{ "id": 571512, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRENCE DION BOWMAN a/k/a TERRENCE TAYLOR", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bowman", "decision_date": "1998-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 142A97", "first_page": "459", "last_page": "483", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "349 N.C. 459" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "396 U.S. 346", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11334148 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/396/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 357", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11330305 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1046", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1331682, 1330979, 1331428, 1330819, 1331686, 1330634, 1331292, 1333776, 1330385, 1332081, 1334228, 1333815, 1334715, 1335068 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1046-03", "/us/513/1046-07", "/us/513/1046-13", "/us/513/1046-06", "/us/513/1046-05", "/us/513/1046-11", "/us/513/1046-14", "/us/513/1046-12", "/us/513/1046-04", "/us/513/1046-08", "/us/513/1046-09", "/us/513/1046-10", "/us/513/1046-01", "/us/513/1046-02" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1332513, 1333762, 1333317, 1330854, 1331561, 1332010, 1333466, 1335833, 1334928, 1334225, 1331538, 1335700, 1335894, 1330809, 1330874, 1331419 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1135-09", "/us/513/1135-05", "/us/513/1135-08", "/us/513/1135-03", "/us/513/1135-15", "/us/513/1135-14", "/us/513/1135-04", "/us/513/1135-02", "/us/513/1135-12", "/us/513/1135-07", "/us/513/1135-11", "/us/513/1135-10", "/us/513/1135-16", "/us/513/1135-06", "/us/513/1135-01", "/us/513/1135-13" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1159", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1331456, 1334498, 1332549, 1332346, 1331241, 1331178, 1330858, 1330956, 1330509, 1334698, 1335770, 1335257, 1330522, 1333467, 1333725, 1332958 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1159-10", "/us/513/1159-14", "/us/513/1159-12", "/us/513/1159-13", "/us/513/1159-07", "/us/513/1159-09", "/us/513/1159-04", "/us/513/1159-06", "/us/513/1159-16", "/us/513/1159-01", "/us/513/1159-05", "/us/513/1159-15", "/us/513/1159-03", "/us/513/1159-08", "/us/513/1159-02", "/us/513/1159-11" ] }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 884", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 324545, 324386, 328131, 327332, 323172, 326430, 327472, 327185, 324946, 328048, 326327, 324376, 328606, 328191 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0884-13", "/us/516/0884-01", "/us/516/0884-11", "/us/516/0884-10", "/us/516/0884-03", "/us/516/0884-09", "/us/516/0884-12", "/us/516/0884-04", "/us/516/0884-06", "/us/516/0884-07", "/us/516/0884-14", "/us/516/0884-08", "/us/516/0884-05", "/us/516/0884-02" ] }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 1114", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1340160, 1338968, 1339820, 1338605, 1338862, 1339759, 1339856, 1339153, 1340367, 1339762, 1339692, 1339416, 1339802, 1340187 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/1114-07", "/us/514/1114-12", "/us/514/1114-01", "/us/514/1114-02", "/us/514/1114-13", "/us/514/1114-04", "/us/514/1114-08", "/us/514/1114-10", "/us/514/1114-06", "/us/514/1114-11", "/us/514/1114-03", "/us/514/1114-09", "/us/514/1114-14", "/us/514/1114-05" ] }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 1158", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11683648, 11683584, 11683687, 11683367, 11683431, 11683818, 11683405, 11683341, 11683474, 11683733, 11683509, 11683612, 11683549, 11683775 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/1158-10", "/us/520/1158-08", "/us/520/1158-11", "/us/520/1158-02", "/us/520/1158-04", "/us/520/1158-14", "/us/520/1158-03", "/us/520/1158-01", "/us/520/1158-05", "/us/520/1158-12", "/us/520/1158-06", "/us/520/1158-09", "/us/520/1158-07", "/us/520/1158-13" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 1110", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11756257, 11756327, 11756009, 11756202, 11756747, 11756683, 11756111, 11755921, 11756403, 11756051, 11756532, 11756471, 11756158, 11756607 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/1110-07", "/us/517/1110-08", "/us/517/1110-02", "/us/517/1110-06", "/us/517/1110-14", "/us/517/1110-13", "/us/517/1110-04", "/us/517/1110-01", "/us/517/1110-09", "/us/517/1110-03", "/us/517/1110-11", "/us/517/1110-10", "/us/517/1110-05", "/us/517/1110-12" ] }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 893", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 325057, 328452, 324549, 327430, 324717, 328655, 327673, 325041, 328529, 327195, 323769, 324925, 323037, 325854 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0893-08", "/us/516/0893-04", "/us/516/0893-06", "/us/516/0893-11", "/us/516/0893-02", "/us/516/0893-03", "/us/516/0893-13", "/us/516/0893-09", "/us/516/0893-07", "/us/516/0893-14", "/us/516/0893-05", "/us/516/0893-01", "/us/516/0893-12", "/us/516/0893-10" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538239 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550074 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 1083", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550101 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1023", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4836, 5158, 4882, 5207, 5176 