{ "id": 571557, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MIKELSON JOSHUA LaPLANCHE a/k/a MICHAEL J. WILLIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. LaPlanche", "decision_date": "1998-11-06", "docket_number": "No. 582A97", "first_page": "279", "last_page": "284", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "349 N.C. 279" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4767890 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694299 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796005 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 870", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 1128", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 325954, 324515, 323364, 327749, 326471, 327816, 326759, 326698, 324652, 326392, 327445, 324215, 326872, 327964 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/1128-09", "/us/516/1128-12", "/us/516/1128-05", "/us/516/1128-07", "/us/516/1128-03", "/us/516/1128-10", "/us/516/1128-04", "/us/516/1128-14", "/us/516/1128-08", "/us/516/1128-11", "/us/516/1128-06", "/us/516/1128-01", "/us/516/1128-02", "/us/516/1128-13" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793227 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4688200 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307937 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 738", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182629 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0738-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 565, "char_count": 12630, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5057168826074033e-07, "percentile": 0.8099860262123391 }, "sha256": "67b25db00334c1d081400dcff8f5b25c01af0a67405f67c6d1ba3d7e6240519b", "simhash": "1:8f7afb22f6e68c5a", "word_count": 2019 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:15:14.712587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MIKELSON JOSHUA LaPLANCHE a/k/a MICHAEL J. WILLIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nOn 7 March 1994, defendant was indicted for the murders of Gail Ann Brown and Curtis Melvin Brice. The two cases were joined for trial. In a capital trial, defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder for the killing of Mr. Brice and second-degree murder for the killing of Ms. Brown. In a capital sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000, the jury recommended and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction. Defendant was also sentenced to forty-nine years\u2019 imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction. Defendant appeals from both convictions.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant shot both victims multiple times at close range with a .380 Browning semiautomatic handgun. Defendant authorized his trial attorneys to concede that he was guilty of second-degree murder, but to argue that his actions were not premeditated or deliberate. Defendant did not present any evidence and did not testify at the guilt phase of his trial, and he did not testify at his capital sentencing proceeding.\nDefendant\u2019s appellate counsel, in his brief filed with this Court, states that, \u201cafter a conscientious examination of this case, [counsel] has been unable to identify an issue with sufficient merit to support a meaningful argument for relief on appeal.\u201d However, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), State v. Noble, 326 N.C. 581, 391 S.E.2d 168 (1990), and State v. Kinch, 314 N.C. 99, 331 S.E.2d 665 (1985), defense counsel discusses five possible assignments of error \u201cthat might arguably support the appeal.\u201d He also states that he believes the appeal to be \u201cwholly frivolous,\u201d but requests that the Court review the record to determine whether there is any prejudicial error. Defendant\u2019s attorney has sent a copy of his brief, the record, and the trial transcript to defendant and has advised defendant that he may independently file written arguments with this Court. Defendant has not submitted a brief. We conclude that defendant\u2019s appellate counsel has fully complied with Anders.\nWe have examined the five assignments of error in the record, and we agree with defendant\u2019s attorney that an appeal based upon them is wholly frivolous. The first assignment of error addresses the trial court\u2019s failure to impose sanctions on the State for a purported violation of discovery rules. Defendant argued at trial that the State should prohibit the testimony of a witness, Steve Griffin, because the State failed to inform the defense, until jury selection began, that Griffin had given a statement to police concerning what he saw the night of the shootings. Defendant contended that Griffin\u2019s statement might constitute exculpatory material which the State was obligated to disclose pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).\nThe trial court ordered the State to prepare any and all statements of Griffin and give them to the defense at the time Griffin testified, and the State ultimately provided defendant a copy of the interview materials prior to Griffin\u2019s testimony. At trial, defendant conceded that the State had complied with discovery requirements and that he had a reasonable time to review the materials. The record demonstrates that there was no intent on the part of the State to withhold Griffin\u2019s statements from defendant. The trial court took prompt action to ensure that the statements were provided to defendant. Any information favorable to defendant was fully revealed in sufficient time for him to prepare his case. For these reasons, there was no basis for the imposition of sanctions.\nThe second assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the State to call Steve Griffin and have him testify before the jury when in fact the witness was not \u201cSteve Griffin,\u201d but rather \u201cGaspard Mureau.\u201d A defendant is entitled to a new trial when the State knowingly and intentionally uses testimony which is both false and material in order to obtain a conviction. State v. Williams, 341 N.C. 1, 16, 459 S.E.2d 208, 217 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128, 133 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1996). In this case, there is no evidence in the record that the prosecutor knew that, the witness was known by any name other than Steve Griffin. Further, the identity of the witness was not material to the case. After a complete examination of the evidence presented, we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the fact that this witness may have been testifying under a false name could have affected the judgment of the jury.\nThe third assignment of error challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the charge of first-degree murder. Defendant admitted to the second-degree murder of Gail Brown and Curtis Brice. Thus, the only element at issue was whether defendant committed the murders with premeditation and deliberation. Substantial evidence tended to establish that Mr. Brice was killed minutes after defendant killed Ms. Brown, that Mr. Brice was unarmed and hiding in a closet when he was shot, and that he sustained four gunshot wounds to the forehead fired at close range. When all the evidence in the record is considered in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable inference of premeditation and deliberation could be drawn from the circumstances; thus, the trial court did not err in submitting the charge of first-degree murder. See State v. Gibson, 342 N.C. 142, 150, 463 S.E.2d 193, 198-99 (1995).