{ "id": 571614, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES FLOYD DAVIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Davis", "decision_date": "1998-10-09", "docket_number": "No. 452A96", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "61", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "349 N.C. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "517 U.S. 1143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11783808, 11784289, 11784417, 11784224, 11783652, 11784004, 11783912, 11784492, 11784082, 11783730, 11784149, 11784630, 11784568, 11784349, 11783870 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/1143-03", "/us/517/1143-10", "/us/517/1143-12", "/us/517/1143-09", "/us/517/1143-01", "/us/517/1143-06", "/us/517/1143-05", "/us/517/1143-13", "/us/517/1143-07", "/us/517/1143-02", "/us/517/1143-08", "/us/517/1143-15", "/us/517/1143-14", "/us/517/1143-11", "/us/517/1143-04" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1089", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1330912, 1335109, 1330918, 1335365, 1335077, 1331497, 1331403, 1334705, 1330705, 1331381, 1330808, 1332409, 1331131, 1331288 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1089-08", "/us/513/1089-06", "/us/513/1089-12", "/us/513/1089-04", "/us/513/1089-05", "/us/513/1089-10", "/us/513/1089-11", "/us/513/1089-01", "/us/513/1089-02", "/us/513/1089-03", "/us/513/1089-13", "/us/513/1089-07", "/us/513/1089-14", "/us/513/1089-09" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1046", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1331682, 1330819, 1330979, 1331428, 1331686, 1330634, 1331292, 1333776, 1332081, 1330385, 1334228, 1333815, 1334715, 1335068 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1046-03", "/us/513/1046-06", "/us/513/1046-07", "/us/513/1046-13", "/us/513/1046-05", "/us/513/1046-11", "/us/513/1046-14", "/us/513/1046-12", "/us/513/1046-08", "/us/513/1046-04", "/us/513/1046-09", "/us/513/1046-10", "/us/513/1046-01", "/us/513/1046-02" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1332513, 1333762, 1333317, 1330854, 1331561, 1332010, 1333466, 1335833, 1334928, 1334225, 1331538, 1335700, 1335894, 1330809, 1330874, 1331419 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1135-09", "/us/513/1135-05", "/us/513/1135-08", "/us/513/1135-03", "/us/513/1135-15", "/us/513/1135-14", "/us/513/1135-04", "/us/513/1135-02", "/us/513/1135-12", "/us/513/1135-07", "/us/513/1135-11", "/us/513/1135-10", "/us/513/1135-16", "/us/513/1135-06", "/us/513/1135-01", "/us/513/1135-13" ] }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 1161", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 324832, 323396, 327525, 326886, 324552, 323052, 324684, 324795, 325327, 327220, 327541, 324918, 325786, 324411 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/1161-05", "/us/516/1161-08", "/us/516/1161-13", "/us/516/1161-09", "/us/516/1161-14", "/us/516/1161-02", "/us/516/1161-07", "/us/516/1161-01", "/us/516/1161-10", "/us/516/1161-06", "/us/516/1161-04", "/us/516/1161-12", "/us/516/1161-11", "/us/516/1161-03" ] }, { "cite": "518 U.S. 1024", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1730080, 1729633, 1730183, 1729928, 1730015, 1729611, 1730027, 1730125, 1729681, 1729939, 1730227, 1729596, 1730110, 1729791 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/518/1024-08", "/us/518/1024-11", "/us/518/1024-13", "/us/518/1024-02", "/us/518/1024-04", "/us/518/1024-03", "/us/518/1024-12", "/us/518/1024-01", "/us/518/1024-06", "/us/518/1024-09", "/us/518/1024-14", "/us/518/1024-05", "/us/518/1024-07", "/us/518/1024-10" ] }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 884", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 324545, 324386, 328131, 323172, 327332, 326430, 327472, 327185, 324946, 328048, 326327, 324376, 328606, 328191 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0884-13", "/us/516/0884-01", "/us/516/0884-11", "/us/516/0884-03", "/us/516/0884-10", "/us/516/0884-09", "/us/516/0884-12", "/us/516/0884-04", "/us/516/0884-06", "/us/516/0884-07", "/us/516/0884-14", "/us/516/0884-08", "/us/516/0884-05", "/us/516/0884-02" ] }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 1091", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1339136, 1340513, 1339449, 1339523, 1340452, 1338600, 1339784, 1339658, 1339787, 1339756, 1339728, 1339730, 1339928, 1340351, 1340313, 1339295 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/1091-15", "/us/514/1091-06", "/us/514/1091-16", "/us/514/1091-02", "/us/514/1091-13", "/us/514/1091-05", "/us/514/1091-09", "/us/514/1091-12", "/us/514/1091-04", "/us/514/1091-11", "/us/514/1091-03", "/us/514/1091-01", "/us/514/1091-14", "/us/514/1091-10", "/us/514/1091-08", "/us/514/1091-07" ] }, { "cite": "485 U.S. 1036", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 13312, 13445, 13287, 13545, 13740, 13965, 13233, 14131, 13397, 13238, 13399, 13750, 13849, 13725 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/485/1036-05", "/us/485/1036-12", "/us/485/1036-11", "/us/485/1036-04", "/us/485/1036-06", "/us/485/1036-14", "/us/485/1036-08", "/us/485/1036-10", "/us/485/1036-01", "/us/485/1036-02", "/us/485/1036-13", "/us/485/1036-03", "/us/485/1036-09", "/us/485/1036-07" ] }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6468801, 6468547, 6469476, 6468711, 6468967, 6469353, 6469608, 6468624, 6468240, 6468465, 6469044, 6468343, 6469144, 6469246 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/1018-07", "/us/459/1018-04", "/us/459/1018-13", "/us/459/1018-06", "/us/459/1018-08", "/us/459/1018-12", "/us/459/1018-14", "/us/459/1018-05", "/us/459/1018-01", "/us/459/1018-03", "/us/459/1018-09", "/us/459/1018-02", "/us/459/1018-10", "/us/459/1018-11" ] }, { "cite": "515 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1563969, 1564577, 1564483, 1564296, 1564008, 1564331, 1564174, 1563855, 1564503, 1564049, 1563795, 1563863, 1563768, 1564252, 1564093 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/1135-02", "/us/515/1135-14", "/us/515/1135-10", "/us/515/1135-15", "/us/515/1135-04", "/us/515/1135-07", "/us/515/1135-03", "/us/515/1135-09", "/us/515/1135-08", "/us/515/1135-01", "/us/515/1135-12", "/us/515/1135-11", "/us/515/1135-05", "/us/515/1135-06", "/us/515/1135-13" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 558", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790255 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 650", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535633 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793165 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763650 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761257 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686205 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4758195 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53878 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694780 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741422 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 1254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39539 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/1254-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530367 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" }, { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538239 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" }, { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 L. Ed. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 865", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6401817 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0865-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4709664 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 2d 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 1061", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6375268, 6376325, 6375755, 6375564, 6375412, 6376092 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/1061-01", "/us/486/1061-06", "/us/486/1061-04", "/us/486/1061-03", "/us/486/1061-02", "/us/486/1061-05" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2567820 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551800 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 L. Ed. 2d 459", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 942", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11365027, 11364868, 11365765, 11364958, 11365194, 11364716, 11364527, 11364623, 11365105, 11365267, 11364789, 11365658, 11365438, 11365343 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0942-07", "/us/499/0942-05", "/us/499/0942-14", "/us/499/0942-06", "/us/499/0942-09", "/us/499/0942-03", "/us/499/0942-01", "/us/499/0942-02", "/us/499/0942-08", "/us/499/0942-10", "/us/499/0942-04", "/us/499/0942-13", "/us/499/0942-12", "/us/499/0942-11" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109", "parenthetical": "quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 373" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2493650 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2540746 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550074 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793117 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "480 S.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53847 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 L. Ed. 2d 1080", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795939 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2528837 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" }, { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551208 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2557546 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573792 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 L. Ed. 2d 738", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2519104 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761533 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2401681 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497579 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6202354 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" }, { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 510", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531962 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1023", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4836, 5158, 4882, 5207, 5176 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1023-04", "/us/494/1023-03", "/us/494/1023-05", "/us/494/1023-02", "/us/494/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492599 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 2d 756", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1050", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5473, 5290, 5004, 5103, 4917 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1050-01", "/us/494/1050-04", "/us/494/1050-05", "/us/494/1050-03", "/us/494/1050-02" ] }, { "cite": "375 S.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "918" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486627 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659773 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 L. Ed. 2d 777", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 1021", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6268812, 6267060, 6268214, 6267352, 6267610, 6266778, 6268507, 6267902 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/1021-08", "/us/497/1021-02", "/us/497/1021-06", "/us/497/1021-03", "/us/497/1021-04", "/us/497/1021-01", "/us/497/1021-07", "/us/497/1021-05" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" }, { "page": "662", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2487626 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" }, { "page": "48-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 402", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28132 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422-23" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "424-25" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "357", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498038 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560822 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564026 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 141", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715366 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146-47" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533", "parenthetical": "quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368, 373 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139592 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438", "parenthetical": "quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368, 373 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517613 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 L. Ed. 2d 912", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569839 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569559 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 L. Ed. 2d 733", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 1164", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12838, 12486, 12358, 12530, 12506 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/1164-03", "/us/476/1164-04", "/us/476/1164-02", "/us/476/1164-05", "/us/476/1164-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4716135 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561161 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575737 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4764212 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559660 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546001 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53988 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "403" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568444 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 L. Ed. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)" }, { "page": "378-79" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)" }, { "page": "659-60" }, { "page": "659-60" }, { "page": "659-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 873", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" }, { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139375 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552935 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 384, 407 S.E.2d 200, 212 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798920 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 384, 407 S.E.2d 200, 212 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4762743 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139668 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530965 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 284", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204128 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 L. Ed. 2d 818", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556681 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" }, { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 719", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798937 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" }, { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778236 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2565596 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 F.2d 694", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1448672 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/602/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 U.S. 45", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 369864 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" }, { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/287/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168076 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226-27" }, { "page": "1157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 454", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187407 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1157 (1967)" }, { "page": "373", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1157 (1967)" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "374" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "371", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" }, { "page": "845" }, { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2509584 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 L. Ed. 2d 268", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 905", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12130850, 12131043, 12131491, 12132165, 12132518, 12130508, 12131821, 12131342, 12131183, 12131987, 12132344, 12130682, 12131645 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0905-03", "/us/496/0905-04", "/us/496/0905-07", "/us/496/0905-11", "/us/496/0905-13", "/us/496/0905-01", "/us/496/0905-09", "/us/496/0905-06", "/us/496/0905-05", "/us/496/0905-10", "/us/496/0905-12", "/us/496/0905-02", "/us/496/0905-08" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2487602 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12835 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908", "parenthetical": "quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 149 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531831 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43", "parenthetical": "quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 149 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518881 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 412", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959771 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" }, { "page": "851-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0412-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2650, "char_count": 140841, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.518828958310962e-07, "percentile": 0.9465111672533804 }, "sha256": "d75a0e342c2ec3ea406be65586aebaa517651cde6a0e2e825ab0d91ab56d8ed4", "simhash": "1:066bc322374e99f0", "word_count": 22754 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:15:14.712587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES FLOYD DAVIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Justice.\nThis case arises out of the shooting deaths of Gerald Allman, Tony Balogh, and Frank Knox. On 11 September 1995, defendant was indicted for three counts of first-degree murder, one count of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and one count of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. Defendant was tried before a jury, and on 27 September 1996, the jury found defendant guilty of all charges. Following a capital sentencing proceeding, based upon the jury\u2019s finding defendant guilty of all three murders on the basis of premeditation and deliberation and the felony murder theory, the jury recommended sentences of death for each of the murder convictions. In accordance with the jury\u2019s recommendation, the trial court entered three sentences of death. The trial court additionally sentenced defendant to 79 to 104 months\u2019 imprisonment for the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury conviction and 31 to 47 months\u2019 imprisonment for the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill conviction, to be served consecutive to each other and to the sentences of death.\nAfter consideration of the assignments of error brought forward on appeal by defendant and a thorough review of the transcript of the proceedings, the record on appeal, the briefs, and oral arguments, we find no error meriting reversal of defendant\u2019s convictions or sentences.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: Defendant James Floyd Davis had been employed in the warehouse of Union Butterfield since 1991. On 10 May 1995, an altercation occurred between defendant and two other employees. The management of Union Butterfield, including Herb Welsh, Larry Cogdill, Tony Balogh, and Debbie Medford, conducted a fact-finding meeting concerning the altercation. Defendant was suspended with pay until the following Monday, 15 May 1995. Subsequently, management made a decision to terminate defendant\u2019s employment.