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Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" }, { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790245 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" }, { "page": "517-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 517, 459 S.E.2d 747, 762 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1079, 133 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867609 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 517, 459 S.E.2d 747, 762 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1079, 133 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 L. Ed. 2d 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2567784 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 L. Ed. 2d 777", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2487626 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 526", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 1123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11768993, 11768609, 11768259, 11768294, 11768199, 11768841, 11768523, 11768781, 11768078, 11768143, 11768690, 11768915, 11768376, 11768027, 11768447 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/1123-15", "/us/517/1123-10", "/us/517/1123-05", "/us/517/1123-06", "/us/517/1123-04", "/us/517/1123-13", "/us/517/1123-09", "/us/517/1123-12", "/us/517/1123-02", "/us/517/1123-03", "/us/517/1123-11", "/us/517/1123-14", "/us/517/1123-07", "/us/517/1123-01", "/us/517/1123-08" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626" }, { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793195 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 881", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531885 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "considering whether the imposition of the death penalty was arbitrary or disproportionate under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) only after \"[h]aving found no prejudicial error in either the guilt-innocence phase or the sentencing proceeding\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659919 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "considering whether the imposition of the death penalty was arbitrary or disproportionate under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) only after \"[h]aving found no prejudicial error in either the guilt-innocence phase or the sentencing proceeding\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Flippen I" }, { "page": "161" }, { "page": "166" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867605 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Flippen I" }, { "page": "702" }, { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545734 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535633 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0078-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1202, "char_count": 37235, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1195375367733026e-07, "percentile": 0.764370625468898 }, "sha256": "59f6140d30a05916f33c0f7698b731d44c871f3999a53b17244446d6f43dc21e", "simhash": "1:0b6b8036762b1cd2", "word_count": 5867 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:15:14.712587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMUEL R. FLIPPEN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nOn 31 October 1994 defendant was indicted for first-degree murder. He was tried capitally in February 1995. The jury found defendant guilty and recommended that he be sentenced to death. The trial court imposed the death sentence. This Court found no error in the guilt-innocence phase of defendant\u2019s trial but vacated defendant\u2019s death sentence and remanded for a new capital sentencing proceeding. State v. Flippen, 344 N.C. 689, 477 S.E.2d 158 (1996) (Flippen I). Defendant\u2019s new capital sentencing proceeding was held at the 19 May 1997 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Forsyth County. A jury again recommended a sentence of death for the first-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced defendant accordingly. Defendant appeals from this sentence. We hold that defendant received a fair sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error, and that the sentence of death is not disproportionate.\nThe facts were presented in our earlier opinion, id. at 693-94, 477 S.E.2d at 161, and need not be restated in detail here. During defendant\u2019s new capital sentencing proceeding, the State presented evidence that defendant inflicted one or more fatal blows to his two-year-old stepdaughter\u2019s stomach. These blows tore the stepdaughter\u2019s liver and pancreas and caused internal bleeding. Prior to her death, the victim lived for approximately thirty minutes with these fatal injuries.\nDuring this time defendant called 911 to seek medical attention for his stepdaughter. Defendant told medical personnel that the stepdaughter had fallen from a chair. Consequently, as the victim rode to the hospital in an emergency vehicle, the paramedics initially treated her for a head or C-spine injury. As the victim demonstrated increasing difficulty breathing, the paramedics removed her clothes to try to open her airway; they noticed bruising on the victim\u2019s abdomen. The paramedics then no longer believed that the victim suffered from a head or C-spine injury. The victim stopped breathing on her way to the hospital, and her heartbeat steadily decreased and ultimately quit. The paramedics performed infant CPR, and they were still performing it when the emergency vehicle arrived at the hospital, where the victim was pronounced dead.\nDefendant offered as mitigating evidence that he was a high-school graduate who regularly attended church, that he maintained regular employment, and that he had a good reputation in the community for being a fine and upstanding citizen. He presented evidence that he genuinely loved his stepdaughter and had a good relationship with her with no history of physical abuse.