in the result.", "Justice Orr joins in this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "SMITH CHAPEL BAPTIST CHURCH; FELLOWSHIP BAPTIST CHURCH, INC.; LAYMAN\u2019S CHAPEL BAPTIST CHURCH; and CALVARY BAPTIST CHURCH OF DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA v. CITY OF DURHAM, a North Carolina Municipal Corporation" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WEBB, Justice.\nThe defendant contends that two sections of the General Statutes give the City of Durham the authority to assess fees to operate its stormwater program, although a large part of the program expenditures do not involve the physical assets of the program.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-311 provides in part:\nAs used in this Article, the term \u201cpublic enterprise\u201d includes:\n(10) Structural and natural stormwater and drainage systems of all types.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-311 (1994).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314(al) provides in part:\nThe fees established under this subsection must be made applicable throughout the area of the city. Schedules of rates, fees, charges, and penalties for providing structural and natural stormwater and drainage system service may vary according to whether the property served is residential, commercial, or industrial property, the property\u2019s use, the size of the property, the area of impervious surfaces on the property, the quantity and quality of the runoff from the property, the characteristics of the watershed into which stormwater from the property drains, and other factors that affect the stormwater drainage system. Rates, fees, and charges imposed under this subsection may not exceed the city\u2019s cost of providing a stormwater and drainage system.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314(al), para. 2 (1994). The defendant argues that the adoption of these two sections was in response to the requirements of the WQA, which shows that the fees for which N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314(al) provides were intended to finance its entire stormwater program. The plaintiffs contend that the City is limited to collecting fees which will finance only the structural and natural stormwater and drainage systems component part of the stormwater program. We agree with the plaintiffs that the statutes alone do not authorize the ordinance.\nWhen the language of a statute is clear, there is no need for judicial interpretation. We give the statute its plain meaning. State v. Dellinger, 343 N.C. 93, 95, 468 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1996). In this case, the words \u201cstructural and natural stormwater and drainage system\u201d have a plain meaning. In the ordinance establishing the stormwater program, a stormwater system is defined as \u201cthe system of natural and constructed devices for collecting and transporting storm water.\u201d Durham, N.C., Code ch. 23, art. VIII, \u00a7 23-201 (1994). We can only hold N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 160A-311 and -314 do not authorize the City to finance its entire stormwater program with fees assessed against landowners.\nWe must next determine whether the City has the authority from any other source to impose fees to finance the stormwater program. We believe that it has such authority. Article XIV, Section 5 of the Constitution of North Carolina provides in part:\nIt shall be the policy of this State to conserve and protect its lands and waters for the benefit of all its citizenry, and to this end it shall be a proper function of the State of North Carolina and its political subdivisions to . . . control and limit the pollution of our air and water . . . and in every other appropriate way to preserve as a part of the common heritage of this State its forests, wetlands, estuaries, beaches, historical sites, openlands, and places of beauty.\nN.C. Const, art. XIV, \u00a7 5, para. 1.\nWe believe this section of the Constitution gives our cities the authority to regulate our waters. If the City has this power, we believe we should follow the rule of Homebuilders Ass\u2019n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 45, 442 S.E.2d 45, 50-51 (1994), that when a city has the power to regulate activities, it has a supplementary power reasonably necessary to carry the program into effect. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-4 (1987).\nIn this case, it was reasonably necessary for the City of Durham to assess fees against landowners to finance the stormwater program to comply with the WQA. The City could base the amount of fees on the amount landowners contributed to the stormwater problem. In this case, the contribution to the problem is measured by the impervious area of each lot.\nAlthough we have held that the City has the authority outside the parameters of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 160A-311 and -314 to impose fees to support the program, we shall be guided by those two sections in questions of the administration of the program.\nThe plaintiffs contend that the method by which fees are calculated for use of the stormwater system is unlawful. The fees are based on the impervious areas of each lot. An impervious area is that part of a lot in which surface water cannot penetrate the soil, and each lot is assessed based on the size of the impervious area.\nThe plaintiffs argue that a fee for utility service must be commensurate with the services rendered, and the evidence showed there was virtually no benefit to them. In this case, the fees are not based on service to the landowners. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314(al) provides several methods for setting fees. One method is based on \u201cthe area of impervious surfaces on the property.