\nOn 15 May 1995, defendant met with Tony Balogh and Debbie Medford. During the meeting, Balogh informed defendant that his employment was being terminated. Medford informed defendant of the benefits he was entitled to receive upon his termination. Defendant appeared nervous and tearful during the meeting. Balogh and Medford asked defendant if there was anything they could do for him. Defendant responded by saying, \u201cIf you were going to help me, you would have.\u201d\nOn 17 May 1995, at approximately 9:00 a.m., defendant purchased from Pawn World a Winchester .30-caliber Ml carbine rifle, two clips, and ammunition. At approximately 11:20 a.m., defendant entered the facility of his former employer, Union Butterfield, carrying the Winchester rifle and a Lorcin .380-caliber semiautomatic pistol. Defendant proceeded to the break room, where he found Robert Walker, Tim Walker, Howard Reece, Gerald Allman, and Tony Balogh. The men were in the middle of a meeting about the building\u2019s sprinkler system. Defendant entered the break room and told Robert Walker and Tim Walker, representatives from the sprinkler company, to \u201cget the hell out of here.\u201d Defendant aimed the gun at Allman and fired, shooting him in the head. Defendant then turned to Balogh and fired the gun. Reece ran from the room and felt pieces of the wall hitting him as defendant attempted to shoot him.\nDefendant then proceeded down the hallway where the plant management offices were located. He began to fire shots into each office as he walked down the hallway. Larry Cogdill was in an office that he shared with Gerald Allman and Herb Welsh. Cogdill looked out and saw defendant coming down the hallway and slammed the office door shut. Defendant turned the door handle and opened the door slightly until Cogdill slammed his body against the door to keep defendant out. Defendant then shot through the door, with one bullet striking Cogdill in the arm. Cogdill fell to the side and watched as defendant shot holes in the door. At some point, Cogdill was also shot in the leg.\nDefendant continued to move down the hallway, shooting into management offices and reloading his gun at least once. Frank Knox, an employee of Dormer Tools, parent company to Union Butterfield, was working in one of the offices. When Knox heard shots being fired, he hid under his desk. Defendant fired three shots through Knox\u2019s door, and two of the shots struck Knox in the wrist and chest.\nDefendant returned to the office where Cogdill and Welsh were located and fired several more shots through the door. Defendant then entered the warehouse area of the plant. Larry Short then saw defendant standing in a doorway and smoking a cigarette. Short attempted to flag down cars for assistance. When defendant and Short made eye contact, defendant raised his gun and began firing at Short. Short ducked, ran, and then dove and rolled out of defendant\u2019s sight. Soon after, defendant surrendered to the Asheville police.\nWhile in police custody, defendant stated, \u201cI got fired. Damn it. I got set up. They drove me crazy out there.\u201d Furthermore, when the arrest warrants for the murders were served upon defendant, he pointed to one of the victims\u2019 names on the warrant and stated, \u201cThat\u2019s the son of a bitch that fired me.\u201d While looking at another warrant, defendant stated, \u201cThat\u2019s a troublemaker. He\u2019s made my life hell since I\u2019ve worked there.\u201d Finally, while looking at the warrant for the murder of Frank Knox, defendant stated that he did not remember him.\nI.\nFirst, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in excusing prospective jurors for cause based on their beliefs regarding the death penalty. Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s ruling denied defendant his rights to a fair and impartial jury, to due process of law, and to freedom from cru\u00e9l and unusual punishment. We do not agree.\nThe standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excused for cause for his or her views on capital punishment is whether those views would \u201cprevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.\u201d Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851-52 (1985). \u201cThe granting of a challenge for cause where the juror\u2019s fitness or unfitness is arguable is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 343, 451 S.E.2d 131, 145 (1994). Prospective jurors with reservations about capital punishment must be able to \u201c \u2018state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their beliefs in deference to the rule of law.\u2019 \u201d State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 43, 430 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1993) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 149 (1986)). This Court has recognized that a prospective juror\u2019s bias may not always be provable with unmistakable clarity and that, in such cases, reviewing courts must defer to the trial court\u2019s judgment concerning the prospective juror\u2019s ability to follow the law. State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 624, 386 S.E.2d 418, 426 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1990).\nIn the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing the prospective jurors for cause. Our review of the record indicates that each of the prospective jurors excused for cause stated that he or she would be unable to follow the law and recommend a sentence of death, even if that was what the facts and circumstances suggested. Defendant has pointed to nothing in the record to support his contention. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing the State\u2019s challenges for cause of the prospective jurors. This assignment of error is overruled.\nII.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court erred in conducting an ex parte hearing concerning defendant\u2019s competency evaluation in the absence of defendant and defense counsel. Defendant argues that he suffered prejudice when the State allegedly handpicked the forensic psychiatrist to evaluate his competency to stand trial, moved the site of the evaluation from Central Prison to Dorothea Dix Hospital, and subsequently utilized the results of that evaluation to cross-examine the defense\u2019s psychiatric expert. Specifically, defendant argues that this procedure violated: (1) his unwaivable right to presence at every stage of his capital proceeding and to confront the witnesses against him pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution; (2) his right to a true, complete, and accurate record of the proceedings pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1241; and (3) his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the denial of these rights operated to deprive him of his rights to due process of law. We do not agree.\nOn 16 October 1995, the State filed a motion for an order directing Dr. Robert Rollins, director of forensic psychiatry at Dorothea Dix Hospital, to examine defendant and prepare a written report describing the state of defendant\u2019s mental health. Pursuant to statutory mandate, Judge Loto G. Caviness conducted a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, defendant appeared through counsel. The hearing transcript indicates that both the prosecutor and defense counsel expressed concerns for defendant\u2019s capacity to stand trial. After this hearing, defense counsel requested and received an ex parte hearing with the trial court. Following these hearings, the trial court entered an order directing defendant\u2019s transfer to Central Prison and evaluation by Dr. Rollins of the Dorothea Dix forensic unit. At defendant\u2019s request, this order limited the examination to the issue of defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial.\nSubsequently, on 19 December 1995, Judge Dennis J. Winner entered an \u201cOrder to Move Defendant And Assign Specific Forensic Evaluator.\u201d In this order, Judge Winner referred to the 16 October 1995 order and explained that\nDorothea Dix Hospital, Amy Taylor, Forensic Case Analyst, has requested a Court Order assigning Dr. Nicole Wolfe as the forensic evaluator. Ms. Taylor has further requested that the Defendant James Floyd Davis be moved to Dorothea Dix Hospital so that his evaluation can be completed.\nDefendant contends that this order was entered after an ex parte hearing between the trial court and the prosecutor.\nFirst, we will address defendant\u2019s contention that his constitutional right to presence was violated. In State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 410 S.E.2d 832 (1991), this Court was asked to determine whether defendant\u2019s federal and state constitutional rights were violated by conducting bench conferences with defense counsel and counsel for the State outside of defendant\u2019s presence. As this Court noted, \u201cthe essential characteristic of defendant\u2019s constitutional right to presence is just that, his actual presence during trial.\u201d Id. at 219, 410 S.E.2d at 842. The Court concluded that defendant\u2019s state constitutional right to presence is not violated by such conferences \u201cunless the subject matter of the conference implicates the defendant\u2019s confrontation rights, or is such that the defendant\u2019s presence would have a reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to defend.\u201d Id. at 223-24, 410 S.E.2d at 845.\nHere, defendant asserts that his right to presence was violated by an ex parte hearing concerning his competency evaluation which resulted in the entry of an amended order. First, we note that it is not clear from the record whether an ex parte hearing actually occurred. Although an amended order was entered by the trial court, it does not indicate that the State took part in a hearing. In fact, the amended order states that a case analyst at Dorothea Dix Hospital requested a court order assigning Dr. Nicole Wolfe as the forensic evaluator and transferring defendant to Dorothea Dix Hospital. Thus, the amended order appears to be entered upon motion of the hospital, not the State.\nFurther, the purpose of a competency evaluation is to determine whether defendant is competent to stand trial for the charged offense. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1001 (1997). This determination does not implicate defendant\u2019s confrontation rights and does not have a substantial relation to his opportunity to defend. In fact, the competency evaluation is to ensure that a defendant is able \u201cto understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him\u201d before he is \u201ctried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime.\u201d Id. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendant\u2019s state constitutional right to presence was not violated by the entry of this amended order.\nSimilarly, defendant\u2019s federal constitutional claim is without merit. In Buchanan, this Court noted that \u201cthe United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether defendant has a federal constitutional right to presence in terms of whether the conference at issue involves either the receipt of evidence without an opportunity for cross-examination or the usefulness of defendant\u2019s presence in assuring fairness in the proceeding.\u201d Buchanan, 330 N.C. at 211-12, 410 S.E.2d at 837. Although, unlike the present case, Buchanan involved a bench conference, the same analysis applies. There is no proof that an actual proceeding took place, and even if it had, it did not deny defendant an opportunity for cross-examination or necessitate his presence to assure fairness in the proceedings.\nDefendant has also failed to establish that the trial court violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1241 by conducting a hearing without recording the proceedings. First, as noted above, there is nothing in the record which suggests that the trial court conducted a hearing concerning the hospital\u2019s request to amend the order. Second, a full record exists concerning the hearing on the State\u2019s motion for a competency evaluation. The order entered by the trial court on 16 October 1995 contains all required findings. The modified order entered on 19 December 1995 recites that the hospital requested a change in the forensic evaluator and defendant\u2019s relocation. Thus, there is a sufficient record for appellate review.\nDefendant also contends that he suffered a deprivation of his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. The Sixth Amendment, which is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that \u201c[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.\u201d U.S. Const. amend. VI. The parallel provision of the North Carolina Constitution, Article I, Section 23, tracks this language. The Sixth Amendment ensures that the accused \u201c \u2018need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel\u2019s absence might derogate from the accused\u2019s right to a fair trial.\u2019 \u201d Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, 373 (1981) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1157 (1967)). Once again, there is no proof that an actual proceeding took place. Further, the amended order does not affect defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial.\nFinally, because we have found no violation of defendant\u2019s constitutional or statutory rights, defendant\u2019s argument that the cumulative effect of the denial of these rights operated to deprive him of his rights to due process of law is without merit. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nIII.\nDefendant next contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the trial court ordered a competency evaluation by a forensic evaluator but declined to allow defense counsel to be present during the examination. Defendant argues that defense counsel\u2019s presence would have demonstrated the unreasonable and irrational manner in which defendant related to people and also would have helped defense counsel in preparing to cross-examine Dr. Wolfe concerning her examination. We disagree.\nAs noted above, the Sixth Amendment provides that \u201c[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.\u201d U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court determined that defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached when he was examined by a psychiatrist. In making the decision whether to proceed with a psychiatric examination, the Court held that \u201ca defendant should not be forced to resolve such an important issue without \u2018the guiding hand of counsel.\u2019 \u201d Estelle, 451 U.S. at 471, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 374 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 77 L. Ed. 158, 170 (1932)). However, the Court noted:\nRespondent does not assert, and the Court of Appeals did not find, any constitutional right to have counsel actually present during the examination. In fact, the Court of Appeals recognized that \u201can attorney present during the psychiatric interview could contribute little and might seriously disrupt the examination.\u201d\nId. at 470 n.14, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 374 n.14 (quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (5th Cir. 1979)).\nFor the same reasons, we hold that defendant had no constitutional right to have counsel present during his competency evaluation. Here, Dr. Wolfe testified that defense counsel\u2019s presence would interfere with the process. She stated that\n[defendant\u2019s] concerns about his attorney were the main reason I found him incompetent when I last saw him at Dix, and those are questions that I want to be asking him about, and I think he\u2019d be more likely to tell me about dissatisfaction with his attorneys if they\u2019re not present.\nFurther, it was upon motion of defense counsel that defendant was committed to Dorothea Dix Hospital for examination of his capacity to proceed and sanity. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.\nIV.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that defendant had the capacity to proceed to trial. Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support any of the three prongs of the competency test contained in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1001(a).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1001(a) sets forth the standard for measuring capacity as follows:\nNo person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner. This condition is hereinafter referred to as \u201cincapacity to proceed.\u201d\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1001(a). \u201c[This] statute provides three separate tests in the disjunctive. If a defendant is deficient under any of these tests he or she does not have the capacity to proceed.\u201d State v. Shytle, 323 N.C. 684, 688, 374 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1989).\nIn the present case, defendant was given a competency test on 3 June 1996. Dr. Nicole Wolfe, an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry, testified that she first examined defendant at Dorothea Dix Hospital in January 1996. Following physical examinations, laboratory studies, psychological tests, and a review of defendant\u2019s medical records, Dr. Wolfe formed an initial impression that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. She also diagnosed defendant as having a schizotypal personality disorder. Subsequently, defendant became increasingly anxious and agitated. On 23 April 1996, Dr. Wolfe determined that defendant was unable to converse in a coherent manner and was incapable of proceeding to trial at that time.\nDr. Wolfe did not see defendant from 23 April 1996 until 3 June 1996 when she met with him at the Buncombe County jail. At that time, defendant expressed distrust of his attorneys. However, Dr. Wolfe testified that defendant appeared to be doing fairly well on the prescribed medications. She also testified that she questioned defendant about his relationship with his attorneys. Dr. Wolfe stated that although defendant exhibited paranoid ideas about his attorneys, he indicated that he had been able to speak with them about his case. She discussed the possibility that defendant might want to obtain different counsel, but defendant declined to do that, stating that he \u201cdidn\u2019t want to start over.\u201d\nDr. Wolfe subsequently testified that when she examined defendant on 3 June 1996, he appeared to understand her explanation of the difference between the question of competency to stand trial and the question of insanity. In Dr. Wolfe\u2019s opinion, defendant was capable of proceeding to trial. She testified that defendant possessed the ability to understand the nature and extent of the charges against him and also possessed the ability to aid and assist his attorneys in his defense. Dr. Wolfe further testified that defendant understood the nature and purpose of the court proceedings, as well as the seriousness of the charges against him. Dr. Wolfe stated that she believed defendant possessed the ability to understand his legal rights and the capacity to give relevant testimony. Dr. Wolfe also testified that the main reason she found defendant incapable of proceeding in April was his paranoia against his attorneys. Based upon the testimony presented at the competency hearing, the trial court concluded that \u201c[defendant] does possess the capacity to proceed to trial at this time\u201d and ordered that the matter proceed to trial.\nDefendant now asserts that the record fails to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion and that he suffered prejudice when the trial court ordered him to proceed. However, after reviewing the testimony presented at the competency hearing, we do not agree. As noted above, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1001 sets forth the standard for determining capacity to proceed. The evidence must demonstrate that defendant is capable of: (1) understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him, (2) comprehending his own situation in reference to the proceedings, and (3) assisting in his defense in a rational and reasonable manner. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1001. Dr. Wolfe\u2019s testimony clearly indicates that defendant met each prong of the competency test. The trial court properly concluded that defendant possessed the capacity to proceed to trial. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nV.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court committed error in allowing the State\u2019s opening statement and closing argument to include matters outside of the record. Specifically, defendant contends it was error for the State to argue that defendant understood his rights, because the jury may infer defendant\u2019s mental competence based upon the exercise of his constitutional rights.\nArguments of counsel are left largely to the control and discretion of the trial judge, and counsel is allowed wide latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases. State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 481, 346 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1986). Further, the remarks are to be viewed in the context in which they are made and the overall factual circumstances to which they refer. State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 692-93, 473 S.E.2d 291, 306 (1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 136 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1997). Where, as here, defendant failed to object to the arguments at trial, defendant must establish that the remarks were so grossly improper that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu. To establish such an abuse, defendant must show that the prosecutor\u2019s comments so infected the trial with unfairness that they rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair. State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 202, 451 S.E.2d 211, 229 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).\nIn the present case, during her opening statement to the jury, the prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel will \u201ctell you how [defendant] appeared to understand his rights when they were read to him.\u201d The prosecutor continued by stating that the jury would hear defendant\u2019s comments to law enforcement officers after the arrest warrants were read to him. Further, during closing arguments, the prosecutor stated:\nI told you in my opening everything that would happen and who would tell you what happened in the break room. And I told you how the defendant acted after he murdered those men, how he held that gun by the trigger guard with his little finger and threw it out so the police didn\u2019t shoot him graveyard dead.\nAnd you did hear everything I told you you would hear? I told you [that] you would hear how he understood his rights and when those police officers said, Throw out your weapons and we won\u2019t shoot you, after he said, Don\u2019t shoot me, and he complied and they did not shoot him.\nDefendant asserts that this argument is not supported by the evidence and implies to the jury that it may infer defendant was competent based upon the exercise of his constitutional rights. Defendant cites Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986), in support of his position. In Wainwright, the defendant responded to the officer\u2019s Miranda warning by stating that he understood his rights and by requesting an attorney. In closing arguments, and over defense counsel\u2019s objection, the prosecutor made the following argument:\nHe goes to the car and the officer reads him his Miranda rights. Does he say he doesn\u2019t understand them? Does he say \u201cwhat\u2019s going on?\u201d No. He says \u201cI understand my rights. I do not want to speak to you. I want to speak to an attorney.\u201d Again on [sic] occasion of a person who knows what\u2019s going on around his surroundings, and knows the consequences of his act.... And here we are to believe that this person didn\u2019t know what he was doing at the time of the act, and then even down at the station, according to Detective Jolley \u2014 He\u2019s down there. He says, \u201cHave you been read your Miranda rights?\u201d \u201cYes, I have.\u201d \u201cDo you want to talk?\u201d \u201cNo.\u201d \u201cDo you want to talk to an attorney?\u201d \u201cYes.\u201d And after he talked to the attorney again he will not speak. Again another physical overt indication by the defendant....\nSo here again we must take this in consideration as to his guilt or innocence, in regards to sanity or insanity.\nId. at 287 n.2, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 627 n.2.\nHowever, the present case is distinguishable from Wainwright. Here, the prosecutor never directly asked the jury to use defendant\u2019s statements to law enforcement officers in determining defendant\u2019s competence or sanity. The prosecutor\u2019s comments also did not indicate that defendant exercised his right to counsel or silence as was the case in Wainwright. Further, unlike in Wainwright, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor\u2019s argument. Finally, prior to the prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments, the trial court in the case sub judice instructed the jury as follows:\nI will tell you at this point and I will tell you again when I instruct you on the law that you are to apply that if during the course of their arguments one of the lawyers states the evidence a certain way and you recall it differently, one of your duties as a juror is to be guided by your own recollection of the evidence. That\u2019s why we\u2019ve sat here and you\u2019ve listened to all this evidence as it\u2019s being presented.\nWhen taken in context, the remarks about which defendant complains were not so grossly improper as to require the trial court to intervene ex mero motu. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nVI.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence about the victim Tony Balogh. Defendant argues that the evidence admitted pertained to the victim\u2019s character and temperament and is irrelevant to any issue at the guilt phase of the trial.\nDuring direct examination of Debbie Medford, a Union Butterfield employee and the victim\u2019s co-worker, the following exchange occurred:\n[The Prosecutor]: Describe Tony\u2019s [the victim\u2019s] temperament.\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled.\n[Medford]: Tony was \u2014 he was a good listener. He was an easy person to work with. He had a lot of concern for the employees at work. He was involved with everybody that worked there. He had an open-door policy. Anytime\u2014\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. This is not responsive to the question.\nThe Court: Well, sustained. I believe she\u2019s gone beyond the next question.\nThe trial court later stated that it was overruling defense counsel\u2019s objection \u201cto what\u2019s already been testified to.\u201d\nEvidence is relevant if it has \u201cany tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (1992). Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 402 (1992). We have said that \u201cin a criminal case every circumstance calculated to throw any light upon the supposed crime is admissible and permissible.\u201d State v. Collins, 335 N.C. 729, 735, 440 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1994).\nState v. Macon, 346 N.C. 109, 115, 484 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1997).\nHere, evidence concerning Tony Balogh is relevant in showing the circumstances of the Union Butterfield shootings. A review of the record demonstrates that defendant contended that the victims were not willing to assist him with his difficulties and, indeed, tried to \u201cruin\u201d him. Thus, the prosecution was properly permitted to present evidence of Tony Balogh\u2019s temperament and management style in order to prove the circumstances of the crime, and the evidence introduced was in fact relevant.\nDefendant also argues that this error was compounded by the trial court\u2019s instruction that the jury could consider evidence from the guilt phase during its penalty phase deliberations. The trial court instructed the jury that\n[t]here is no requirement to resubmit during the sentencing proceeding any evidence which was submitted during the guilt phase of this case. All the evidence which you have heard in both phases of the case remain[s] competent for your consideration and recommending punishment.\nAs noted above, it was not error for the trial court to admit the evidence during the guilt phase; therefore, its reconsideration during the sentencing phase is also proper.\nFinally, defendant contends that even if the testimony was relevant, any minimal probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, we do not agree. The testimony presented by Medford was relevant testimony and did not unduly prejudice defendant. This assignment of error is without merit.\nVII.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence of what victim Tony Balogh and defendant said in a meeting two days prior to the murders. Defendant argues that much of the testimony constituted hearsay and that all of the challenged evidence proved only the victim\u2019s good character.\nDuring direct examination by the State, Debbie Medford testified regarding defendant\u2019s dismissal conference attended by both Medford and Balogh as follows:\nJames [defendant] came in. And he was nervous, a little tearful. He told us that he had missed us, that he was glad to be there, he was glad to see us. He sat down. And Tony told him, he said, \u201cJames, I\u2019m sorry. But I\u2019m going to have to terminate your employment.\u201d\nDefense counsel objected to this testimony, and the trial court subsequently overruled the objection. Medford then continued her testimony in response to an instruction from the prosecutor:\nI can\u2019t remember word for word the things that were said. I know that James told him right away that he had gone to the Employee Assistance Program. He wanted him to know that he had done that. And he asked him was there anything that he could do to keep his job.\nAfter Medford\u2019s testimony concerning the dismissal conference, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to strike.\nAs we have previously stated, the State is entitled to prove the circumstances of the crime and to introduce evidence tending to support the theory of the case. State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 280, 389 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1990). Here, the conversation between Balogh and defendant showed the circumstances of the crime, particularly the motive for the killings. This crime was committed at defendant\u2019s former place of employment, and his victims were former co-workers. The fact that Balogh terminated defendant\u2019s employment two days prior to the murder is clearly relevant to show the motive for the crime. Thus, the trial court properly admitted Medford\u2019s testimony concerning the dismissal conference.\nDefendant also contends that much of Medford\u2019s testimony constitutes hearsay. Hearsay is \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1992). Here, the State never offered Balogh\u2019s or defendant\u2019s statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, the statements were offered to prove defendant\u2019s motive for the crime. Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting Medford\u2019s testimony regarding the conversation between Balogh and defendant at defendant\u2019s dismissal conference.\nFinally, defendant contends that even if the testimony was relevant, any minimal probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, we do not agree. As noted above, the testimony presented by Medford was highly relevant to the motive of the case and did not unduly prejudice defendant. This assignment of error is without merit.\nVIII.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing State witnesses Howard Reece, Larry Cogdill, and Helen Pittman to read into the record their prior written statements. Defendant argues that the pretrial statements are inadmissible hearsay admitted under the guise of corroboration. We do not agree.\nAs previously noted, hearsay is \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c). Here, the prior statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to bolster the testimony given by Reece and Cogdill. \u201cThe wide latitude which this jurisdiction grants to the admission of [prior consistent statements] is set forth in recent decisions which state the rule that prior consistent statements are admissible even when the witness has not been impeached.\u201d State v. Martin, 309 N.C. 465, 476, 308 S.E.2d 277, 284 (1983). This Court has previously stated that\n\u201cprior statements of a witness can be admitted as corroborative evidence if they tend to add weight or credibility to the witness\u2019 trial testimony. New information contained within the witness\u2019 prior statement, but not referred to in his trial testimony, may also be admitted as corroborative evidence if it tends to add weight or credibility to that testimony.\u201d\nState v. Francis, 343 N.C. 436, 439, 471 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1996) (quoting State v. McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 384, 407 S.E.2d 200, 212 (1991)) (citations omitted). Here, the statements were given by the witnesses immediately after the shooting occurred. Thus, they were the witnesses\u2019 present-sense impressions and added weight and credibility to the witnesses\u2019 trial testimony.\nAt trial, defense counsel objected to the reading of the prior statements of Reece and Cogdill, but failed to object to the reading of Pittman\u2019s statement. The objection was a general objection to the reading of the statements. Also, for the first time on appeal, defendant has specified statements within each pretrial statement which he claims are prejudicial: the statement of Cogdill that \u201csomeone yelled it was James, and apparently everyone figured that Davis would do something foolish after he was fired\u201d; the statement of Reece that \u201c[w]ithin seconds, for no apparent reason, he fired and shot Gerald Allman\u201d; and the statements of Pittman that she \u201cfelt like he was out to get revenge and was probably targeting employees both in management and in the warehouse\u201d and that \u201cfolks knew that he was going to come back some day and do something.\u201d None of these statements was specifically objected to at the time of its reading into the record.\nHaving not objected to this evidence at trial, defendant alleges this error for the first time on appeal under the plain error rule. The plain error rule holds that the Court may review alleged errors affecting substantial rights even though defendant failed to object to the admission of the evidence at trial. State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 313, 488 S.E.2d 550, 563 (1997), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 139 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1998). This Court has chosen to review such \u201cunpreserved issues for plain error when Rule 10(c)(4) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure has been complied with and when the issue involves either errors in the trial judge\u2019s instructions to the jury or rulings on the admissibility of evidence.\u201d Id. at 313-14, 488 S.E.2d at 563. The rule must be applied cautiously, however, and only in exceptional cases where, \u201cafter reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a ''fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done.\u2019 \u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)). Thus, the appellate court must study the whole record to determine if the error had such an impact on the guilt determination, therefore constituting plain error. Id. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 378-79.\nA review of the evidence in the present case reveals that this is not the exceptional case where such a pervasive defect or plain error occurred which would have tainted all results and denied defendant a right to a fair trial. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.\nIX.\nNext, defendant contends that his constitutional right to confront his accusers with evidence was violated by the trial court\u2019s exclusion of a jail nurse\u2019s opinion of defendant\u2019s mental condition. We disagree.\nJail nurse Pat Orsban was one of the first medical personnel to evaluate defendant after the shootings upon his admission to the jail. Orsban testified that for about fifteen to twenty minutes, he was in close proximity to defendant and observed that defendant appeared very upset, with rapid speech and mood swings. Based on these visual observations, Orsban circled the term \u201cmentally disturbed\u201d on the jail screening form. Orsban\u2019s opinion based on this visual perception is not disputed. However, at trial, defense counsel attempted to elicit a psychiatric diagnosis of defendant\u2019s mental condition from Orsban. During defense counsel\u2019s questioning of Orsban, the following exchange took place:\nQ. Mr. Orsban, as a result of your training as a nurse, your years of experience, your time at Copestone, are you familiar with the term \u201cpsychotic\u201d?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Do you know what that means?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Do you know what someone who is psychotic looks like?\nA. Most of the time.\nQ. Based on the time that you saw [defendant] May the 17th, do you have an opinion as to whether he appeared to be psychotic to you?\n[Prosecutor]: Objection.\nThe Court: Well, sustained.\nWe disagree that the exclusion of Orsban\u2019s opinion violated defendant\u2019s constitutional rights to confront his accusers with evidence. Rule 701 establishes the standard for a lay witness\u2019 testimony:\nIf the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 (1992). The question posed by defense counsel called for Orsban, a lay witness, to make a psychiatric diagnosis of defendant\u2019s mental condition. Orsban was not an expert witness, and no foundation had been laid to show that he had the expertise to make such a psychiatric diagnosis. While it may have been appropriate for Orsban to make a general observation that defendant appeared to be \u201cmentally disturbed\u201d upon admission to jail, it was beyond Orsban\u2019s ability as a lay witness to make a specific psychiatric diagnosis of defendant\u2019s being \u201cpsychotic.\u201d Thus, this assignment of error is overruled.\nX.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court committed plain error by instructing defendant on his right to testify on his own behalf. Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s instructions overstated the permissible scope of cross-examination to which defendant might be subjected. Thus, defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s instructions impermissibly chilled defendant\u2019s right to testify.\nDefendant cites to State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 364 S.E.2d 341 (1988), as support for his position. In Autry, this Court held that the following instruction constituted error:\n[The prosecutor] could, on good faith, ask you about prior misconduct, whether it resulted in convictions in court if they had some good faith reason to ask those questions, and you would be under oath to answer the questions truthfully.\nId. at 402, 364 S.E.2d at 347. This Court stated that \u201c[t]he trial court, though it made an admirable and lengthy effort to explain to defendant his various options, clearly, as to one part, gave instructions inconsistent with Rule 608(b) and therefore committed error.\u201d Id. at 403, 364 S.E.2d at 347. However, this Court concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. Id. The Court further stated:\nWe hold that, here, where the trial court\u2019s error in its instructions to defendant was insulated by defendant\u2019s access to and actual conference with his attorney, the trial court\u2019s instructional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nId. at 404, 364 S.E.2d at 348.