\nThe jury found one aggravating circumstance: that defendant\u2019s crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9) (1997). The jury also found one mitigating circumstance: that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(1). The jury then determined that the mitigating circumstance found was insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance found and that the aggravating circumstance, when considered with the mitigating circumstance, was sufficiently substantial to call for imposition of the death penalty.\nDefendant first contends that this Court erred in Flippen I when it found prejudicial error in the trial court\u2019s sentencing-phase jury charge and remanded this matter for a new sentencing proceeding under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(3). See Flippen I, 344 N.C. at 702, 477 S.E.2d at 166. Defendant argues that this Court was required to overturn the death sentence and impose a sentence of life imprisonment in lieu thereof under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) because his first jury arbitrarily recommended the death sentence under the influence of passion and prejudice.\nOnce this Court concludes that an error exists in the instructions to the jury in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, it must remand the matter for resentencing under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(3), which provides: \u201cIf the sentence of death and the judgment of the trial court are reversed on appeal for error in the post-verdict sentencing proceeding, the Supreme Court shall order that a new sentencing hearing be conducted.\u201d When this Court finds prejudicial error in a sentencing-phase jury instruction, it does not reach the question of arbitrariness under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2). See, e.g., State v. Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417, 449, 502 S.E.2d 563, 584 (1998) (considering whether the imposition of the death penalty was arbitrary or disproportionate under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) only after \u201c[h]aving found no prejudicial error in either the guilt-innocence phase or the sentencing proceeding\u201d). Thus, when this Court finds error in the instructions in the sentencing phase, we remand the case for resentencing under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(3) and do not reach the question of whether the defendant\u2019s sentence of death should be overturned under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2).\nIn Flippen I we held that during the sentencing phase of defendant\u2019s capital trial, \u201cthe trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(l) mitigating circumstance existed as a matter of law and must be given weight.\u201d Flippen I, 344 N.C. at 701, 477 S.E.2d at 165. We further concluded that this error was prejudicial. Id. at 702, 477 S.E.2d at 166. Thus, we properly remanded for a new sentencing proceeding as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(3) rather than overturning the sentence of death under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2). Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in submitting the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance over defendant\u2019s objection. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9). Defendant submits that the State offered insufficient evidence to support this statutory aggravating circumstance. He argues that if we permit trial courts to submit the (e)(9) circumstance under the facts here, we will be creating a new statutory aggravating circumstance encompassed within the (e)(9) circumstance for all cases in which the homicide victim is a child.\nWhether a trial court properly submitted the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance depends on the facts of the case. State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 61, 436 S.E.2d 321, 356 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1994). The capital offense must not be merely heinous, atrocious, or cruel; it must be especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Id. A murder is especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel when it is a conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. State v. Burr, 341 N.C. 263, 307, 461 S.E.2d 602, 626 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1123, 134 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1996).\nEvidence of \u201cthe victim\u2019s age and the existence of a parental relationship between the victim and defendant\u201d may be considered in determining the existence of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance. Id. Evidence that the defendant was the primary caregiver of the victim also supports the (e)(9) aggravator because such a \u201ckilling betrays the trust that a baby has for its primary caregiver.\u201d State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 56, 381 S.E.2d 635, 667 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990). Evidence that \u201cthe injuries inflicted upon the child were numerous, going beyond what would be necessary to kill the victim\u201d further supports a conclusion that this aggravator was properly submitted. Burr, 341 N.C. at 308, 461 S.E.2d at 626.\nIn determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s submission of the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator, we must consider the evidence \u201cin the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.\u201d State v. Lloyd, 321 N.C. 301, 319, 364 S.E.2d 316, 328, sentence vacated on other grounds, 488 U.S. 807, 102 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1988).\nApplying these principles here, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support submission of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance. Ample evidence demonstrated that defendant had a parental relationship with the victim. The victim called defendant \u201cDaddy.\u201d On the morning of the murder, defendant was alone with her in their home, and he was her primary caregiver. The victim was only two years and four months old. As such, she was particularly vulnerable and at defendant\u2019s mercy. Defendant inflicted numerous blows upon her head, neck, and abdomen; the resulting injuries went beyond what would have been necessary to kill her. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to give a mandatory peremptory instruction on the statutory mitigating circumstance that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(1). In defendant\u2019s first trial, the State and defendant stipulated that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. Defendant contends that this stipulation in his first sentencing proceeding precluded the jury\u2019s consideration of contrary evidence presented at his new sentencing proceeding and conclusively established the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance in that proceeding.\n\u201cAny evidence that the trial court \u2018deems relevant to sentencing]\u2019 may be introduced in the sentencing proceeding.\u201d State v. Heatwole, 344 N.C. 1, 25, 473 S.E.2d 310, 322 (1996) (quoting State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 517, 459 S.E.2d 747, 762 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1079, 133 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1996)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997). The State must be allowed to present any competent evidence in support of the death penalty. Id.\nA prior stipulation or concession regarding capital sentencing circumstances does not limit the parties\u2019 presentation of evidence when relevant evidence contradicts that prior stipulation. See State v. Adams, 347 N.C. 48, 56-58, 490 S.E.2d 220, 223-25 (1997) (recognizing that although the State had stipulated in the defendant\u2019s first sentencing proceeding that insufficient evidence existed to support a statutory aggravating circumstance, the State could introduce evidence at the defendant\u2019s new sentencing proceeding to support that aggravating circumstance), cert. denied, -U.S. \u2014, 139 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1998). This rule allows \u201cboth sides to introduce evidence in support of [or in opposition to] aggravating and mitigating circumstances which have been admitted into evidence by stipulation.\u201d State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 20-21, 301 S.E.2d 308, 320, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1983).\nDespite the existence of a prior stipulation on a mitigating circumstance, a \u201cdefendant is not entitled to a peremptory instruction when the evidence supporting a mitigating circumstance is controverted.\u201d State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 683, 473 S.E.2d 291, 300 (1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 136 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1997). Defendant is entitled to a peremptory instruction on a mitigating circumstance only when that circumstance is supported by uncontroverted evidence. Id. The record shows that the evidence regarding the existence of the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance was not uncontroverted.\nAlthough the parties stipulated in defendant\u2019s first sentencing proceeding that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity, this stipulation did not limit the presentation of subsequently discovered, contradictory evidence at defendant\u2019s new sentencing proceeding. See Adams, 347 N.C. at 56-58, 490 S.E.2d at 224-25. At defendant\u2019s new sentencing proceeding, the State properly produced evidence that defendant had twice assaulted his wife. This evidence tends to contradict the prior stipulation. Because the evidence regarding the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance was not uncontroverted at defendant\u2019s new sentencing proceeding, the trial court properly refused to peremptorily instruct the jury on the existence of this mitigator.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in its jury instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances by failing to require the jury to make separate findings as to whether those mitigating circumstances existed and whether they had mitigating value. In support of this contention, defendant explains that the allegedly erroneous instruction precludes this Court\u2019s review of his argument that the jury acted arbitrarily in rejecting nonstatutory mitigating circumstances supported by the evidence.\nThe trial court instructed the jury as follows:\nIf one or more of you finds by a preponderance of the evidence that this circumstance exists and also is deemed mitigating, you would so indicate by having your foreperson write \u201cyes\u201d in the space provided after this mitigating circumstance on this Issues and Recommendations form. Now, if none of you finds the circumstance to exist or if none of you deem it to have mitigating value, you would so indicate by having your foreperson write \u201cno\u201d in that space.\nThe trial court gave these instructions in substantially the same form for all of the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted.\nWe have consistently upheld nearly identical instructions on non-statutory mitigating circumstances, see, e.g., State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 117, 443 S.E.2d 306, 325 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995), and \u201c[w]e presume \u2018that jurors . . . attend closely the particular language of the trial court\u2019s instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them,\u2019 \u201d State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 618, 430 S.E.2d 188, 208 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 360 n.9 (1985)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028, 126 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1993). Nonstatutory mitigating circumstances do not have mitigating value as a matter of law, and although there may be substantial evidence to support the proffered mitigating circumstances, a jury\u2019s failure to find that the circumstances have mitigating value does not render its sentencing recommendation arbitrary and require that it be set aside. State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 292, 439 S.E.2d 547, 572, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994).