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1023-04", "/us/494/1023-03", "/us/494/1023-05", "/us/494/1023-02", "/us/494/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492599 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793165 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763650 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761257 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686205 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4758195 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569559 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53878 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694780 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741422 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 1254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39539 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/1254-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530367 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" }, { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 L. Ed. 2d 1137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 907", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787596, 1787636, 1787637, 1787575, 1787641, 1787643 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0907-04", "/us/448/0907-02", "/us/448/0907-06", "/us/448/0907-01", "/us/448/0907-05", "/us/448/0907-03" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572332 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 891", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1333729, 1331544, 1333350, 1333959, 1332299, 1334700, 1330702, 1330417, 1331764, 1333716, 1332246, 1335543, 1335832, 1330525, 1331358, 1335743 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/0891-09", "/us/513/0891-11", "/us/513/0891-13", "/us/513/0891-10", "/us/513/0891-07", "/us/513/0891-06", "/us/513/0891-15", "/us/513/0891-16", "/us/513/0891-08", "/us/513/0891-01", "/us/513/0891-14", "/us/513/0891-04", "/us/513/0891-12", "/us/513/0891-05", "/us/513/0891-02", "/us/513/0891-03" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530932 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 818", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "492 S.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551315 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446-47" }, { "page": "446-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 U.S. 586", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1769215 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" }, { "page": "990" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/438/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 L. Ed. 2d 1022", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850" }, { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2557546 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 528, 453 S.E.2d 824, 850, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995)" }, { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54098 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 528, 453 S.E.2d 824, 850, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995)" }, { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 L. Ed. 2d 860", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552845 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 808", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108176 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" }, { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546948 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993)" }, { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529092 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993)" }, { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53918 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 L. Ed. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "499 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" }, { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659874 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" }, { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1147397 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "596-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/511/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139592 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566320 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 659, 157 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2534822 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 659, 157 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139483 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" }, { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 L. Ed. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "450 U.S. 1025", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6384011, 6384236, 6384379 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/450/1025-01", "/us/450/1025-02", "/us/450/1025-03" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565925 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867541 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 L. Ed. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573188 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Calloway, 305 N.C. 747, 754, 291 S.E.2d 622, 627 (1982)" }, { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867652 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537-38", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Calloway, 305 N.C. 747, 754, 291 S.E.2d 622, 627 (1982)" }, { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793083 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 383, 462 S.E.2d 25, 35 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110, 134 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551222 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 383, 462 S.E.2d 25, 35 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110, 134 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571537 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2557266 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 L. Ed. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498038 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 247, 415 S.E.2d 726, 731 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551271 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 247, 415 S.E.2d 726, 731 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 412", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959771 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" }, { "page": "851-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 229", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6175698 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806", "parenthetical": "quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597, 607 (1976)" }, { "page": "806" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574128 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597, 607 (1976)" }, { "page": "130-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 U.S. 522", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176665 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/419/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 U.S. 404", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171091 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" }, { "page": "110-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567885 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307778 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 U.S. 346", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11334148 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" }, { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/396/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 357", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11330305 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0357-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1770, "char_count": 56634, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9083862940510808e-07, "percentile": 0.7313876214404778 }, "sha256": "05632608a1da0826dacc1037ab2739b3ec983236011e75287500240336bd4d94", "simhash": "1:076bd03abe0ebd74", "word_count": 9259 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:15:14.712587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRENCE DION BOWMAN a/k/a TERRENCE TAYLOR" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LAKE, Justice.\nThe defendant was indicted on 20 May 1996 for two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant was tried capitally to a jury at the 3 February 1997 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Lenoir County, the Honorable Louis B. Meyer presiding. The jury found defendant guilty of both counts of first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation. Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended sentences of death as to each murder conviction. On 18 February 1997, the trial court sentenced defendant to two separate sentences of death, one for each of the two convictions for first-degree murder.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that Venice Taylor, a first cousin of defendant\u2019s, knew that Antoinette Gilchrist had been selling marijuana for defendant for approximately six months prior to the murders. Venice Taylor stated that he was at his uncle Charles Taylor\u2019s home in the Simon Bright Apartments about one week before the murders, which occurred on 13 January 1996. Defendant, who shared the apartment with Charles Taylor, was also in the apartment at this time. Venice Taylor overheard defendant talking on the phone with Gilchrist. Defendant was discussing how some \u201cweed\u201d was stolen from Gilchrist, and defendant told Gilchrist to show him who took it. Following this phone conversation, defendant stated that whoever had stolen his marijuana was going to get his \u201csh\u2014 pushed back.\u201d Venice Taylor (hereinafter \u201cTaylor\u201d) testified that he understood this phrase to mean that defendant was going to shoot someone in the head. Defendant then left to go to Gilchrist\u2019s house.\nThe next morning, Taylor again saw defendant at his uncle\u2019s apartment. Defendant told Taylor that he was going to return to New York. Defendant frequently traveled back and forth between New York and Kinston, but he resided in New York. While in Kinston, defendant stayed with either Charles Taylor or with Crystal Jones, who lived nearby. Defendant also kept a lot of marijuana at Gilchrist\u2019s house.\nOn 12 January 1996, approximately one week after Taylor last saw defendant, Taylor was at his uncle\u2019s home with his cousins, Johnny James and Chris Kent, and a \u201cdude\u201d from Maryland whom he did not know. It was close to 10:30 p.m., and they were all watching a basketball game on television. At that time, defendant and Bobby Jennings entered the apartment and sat down. Taylor, Jennings and defendant left the apartment to obtain beer, returned and then drove to a local nightclub called \u201cThe Vibe\u201d in James\u2019 Mercedes Benz. In the car, and before they arrived at The Vibe, defendant stated that \u201csomebody\u2019s going to get it tonight.