\nHere, the trial court did not make the error discussed in Autry. Instead, the trial court correctly instructed defendant on the general rules which guide cross-examination. As this Court has previously noted, \u201c \u2018[t]he bounds of cross-examination are limited by two general principles: 1) the scope of cross-examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge; and 2) the questions must be asked in good faith.\u2019 \u201d State v. Larry, 345 N.C. 497, 523, 481 S.E.2d 907, 922 (quoting State v. Bronson, 333 N.C. 67, 79, 423 S.E.2d 772, 779 (1992)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 139 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1997). In the present case, the trial court did not attempt to give defendant detailed instructions concerning the scope of cross-examination and did not give an instruction inconsistent with any of the Rules of Evidence. Further, as demonstrated by the following exchange, defendant had discussed the consequences of testifying with his attorneys:\nThe Court: Mr. Hufstader, Ms. Burns [defense counsel], I take it you have advised your client about his right to testify and have discussed that \"with him?\nMr. Hufstader: We have previously.\nThe Court: I just want Mr. Davis \u2014 Mr. Davis, can you hear me, sir?\nThe Defendant: Yes, sir.\nThe Court: Have you discussed with your lawyers whether or not you would want to testify in this matter?\nThe Defendant: I have.\nThe Court: Do you understand that you have the absolute right to testify, but if you do that you would be subject to cross-examination on a very wide matter of subjects, subject only to the discretion of the Court and the relevancy of this matter? Do you understand that?\nThe Defendant: Yes, sir.\nThe Court: You\u2019ve elected not to testify.\nThe Defendant: I elected not to testify.\nAccordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in its instructions regarding the scope of cross-examination and, thus, did not impermissibly chill defendant\u2019s right to testify. This assignment of error is overruled.\nXI.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder of Frank Knox based upon the insufficiency of the evidence. Defendant argues there was no evidence from which the jury could find that defendant possessed the specific intent to kill Knox, or any other person. We disagree.\nDefendant argues that there is no evidence that defendant bore any malice toward Knox. In his brief, defendant points out that there was no evidence that he knew Knox and that Knox was not present at the dismissal conference discussed above. Defendant notes that when Detective Romick was reading the arrest warrants to defendant, defendant indicated that he knew and was angry at Balogh and Allman, but when defendant was read his third warrant, he said he did not remember Frank Knox. Essentially, defendant\u2019s argument appears to be that he had no motive to murder Knox. However, motive is not an element of first-degree murder. State v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 600, 197 S.E.2d 539, 546 (1973).\nBecause a specific intent to kill is a necessary constituent of the elements of premeditation and deliberation, proof of premeditation and deliberation is also proof of intent to kill. State v. Lowery, 309 N.C. 763, 768, 309 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1983). In discussing premeditation and deliberation, this Court has stated that\n[p]remeditation means that the act was thought out beforehand for some length of time, however short, but no particular amount of time is necessary for the mental process of premeditation. State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 263 S.E.2d 768 (1980). Deliberation means an intent to kill, carried out in a cool state of blood, in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge or to accomplish an unlawful purpose and not under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by lawful or just cause or legal provocation. State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 297 S.E.2d 563 (1982).\nState v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 58, 337 S.E.2d 808, 822-23 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 90 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).\nHere, the evidence showed that defendant purchased a semiautomatic weapon the morning of the killings. Defendant then drove to the Union Butterfield facility and killed Balogh and Allman in the break room. He then proceeded down the hallway of management offices, firing shots into the offices as he made his way down the hall. Knox was working at his desk at the time and dove underneath the desk to avoid the shots. As Knox lay behind and underneath his desk, defendant fired at least three rounds through the office door. One round penetrated Knox\u2019s wrist and proceeded through his body. After the killings, while his victims bled to death, defendant stood in the doorway of the facility, smoking a cigarette as if nothing had happened. Further, there was no evidence presented that Knox provoked defendant before defendant shot him. Finally, based on the doctrine of transferred intent, as discussed below, a jury could reasonably find that defendant formed the requisite premeditation and deliberation required under first-degree murder. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nXII.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error in its instructions on lack of mental capacity as a factor tending to negate the specific intent required for first-degree murder. Defendant argues that the instructions regarding the murder of Knox were clearly erroneous, thus entitling him to a new trial. We do not agree.\nIn the present case, the trial court instructed the jury on the diminished-capacity defense as follows:\nMembers of the jury, you would also consider the charge of first degree murder as it relates to Mr. Frank Knox. Members of the jury, the burden of proof is on the State. And they would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements as I have explained those to you as it relates to Mr. Knox. The defense contends that he shall \u2014 that the defendant, Mr. Davis, should be found not guilty of first degree murder by lack of diminished capacity as I\u2019ve previously instructed you on that. That is, he could not form the specific intent required of first degree murder. If you so find, then you would consider second degree murder. And you would also consider the charge of second degree murder if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of the things which the State must prove.\nDefendant concedes that he did not object to these instructions at trial. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to any relief unless any error constituted plain error. See Odom, 307 N.C. at 659-60, 300 S.E.2d at 378. We have previously explained that plain error is that error in the instructions which is \u201cso fundamental as to amount to a miscarriage of justice or which probably resulted in the jury reaching a different verdict than it otherwise would have reached.\u201d State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 213, 362 S.E.2d 244, 251 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1988).\nHaving reviewed the trial court\u2019s instructions on lack of mental capacity under this standard, we find no plain error. Defendant contends there are three separate errors with regard to the trial court\u2019s instruction. First, the trial court erred by using the phrase \u201clack of diminished capacity\u201d as opposed to \u201clack of mental capacity.\u201d Second, the reference \u201cas I\u2019ve previously instructed you on that\u201d reinforced the error in the diminished-capacity instructions given earlier. Third, the jury was told that if it found that defendant could not form the specific intent to commit first-degree murder, then it could consider second-degree murder.\nFirst, the trial court\u2019s use of the phrase \u201clack of diminished capacity\u201d appears to be a mere lapsus linguae. As we have previously stated, \u201ca lapsus linguae not called to the attention of the trial court when made will not constitute prejudicial error when it is apparent from a contextual reading of the charge that the jury could not have been misled by the instruction.\u201d State v. Baker, 338 N.C. 526, 565, 451 S.E.2d 574, 597 (1994). Here, although the trial court used the term \u201cdiminished capacity,\u201d it correctly defined the defense by stating that it exists if defendant \u201ccould not form the specific intent required of first degree murder.\u201d Accordingly, when read contextually, the instructions properly conveyed to the jury what it must find for the defense to apply. Further, the trial court\u2019s previous instructions, contrary to defendant\u2019s assertions, appear to be correct.\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court instructed the jury that if it found defendant could not form the specific intent for first-degree murder, then it could consider second-degree murder. However, the trial court properly instructed that if the jury found defendant could not form the specific intent required for first-degree murder, then it \u201cwould consider second degree murder.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court properly conveyed the mandatory nature of this instruction. Having reviewed the trial court\u2019s instructions on lack of mental capacity, we find no error, much less plain error. This assignment of error is overruled.\nXIII.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error in its instructions concerning defendant\u2019s diminished-capacity defense with regard to the murder of Tony Balogh. Specifically, defendant argues that the instructions improperly gave the jury the option of finding defendant not guilty if it found that he lacked the mental capacity to commit murder, rather than requiring such a verdict.\nThe trial court gave the following instructions to the jury with regard to the murder of Balogh:\nNow, as to the charge of first degree murder, the defendant[] contend[s] that the defendant should be found not guilty because he lacked the mental capacity at the time of the acts alleged in this case. If you find that there is evidence which tends to show that the defendant lacked mental capacity at the time of the acts alleged in this case, you may find him not guilty of first degree murder. However, if you find that the defendant lacked mental capacity, you should consider whether this condition affected his ability to formulate the specific intent which is required for conviction of first degree murder. In order for you to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed the deceased, in this case Mr. Balogh, with malice and in the execution of an actual specific intent to kill formed after premeditation and deliberation as I have defined those terms to you. If as a result of the lack of mental capacity the defendant did not have the specific intent to kill the deceased formed after premeditation and deliberation, he is not guilty of first degree murder. Therefore, I charge that if upon considering evidence with respect to the defendant\u2019s lack of mental capacity you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant formulated the specific intent required for conviction of first degree murder, you would not return a verdict of guilty of first degree murder. Now, if you so find you would then consider whether the defendant is guilty of second degree murder.\nOnce again, defendant concedes that he did not object to these instructions at trial. Accordingly, we must determine whether the instructions constitute plain error. Defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s use of the phrase \u201cyou may find him not guilty of first degree murder\u201d was ambiguous. He argues that this impermissibly gave the jurors the option of finding defendant not guilty of first-degree murder if they found that he lacked the mental capacity necessary, rather than requiring them to find him not guilty.\n\u201c \u2018[A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.\u2019 \u201d State v. Holden, 346 N.C. 404, 438, 488 S.E.2d 514, 533 (1997) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368, 373 (1973)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 140 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1998). \u201c \u2018[I]n determining the propriety of the trial judge\u2019s charge to the jury, the reviewing court must consider the instructions in their entirety, and not in detached fragments.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Wright, 302 N.C. 122, 127, 273 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1981)).\nWhen read in context, the instructions correctly stated the jurors\u2019 obligations in determining lack of mental capacity. After stating that the jury \u201cmay find him not guilty of first degree murder\u201d if defendant lacks mental capacity, the trial court proceeded to explain to the jury what constituted a lack of mental capacity with regard to first-degree murder. The trial court noted that the jury should consider whether defendant\u2019s lack of capacity \u201caffected his ability to formulate the specific intent which is required for conviction of first degree murder.\u201d It was not error for the trial court to qualify what lack of capacity meant in this context. Only if the jury found that defendant could not formulate the required specific intent could it find defendant not guilty of first-degree murder based upon lack of mental capacity. The trial court properly concluded that \u201cif upon considering the evidence with respect to the defendant\u2019s lack of mental capacity you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant formulated the specific intent required for conviction of first degree murder, you would not return a verdict of guilty of first degree murder.\u201d Thus, when read contextually, the instructions do not amount to error, much less plain error. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.\nXIV.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent with regard to the murder of Frank Knox. Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction and that the instruction itself was flawed. We disagree.\nUnder the doctrine of transferred intent:\nIt is an accepted principle of law that where one is engaged in an affray with another and unintentionally kills a bystander or a third person, his act shall be interpreted with reference to his intent and conduct towards his adversary. Criminal liability, if any, and the degree of homicide must be thereby determined. Such a person is guilty or innocent exactly as [if] the fatal act had caused the death of his adversary. It has been aptly stated that \u201c[t]he malice or intent follows the bullet.\u201d 40 Am. Jur., 2d Homicide, \u00a7 11, p. 302 [(1968)].\nState v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 519, 180 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1971) (citations omitted).\nFirst, defendant argues that the evidence does not support an instruction on transferred intent. In the present case, all of the management offices were located down one hallway. Larry Cogdill, an employee of Union Butterfield, testified that defendant headed straight for that hallway upon entering the building. Once there, he fired into the door of the office that Cogdill shared with Gerald Allman and Herb Welsh. Mary Zellers testified that she was hiding inside the company president\u2019s office when defendant fired through the door. Debbie Medford, the personnel administrator of the company, testified that she was able to escape from her office before defendant reached that end of the hall. In statements to law enforcement officials, defendant stated that the people at Union Butterfield had \u201cruined\u201d him. He claimed that they had set him up and fired him. Upon his arrest, defendant commented as to one of the victims, \u201cThat\u2019s the son of a bitch that fired me.\u201d Defendant commented about another victim, \u201cThat\u2019s a troublemaker. He\u2019s made my life hell since I\u2019ve worked there.\u201d This evidence demonstrates that defendant\u2019s actions were aimed at employees of Union Butterfield, particularly those who were involved in management. Because Knox was working inside management\u2019s offices during the shooting, the evidence is sufficient to support the transferred-intent instruction given by the trial court.\nDefendant also argues that the instruction on transferred intent was flawed because \u201cit did not specify any intended victim toward who[m] the defendant\u2019s malice and intent to kill were allegedly directed.\u201d Defendant again concedes that he did not object to these instructions at trial. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to any relief unless any error constituted plain error. See Odom, 307 N.C. at 659-60, 300 S.E.2d at 378.\nIn the present case, the trial court instructed the jury on transferred intent as follows:\nI would also instruct you on the matter of Mr. Knox that the law is that if a person intends to harm one person and actually harms a different person, the legal effect would be the same as if he had harmed the intended victim. That is, if a killing of an intended person would be with malice, then the killing of a different person is also with malice.\nDefendant contends that this instruction is flawed because it does not specify whom the defendant intended to kill.\nIn discussing the doctrine of transferred intent, this Court has noted that \u201cit is immaterial whether the defendant intended injury to the person actually harmed; if he in fact acted with the required or elemental intent toward someone, that intent suffices as the intent element of the crime charged as a matter of substantive law.\u201d State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 245, 415 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1992) (emphasis added). It is not necessary that the someone be named in the trial court\u2019s instructions. Here, the evidence indicates that defendant sought revenge from the management of Union Butterfield because of his allegedly unjustified dismissal. Thus, the jury was properly instructed on the doctrine of transferred intent based on defendant\u2019s intent to harm the management of Union Butterfield. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.\nCAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING\nXV.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony from defendant\u2019s sister Violet Bailey during the sentencing proceeding. Specifically, defendant argues that it was error to permit his sister to testify that his mother had told the police that defendant did not suffer any psychological problems from being in the Vietnam War.\nDuring the prosecutor\u2019s questioning of Bailey, the following exchange took place:\nQ. Ma\u2019am, on the 17th day of May, the day that James Floyd Davis was arrested, the officers went and talked to your mama about 8:00 that evening. Axe you aware of that?\nA. No, I don\u2019t.\nQ. So\u2014\nA. I might not even have been there.\nQ. You might not have been where?\nA. At my mama\u2019s.\nQ. [So you] don\u2019t know if the police were talking to your mama any?\nA. I was living in Statesville. I come up that next day. I don\u2019t know what time I got there. I don\u2019t know if I was there with her or not.\nQ. Well, do you remember your mama telling them that James \u2014\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection. She says she wasn\u2019t there, Judge.\nThe Court: Well, sustained.\n[The Prosecutor]: I\u2019m not asking about that time. She said she may have been there other times. I\u2019m asking if she remembers her mama telling them something.\nThe Court: Ask the question.\nQ. [The Prosecutor] Do you remember some of the times when you were there and your mama talked to the officers and her telling them [defendant] didn\u2019t suffer any psychological problems from being in the war?\nA. No.\nQ. You don\u2019t?\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection.\nQ. Don\u2019t that\u2014\nA. No.\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled. She said she didn\u2019t remember.