\nHere, pursuant to Robinson, the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding each nonstatutory mitigating circumstance, and under Jennings we presume that the jury followed the instructions. Thus, pursuant to the trial court\u2019s instructions, we presume that in instances in which evidence supported the existence of a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance, the jury rejected the circumstance because it determined that the circumstance did not have mitigating value. Because nonstatutory mitigators do not have mitigating value as a matter of law, the jury may properly reject a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that exists. Id. This does not render the jury\u2019s sentencing recommendation arbitrary, and it does not hinder this Court\u2019s review of that recommendation. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting into evidence a videotape of the victim, filmed forty-nine days prior to her death, and testimony about defendant\u2019s prior treatment of the victim. Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to properly perform the balancing test required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403, and that this evidence was inadmissible because it possessed little probative value, created a great danger of prejudice, and served merely to inflame the passions of the jury.\nThe Rules of Evidence do not apply in sentencing proceedings. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 1101(b)(3) (1992). Any evidence the court \u201cdeems relevant to sentence\u201d may be introduced at this stage. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(a)(3). The State \u201cmust be permitted to present any competent, relevant evidence . . . which will substantially support the imposition of the death penalty.\u201d State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 61, 337 S.E.2d 808, 824 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 90 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988). Thus, trial courts are not required to perform the Rule 403 balancing test during a sentencing proceeding. Daughtry, 340 N.C. at 517-18, 459 S.E.2d at 762.\n\u201cWhether the use of photographic evidence ... is more probative than prejudicial [is a] matter[] generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court.\u201d State v. Harden, 344 N.C. 542, 559, 476 S.E.2d 658, 666 (1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 137 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1997). \u201c \u2018[W]e have repeatedly held that showing photographs of victims made during their lives is not prejudicial error.\u2019 \u201d State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 388, 488 S.E.2d 769, 781 (1997) (quoting State v. Norwood, 344 N.C. 511, 532, 476 S.E.2d 349, 358 (1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 137 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1997)). Likewise, the trial court may, in its discretion, admit evidence of the defendant\u2019s prior conduct toward the victim because prior physical mistreatment or malicious behavior by a defendant toward a homicide victim is relevant to prove malice, ill will, intent, and premeditation and deliberation. State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 229, 461 S.E.2d 687, 703 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996).\nHere, the trial court determined that the videotape depicting the two-year-old, thirty-pound victim forty-nine days prior to her death was \u201cprobative of the State\u2019s case to show [the victim\u2019s] vulnerability and ... to show why it would be heinous, atrocious or cruel\u201d for a man as large and powerful as defendant to murder her with his hands while she was in his care. The court recognized \u201cthe fact that [the videotape] is prejudicial,\u201d but it also noted that \u201cjust the mere fact of a young two year old child being murdered, of course, is prejudicial.\u201d Ultimately, the court concluded that \u201cit\u2019s not unfairly prejudicial in [sic] a probative value, I would think, would fair [sic] exceed and outweigh any prejudicial effect.\u201d The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence after thorough consideration of its probative value. See Bishop, 346 N.C. at 388, 488 S.E.2d at 780.\nThe trial court also admitted testimony of Felicia Carle about her observations of defendant\u2019s prior treatment of the victim. Carle testified that she once saw the victim start to cry as defendant approached her and that she once witnessed defendant say he would rather play basketball than watch the victim on an evening when the victim\u2019s mother was going to a concert. Defendant neither moved in limine to exclude this testimony nor objected to it. Defendant thus failed to properly preserve his right to appellate review. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Because this issue was not preserved for appeal, we may review it only for plain error. State v. Allen, 339 N.C. 545, 555, 453 S.E.2d 150, 155 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, -U.S. -, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997). Defendant also waived plain error review by failing to allege in his assignment of error that the trial court committed plain error. N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4); State v. Truesdale, 340 N.C. 229, 232-33, 456 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1995). This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn defendant\u2019s final assignments of error, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in a number of its rulings regarding various prosecutorial statements, questions, and arguments, and in its denial of defendant\u2019s requests for peremptory instructions regarding three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in overruling objections to three similar statements by the prosecutor during jury selection. The prosecutor stated to one prospective juror, \u201cI understand that it takes a lot of courage to vote for the death penalty in a case.