\nThe next assignment of error is that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence, over defendant\u2019s objection, photographs of the victims and by allowing the jury to view the photographs repeatedly. \u201cWhether the use of photographic evidence is more probative than prejudicial and what constitutes an excessive number of photographs in the light of the illustrative value of each likewise lies within the discretion of the trial court.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988). A careful examination of the record reveals that the State presented a limited number of photographs of the victims; that the photographs were used to illustrate the testimony of witnesses; and that the trial court conducted a thorough review of the photographs and witnesses, outside the presence of the jury, prior to allowing the photographs to be admitted into evidence. The trial court concluded that the photographs were relevant and that their probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. Further, there is no indication that the jury viewed the photographs \u201crepeatedly.\u201d There is no meaningful argument on this record that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting these photographs into evidence or that their admission deprived defendant of a fair trial.\nThe final assignment of error is that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to serve forty-nine years\u2019 imprisonment for second-degree murder, that sentence to commence at the expiration of an unrelated twenty-year sentence then being served by defendant, and to life imprisonment for first-degree murder, that sentence to commence at the expiration of the forty-nine-year sentence for second-degree murder. This assignment of error also charges that the consecutive sentencing was disproportionate when compared with that of similarly situated defendants. It is undisputed that the trial court has express authority under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1354(a) to impose consecutive sentences. See State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 697, 343 S.E.2d 828, 847 (1986). Additionally, \u201c[o]nly in exceedingly unusual non-capital cases will the sentences imposed be so grossly disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment\u2019s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.\u201d State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 786, 309 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1983). We conclude there is no meritorious argument that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive terms or that, based on the facts of this case, the consecutive sentences violated any constitutional requirement of proportionality.\nIn accordance with our duty under Anders, we have conducted a thorough review of the record, the transcript, and the brief filed by defendant\u2019s appellate counsel. We find no error warranting reversal of defendant\u2019s convictions or modification of his sentences. We find the appeal to be wholly frivolous.\nNO ERROR.\nJustice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Teresa L. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Thomas H. Eagen for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MIKELSON JOSHUA LaPLANCHE a/k/a MICHAEL J. WILLIS\nNo. 582A97\n(Filed 6 November 1998)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 111 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 Anders appeal\u2014 State\u2019s failure to inform defense of witness statement \u2014 no error\nThere was no error in an appeal from a first- and second-degree murder conviction on an Anders brief from the trial court\u2019s failure to impose sanctions for the State\u2019s failure to inform the defense until jury selection began that a witness had given a statement to police concerning what he saw the night of the shootings. The record demonstrates that there was no intent on the part of the State to withhold the statements, the trial court took prompt action to insure that the statements were provided to defendant, and any information favorable to defendant was fully revealed in sufficient time for him to prepare his case.\n2. Constitutional Law \u00a7 164 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 Anders brief \u2014 State\u2019s unknowing use of false evidence \u2014 no error\nThere was no prejudicial error in a murder prosecution appealed with an Anders brief where defendant contended that the State knowingly called a witness under a false name. There was no evidence that the prosecutor knew that the witness was known by any other name, the identity of the witness was not material to the case, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the fact that the witness was testifying under a false name could have affected the judgment of the jury.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 253 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn a first-degree murder prosecution appealed with an Anders brief, a reasonable inference of premeditation and deliberation could be drawn from substantial evidence that the second victim was killed minutes after defendant killed the first, that the second victim was unarmed and hiding in a closet when he was shot, and that he sustained four gunshot wounds to the forehead at close range.\n4. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1693 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 photographs of victim \u2014 admissible\nThere was no error in a murder prosecution appealed on an Anders brief where defendant objected to introduction of photographs of the victims. The State presented a limited number of photographs, the photographs were used to illustrate the testimony of witnesses, the trial court conducted a thorough review of the photographs and witnesses outside the presence of the jury and concluded that the photographs were relevant and that their probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice, and there is no indication that the jury viewed the photographs repeatedly.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 1034 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 first- and second-degree murder \u2014 consecutive sentences \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThere was no abuse of discretion in a murder prosecution appealed on an Anders brief where the court sentenced defendant to serve forty-nine years for second-degree murder, commencing at the expiration of an unrelated twenty-year sentence then being served, and to life imprisonment for first-degree murder, that sentence to commence at the expiration of the forty-nine-year sentence. It is undisputed that the trial court has express authority under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1354(a) to impose consecutive sentences and there is no meritorious argument that the consecutive sentences violated any constitutional requirement of proportionality.\nJustice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Allen (J.B., Jr.), J., on 25 August 1995, in Superior Court, Wake County, upon a jury verdict of first-degree murder. Defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to an additional judgment imposed for second-degree murder was allowed 30 June 1998. Calendared in the Supreme Court 30 September 1998; determined on the briefs without oral argument pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 30(d) upon motion of the parties.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Teresa L. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nThomas H. Eagen for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0279-01", "first_page_order": 317, "last_page_order": 322 }