\nDefendant argues that such questions were highly improper and were designed to place before the jury clearly inadmissible hearsay. However, defendant\u2019s argument is without merit. No improper testimony was admitted, and the jurors heard defendant\u2019s sister deny any knowledge of such conversation. Further, upon defense counsel\u2019s objection, the trial court noted that the witness \u201csaid she didn\u2019t remember.\u201d Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.\nXVI.\nNext, defendant contends that he suffered a deprivation of his protection against self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution, as well as his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.\nAs noted previously, Dr. Wolfe performed a competency evaluation of defendant at Dorothea Dix Hospital. On 23 April 1996, defendant was moved from the hospital to the Buncombe County jail. Subsequently, on 1 May 1996, Dr. Wolfe completed her report and submitted it to the trial court and counsel for both the State and defendant. On 3 June 1996, Dr. Wolfe performed a competency evaluation. Based upon the evidence presented at a subsequent hearing, the trial court concluded that defendant was competent to proceed. On 5 August 1996, defense counsel filed notice of an intent to present a defense of insanity/diminished capacity and to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease, defect, or other condition pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-959. Also, shortly before trial, defense counsel filed a \u201cMotion to Commit Defendant to Dorothea Dix Hospital for Examination on Capacity to Proceed and Sanity.\u201d The motion requested that Dr. Wolfe reevaluate defendant to form an opinion concerning the defenses of insanity and diminished capacity.\nOn 3 September 1996, defense counsel filed an additional motion to commit defendant to Dorothea Dix Hospital. The motion also noted that Dr. McKee, the defense expert, first examined defendant on 20 July 1996 to determine defendant\u2019s competency, criminal responsibility, and mitigation. Dr. McKee examined defendant and ultimately testified for the defense during the sentencing proceeding. Among other things, Dr. McKee testified that he had reviewed defendant\u2019s records from Dorothea Dix Hospital and also referred to testing which defendant underwent at Dorothea Dix Hospital. Subsequently, Dr. McKee faced cross-examination concerning the contents of defendant\u2019s records from Dorothea Dix Hospital. The cross-examination included discussion concerning the possibility that defendant faked his mental illness by producing invalid results on tests performed at Dorothea Dix Hospital as part of the competency evaluation.\nFirst, defendant asserts that the State\u2019s cross-examination of Dr. McKee using defendant\u2019s statements from the records of his competency evaluation at Dorothea Dix Hospital violated his privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant asserts that the State requested the evaluation to determine competency and then used the results for a different purpose. Defendant cites Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, in support of his contention. In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court found a Fifth Amendment violation when the State, without notice to or knowledge of defense counsel, obtained an order for a competency evaluation of defendant and then utilized the records of that evaluation to prove an aggravating circumstance.\nIn Estelle, the United States Supreme Court noted:\nRespondent, however, introduced no psychiatric evidence, nor had he indicated that he might do so. Instead, the State offered information obtained from the court-ordered competency examination as affirmative evidence to persuade the jury to return a sentence of death. Respondent\u2019s future dangerousness was a critical issue at the sentencing hearing, and one on which the State had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet its burden, the State used respondent\u2019s own statements, unwittingly made without an awareness that he was assisting the State\u2019s efforts to obtain the death penalty. In these distinct circumstances, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the Fifth Amendment privilege was implicated.\nId. at 466, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 371 (citation omitted).\nHere, defendant introduced the reports from Dorothea Dix through his expert witness. Dr. McKee\u2019s testimony related to defendant\u2019s insanity and diminished-capacity defenses. Unlike Estelle, this was not a situation in which the State had the burden of proof. In fact, defendant had the burden of proving the defenses asserted by him.\nIn Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 97 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1987), the United States Supreme Court expanded upon its holding in Estelle as follows:\n\u201cA criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding.\u201d [Estelle, 451 U.S.] at 468, 68 L. Ed. 2d [at 372]. This statement logically leads to another proposition: if a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested. The defendant would have no Fifth Amendment privilege against the introduction of this psychiatric testimony by the prosecution.\nBuchanan, 483 U.S. at 422-23, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 355.\nHere, defense counsel participated in the hearing concerning defendant\u2019s competency examination and voiced no opposition to the examination so long as the trial court limited the scope of the examination to determining competency. Further, defense counsel then sought to rely on the defenses of insanity and diminished capacity during trial. In forming his opinion, the defense\u2019s expert, Dr. McKee, testified that he reviewed defendant\u2019s records from Dorothea Dix Hospital and referred to testing done at Dorothea Dix Hospital. Because defendant relied on this evidence at trial, the State should not be foreclosed from also relying on it to rebut defendant\u2019s contentions. This is the situation contemplated by Buchanan. Accordingly, we hold that defendant\u2019s Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination was not violated by the cross-examination of Dr. McKee.\nDefendant also contends that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when defense counsel was not notified in advance that the information generated from the competency evaluation would be used against defendant in the sentencing proceeding. We believe that State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990), controls this issue.\nIn Huff, this Court discussed a similar issue and stated:\nIn Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, the United States Supreme Court also held that the sixth amendment was violated by the State\u2019s introduction of a psychiatrist\u2019s testimony at the penalty phase of defendant\u2019s trial. The defendant had not placed his mental state in issue and his attorney had neither been informed that the order for psychiatric examination had been entered nor did he have notice that the scope of the examination would include a determination of defendant\u2019s future dangerousness.\nAlthough defendant asserts that Smith controls the outcome in this case, we disagree. Instead, we find that Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 97 L. Ed. 2d 336, also states the principles that control our sixth amendment analysis. The defendant in Buchanan argued that his right to counsel had been violated under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, by the admission of this report. However, the Court held that no right to counsel violation had occurred, and that the fact situation presented in Smith was critically different from that presented in Buchanan. \u201cIn Smith, defendant had not received the opportunity to discuss with his counsel the examination or its scope.\u201d Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. at 424, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 356. In contrast, in Buchanan, defendant had the opportunity to discuss with counsel the nature of the psychiatric examination; in fact, \u201ccounsel himself requested the psychiatric evaluation by . . . [the psychiatrist].\u201d Id. In Buchanan, the Court said, \u201cIt can be assumed \u2014 and there are no allegations to the contrary \u2014 that defense counsel consulted with petitioner about the nature of this examination.\u201d Id.\nHuff, 325 N.C. at 48, 381 S.E.2d at 662.\nSimilarly, in the present case, defendant had the opportunity to discuss with counsel the nature of the psychiatric evaluation. Indeed, as defendant notes in his brief, \u201cdefendant\u2019s attorneys apparently advised him not to discuss the actual facts of the crimes.\u201d Defendant argues that defense counsel had no way of knowing that the examination would be used against defendant during the sentencing proceeding. However, this Court noted in Huff that\n\u201cthe proper concern of this [Sixth] Amendment\u201d does not focus on the potential uses to which the prosecution might put the psychiatric report but on \u201cthe consultation with counsel. . . . Such consultation [with counsel], to be effective, must be based on counsel\u2019s being informed about the scope and nature of the proceeding [referring to defendant\u2019s examination].... To be sure, the effectiveness of the consultation [between defendant and attorney] also would depend on counsel\u2019s awareness of the possible uses to which petitioner\u2019s statements in the proceeding could be put.\u201d Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. at 424-25, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 357. The Court concluded, \u201cGiven our decision in Smith, however, counsel was certainly on notice that if, as appears to be the case, he intended to put on a \u2018mental status\u2019 defense ... , he would have to anticipate the use of psychological evidence by the prosecution in rebuttal.\u201d Id. at 425, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 357 (footnote omitted).\nHuff, 325 N.C. at 48-49, 381 S.E.2d at 662 (alterations in original). Here, as in Huff, defense counsel should have anticipated the use of the psychological evidence by the prosecution in rebuttal to any defense involving defendant\u2019s mental status. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nXVII.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero mo tu during the prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments in the sentencing proceeding. Defendant argues that the prosecutor\u2019s statements were so prejudicial that a new sentencing hearing is warranted. We disagree.\nAs noted above, arguments of counsel are left largely to the control and discretion of the trial judge, and counsel is allowed wide latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases. Williams, 317 N.C. at 481, 346 S.E.2d at 410. Further, the remarks are to be viewed in the context in which they are made and in light of the overall factual circumstances to which they refer. State v. Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 501 S.E.2d 625 (1998). Because defendant did not object to the arguments at trial, he must establish that the remarks were so grossly improper that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero mo tu. To establish such an abuse, defendant must show that the prosecutor\u2019s comments so infected the trial with unfairness that they rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair. Rose, 339 N.C. at 202, 451 S.E.2d at 229.\nDefendant first asserts that the prosecutor improperly urged the jurors to sentence defendant to death on behalf of the victims. Specifically, defendant complains of the following remarks by the prosecutor:\nAnd I\u2019m urging you on behalf of [Gerald] Allman, Tony Balogh, and Frank Knox \u2014 and, again, you will have this question to answer three times. It\u2019s the same question. The same factors will be on each sheet \u2014 say, yes, the mitigating is insufficient to outweigh the aggravating. Yes.\nNow, Mrs. Dreher [the prosecutor] and myself are here to speak on behalf of Tony and Gerald and Frank. The folks you\u2019ve seen here for the last several weeks, Ms. Knox, Tony\u2019s boys, Mr. Knox\u2019s children, Gerald\u2019s family, they relied on the law for justice, and that\u2019s why they\u2019re here.\nI\u2019m asking you to find the aggravating factors. I\u2019m asking you to answer Issue Three and Four \u201cyes.\u201d And I\u2019m asking you to on behalf of Gerald, Tony, and Frank to put James Floyd Davis to death.\nIn State v. McNeil, 324 N.C. 33, 375 S.E.2d 909, (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1050, 100 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1990), the prosecutor told the jury that \u201c[b]eing a prosecutor is not always a pleasant task, for I speak, Mr. Hobgood speaks for two dead ladies who can not speak.\u201d Id. at 48, 375 S.E.2d at 918. The McNeil Court noted that the prosecutor\u2019s statement only reminded the jury that he was an advocate for the two victims and concluded that the argument was not so grossly improper that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to intervene ex mero motu. Id. In the present case, the prosecutor\u2019s remarks similarly reminded the jury that he was an advocate for the State and the victim. Further, nothing in the prosecutor\u2019s argument ever suggested or implied to the jurors that they should impose the death penalty because the victims or their families demanded it. Rather, the prosecutor argued for a death sentence because the law and evidence supported it. For example, the prosecutor told the jurors that he spoke for the victims and their families, but noted that the victims\u2019 families \u201crelied on the law for justice, and that\u2019s why they\u2019re here.\u201d After reviewing the statements in context, we hold that the trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero mo tu.\nNext, defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly utilized biblical arguments throughout the closing argument. For example, the prosecutor argued to the jury as follows:\nAnd while I am talking about life is never worse, I want to talk a little bit about the Bible. Our Supreme Court doesn\u2019t want us to make Biblical arguments. And I don\u2019t wish to offend juries. But some of you expressed concerns of that nature. And so I want to say this. You may recall that when Jesus was questioned by the Herodians at the behest of the Pharisees when they were trying to trip Jesus up, they asked him, \u201cIs it lawful to pay taxes to Caesar?\u201d And Jesus said, \u201cLet me see the coin you pay with.\u201d And he looked at the coin, and he said, \u201cWhose inscription appears on this coin?\u201d And they said, \u201cCaesar\u2019s.\u201d And Jesus said, \u201cThen render unto Caesar what is Caesar\u2019s and unto God what is God\u2019s.\u201d And for the purposes of this sentencing hearing, James Floyd Davis belongs to Caesar. You all promised that you would apply the law as it exists in North Carolina, the law of the state, and not some other law and not the law as you wish it was.\nThe prosecutor also argued that \u201c \u2018God may have mercy on him because God can do what man cannot.\u2019 And man cannot appropriately address what he did at that plant on May 17, 1995, without a death sentence.\u201d The prosecutor continued to make biblical allusions throughout the closing argument.\nIn State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 384 S.E.2d 470 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990), this Court discussed the bounds of biblical arguments as follows:\nIn their arguments before the jury, counsel for both sides are entitled to argue the law and the facts in evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Neither the \u201claw\u201d nor the \u201cfacts in evidence\u201d include biblical passages, and, strictly speaking, it is improper for a party either to base or to color his arguments with such extraneous material. However, this Court has repeatedly noted the wide latitude allowed counsel in arguing hotly contested cases, and it has found biblical arguments to fall within permissible margins more often than not. This Court has distinguished as improper remarks that state law is divinely inspired or that law officers are \u201cordained\u201d by God.\nId. at 331, 384 S.E.2d at 500 (citations omitted).\nIn the present case, the prosecutor did not state that the law of this state is divinely inspired or refer to law officers as being ordained by God. In fact, as defendant points out, \u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s argument is ... a jumble of biblical allusions and legal catch phrases, and it is difficult to clearly understand exactly what the source of the argument is.\u201d After reading the remarks in context, we conclude that they were not so improper as to require intervention by the trial court ex mero motu. However, we do urge caution in the use of biblical phrases and allusions. In closing arguments at the sentencing proceeding, it is the prosecutor\u2019s duty to convince the jury that the facts and circumstances of the crime warrant the death penalty. It is not the duty of the prosecutor to preach to the jury, especially in such a convoluted manner. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero motu, this assignment of error is overruled.\nXVIII.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that an M-1 .30-caliber rifle is a deadly weapon. Defendant argues that this instruction relieved the State of its burden of proving each element of the (e)(10) aggravating circumstance, that defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device that would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(10) (1997).\nDefendant concedes that he did not object to these instructions at trial. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to any relief unless any error constituted plain error. See Odom, 307 N.C. at 659-60, 300 S.E.2d at 378.\nDuring the guilt phase of the trial, the trial court instructed the jury on the charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. In instructing the jury on the elements of these offenses, the trial court noted that \u201c[a] deadly weapon is a weapon which is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury,\u201d and \u201c[a]n M1 .30 caliber carbine is a deadly weapon.\u201d\nSubsequently, during the capital sentencing proceeding, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the (e)(10) aggravating circumstance as follows:\nDid the defendant knowingly create a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person?\nThe defendant does so if at the time he kills he is using a weapon and the weapon would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person and the defendant uses ... it in such a way as to create a risk of death to more than one person and the risk is great and the defendant knows that he is thereby creating such a great risk.\nDefendant relies on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979), and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1985), in support of his position that the previous instructions relieved the State of its burden of proving each element of the (e)(10) aggravating circumstance. In Franklin, the United States Supreme Court held:\nBecause a reasonable juror could have understood the challenged portions of the jury instruction in this case as creating a mandatory presumption that shifted to the defendant the burden of persuasion on the crucial element of intent, and because the charge read as a whole does not explain or cure the error, we hold that the jury charge does not comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause.\nFranklin, 471 U.S. at 325, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 360.