\u201d He similarly stated to another, \u201cLet me assure you that the State of North Carolina understands what we\u2019re asking you to do and we understand it takes a lot of courage.\u201d The prosecutor also asked another, \u201cYou feel like you have the courage to be able to vote for the death penalty in a particular case?\u201d\nTrial judges do not abuse their discretion by allowing prosecutors to ask jurors whether they have the \u201cbackbone\u201d to impose the death penalty, State v. Hinson, 310 N.C. 245, 252, 311 S.E.2d 256, 261, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839, 83 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1984), or whether they are \u201cstrong enough to recommend the death penalty,\u201d State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 130, 400 S.E.2d 712, 729 (1991). Thus, the trial court properly overruled defendant\u2019s objections to each of the identified comments about prospective jurors\u2019 \u201ccourage\u201d or ability to impose the death penalty.\nDefendant next complains of questions the prosecutor asked of a defense witness about defendant\u2019s testimony in his first trial. Defendant contends that these questions drew attention to the fact that defendant did not testify in the new sentencing proceeding, thus violating defendant\u2019s Fifth Amendment rights. The prosecutor asked a defense witness, \u201cBut you heard his testimony last time, did you not?\u201d The witness answered that he had heard defendant\u2019s prior testimony, and the prosecutor then asked, \u201cAnd he testified [that the victim] fell from a chair, didn\u2019t he?\u201d Defendant did not object to either of these questions about defendant\u2019s prior testimony. Later, defendant objected to questions about the impression such testimony left with the jury. The trial court ultimately sustained defendant\u2019s objection to questions about the first jury\u2019s impression of defendant\u2019s prior testimony. Defendant never raised a constitutional issue before the trial court stemming from any questioning regarding defendant\u2019s prior testimony.\nIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented the trial court with a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought if the specific grounds are not apparent. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Defendant did not object at trial to the questions he complains of here, and he thus failed to properly preserve this issue for our review. Because this issue was not preserved, we may review it only for plain error. Allen, 339 N.C. at 555, 453 S.E.2d at 155. However, defendant also waived plain-error review by failing to allege in his assignment of error that the trial court committed plain error. N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4); Truesdale, 340 N.C. at 232-33, 456 S.E.2d at 301. Defendant further waived review of any constitutional issue by failing to raise a constitutional issue at the sentencing proceeding. State v. Elliott, 344 N.C. 242, 277, 475 S.E.2d 202, 218 (1996), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 137 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1997). Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant also complains that the trial court erred in failing to sustain defendant\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s characterization of defendant\u2019s demeanor at trial as \u201csniveling.\u201d A prosecutor may properly comment on a defendant\u2019s demeanor displayed throughout the trial. State v. Price, 326 N.C. 56, 85, 388 S.E.2d 84, 100, sentence vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 802, 112 L. Ed. 2d 7 (1990). Remarks relating to a defendant\u2019s demeanor are permissible because the defendant\u2019s demeanor is \u201cbefore the jury at all times.\u201d State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 680, 263 S.E.2d 768, 774 (1980). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s remark.\nDefendant next complains that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s requests for peremptory instructions on the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) that defendant was kind and considerate to others, (2) that defendant assisted the emergency medical technicians, and (3) that defendant loved his stepdaughter. A defendant is not entitled to a peremptory instruction when the evidence supporting a mitigating circumstance is controverted. Womble, 343 N.C. at 683, 473 S.E.2d at 300. Although some evidence suggested that defendant was kind and considerate toward others, other evidence showed that defendant assaulted his wife twice, became angry with his stepdaughter easily, and scared his stepdaughter. Although defendant called 911 and directed the emergency medical technicians to his injured stepdaughter, defendant also failed to tell the technicians that the victim suffered from injuries around her abdomen as a result of his punches. Because defendant failed to provide full information to the emergency medical technicians, they initially treated the victim for head and spinal injuries rather than for the internal bleeding that ultimately caused her death. A jury could reasonably conclude that defendant\u2019s failure to provide full information to the emergency medical technicians hindered, rather than assisted, the technicians in identifying and treating the victim\u2019s fatal injuries. Finally, a jury could reasonably conclude that the evidence regarding defendant\u2019s brutal and fatal beating of his stepdaughter reflected a lack of love for her. Thus, in each instance in which the trial court denied defendant\u2019s request for a peremptory instruction on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, the evidence was controverted, and the trial court acted properly under Womble in denying the request.\nWe now turn to our duty to ascertain: (1) whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances found by the jury; (2) whether the sentence was entered under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary consideration; and (3) whether the sentence is \u201cexcessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2).