\u201d\nInside the club, Clarence Jones approached Taylor and asked him for a cigarette. Approximately thirty minutes after they arrived at the club, Michael Cannon entered the club to find Taylor. Cannon took Taylor outside The Vibe, where Taylor observed defendant holding one of the victims, Michael Smith, by his coat collar. Defendant told Smith, \u201cI know you robbed me, so you\u2019ll pay for it.\u201d At the same time, defendant held a gun to Smith\u2019s back. Taylor grabbed defendant and pulled him away from Smith. Defendant then pointed the gun at the head of a man named Chad. Taylor and James grabbed defendant\u2019s hand because they thought he was going to shoot Chad. While this occurred, the two victims, Michael Smith and Clarence Jones, walked away from the club.\nWhen the Vibe closed for the night, James, Kent, Taylor, defendant and the \u201cdude\u201d from Maryland got back into the Mercedes Benz and proceeded to get something to eat. They rode to a take-out restaurant located next to K-town Taxi. After thirty minutes at the restaurant, they all rode to an area of Kinston known as \u201cGeorgetown.\u201d Once in Georgetown, they stopped at a house because James wanted to see his girlfriend. She was not there, but the house was filled with people playing pool and drinking alcohol. A fight began inside the house, and defendant participated in this fight. Immediately after the fight, Taylor, James, Kent, defendant and the \u201cdude\u201d from Maryland got back into the Mercedes Benz and drove away.\nAfter leaving the house in Georgetown, they drove to Crystal Jones\u2019 house for the second time that night. Taylor knew that defendant kept his cocaine and guns at Jones\u2019 house. Everyone waited inside the car while defendant entered Jones\u2019 house. After approximately ten minutes, defendant returned to the Mercedes Benz. They all rode in the car to Simon Bright Apartments. From the car, defendant saw the two victims, Michael Smith and Clarence Jones. Defendant got out of the car and walked over to Smith and Jones. It appeared to Taylor that defendant was speaking to Smith, but Taylor could not hear anything because the car windows were up. Approximately one minute after defendant left the car, defendant shot Smith. Defendant then shot Jones.\nDefendant got back into the car and told Taylor to \u201cforget them country boys. They should not have robbed me.\u201d At defendant\u2019s request, James drove the Mercedes Benz to Yashica Miller\u2019s house located in the Richard Green Apartments. On the way to Miller\u2019s apartment, Taylor repeatedly asked defendant why he had to do it, and defendant answered that the victims should not have robbed him. Defendant also stated that Smith and Jones \u201cgot it flatbush style in the head.\u201d\nOnce they arrived at Miller\u2019s house, everyone stayed inside the car except the defendant. Defendant entered the house and stayed approximately five to ten minutes. Defendant then got back into the Mercedes Benz. Taylor, James, Kent and the \u201cdude\u201d from Maryland were still in the car. They all drove to the Sheraton Inn. On the way to the Sheraton Inn, they drove over a bridge where defendant threw bullet shells out the car window. Defendant and Taylor were still arguing about the murders while riding to the Sheraton Inn.\nWhen they arrived at the Sheraton, everyone from the Mercedes Benz went inside. The five men shared two connecting rooms. Sometime after 12:00 p.m. the next day, defendant received a page on his beeper. Defendant called the Kinston Police Department and learned that the police had a warrant for him. When defendant told Taylor about the warrant, defendant laughed. Defendant then stated that since the police were coming, he needed to switch rooms. Defendant called the Comfort Inn, which was across the street from the Sheraton, and he inquired as to whether the Comfort Inn had any rooms available. Defendant sent the \u201cdude\u201d from Maryland over there and told James, Kent and Taylor not to say anything to the police. Approximately thirty minutes later, the police arrived.\nInitially, defendant tried to hide under the mattress when the police knocked on his motel room door. Defendant then changed his mind, answered the door and told the police his name was Eric Fludd. Both Taylor and defendant were taken to the police station and placed in custody. At this point, Taylor told the police everything defendant had done.\nAt trial, Yashica Miller testified that she was dating defendant in January 1996. She stated that defendant came to her house early on the morning of 13 January 1996. Defendant asked if he could leave a gun at her place. Defendant left after five or ten minutes. Later that same morning, the police stopped by Miller\u2019s house. They were looking for defendant, and they told Miller that defendant had been involved in a shooting. Miller did not tell the police about the gun; rather, she hid the gun inside a paper bag and placed the bag under a bush in a nearby park. Later, she called the police, told them the gun was in the park, went with the police to the park and retrieved the gun from where she had left it.