\nHowever, the trial court\u2019s instructions in the present case did not create a mandatory presumption that shifted the burden of persuasion to defendant. The trial court\u2019s instructions at the guilt phase of the trial simply informed the jurors that the carbine rifle constituted a deadly weapon as a matter of law, regardless of the weapon\u2019s use. The trial court\u2019s instructions concerning the (e)(10) aggravating circumstance focused on totally separate issues. In finding this circumstance, the jury must determine whether the weapon in its normal use is hazardous to the lives of more than one person and whether a great risk of death was knowingly created. See State v. Rose, 327 N.C. 599, 605, 398 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1990). Further, this Court has stated that \u201c[a]s to the weapon, the crucial consideration in determining what type of weapon or device is envisioned by G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(10) is its potential to kill more than one person if the weapon is used in the normal fashion, that is, in the manner for which it was designed. The focus must be upon the destructive capabilities of the weapon or device.\u201d State v. Moose, 310 N.C. 482, 497, 313 S.E.2d 507, 517 (1984). Thus, the fact that a deadly weapon is used by defendant is not enough to support a finding that the (e)(10) aggravating circumstance exists. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s instructions, contrary to defendant\u2019s assertions, did not create a mandatory presumption which shifted the burden of persuasion to defendant.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court\u2019s instructions violated well-settled principles of North Carolina sentencing law. Defendant argues that the trial court, in its instructions, erroneously utilized evidence of the deadly weapon during the sentencing proceeding because it also relied on the use of the weapon to infer malice during the guilt phase. Defendant cites to State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983), to support this proposition. However, Blackwelder involved interpretation of the statutory provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act. The statute involved in Blackwelder specifically prohibited utilizing evidence necessary to prove an element of the offense to also prove an aggravating factor. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.1 to .7 (repealed 1993). The capital sentencing scheme provided for within chapter 15A of the General Statutes contains no such prohibition. In fact, the statute clearly contemplates a sentencing determination by the jury based on the evidence presented during both the guilt and sentencing phases. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(a)(3). Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nXIX.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred by submitting both the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000 (e)(10) aggravating circumstance, that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device that would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person, and the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000 (e)(11) aggravating circumstance, that the murder was part of a course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons. Defendant argues that the circumstances were based on the same evidence and were inherently duplicative on the facts of this case. We do not agree.\n\u201cAggravating circumstances are not considered redundant absent a complete overlap in the evidence supporting them.\u201d State v. Moseley, 338 N.C. 1, 54, 449 S.E.2d 412, 444 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1091, 131 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1995). This Court has held that it is permissible to use the same evidence to support multiple aggravating circumstances when the circumstances are directed at different aspects of a defendant\u2019s character or the murder for which he is to be punished. State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 354, 279 S.E.2d 788, 808 (1981).\nThis Court, in discussing the (e)(11) circumstance, has stated that \u201c[e]vidence that a defendant killed more than one victim is sufficient to support the submission of the course of conduct aggravating circumstance.\u201d State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 530, 453 S.E.2d 824, 851, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995). Here, the evidence showed that defendant killed three people and injured two others.\nFurther, in State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 496 S.E.2d 357 (1998), in discussing the (e)(10) aggravating circumstance, this Court stated that\n[t]his circumstance speaks to a distinct aspect of defendant\u2019s character, that he not only intended to kill a particular person when he set fire to the apartment building, but that he disregarded the value of every human life in the building by using an accelerant to set the fire in the middle of the night.\nId. at 468, 496 S.E.2d at 366. Similarly, in the present case, defendant not only sought out the management of Union Butterfield during his shooting spree, but also disregarded the value of every human life in the building as he randomly fired into offices while walking down the hall. This aspect of defendant\u2019s character is not fully captured by the (e)(11) aggravating circumstance. Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, there was independent evidence to support each of the circumstances submitted, though some of the evidence may have overlapped. Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to submit both circumstances.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could not utilize the evidence of one aggravating circumstance to prove another. However, once again, defendant did not object to the trial court\u2019s instruction at trial. Thus, plain error analysis applies. Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury on both the (e)(10) and (e)(11) aggravating circumstances. While we have stated that \u201ctrial court[s] should ... instruct the jury in such a way as to ensure that jurors will not use the same evidence to find more than one aggravating circumstance,\u201d State v. Gay, 334 N.C. 467, 495, 434 S.E.2d 840, 856 (1993) (emphasis added), we have not required that trial courts do so. Having reviewed the instructions, we hold that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to instruct the jury not to consider duplicative evidence with respect to the aggravating circumstances submitted. This assignment of error is overruled.\nXX.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury regarding mitigating circumstances. Specifically, defendant contends that \u201c[i]n its initial instructions about statutory mitigating circumstances, the trial court was completely silent about whether those circumstances were deemed by law to have mitigating value.\u201d Defendant argues that the instructions given by the trial court allowed the jurors to assign no weight to the statutory mitigating circumstances which the jurors may have found. He also argues that a subsequent instruction by the trial court in response to a question submitted by the jury similarly failed to distinguish between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. We do not agree.\nBefore reviewing defendant\u2019s argument, we note that the terms \u201cvalue\u201d and \u201cweight\u201d which are utilized in separate statutory provisions of our capital sentencing scheme have at times been inadvertently used interchangeably. We take this opportunity to point out the statutory distinction between \u201cvalue\u201d and \u201cweight\u201d to avoid any misunderstanding in this area of the law. The term \u201cvalue\u201d is found only in the statutory catchall provision, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(9), and has also been applied to nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. The term \u201cweight\u201d or \u201cweighing\u201d is used only in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(b)(2) and (3), referring to the process of weighing the mitigating circumstances found against the aggravating circumstances found. In Issue Two, the jury is asked, \u201cDo you find from the evidence the existence of one or more of the following mitigating circumstances?\u201d Under Issue Two, the term \u201cvalue\u201d is used in the trial court\u2019s instructions regarding the statutory catchall, as well as its instructions regarding nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. In both the statutory catchall and non-statutory mitigating circumstances, the jury is instructed that it must first find that a circumstance has mitigating value before it can answer \u201cyes\u201d to that mitigating circumstance. This is the only portion of our sentencing scheme which involves the term \u201cvalue.\u201d\nThe term \u201cweight\u201d subsequently comes into play in both Issues Three and Four. In Issue Three, the jury is asked, \u201cDo you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstance or circumstances found is, or are, insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found?\u201d The jurors are then instructed that in answering this question, they must weigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found against the mitigating circumstance or circumstances found. In Issue Four, the jury is asked, \u201cDo you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances you found is, or are, sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstance or circumstances found by one or more of you?\u201d The jurors are then instructed that in weighing the circumstances, they may give more weight to one circumstance than another. \u201cValue\u201d does not enter into either Issue Three or Issue Four.\nHaving clarified this terminology, we turn now to the issue at hand. In the present case, as to each murder, three statutory mitigating circumstances, twenty-six nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, and the statutory catchall were submitted to the jury. The jury was instructed to determine whether any of these circumstances existed prior to answering Issue Two. The three statutory mitigating circumstances submitted were (1) defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(1); (2) this murder was committed while defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(2); and (3) the capacity of defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(6). The trial court also submitted the statutory catchall, which provides that the jury may consider \u201cany other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(9).\nWith regard to the first statutory mitigating circumstance submitted, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:\nNow, I would instruct you that the defendant has the burden of proving this and establishing this mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence, as I\u2019ve explained it to you. Accordingly as to this mitigating circumstance]], I charge that if one or more [of] you have found the facts to be as all the evidence tends to show, you will answer \u201cyes\u201d to the mitigating circumstance number 1 on the Issues and Recommendation form. If none of you find this circumstance to exist, you would so indicate by having your foreperson write \u201cno\u201d in that space.\nThe trial court gave similar instructions regarding each of the two remaining statutory mitigating circumstances.\nPrior to listing the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances individually, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:\nMembers of the jury, you will also \u2014 should also consider the following circumstances arising from the evidence which you find have mitigating value. If one or more of you find by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the following circumstances exist and also are deemed by you to have mitigating value, you would so indicate by having your foreperson write \u201cyes\u201d in the space provided. If none of you find the circumstance to exist or if none of you deem it to have mitigating value, you can so indicate by having your foreperson write \u201cno\u201d in that space.\nThen, after reading each nonstatutory mitigating circumstance, the trial court further instructed that \u201cif one or more of you find the facts to be as all the evidence tends to show and if you determine that this circumstance has mitigating value, then you will answer \u2018yes.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.)\nFinally, the trial court instructed the jury on the statutory catchall mitigating circumstance as follows:\nNow, members of the jury, I would also instruct you as to number 30. You would also consider and you should consider any other circumstance or circumstances arising from the evidence which one or more of you deem to have mitigating value. If one or more of you do so find by the preponderance of the evidence, you would so indicate by having your foreperson write \u201cyes\u201d in the space provided after this mitigating circumstance, that is number 30, on the Issues and Recommendation form. If none of you find any such circumstances to exist, you would so indicate by having your foreperson write \u201cno\u201d in this space.\nSubsequently, in response to a question from the jury concerning the meaning of \u201cmitigating,\u201d the trial court stated:\nA mitigating circumstance is a fact or group of facts which do not constitute a justification or excuse for a killing or reduce it to a less degree of crime than first degree murder but which may be considered as extenuating or reducing the moral culpability of the killing or making it less deserving of extreme punishment than other first degree murders.\nNow, our law identifies several possible mitigating circumstances. However, in considering Issue Number Two, it would be your duty to consider as a mitigating circumstance any aspect of the defendant\u2019s character, record or any other circumstances of this murder that the defendant contends is a basis for a sentence less than death and any other circumstances arising from the evidence which you deem to have mitigating value.\nFirst, defendant contends that the trial court erred by simply instructing the jurors to answer \u201cyes\u201d for a given statutory mitigating circumstance if one or more jurors found that circumstance to exist. Defendant argues that the instructions were erroneous because \u201cthe trial court was completely silent about whether those circumstances were deemed by law to have mitigating value.\u201d Defendant cites State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 464 S.E.2d 448 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1024, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (1996), in support of his position.\nIn Jaynes, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:\nA number of mitigating circumstances listed on the form have been submitted to the jury for its consideration; the same being (1) through and including (37). Now as to these listed circumstances, it is for you to determine from the circumstances and the facts in this case whether or not any listed circumstance has mitigating effect. And if one or more of you should determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the mitigating circumstance listed exists and that it has mitigating value, then you would find that it existed and answer so. If none of you finds that, then you would indicate, no, as to that.\nId. at 285, 464 S.E.2d at 470 (alteration in original). Subsequently, after the jury submitted a question to the trial court, the trial court informed the jury that it was\nnot able to answer your question any more clearly than to say that it is for you to determine as a juror whether or not the listed circumstance has mitigating value or effect.\nId. This Court concluded that the trial court committed error by combining both the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and instructing that \u201cif one or more of you should determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the mitigating circumstance listed exists and that it has mitigating value, then you would find that it existed and answer so.\u201d\nThese instructions improperly placed a higher burden on the jury\u2019s finding statutory mitigating circumstances than .is required by law. Under our law, in order to find that a statutory mitigating circumstance exists, one or more of the jurors have only to find that it exists factually by a preponderance of the evidence. The jurors are not required by law to determine whether it has mitigating value. As noted above, the only time \u201cvalue\u201d comes into play is in determining whether the statutory catchall or the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances exist. In order to find that these exist, the jurors must first find that they have mitigating value. By distinguishing between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, \u201c[t]he General Assembly has determined as a matter of law that statutory mitigating circumstances have mitigating value.\u201d Id. This means that jurors are not required to find value as to statutory mitigating circumstances, as in the case of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. It does not mean that the trial court is required to instruct that statutory mitigating circumstances have value as a matter of law. However, the trial court\u2019s instructions in Jaynes failed to appropriately distinguish between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and, in fact, required the same finding as to both. Accordingly, the Court vacated the defendant\u2019s sentence of death and ordered a new capital sentencing proceeding.\nIn the present case, the trial court properly instructed the jurors from the pattern jury instructions regarding both statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances. See N.C.P.I. \u2014 Crim. 150.10 (1997). For example, with regard to the first statutory mitigating circumstance, the trial court instructed that \u201cif one or more [of] you have found the facts to be as all the evidence tends to show, you will answer \u2018yes\u2019 to the mitigating circumstance number 1 on the Issues and Recommendation form.\u201d With regard to the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, the trial court instructed the jurors that \u201c[i]f one or more of you find by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the following circumstances exist and also are deemed by you to have mitigating value, you would so indicate by having your foreperson write \u2018yes\u2019 in the space provided.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court properly informed the jurors that in order to find a statutory mitigating circumstance to exist, all they must find is that the circumstance is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. However, unlike statutory mitigating circumstances, the trial court instructed the jurors that in order to find nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, they must (1) find by a preponderance of the evidence that the circumstance existed, and (2) find that the circumstance has mitigating value. These instructions properly distinguished between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and informed the jurors of their duty under the law. We have upheld instructions virtually identical to the ones given in the present case. See State v. Conner, 345 N.C. 319, 480 S.E.2d 626, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1997); State v. Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 462 S.E.2d 191 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1161, 134 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1996); State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 446 S.E.2d 298 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995).\nIn the present case, as noted on the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment forms submitted for each of the three murders, each of the three individual statutory mitigating circumstances was found to exist by the jury, as well as the twenty-six nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted. The only circumstance submitted which the jury did not find was the statutory catchall. Because the jurors found mitigating circumstances to exist, they were required to answer Issue Two \u201cyes.\u201d Once Issue Two is answered \u201cyes,\u201d the jury then must answer both Issues Three and Four. Here, the trial court properly instructed the jurors in Issue Three that they must \u201cweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances against the mitigating circumstance or circumstances.