\u201d The statute does not require that there be a showing of benefit to the landowners, and the plaintiffs have not questioned the constitutionality of the statute.\nThe plaintiffs next contend that the impervious-area method of calculating fees does not reasonably relate to the stormwater runoff of individual properties. They argue that several other methods better measure the quantity and quality of the runoff and that it was unreasonable for the City to use this method. The best answer to this argument is that the City is authorized by statute to use the impervious-area method in setting runoff fees. There is substantial evidence in the record that consultants hired by the City considered several different methods before recommending the impervious-area method. There was plenary evidence that the impervious-area method for calculating fees is the best method. This supports the selection of the impervious-area method for setting fees.\nThe plaintiffs next argue that the rates set by the City are discriminatory. They base this argument on the way the cost of street cleaning is handled under the plan. The City was required, as part of its plan to receive an NPDES permit, to clean its streets. The costs to the Utility to clean the streets was $1,820,087, but the fee charged to the City was only $1,280,000. The plaintiffs say first that it is discriminatory for the Utility to clean the City\u2019s streets but refuse to clean the paved parking lots and private roads of its customers. The plaintiffs say next that it is discriminatory to charge the City an amount which does not cover the cost of the City\u2019s pollution.\nThe City has produced a plan as it was required to do to receive its NPDES permit. The plan does not provide that the City clean private property. There is a distinction between city owned property and privately owned property that supports this different treatment.\nThe argument that it is discriminatory not to require the City to pay an amount that covers the costs of removing its own pollution is answered by an understanding of the impervious-area method of calculating fees. These fees are set based on the amount of pollution caused by each lot, not on how much it costs to clean each lot. We have no doubt pollution in the streets is caused in part by drainage from the surrounding land.\nThe plaintiffs next contend that the Stormwater Quality Management Program contains many features which serve to benefit the public but are of no particular benefit to the persons who are assessed to pay for it. They say this makes the program arbitrary and capricious. We disagree. It is not arbitrary and capricious to promulgate a plan for the amelioration of a stormwater problem and require those who caused the problem to pay for it. There is no need to show a particular benefit to a landowner. It is the public which benefits from this program.\nThe plaintiffs next argue that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has been violated because the City of Durham\u2019s stormwater charges are not reasonably related to services provided. We have held that fees based on the amount of impervious area are valid and reasonable. On that basis, we reject this argument.\nFinally, the plaintiffs argue that the City\u2019s stormwater plan violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of North Carolina. They say this is so because of certain exemptions from the plan. There are 45,304 acres in the City of Durham, of which 23,720 acres are in undeveloped land. These undeveloped acres are exempt from the plan. Commercial property with less than 1,200 square feet of impervious area is also exempt, as are golf courses, state roads, and railroad corridors and tracks. Furthermore, the maximum charge for residential property is $3.25 per month.\nThe plaintiffs contend that these exemptions are arbitrary and deprive them of the equal protection of the law. We believe each of the exemptions can be justified. First, undeveloped land and golf courses do not produce as much runoff as do impervious areas. Second, commercial property with 1,200 square feet of impervious area produces a de minimus amount of stormwater runoff. Third, it would be difficult for a city to assess the State for land owned by the State as state roads. Next, railroad corridors and tracks have very little impervious area, and thus it is not unreasonable to exempt them from the program. Finally, residential property is distinguishable from nonresidential property. There was not a showing in this case that the fees collected from residential property were substantially less because of the $3.25 limit.\nFor the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the decision of the Superior Court, Durham County, and remand for the entry of a judgment for the defendant. '\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\nJustice Frye concurs in the result.", "type": "majority", "author": "WEBB, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice Lake\ndissenting.\nI must respectfully dissent because the statutes governing the operation of public enterprises for municipal corporations clearly invalidate th\u00e9 enabling ordinance at issue in this case, as well as the actions taken by the \u201cutility\u201d established thereunder.\nIt is undisputed that, for reasons of expediency, the City of Durham chose to establish a utility as the mechanism by which it would comply with the unfunded mandates of the 1987 Water Quality Act related to stormwater runoff. Municipalities are authorized to establish and to operate public enterprises like utilities only as provided by statute. Having chosen this method, therefore, the City must abide by the statutory requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-311 and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314, which govern such public enterprises. These statutes read in relevant part:\n\u00a7 160A-311. Public enterprise defined.