\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to quash the jury venire based on an underrepresentation of African-American citizens in the jury pool. Defendant submitted a certified copy of the 1990 census for Lenoir County in support of his motion. The census indicated that Caucasians constituted 59.9% of the county\u2019s population, while African-Americans represented 39.17% of the population. However, the venire summoned for jury service contained 75% Caucasians and 23% African-Americans. Defendant argues in his brief that this resulted in a 16.17% absolute disparity between the percentage of African-Americans in the general population and their percentage in the venire.\nThe State disagrees with defendant\u2019s calculations. The State points out that in his challenge to the jury panel, defendant states that \u201c[t]he jurors summoned include 48 white males (37.5%), 49 white females (38.3%), 12 black males (9.4%) and 19 black females (14.8%).\u201d The State claims that this results in a jury pool made up of 24.2% African-Americans, and a disparity of 14.8%. Therefore, depending on whether the defendant\u2019s or the State\u2019s calculations are correct, the disparity between the number of African-Americans in the general population and their proportion in the venire is either 16.17% or 14.8%.\nOur state and federal Constitutions protect a criminal defendant\u2019s right to be tried by a jury of his peers. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.C. Const. art. I, \u00a7\u00a7 24, 26. This constitutional guarantee assures that members of a defendant\u2019s \u201cown race have not been systematically and arbitrarily excluded from the jury pool which is to decide [his] guilt or innocence.\u201d State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 718, 392 S.E.2d 78, 81 (1990). The United States Supreme Court has set forth a three-part test for determining whether a defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to a fair cross-section in the venire has been violated. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579, 587 (1979). In order to establish a prima facie case of disproportionate representation of a defendant\u2019s race in a venire, a defendant must show:\n(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a \u201cdistinctive\u201d group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.\nId. In its brief to this Court, the State does not dispute that the first prong of the Duren test for establishing a prima facie case of disproportionate representation has been satisfied. The issue is whether defendant has satisfied the second and third prongs of the test. For the following reasons, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish his prima facie case.\nThe second prong of the Duren test calls for a determination as to whether the representation of African-Americans in the venire is fair and reasonable. In State v. Price, 301 N.C. 437, 447, 272 S.E.2d 103, 110 (1980), this Court considered data which was similar to the data set forth in the case at bar. The evidence in Price showed that African-Americans made up 17.1% of the jury pool, while the county\u2019s population was 31.1% African-American. Id. The absolute disparity was 14%. Id. Upon reviewing that data, this Court stated: \u201c[W]e are unable to conclude as a matter of law that the applicable percentages are sufficient to establish that the representation of [African-Americans] is not fair and reasonable in light of their presence in the community.\u201d Id.\nIn the present case, it is disputed whether the disparity amounts to 14.8% or 16.17%. Even if we consider only defendant\u2019s data, a disparity of 16.17%, we cannot conclude that this figure, standing alone, is unfair or unreasonable. \u201c[A] criminal defendant is not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, nor is he entitled to be tried before a jury which mirrors the presence of various and distinctive groups within the community.\u201d Id. at 448, 272 S.E.2d at 110-11. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 32 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1972). \u201c[T]he right to trial by jury carries with it the right to be tried before a body which is selected in such a manner that competing and divergent interests and perspectives in the community are reflected rather than reproduced absolutely.\u201d Id. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975).\nDefendant argues that the United States Supreme Court ruled that a 23% absolute disparity between the percentage of African-Americans in the venire and the general population established a prima facie case of discrimination. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 24 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1970). However, in that decision, the United States Supreme Court did not conclude that the prima facie case was solely based upon the disparity of representation of African-Americans in the jury venire. Rather, that Court\u2019s conclusion ultimately rested upon the finding that the underrepresentation was the result of the systematic exclusion of African-Americans in the jury-selection process. Id. at 360, 24 L. Ed. 2d at 579. Under our interpretation of Turner, merely showing a disparity under the second prong of the Duren test, standing alone, will not establish a prima facie case of disproportionate representation.