\u201d Thus, the jurors were required to take into account any statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstance or circumstances they found prior to answering Issue Three. The jurors were also instructed on Issue Four as follows: \u201cIn deciding this issue you are not to consider the aggravating circumstances standing alone. You must consider them in connection with any mitigating circumstances found by one or more of you.\u201d Thus, the jurors were required to give the mitigating circumstances they had found, both statutory and nonstatutory, weight in determining both Issues Three and Four. Further, the trial court properly instructed that the weight to be given each mitigating circumstance is for the individual jurors to determine. See State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 400 S.E.2d 712 (1991). As we stated in Daniels, \u201c[t]hese instructions are in accord with the pattern jury instructions. We conclude that the instructions here were given in accordance with the law and that the jury was able to follow the instructions as they were given.\u201d Daniels, 337 N.C. at 275, 446 S.E.2d at 318.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in instructions given in response to a question sent out by the jury, which stated: \u201cAre the mitigating questions under Issue #2 to be answered yes or no in relation to (1) [b]eing a factor that contributed to the crime on May 17th or (2) [b]eing true that the defense presented this evidence and we agree/disagree to its truth[?]\u201d As noted above, the trial court responded to the question as follows:\nA mitigating circumstance is a fact or group of facts which do not constitute a justification or excuse for a killing or reduce it to a less degree of crime than first degree murder but which may be considered as extenuating or reducing the moral culpability of the killing or making it less deserving of extreme punishment than other first degree murders.\nNow, our law identifies several possible mitigating circumstances. However, in considering Issue Number Two, it would be your duty to consider as a mitigating circumstance any aspect of the defendant\u2019s character, record or any other circumstances of this murder that the defendant contends is [sic] a basis for a sentence less than death and any other circumstances arising from the evidence which you deem to have mitigating value.\nThese instructions track the language of the pattern jury instructions. See N.C.P.I.- \u2014 Crim. 150.10. The instructions provide a general discussion of what constitutes a mitigating circumstance and a summary of what Issue Two is about, that is, considering mitigating circumstances submitted by defendant that would be a basis for a sentence less than death. Generally, these instructions are given in Issue Two, prior to the trial court\u2019s instructions on the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. In fact, the jurors in the present case had previously received instructions identical to those set out above. However, the instructions above do not affect the trial court\u2019s previous instructions, which specifically addressed the distinction between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and the method the jury must utilize to find them. In responding to the jurors\u2019 question, the trial court elected to reinstruct the jurors using the pattern jury instructions in an attempt to avoid a misstatement of the law. These instructions do not constitute error.\nFurther, as this Court has previously stated, \u201c \u2018a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.\u2019 \u201d State v. McNeil, 327 N.C. 388, 392, 395 S.E.2d 106, 109 (1990) (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 373), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 942, 113 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1991). \u201cIf the charge as a whole presents the law fairly and clearly to the jury, the fact that isolated expressions, standing alone, might be considered erroneous will afford no ground for reversal.\u201d State v. Terry, 337 N.C. 615, 623, 447 S.E.2d 720, 724 (1994). When viewed as a whole, the trial court\u2019s instructions in the present case properly informed the jurors of their duties under the law. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nPRESERVATION ISSUES\nDefendant raises sixteen additional issues which he concedes have been previously decided contrary to his position by this Court: (1) the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to prohibit death-qualification of the prospective jurors; (2) the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to strike the death penalty from consideration; (3) the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion for a bill of particulars regarding aggravating circumstances; (4) the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion for individual, sequestered jury voir dire; (5) the trial court erred by giving a blanket instruction that all evidence offered by the State during the guilt phase could be considered as evidence in aggravation during the sentencing phase; (6) the trial court erred by instructing on the definition of mitigating circumstances which did not adequately focus the jury on the culpability of defendant, as opposed to the facts of the murder; (7) the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to declare the North Carolina capital sentencing statute unconstitutional because it places a burden on defendant to overcome the weight of aggravation; (8) the trial court erred by incorporating the terms \u201crecommend\u201d and \u201crecommendation\u201d when referring to the capital sentencing decision in its instructions; (9) the trial court erred by making jury unanimity a condition to a \u201cno\u201d answer by the jury on sentencing Issue Four; (10) the trial court erred in its instructions on defendant\u2019s burden of proof on mitigating circumstances; (11) the trial court erred by permitting jurors to reject submitted nonstatutory mitigating circumstances on the basis that they had no mitigating value; (12) the trial court erred by using the term \u201cmay\u201d in its instructions in sentencing Issues Three and Four; (13) the trial court erred by failing to instruct on the meaning of a life sentence; (14) the trial court erred by submitting aggravating circumstances not supported by the evidence; (15) the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to strike the death penalty; and (16) the trial court erred by making jury unanimity a condition to a \u201cno\u201d answer by the jury on sentencing Issues One and Three.\nDefendant raises these issues so that this Court may reexamine its prior holdings and also to preserve the issues for any possible further judicial review. We have considered defendant\u2019s arguments on these issues and find no compelling reason to depart from our prior holdings. These assignments of error are overruled.\nPROPORTIONALITY REVIEW\nHaving found no error in either the guilt or sentencing phase, we must determine whether: (1) the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances found by the jury; (2) passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor influenced the imposition of the death sentence; and (3) the sentence is \u201cexcessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2).\nIn the present case, defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation and also under the felony murder rule. With respect to each murder, the jury found the aggravating circumstances that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(10), and that the murder was part of a course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(11).\nWe conclude that the evidence supports each aggravating circumstance found. We further conclude, based on a thorough review of the record, that the sentences of death were not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Thus, the final statutory duty of this Court is to conduct a proportionality review.\nProportionality review is designed to \u201celiminate the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury.\u201d State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 164-65, 362 S.E.2d 513, 537 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988). In conducting proportionality review, we determine \u201cwhether the sentence of death in the present case is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering both the crime and the defendant.\u201d State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 79, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1983). Whether the death penalty is disproportionate \u201cultimately rest[s] upon the \u2018experienced judgments\u2019 of the members of this Court.\u201d State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 198, 443 S.E.2d 14, 47, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994).\nIn our proportionality review, it is proper to compare the present case with other cases in which this Court has concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate. State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 161 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994). It is also proper for this Court to compare this case with the cases in which we have found the death penalty to be proportionate. Id. at 244, 433 S.E.2d at 164. Although we review all of these cases when engaging in this statutory duty, we will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each time we carry out that duty. Id.\nThis Court has determined that the sentence of death was disproportionate in seven cases: State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373; State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); and State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).\nHowever, we find that the present case is distinguishable from each of these seven cases. First, defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder. As this Court has previously noted, we have never found the sentence of death disproportionate in a case where the defendant was found guilty of murdering more than one victim. State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 552, 461 S.E.2d 631, 654 (1995). Further, the jury convicted defendant on the theory of malice, premeditation, and deliberation and also under the felony murder rule. We have said that \u201c[t]he finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a more cold-blooded and calculated crime.\u201d Artis, 325 N.C. at 341, 384 S.E.2d at 506.\nWe recognize that juries may have imposed sentences of life imprisonment in cases which are similar to the present case. However, this fact \u201cdoes not automatically establish that juries have \u2018consistently\u2019 returned life sentences in factually similar cases.\u201d Green, 336 N.C. at 198, 443 S.E.2d at 47. This Court has long rejected a mechanical or empirical approach to comparing cases that are superficially similar. State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 139, 443 S.E.2d 306, 337 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995). \u201cWe note that in deciding whether a death sentence is disproportionate, this Court independently considers each individual defendant and the nature of the crimes that defendant has committed.\u201d State v. Lynch, 340 N.C. 435, 483, 459 S.E.2d 679, 703 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1143, 134 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1996).\nThe evidence in the present case shows that defendant engaged in a shooting rampage at the Union Butterfield facility which resulted in the murder of three employees, as well as the wounding of two others. Defendant fired multiple rounds from two semiautomatic weapons throughout the facility as employees hid under desks or fled the building in fear for their lives. With the killings completed, defendant stood in the doorway, smoking a cigarette.\nBased on the nature of this crime, and particularly the distinguishing features noted above, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the sentences of death were excessive or disproportionate. We hold that defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.\nJustice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by David Roy Blackwell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "David G. Belser for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES FLOYD DAVIS\nNo. 452A96\n(Filed 9 October 1998)\n1. Jury \u00a7 219 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 jury selection \u2014 beliefs regarding the death penalty\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion during jury selection for a capital first-degree murder prosecution by excusing prospective jurors for cause based on their beliefs regarding the death penalty. Each prospective juror excused stated that he or she would be unable to follow the law and recommend a sentence of death even if that was what the facts and circumstances suggested.\n2. Constitutional Law \u00a7 343 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 competency hearing \u2014 ex parte \u2014 no state constitutional violation\nA first-degree murder defendant\u2019s state constitutional right to be present at every stage of his capital proceeding was not violated by entry of an amended order concerning his evaluation for competency to stand trial where the order appears to have been entered upon motion of Dorothea Dix Hospital, not the State; the order does not indicate that the State took part in the hearing; and the purpose of a competency evaluation is to determine whether defendant is competent to stand trial, does not implicate defendant\u2019s confrontation rights, and does not have a substantial, relation to his opportunity to defend. Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution.\n3. Constitutional Law \u00a7 343 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 right to be present \u2014 ex parte competency hearing\u2014 no federal constitutional violation\nA first-degree murder defendant\u2019s federal constitutional right to be present at every stage of his capital trial was not violated by an ex parte hearing concerning his evaluation for competency to stand trial where the order appears to have been entered upon motion of the hospital, not the State, it is not clear that an ex parte hearing actually occurred, and, even if it did, it did not deny defendant an opportunity for cross-examination or necessitate his presence to assure fairness in the proceedings.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 514 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 first-degree murder\u2014 competency to stand trial \u2014 hearing\u2014record\nThere was a sufficient record for appellate review and defendant did not establish a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1241 in a first-degree murder prosecution regarding the evaluation of his competency to stand trial. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the court conducted a hearing concerning Dorothea Dix Hospital\u2019s request to amend the competency evaluation order, a full record exists concerning the hearing on the State\u2019s motion for a competency evaluation, and the order entered by the trial court contains all required findings.\n5. Constitutional Law \u00a7 262 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 evaluation of competency to stand trial \u2014 right to counsel\nA defendant in a capital first-degree murder prosecution was not deprived of his constitutional rights to counsel in a proceeding to determine his competency to stand trial where an order was entered pursuant to a request by Dorothea Dix Hospital to assign a specific forensic evaluator and to transfer defendant to Dorothea Dix Hospital but there is no proof that an actual proceeding took place. The amended order does not affect defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial.\n6. Constitutional Law \u00a7 98 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder\u2014 competency evaluation \u2014 cumulative effect of alleged errors \u2014 no due process violation\nThere was no violation of a defendant\u2019s due process rights in a capital first-degree murder prosecution due to the cumulative effect of alleged errors surrounding the evaluation of defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial.\n7. Constitutional Law \u00a7 264 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 evaluation of competency to stand trial \u2014 no right to counsel\nA defendant in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel where the court ordered a competency evaluation by a forensic evaluator but declined to allow defense counsel to be present during the examination. Defendant had no constitutional right to have counsel present during his evaluation; the expert in forensic psychiatry who was the evaluator testified that defense counsel\u2019s presence would interfere with the process. Furthermore, it was upon motion of defense counsel that defendant was committed for examination of his capacity to proceed.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 181 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 first-degree murder\u2014 capacity to stand trial \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err in a capital first-degree murder prosecution by finding that defendant had the capacity to stand trial where the testimony of an expert in forensic psychiatry clearly indicates that defendant met each prong of the competency test set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1001. The evidence must demonstrate that defendant is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him, comprehending his own situation in reference to the proceedings, and assisting in his defense in a rational and reasonable manner.\n9. Criminal Law \u00a7 468 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 first-degree murder\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 defendant\u2019s mental competence\u2014 defendant\u2019s understanding of his rights\nThere was no gross impropriety requiring intervention ex mero motu in the prosecutor\u2019s opening statement and closing argument in a capital first-degree murder prosecution where defendant contended that the jury could infer defendant\u2019s mental competence from the State\u2019s argument that defendant understood his rights. The prosecutor never directly asked the jury to use defendant\u2019s statements to law enforcement officers in determining his competence or sanity, the prosecutor\u2019s comments did not indicate that defendant exercised his right to counsel or to silence, and the trial court instructed the jury that it was to be guided by its own recollection of the evidence.\n10. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 264 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 character of victim \u2014 relevant\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by admitting evidence of the victim\u2019s character and temperament where the victim had informed defendant that his employment was being terminated as a result of an altercation, defendant returned to the facility with a rifle and killed several people, and defendant contended that the victims had not been willing to assist him and had tried to ruin him. The prosecution was properly permitted to present evidence of the victim\u2019s temperament and management style in order to prove the circumstances of the case. As the evidence was properly admitted during the guilt phase, its reconsideration during the sentencing phase was also proper, and did not unduly prejudice defendant.\n11. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 920 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 conversation between victim and defendant prior to murders \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by admitting evidence of what a victim and defendant had said in a meeting two days prior to the murder at which the victim had terminated defendant\u2019s employment. The conversation showed the circumstances of the crime, particularly the motive for the killings. The State is entitled to prove the circumstances of the crime and to introduce evidence tending to support the theory of the case.\n12. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 920 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 conversation between victim and defendant\u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by admitting the testimony of a coworker of defendant and the victim who was present at defendant\u2019s dismissal conference before defendant returned and began shooting. The State never offered the statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to prove defendant\u2019s motive for the crime.\n13. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 735 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 conversation between defendant and victim \u2014 not unduly prejudicial\nTestimony relating a conversation between a first-degree murder defendant and his victim at which the victim terminated defendant\u2019s employment was highly relevant to the motive of the case and its probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\n14. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 3195 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 State\u2019s witnesses \u2014 prior written statements\u2014 read into the record\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by allowing the State\u2019s witnesses to read into the record their prior written statements where the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to bolster the testimony given by two of the witnesses. The statements were given by the witnesses immediately after the shooting occurred, were thus present sense impressions, and added weight and credibility to the witnesses\u2019 trial testimony.\n15. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 3195 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 reading of witness\u2019s prior statement \u2014 no plain error\nThere was no plain error in a capital first-degree murder prosecution in the reading of a witness\u2019s prior written statement where the objection at trial was general and specific statements were identified for the first time on appeal. A review of the evidence reveals that this is not the exceptional case where such a pervasive defect or plain error occurred which would have tainted all results and denied defendant a right to a fair trial.\n16. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2080 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 defendant\u2019s mental condition \u2014 jail nurse\u2019s opinion\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by excluding a jail nurse\u2019s opinion of defendant\u2019s mental condition where the question called for the lay witness to make a psychiatric diagnosis. No foundation had been laid to show that he had the expertise to make such a diagnosis and, while it may have been appropriate for the witness to make a general observation that a defendant appeared \u201cmentally disturbed\u201d upon admission to jail, it was beyond his ability as a lay witness to make a specific diagnosis as to defendant\u2019s being \u201cpsychotic.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701.\n17. Constitutional Law \u00a7 346 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 defendant\u2019s right to testify \u2014 instruction by court to defendant \u2014 no plain error\nThere was no plain error in a capital first-degree murder prosecution where the court instructed defendant that he had the right to testify, but that if he did he would be subject to cross-examination on a wide variety of subjects, subject only to the discretion of the court and relevancy. The court did not attempt to give defendant detailed instructions concerning the scope of cross-examination, did not give an instruction inconsistent with any of the rules of evidence, and did not impermissibly chill defendant\u2019s right to testify.\n18. Homicide \u00a7 244 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 specific intent to kill \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThe trial court did not err in a capital first-degree murder prosecution by failing to dismiss the charge as to a particular victim based upon insufficient evidence that defendant possessed the specific intent to kill that victim where defendant was discharged from his employment, purchased a semi-automatic weapon the morning of the killings, drove to the facility and killed two others who had been involved in his dismissal in a break room, proceeded down a hallway firing shots into offices, this victim was working at his desk and dove underneath the desk to avoid the shots, defendant fired at least three rounds through the office door, one penetrated this victim\u2019s wrist and proceeded through his body, defendant stood in a doorway smoking a cigarette while his victims bled to death, and there was no evidence that this victim had provoked defendant. Although defendant\u2019s argument appears to be that he had no motive to murder this victim, motive is not an element of first-degree murder and a jury could reasonably find that defendant formed the requisite premeditation and deliberation based upon the doctrine of transferred intent.\n19. Homicide \u00a7 469 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 specific intent \u2014 instructions on mental capacity \u2014 no plain error\nThere was no plain error in a capital first-degree murder prosecution in the court\u2019s instructions on lack of mental capacity regarding specific intent where the court used the phrase \u201clack of diminished capacity\u201d as opposed to \u201clack of mental capacity.\u201d The use of the phrase \u201clack of diminished capacity\u201d appears to be a mere lapsus linguae, the court correctly defined the defense, and, read contextually, the instructions properly conveyed to the jury what it must find for the defense to apply.\n20. Homicide \u00a7 520 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 instructions \u2014 consideration of second-degree murder\nThe trial court in a capital first-degree murder prosecution properly conveyed the mandatory nature of its instruction that the jury would consider second-degree murder if it found that defendant could not form the specific intent required for first-degree murder.\n21. Homicide \u00a7 678 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 diminished capacity defenses \u2014 instructions\u2014no error\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution in its instructions regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity defense where defendant contended that the instructions gave the jury the option of finding defendant not guilty if it found that he lacked the mental capacity to commit murder, rather than requiring such a verdict, but the instructions correctly stated the jurors\u2019 obligations when read in context.\n22. Homicide \u00a7 478 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 doctrine of transferred intent \u2014 evidence sufficient to support instruction\nThe evidence in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder was sufficient to support the transferred intent instruction given by the trial court where defendant returned to his workplace with a rifle after being terminated, headed straight for the hallway where all of the management offices were located, fired into the doors of offices, and, in his statements to law enforcement officials, stated that the people at the facility had set him up, fired him, and ruined him. The evidence demonstrated that defendant\u2019s actions were! aimed at the employees of the company, particularly those who were involved in management, and this victim was working inside management\u2019s offices during the shooting.\n23. Homicide \u00a7 478 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 transferred intent \u2014 instructions\u2014no plain error\nThere was no plain error in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder in the trial court\u2019s instructions on transferred intent where defendant contended that the instruction was flawed because it did not specify whom defendant intended to kill. The evidence indicates that defendant sought revenge from the management of his former employer because of his allegedly unjustified dismissal and the jury was properly instructed on the doctrine of transferred intent based on his intent to harm the management of the company.\n24. Criminal Law \u00a7 1335 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 hearsay testimony \u2014 no error\nThere was no error in a capital sentencing proceeding where defendant contended that defendant\u2019s sister was allowed to give hearsay testimony but the jurors heard defendant\u2019s sister deny any knowledge of the conversation about which the prosecutor asked and no improper testimony was admitted.\n25. Constitutional Law \u00a7 352 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 determination of competency to stand trial \u2014 no Fifth Amendment violation\nA capital first-degree murder defendant\u2019s Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination was not violated by the cross-examination at trial of a defense expert regarding the contents of defendant\u2019s records from Dorothea Dix Hospital, where he was examined for competency to stand trial. Defense counsel participated in the hearing concerning defendant\u2019s competency examination and voiced no opposition to the examination so long as the trial court limited the scope to determination of competency. Defense counsel then sought to rely on the defenses of insanity and diminished capacity during trial and the defense expert testified that in forming his opinion he reviewed defendant\u2019s records and referred to the testing done at Dorothea Dix Hospital during the competency examination. The State should not be foreclosed from also relying on that evidence to rebut defendant\u2019s contentions.\n26. Constitutional Law \u00a7 290 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 use of information from competency evaluation at sentencing \u2014 defense counsel not informed \u2014 no denial of Sixth Amendment right to counsel\nDefendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when defense counsel was not notified in advance that the information generated from a competency evaluation would be used against defendant in the sentencing proceeding. Defendant had the opportunity to discuss with counsel the nature of the psychiatric evaluation and defense counsel should have anticipated the use of the psychological evidence by the prosecution in rebuttal to any defense involving defendant\u2019s mental status.\n27. Criminal Law \u00a7 460 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 jury acting on behalf of victims\nThe trial court did not err by not intervening ex mero motu during the prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments in a capital sentencing proceeding where defendant contended that the prosecutor improperly urged the jurors to sentence defendant to death on behalf of the victims, but the prosecutor\u2019s remarks only reminded the jury that he was an advocate for the State and the victim and nothing in the prosecutor\u2019s argument suggested or implied that the jurors should impose the death penalty because the victims or their families demanded it.\n28. Criminal Law \u00a7 475 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 biblical arguments\nThe prosecutor\u2019s biblical arguments in a capital sentencing proceeding were not so improper as to require intervention ex mero motu where the prosecutor did not state that the law of this state is divinely inspired or refer to law officers as being ordained by God and, in fact, the argument was a jumble of allusions and catch phrases which were difficult to clearly understand. However, caution is urged in the use of biblical phrases and allusions; it is the prosecutor\u2019s duty in closing arguments at the sentencing proceeding to convince the jury that the facts and circumstances of the crime warrant the death penalty and it is not the duty of the prosecutor to preach to the jury.\n29. Criminal Law \u00a7 1373 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 risk of death to more than one person \u2014 instruction that rifle is a deadly weapon \u2014 no plain error\nThere was no plain error in a capital sentencing proceeding where defendant contended that the court\u2019s instruction that an M-l .30-caliber rifle is a deadly weapon relieved the State of its burden of proving each element of the aggravating circumstance that defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device that would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person. The court\u2019s instructions at the guilt phase simply informed the jurors that the rifle constituted a deadly weapon as a matter of law regardless of the weapon\u2019s use and the instructions concerning the aggravating circumstance focused on totally separate issues. The fact that a deadly weapon was used is not enough to support a finding that this aggravating circumstance exists. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(10).\n30. Criminal Law \u00a7 1335 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 risk of death to more than one person \u2014 evidence used to infer malice during guilt phase\nThere was no error in a capital sentencing proceeding where defendant contended that the court erroneously utilized evidence of a deadly weapon during the sentencing proceeding because it also relied on the use of the weapon to infer malice during the guilt phase. Although the Fair Sentencing Act specifically prohibited utilizing evidence necessary to prove an element of the offense to also prove an aggravating factor, the capital sentencing scheme contains no such prohibition and clearly contemplates a sentencing determination based on evidence presented during both the guilt and sentencing phases.\n31. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 1373 and 1374 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 risk of harm to more than one person \u2014 course of conduct \u2014 both properly submitted\nThere was no error in a capital sentencing proceeding where the court submitted both the aggravating circumstance that defendant knowingly created a risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device that would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person and the aggravating circumstance that the murder was part of a course of conduct which included other crimes of violence against another person or persons. Although defendant argues that the circumstances were based on the same evidence, it has been held permissible to use the same evidence to support multiple aggravating circumstances when the circumstances are directed at different aspects of a defendant\u2019s character or the murder. In this case, defendant during a shooting spree sought out the management of a company from which he had been terminated and disregarded the value of every human life in the building as he randomly fired into offices while walking down the hall. That aspect of defendant\u2019s character is not fully captured by the (e)(ll) aggravating circumstance. There was independent evidence to support each circumstance, although some of the evidence may have overlapped.\n32. Criminal Law \u00a7 1346 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 consideration of the same evidence to support more than one circumstance \u2014 instructions\nThere was no plain error in a capital sentencing proceeding where defendant contended that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could not utilize the evidence of one aggravating circumstance to prove another. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that trial courts should instruct the jury in such a way as to insure that jurors will not use the same evidence to find more than one aggravating circumstance, it has not required that trial courts do so.\n33. Criminal Law \u00a7 1381 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 mitigating circumstances \u2014 value and weight distinguished\nIn capital sentencing, the term \u201cvalue\u201d is found only in the statutory catchall provision, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(9), and has also been applied to nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. The term \u201cweight\u201d or \u201cweighing\u201d is used only in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(b)(2) and (3), referring to the process of weighing the mitigating circumstances found against the aggravating circumstances found. The term \u201cvalue\u201d is used under Issue Two and does not enter into either Issue Three or Issue Four.\n34. Criminal Law \u00a7 1349 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 instructions \u2014 mitigating circumstances \u2014 value and weight\nThere was no error in a capital sentencing proceeding in the instructions concerning valuing and weighing statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances where defendant contended that the court erred by simply instructing the jurors to answer \u201cyes\u201d for a given statutory mitigating circumstance if one or more jurors found that circumstance to exist and was silent about \u201cwhether those circumstances were deemed by law to have mitigating value.\u201d The only time \u201cvalue\u201d comes into play is in determining whether the statutory catchall or the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances exist because jurors must first find that they have mitigating value in order to find that they exist. Jurors are not required to find value as to statutory mitigating circumstances, but this does not mean that the trial court is required to instruct that statutory mitigating circumstances have value as a matter of law. The instructions here properly distinguished between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, properly instructed the jurors in Issue Three that they must \u201cweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances against the mitigating circumstance or circumstance,\u201d and required the jurors to give the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances they had found weight in determining both Issues Three and Four. Furthermore, the trial court properly instructed that the weight to be given each mitigating circumstance is for the individual juror to decide.\n35. Criminal Law \u00a7 1345 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 response to jurors\u2019 questions \u2014 reinstruction\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by electing in response to jurors\u2019 questions to reinstruct the jurors in the pattern jury instructions in an attempt to avoid a misstatement of the law. When viewed as a whole, the trial court\u2019s instructions properly informed the jurors of their duties under the law.\n36. Criminal Law \u00a7 1402 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 death sentence \u2014 not arbitrary\nThe evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding supported each aggravating circumstance found and the sentences were not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.\n37. Criminal Law \u00a7 1402 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 death sentence \u2014 not disproportionate\nA sentence of death for first-degree murder was not disproportionate where defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder, was convicted on a theory of malice, premeditation, and deliberation, and the evidence showed that defendant engaged in a shooting rampage at his former workplace which resulted in the murder of three employees, as well as the wounding of two others. He fired multiple rounds from two semi-automatic weapons throughout the facility as employees hid under desks or fled the building in fear for their lives. With the killings completed, defendant stood in the doorway, smoking a cigarette.\nJustice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from three judgments imposing sentences of death entered by Payne, J., on 1 October 1996 in Superior Court, Buncombe County, upon jury verdicts of guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 27 May 1998.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by David Roy Blackwell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nDavid G. Belser for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 39, "last_page_order": 99 }