\nAs used in this Article, the term \u201cpublic enterprise\u201d includes:\n(10) Structural and natural stormwater and drainage systems of all types.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-311 (1994) (emphasis added).\n\u00a7 160A-314. Authority to fix and enforce rates.\n(a) A city may establish and revise from time to time schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of or the services furnished by any public enterprise. Schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties may vary according to classes of service, and different schedules may be adopted for services provided outside the corporate limits of the city.\n(al)....\nThe fees established under this subsection must be made applicable throughout the area of the city. Schedules of rates, fees, charges, and penalties for providing structural and natural stormwater and drainage system service may vary according to whether the property served is residential, commercial, or industrial property, the property\u2019s use, the size of the property, the area of impervious surfaces on the property, the quantity and quality of the runoff from the property, the characteristics of the watershed into which stormwater from the property drains, and other factors that affect the stormwater drainage system. Rates, fees, and charges imposed under this subsection may not exceed the city\u2019s cost of providing a stormwater and drainage system.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314(a), (al) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).\nIn deciding whether the City\u2019s public enterprise complies with the above statutes, we first must look to the plain language of the statutes themselves. State v. Dellinger, 343 N.C. 93, 95, 468 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1996). \u201cOrdinary rules of grammar apply when ascertaining the meaning of a statute.\u201d Dunn v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 129, 134, 418 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1992). When the language of a statute is clear, there is no need for judicial interpretation, and the court should give the statute its plain meaning. Dellinger, 343 N.C. at 95, 468 S.E.2d at 220.\nIn the case sub judice, the language of the above statutes is clear. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-311 defines \u201cpublic enterprises\u201d as \u201cstructural and natural stormwater and drainage systems.\u201d The word \u201csystems\u201d is limited by the adjectival phrases \u201cstructural and natural\u201d and \u201cstormwater and drainage.\u201d Thus, the plain meaning is that the public enterprises authorized by the statute applicable here are expressly limited to those which oversee systems of physical infrastructure, structural or natural, for servicing stormwater. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314 reinforces this understanding of the statutory construct. That statute provides that the City may establish fees \u201cfor the use of or the services furnished\u201d and that fees may vary for \u201cstructural and natural stormwater and drainage system service\u201d according to the type and size of \u201cproperty served.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314(a), (al) (emphasis added). This plain language contemplates only the collection of fees for the \u201cuse of\u2019 or \u201cfurnishing of\u2019 stormwater services by the utility. The statute further modifies the setting of fees by tying their computation to the particular \u201cproperty served.\u201d Thus, the plain meaning of these statutes is that, in order to operate as an authorized public enterprise for the purposes of stormwater control, the utility in question is limited to the establishment and maintenance of physical systems directly related to stormwater removal and drainage of property.\nEven though the plain language of the statute is sufficient to determine its meaning in this case, it is also clear the legislature intended for public enterprises of this type to operate actual drainage systems, not broad pollution protection programs. In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, the title of an act should be considered as a guide. State ex rel. Cobey v. Simpson, 333 N.C. 81, 90, 423 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1992). The act that added the statutory provisions regarding stormwater was titled:\nAn ACT TO AUTHORIZE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE STORM DRAINAGE SYSTEMS AS PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND TO PROVIDE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WITH FUNDING AND TAXING AUTHORITY TO FINANCE THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF STORM DRAINAGE SYSTEMS.\nAct of July 15, 1989, ch. 643, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 1763. The title\u2019s focus on \u201cconstruction and operation\u201d of storm drainage \u201csystems\u201d indicates the legislature did not intend for such public enterprises to be used as general programmatic bodies, but rather as organizations charged merely with the supervision of physical drainage systems.\nWhen determining the intent of the legislature, it is also significant if the General Assembly adopts provisions which differ from those suggested by a study commission. Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 634, 325 S.E.2d 469, 475-76 (1985). The study commission proposal did not contain language that tied stormwater charges to services provided to properties. Proposed Legislation: Study Commission Report to 1991 N.C. General Assembly 44-45. Conversely, the adopted statute linked the charges for stormwater services to the character of property served. This is indicative of the legislature\u2019s intent that stormwater utilities limit their activities to physical systems for the removal of stormwater from property.\nExamination of the City\u2019s ordinance establishing the utility, as well as the actual operation of the utility, reveals the City to have exceeded the authority conferred upon it by the plain language of the statutes. The ordinance creates a stormwater utility \u201cto develop and operate the stormwater management program.\u201d The \u201cprogram\u201d is defined by the ordinance to include not just a stormwater system, but also \u201cthe development of ordinances, policies, technical materials, inspections, monitoring, outreach, and other activities related to the control of stormwater quantity and quality.\u201d Durham, N.C., Code ch. 23, art. VIII, \u00a7 23-201 (1994). Similarly, the ordinance provides that \u201call developed land . . . shall be subject to a stormwater charge,\u201d id., not just property served by the system. Thus, the ordinance on its face exceeds the express limitations in the plain meaning of the statute. Moreover, the operation of the utility exceeds statutory authority. All funds collected by the utility are placed in one fund, and this fund pays for the City\u2019s entire stormwater quality program. The City concedes the utility\u2019s activities substantially exceed the providing of stormwater infrastructure. Over half of the funds go to general programmatic elements involving water quality, such as general education programs for commercial and residential areas, programs related to discharge and disposal of hazardous materials, inspection and training for industrial sites, and construction-site runoff consultation. It is clear the ordinance and its application through the utility exceed the express limitations imposed by the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 160A-311 and-314.\nMoreover, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314 expressly mandates that \u201c[r]ates, fees, and charges imposed under this subsection may not exceed the city\u2019s cost of providing a stormwater and drainage system.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314(al) (emphasis added). The uncontroverted evidence establishes the City spent only a fraction of the money collected by the utility on the cost of constructing the stormwater and drainage infrastructure. The vast majority of the fees were spent on general programmatic pollution reduction efforts. This exceeds the authority conferred by the plain meaning of the statutes. Even assuming arguendo that the majority\u2019s expansive interpretation is correct, the evidence still shows the utility to have exceeded its authority. The City admits substantial sums of money collected for the purposes of operating the stormwater \u201cutility\u201d were transferred to other city uses, including the sewer and landfill funds, and even the general fund. The evidence establishes the City transferred over $1.8 million to the general fund alone. Leaving aside the question of whether this amounts to an illegal or unconstitutional taxation of these churches via the utility strawman, which is not raised on appeal, it clearly exceeds any reasonable interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314, which requires that fees not exceed costs.\nAdditionally, the defendant\u2019s unreasoned, blanket exclusion of all undeveloped land (which is approximately 50% of the area producing the stormwater the ordinance purports to address), defendant\u2019s like exemption of certain types of commercially developed properties, and its diversion of very substantial portions of the funds generated from the assessed \u201cuser fees\u201d to programs unrelated either to cost of service in providing stormwater infrastructure or any benefit received or burden generated by the plaintiff churches, if not violative of equal protection, seem clearly to be \u201cso arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a deprivation of the plaintiff[s\u2019] liberty or property, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or the similar Law of the Land Clause of Art. I, \u00a7 19, of the Constitution of North Carolina.\u201d Guthrie v. Taylor, 279 N.C. 703, 713, 185 S.E.2d 193, 200 (1971). See also United States v. Sperry Corporation, 493 U.S. 52, 63, 107 L. Ed. 2d 290, 303 (1989).\nIn light of the fact that the ordinance at issue, as well as its application, exceeds the express limitations established by the plain meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 160A-311 and -314 and is, I believe, violative of equal protection and due process, I vote to uphold the determination of the trial court.\nJustice Orr joins in this dissenting opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice Lake" } ], "attorneys": [ "Siam, Fordham & Danchi, P.A., by Paul Stam, Jr., and Henry C. Fordham, Jr., for plaintiff-appellees.", "Office of the City Attorney, by Karen A. Sindelar, Assistant City Attorney, for defendant-appellant.", "North Carolina League of Municipalities, by Andrew L. Romanet, Jr., General Counsel, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SMITH CHAPEL BAPTIST CHURCH; FELLOWSHIP BAPTIST CHURCH, INC.; LAYMAN\u2019S CHAPEL BAPTIST CHURCH; and CALVARY BAPTIST CHURCH OF DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA v. CITY OF DURHAM, a North Carolina Municipal Corporation\nNo. 250PA97\n(Filed 30 July 1998)\n1. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 258 (NCI4th)\u2014 stormwater program \u2014 landowner fees \u2014 no statutory authority\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 160A-311 and -314 do not authorize a city to finance its entire stormwater program with fees assessed against landowners.\n2. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 258 (NCI4th)\u2014 stormwater program \u2014 landowner fees \u2014 constitutional authority\nArticle XIV, Section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution authorizes cities to regulate waters, and cities have the supplementary power reasonably necessary to do so. It was reasonably necessary for a city to assess fees against landowners to finance the city\u2019s stormwater program to comply with the federal Water Quality Act, and the city could base the amount of fees on the amount landowners contributed to the stormwater problem measured by the impervious area of each developed lot. N.C. Const, art. XIV, \u00a7 5, para. 1.\n3. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 258 (NCI4th)\u2014 stormwater program \u2014 landowner fees \u2014 consideration of statutes\nAlthough a city was given the authority outside the parameters of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-311 and -314 to impose fees to support its stormwater program, the appellate court will be guided by those two statutes in questions of the administration of the program.\n4. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 258 (NCI4th)\u2014 stormwater program \u2014 landowner fees \u2014 impervious area method \u2014 statutory authority\nA city was authorized by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314(al) to use the impervious area method in setting stormwater program fees, and the fees were not unlawful on grounds that there was no showing of benefit to landowners, or that this method of calculating fees does not reasonably relate to the stormwater runoff of individual properties.\n5. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 258 (NCI4th)\u2014 stormwater program \u2014 landowner fees not discriminatory\nFees set by a city to finance its stormwater program in order to receive an NPDES permit were not discriminatory because the city cleans the city\u2019s streets but does not clean paved parking lots and private roads of landowners since there is a distinction between city owned property and privately owned property that supports this different treatment. Nor are the rates discriminatory because the city is not required to pay an amount that covers the cost of cleaning its own streets since the fees are set under the impervious area method based on the amount of pollution caused by each lot rather than on how much it costs to clean each lot. #\u2022\n6. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 258 (NCI4th)\u2014 stormwater program \u2014 landowner fees \u2014 exemptions\u2014not equal protection violation\nA city\u2019s stormwater plan is not arbitrary and does not deprive owners of developed property of equal protection because the plan exempts undeveloped land, commercial property with less than 1200 square feet of impervious area, golf courses, state roads, and railroad corridors and tracks, or because the maximum charge for residential property is $3.25 per month, since each of the exemptions was justified, and there was no showing that the fees collected from residential property were substantially less because of the $3.25 limit.\nJustice Frye concurs in the result.\nJustice Lake dissenting.\nJustice Orr joins in this dissenting opinion.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31, prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals, of a judgment entered by Manning, J., on 11 October 1996 and an amended judgment entered on 3 January 1997 in Superior Court, Durham County. Heard in the Supreme Court 19 November 1997.\nIn this case, the plaintiffs contest a program established by the City of Durham to comply with the Water Quality Act (WQA) adopted by the United States Congress. The WQA required that cities of 100,000 or more in population obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit to discharge stormwater into the waters of the state. Stormwater is that portion of rain that does not evaporate or penetrate the ground but remains on the surface and travels over natural and developed surfaces. In order to receive a NPDES permit, a city must develop a comprehensive stormwater quality program.\nTo comply with the federal requirements, the City of Durham adopted an ordinance creating a city department called the Stormwater Services Division to operate the stormwater program. The program was to be financed by charging fees for all developed land in the City. Fees were based on the impervious areas of the assessed land. The Durham Stormwater Utility (Utility) was created to receive the fees and to pay the expenses of the Stormwater Services Division.\nThe plaintiffs brought this action for a declaratory judgment alleging that the City of Durham did not have the authority to impose fees to operate its stormwater program. After a trial without a jury, the superior court held that the City did not have the statutory authority to use fees to fund more than the cost of a stormwater and drainage system and that it had exceeded its authority by imposing fees to fund other parts of its stormwater program.\nThe defendant appealed, and we allowed discretionary review prior to determination by the Court of Appeals.\nSiam, Fordham & Danchi, P.A., by Paul Stam, Jr., and Henry C. Fordham, Jr., for plaintiff-appellees.\nOffice of the City Attorney, by Karen A. Sindelar, Assistant City Attorney, for defendant-appellant.\nNorth Carolina League of Municipalities, by Andrew L. Romanet, Jr., General Counsel, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0632-01", "first_page_order": 680, "last_page_order": 691 }