\nWith respect to the third prong of the Duren analysis, defendant in the case sub judice has failed to present any evidence showing that the jury-selection process was tainted by the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the jury pool. This Court has held:\n\u201c[T]he fact that a particular jury or a series of juries does not statistically reflect the racial composition of the community does not in itself make out an invidious discrimination forbidden by the [Equal Protection] Clause.\u201d\nState v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 130, 261 S.E.2d 803, 806 (1980) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597, 607 (1976)). Defendant\u2019s only evidence in the instant case consisted of the statistical makeup of this particular jury venire. Statistics concerning one jury pool, standing alone, are insufficient to meet the third prong of Duren. Avery, 299 N.C. at 130-31, 261 S.E.2d at 806. We must overrule this assignment of error.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State\u2019s challenge for cause of prospective juror Mercedes Morris, who indicated that she might have difficulty voting in favor of a death sentence. We do not agree.\nIn order to determine whether a prospective juror may be excused for cause due to that juror\u2019s views on capital punishment, the trial court must consider whether those views would \u201cprevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.\u201d Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851-52 (1985). At the outset of voir dire, the trial court explained North Carolina\u2019s capital sentencing law to the venire. The trial court then asked whether any of the prospective jurors had personal views which would prevent or substantially impair their ability to serve as a juror and to fairly consider both punishments. At that point, Morris indicated that she would have difficulty voting for the death penalty.\nDuring voir dire, the prosecutor questioned Morris in order to further explore her feelings concerning the death penalty. The prosecutor asked:\nQ. Do you feel, Ms. Morris, that your own personal beliefs, whether they be religious beliefs, personal beliefs, or moral beliefs, are such that it would prevent you from considering a death penalty in this case?\nA. I think so.\nQ. Okay. When you say you think so, can you tell me what you mean by that, Ms. Morris?\nA. I don\u2019t think I would be able to do it because of conscience. I don\u2019t think it would be so easy for me to get over.\nQ. Yes, Ma\u2019am. So do you feel like, Ms. Morris, that \u2014 and, again, there are no right or wrong answers, okay? \u2014 Your own personal beliefs are such that you could not consider a sentence of death in this case?\nA. I couldn\u2019t consider it.\nMorris then indicated that she could not recommend a death sentence for defendant. At that point, the prosecutor challenged Morris for cause, and defendant was then permitted to question Morris. Defendant asked Morris whether she would be able to consider both punishments if the State proved defendant guilty of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Morris replied that she could. The trial court then clarified that if defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, the jury could recommend only a sentence of death or a sentence of life imprisonment. Morris responded that she understood and indicated that she could fairly consider both alternative sentences.\nIn view of these answers, the trial court inquired further of Morris as follows:\nThe Court: All right. I gather then, Ms. Morris, what you\u2019re telling us is that you don\u2019t have any real personal opposition to the death penalty law\u2014\nA. No.\nThe Court: \u2014But you, as an individual, because of your own personal views, don\u2019t want to be put in the position of imposing a death penalty\u2014\nA. That\u2019s right.\nThe Court: \u2014or recommending it to the court?\nA. (Nods head up and down.)\nThe trial court then allowed the prosecutor\u2019s for-cause challenge, finding that Morris\u2019 views concerning the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair her performance as a juror.\nThe decision \u201c \u2018[w]hether to allow a challenge for cause in jury selection is . . . ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court which will not be reversed on appeal except for abuse of discretion.\u2019 \u201d State v. Stephens, 347 N.C. 352, 365, 493 S.E.2d 435, 443 (1997) (quoting State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 247, 415 S.E.2d 726, 731 (1992)), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 142 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1998). This Court has previously noted that \u201ca prospective juror\u2019s bias for or against the death penalty cannot always be proven with unmistakable clarity.\u201d State v. Miller, 339 N.C. 663, 679, 455 S.E.2d 137, 145, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 893, 133 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1995). Therefore, we must defer to the trial court\u2019s j\u00fadgment as to whether the prospective juror could impartially follow the law. Id.\nIn the present case, Morris clearly stated that she felt her personal beliefs might affect her consideration of the death penalty for defendant. Morris\u2019 responses were at best equivocal, in comparison, and the trial court gave ample opportunity to both sides to explore and elicit Morris\u2019 views. Absent an abuse of discretion, it is the trial court\u2019s decision as to whether this prospective juror\u2019s beliefs would affect her performance as a juror. State v. Hoffman, 349 N.C. 167, 175-76, 505 S.E.2d 80, 85 (1998). In light of the questioning and responses here, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by excusing prospective juror Morris. This assignment of error is overruled.