\nThe jury found the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance that defendant\u2019s murder of his stepdaughter was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9). The record fully supports the jury\u2019s finding of this aggravating circumstance, and we find no indication that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary consideration. We therefore turn to our final duty of proportionality review.\nOne purpose of proportionality review is to \u201celiminate the possibility that a sentence of death was imposed by the action of an aberrant jury.\u201d Lee, 335 N.C. at 294, 439 S.E.2d at 573. Another is to guard \u201cagainst the capricious or random imposition of the death penalty.\u201d State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 354, 259 S.E.2d 510, 544 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1980). In proportionality review, it is proper to compare the present case with other cases in which this Court has concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate. State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 162 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994). We have found the death penalty disproportionate in seven cases: State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Gaines, 345 N.C. at 647, 483 S.E.2d at 396, and Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 570, 364 S.E.2d at 373; State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); and State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983). This case is distinguishable from each of those cases.\nDefendant contends that his effort to assist the victim by calling 911 renders his death sentence disproportionate. Although defendant does not direct us to any authority to support this assertion, we recognize that we have considered evidence of a defendant\u2019s remorse for his action as important in proportionality review. In Bondurant, 309 N.C. at 694, 309 S.E.2d at 182, we stated that \u201c[w]e deem it important in amelioration of defendant\u2019s senseless act that immediately after he shot the victim, he exhibited a concern for [the victim\u2019s] life and remorse for his action by directing the driver of the automobile to the hospital.\u201d The defendant in Bondurant exhibited his remorse as he \u201creadily spoke with policemen at the hospital, confessing that he fired the shot which killed [the victim].\u201d Id. at 694, 309 S.E.2d at 183.\nDefendant here did not exhibit the kind of conduct we recognized as ameliorating in Bondurant. Defendant failed to direct the medical personnel to the victim\u2019s fatal injuries and left those injuries concealed beneath her clothing. Further, defendant misled the medical personnel about the victim\u2019s injuries, telling them that the victim fell from a chair. Thus, although the defendant called 911, he failed to exhibit sufficient remorse to ameliorate his murder of his stepdaughter as did the defendant in Bondurant.\nThe present case is more similar to cases in which we have found the sentence of death proportionate than to those in which we have found it disproportionate. See, e.g., Burr, 341 N.C. at 315, 461 S.E.2d at 631 (concluding that the death penalty was.proportionate in a case in which an infant was shaken and beaten to death by the mother\u2019s boyfriend).\nAfter comparing this case to similar cases as to the crime and the defendant, we cannot conclude that this death sentence is excessive or disproportionate. Defendant received a fair capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court must be and is left undisturbed.\nNO ERROR.\nJustice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William P. Hart, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "White and Crumpler, by David B. Freedman, Dudley A. Witt, and Fred G. Crumpler, Jr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMUEL R. FLIPPEN\nNo. 178A95-2\n(Filed 6 November 1998)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 1398 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 prior death sentence reversed \u2014 new sentencing hearing rather than life imprisonment \u2014 no error\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court was not required to overturn a death sentence and impose a sentence of life imprisonment where the Court in the previous appeal had remanded the case under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(3) for error in the instructions and had not reached the question of arbitrariness under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2).\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 1370 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 particularly heinous, atrocious or cruel \u2014 death of child\nThe trial court did not err in a capital resentencing hearing by submitting the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance where defendant contended that allowing the submission of the circumstance creates a new statutory aggravating circumstance for all cases in which the homicide victim is a child. In this case, ample evidence demonstrated that defendant had a parental relationship with the victim; the victim was only two years and four months old and was particularly vulnerable and at defendant\u2019s mercy; and defendant inflicted numerous blows upon her head, neck and abdomen resulting in injuries which went beyond what would have been necessary to kill her.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 693 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital resentencing\u2014 mitigating circumstance \u2014 no significant history of prior criminal activity \u2014 no peremptory instruction\nThe trial court did not err in a capital resentencing by failing to give a mandatory peremptory instruction on the statutory mitigating circumstance that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity where the State and defendant had stipulated in the first trial that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. A prior stipulation or concession regarding capital sentencing circumstances does not limit the parties\u2019 presentation of evidence when relevant evidence contradicts that prior stipulation. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(l).\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 1392 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 nonstatutory mitigating circumstances \u2014 instructions\nThe trial court did not err in a capital resentencing by failing to require the jury to make separate findings as to whether non-statutory mitigating circumstances existed and whether they had mitigating value. The trial court properly instructed the jury regarding each nonstatutory mitigating circumstance pursuant to State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, and it is presumed under State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, that the jury followed the instructions. The jury\u2019s rejection of a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that exists does not render the sentencing recommendation arbitrary and does not hinder appellate review of the recommendation.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 1343 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital resentencing \u2014 two-year-old victim \u2014 videotape\u2014admissible\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital re-sentencing for the murder of a child by admitting into evidence a videotape of the victim. The rules of evidence do not apply in sentencing proceedings although the trial court here admitted the evidence after a thorough consideration of its probative value.\n6. Appeal and Error \u00a7 147 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital resentencing\u2014 defendant\u2019s prior treatment of victim \u2014 reviewable only for plain error \u2014 plain error review waived\nDefendant in a capital resentencing waived review of whether the court erred by admitting testimony regarding defendant\u2019s prior treatment of the child victim where defendant neither moved in limine to exclude this testimony nor objected to it, so that the issue was reviewable only for plain error, and defendant also waived plain error review by failing to allege in his assignment of error that the trial court committed plain error.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 448 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital resentencing\u2014 jury selection \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s statement \u2014 courage required to vote for death penalty\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital resentencing by allowing the prosecutor to refer during jury selection to the courage required to vote for the death penalty.\n8. Appeal and Error \u00a7 147 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital resentencing\u2014 question about defendant\u2019s testimony in first trial \u2014 no objection \u2014 no assignment of error \u2014 constitutional issue not raised at sentencing\nAn assignment of error in a capital resentencing to a question about defendant\u2019s testimony in his first trial was not properly preserved for appellate review where defendant did not object at trial, waived plain error review by failing to allege in his assignment of error that the trial court committed plain error, and further waived review of any constitutional issue by failing to raise it at the sentencing proceeding.\n9. Criminal Law \u00a7 439 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital resentencing\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s characterization of defendant\u2019s demeanor\u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital resentencing by failing to sustain defendant\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s characterization of defendant\u2019s demeanor at trial as \u201csniveling.\u201d Remarks relating to a defendant\u2019s demeanor are permissible because the defendant\u2019s demeanor is before the jury at all times.\n10. Criminal Law \u00a7 690 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital resentencing\u2014 peremptory instructions denied \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in a capital resentencing by denying defendant\u2019s request for peremptory instructions on the non-statutory mitigating circumstances that defendant was kind and considerate to others, that defendant assisted the emergency medical technicians, and that defendant loved his stepdaughter, the victim. The evidence was controverted in each instance in which the trial court denied defendant\u2019s request and the trial court acted properly in denying the request.\n11. Criminal Law \u00a7 1402 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 death sentence \u2014 supported by evidence \u2014 not entered under influence of passion, or prejudice \u2014 not disproportionate\nThe evidence in a capital resentencing in which the jury returned a death sentence fully supported the aggravating circumstance found by the jury, and there was no indication that the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary consideration.\n12. Criminal Law \u00a7 1402 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 death sentence \u2014 not disproportionate\nA sentence of death for the beating death of a two-year-old child by her stepfather was not disproportionate where defendant contended that his effort to assist the victim by calling 911 rendered the death sentence disproportionate, but he failed to direct the medical personnel to the victim\u2019s fatal injuries, left those injuries concealed beneath her clothing, and misled the medical personnel about her injuries. This case is more similar to cases in which the sentence of death was found proportionate to those in which it was found disproportionate.\nJustice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAppeal of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Greeson, J., on 23 May 1997 in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Supreme Court 28 September 1998.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William P. Hart, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nWhite and Crumpler, by David B. Freedman, Dudley A. Witt, and Fred G. Crumpler, Jr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0264-01", "first_page_order": 302, "last_page_order": 317 }