\nBy his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial because the prosecutor repeatedly asked the State\u2019s witnesses leading questions and because the State\u2019s witnesses also made several impermissible and prejudicial statements. However, while defendant offered objections, he failed to make any motion for a mistrial. Our consideration of this assignment of error is therefore limited to whether the trial court should have ordered a mistrial ex mero moto.\nThis Court has repeatedly held that the decision \u201c \u2018to grant a motion for mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is so clearly erroneous as to amount to a manifest abuse of discretion.\u2019 \u201d State v. Sanders, 347 N.C. 587, 595, 496 S.E.2d 568, 573 (1998) (quoting State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 383, 462 S.E.2d 25, 35 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110, 134 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1996)). It is appropriate for a trial court to declare a mistrial \u201c \u2018only when there are such serious improprieties as would make it impossible to attain a fair and impartial verdict under the law.\u2019 \u201d State v. Norwood, 344 N.C. 511, 537-38, 476 S.E.2d 349, 361 (1996) (quoting State v. Calloway, 305 N.C. 747, 754, 291 S.E.2d 622, 627 (1982)), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1158, 137 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1997).\nA review of the record reveals that the trial corut sustained defendant\u2019s objections and issued curative instructions. \u201cThis Court presumes that jurors follow the trial court\u2019s instructions.\u201d Norwood, 344 N.C. at 537, 476 S.E.2d at 361. After a careful reading of the record, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor\u2019s questions or the statements complained of, or their cumulative effect, amounted to such serious impropriety that it was impossible for defendant to obtain a fair trial. Id. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial ex mero motu. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury on defendant\u2019s right not to testify when defendant did not request such an instruction. This Court has consistently held that while it is the better practice not to give an instruction on a defendant\u2019s failure to testify absent a request to do so, giving such an instruction does not constitute prejudicial error. State v. Cunningham, 344 N.C. 341, 362, 474 S.E.2d 772, 782 (1996); State v. McDowell, 301 N.C. 279, 293, 271 S.E.2d 286, 295 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025, 68 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1981). This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s next assignment of error addresses the trial court\u2019s failure to control asserted inflammatory argument by the prosecutor during the guilt and penalty phases of defendant\u2019s trial. Defendant contends that the prosecutor took a \u201ccheap shot\u201d at defense counsel during the guilt-phase closing argument. The prosecutor argued:\nAnd, again, I would ask for you to listen to what the judge defines to you in regards to what reasonable doubt means, because reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense. And reasonable doubt arises from the evidence, all the evidence, not one part of it. And reasonable doubt is not created or manufactured by lawyers getting up here and arguing to you and trying to do those lawyer trick things.\nDefendant objected to this argument, and the trial court overruled the objection. Defendant argues that this comment amounts to prosecutorial misconduct, which deprived defendant of his right to a fair trial. We do not agree.\nThis Court has held that \u201c[arguments of counsel are left largely to the control and discretion of the trial judge, and counsel is allowed wide latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases.\u201d State v. Robinson, 346 N.C. 586, 606, 488 S.E.2d 174, 187 (1997). However, \u201ca trial attorney may not make uncomplimentary comments about opposing counsel, and should \u2018refrain from abusive, vituperative, and opprobrious language, or from indulging in invectives.\u2019 \u201d State v. Sanderson, 336 N.C. 1, 10, 442 S.E.2d 33, 39 (1994) (quoting State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 659, 157 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1967)). In evaluating counsel\u2019s comments, \u201cremarks are to be viewed in the context in which they are made and the overall factual circumstances to which they referred.\u201d Robinson, 346 N.C. at 606, 488 S.E.2d at 187.\nIn the present case, the prosecutor\u2019s comment that \u201creasonable doubt is not created or manufactured by lawyers getting up here and arguing to you and trying to do those lawyer trick things\u201d is not directed clearly and specifically toward the defense counsel in this case, but rather would seem more logically to reference lawyers in general. However, to the extent that it could be considered a comment directed against opposing counsel, the prosecutor did not use \u201cabusive, vituperative, or opprobrious language.\u201d State v. Holden, 346 N.C. 404, 432, 488 S.E.2d 514, 529 (1997), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 140 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1998). This statement was also an isolated comment and not a repeated attempt to \u201cdiminish defense counsel before the jury.\u201d Id. We therefore conclude that this one reference to defense lawyers generally, or perhaps to defendant\u2019s counsel particularly, did not amount to misconduct so improper as to deprive defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s sustaining the prosecutor\u2019s objection to defense counsel\u2019s definition of reasonable doubt. During the guilt-phase closing arguments, defense counsel offered the following definition of reasonable doubt:\n[W]hen it is said that the jury must be satisfied of the defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is meant that [it] must be fully satisfied or satisfied to a moral certainty of the truth of the charges.\nIf after considering, comparing, and weighing all the evidence the minds of the jurors are left in such condition that they cannot say that they have an abiding faith to a moral certainty in the defendant\u2019s guilt, then they have a reasonable doubt, otherwise not.\nAt the close of this argument, the trial court excused the jury and then told defense counsel that this explanation of reasonable doubt may not \u201caccurately reflect the law.\u201d The trial court recommended that in their final argument, defense counsel might wish to clarify for the jurors that \u201cthey must be convinced only to an evidentiary certainty [of defendant\u2019s guilt],\u201d rather than to a \u201cmoral certainty.\u201d\nThen, during defendant\u2019s final closing argument to the jury, the following transpired:\nNow, his Honor is going to instruct you as to what is a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is an evidentiary standard. And I would contend to you that a shorthand way of saying it, not the legal definition, but a shorthand way is basically if you can look in the mirror after you make a decision.\n[Prosecutor]: Objection, your Honor.\nThe Court: Sustained. Do not argue that, please.\n[Defense Counsel]: Yes, sir.\nDefendant contends that defense counsel was denied the opportunity to argue its conception of reasonable doubt to the jury, which resulted in depriving defendant of effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.\nThe United States Supreme Court has held that jury instructions which explain reasonable doubt with \u201cmoral certainty\u201d language are permissible so long as the jurors are also explicitly told \u201cthat their conclusion had to be based on the evidence in the case.\u201d Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 16, 127 L. Ed. 2d 583, 596-97 (1994). In this case, defense counsel knew from the trial court\u2019s admonition that any references to \u201cmoral certainty\u201d in the context of explaining or defining reasonable doubt could not be disassociated from the evidence. However, defense counsel nevertheless argued that reasonable doubt could be measured by whether a juror \u201ccould look in the mirror\u201d after reaching a decision, thus in effect obviating the evidentiary standard. Considering the context in which this argument was made, defense counsel\u2019s statement served to reassert the concept of moral conscience and to disassociate this from the sufficiency of the evidence. Since the trial court had previously instructed defense counsel not to define reasonable doubt with moral certainty language, the trial court did not err by sustaining the prosecutor\u2019s objection to this portion of defendant\u2019s argument. State v. Warren, 348 N.C. 80, 105, 499 S.E.2d 431, 445, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 142 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1998).\nAssuming arguendo that the trial court did err in sustaining the prosecutor\u2019s objection, this error was cured because the trial court thereafter correctly instructed the jury as to reasonable doubt in accordance with the pattern jury instruction, N.C.P.I.\u2014Crim. 101.10 (1974). Warren, 348 N.C. at 106, 499 S.E.2d at 445. We conclude that this assignment of error is without merit.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial since the trial court allowed the bailiff to interject his interpretation of a written question submitted to the trial court by the jury after deliberations had begun. During guilt-phase deliberations, the trial court received a written inquiry from the jury seeking an explanation of \u201cexactly what premeditation means.\u201d The trial court discussed the jury\u2019s request with counsel, and the bailiff asked if he might address the court. The trial court gave the bailiff permission to speak, and the following colloquy occurred:\nBailiff: What they really wanted to know is if there\u2019s a time limit on premeditation.\nThe Court: If there was a time limit?\nBailiff: Yes. If it had to be premeditated ten minutes, an hour, or so forth. That was what they wanted to find out.\nThe trial court informed counsel that he would respond to the jury\u2019s question by repeating only the relevant portions of his jury charge. Defendant then requested the trial court to read all the elements of first- and second-degree murder to the jurors. The trial court declined, stating, \u201cthat\u2019s not the subject of their question.\u201d\nBefore the trial court directly answered the jury\u2019s question, the trial court sought to clarify the jury\u2019s concern:\nLadies and gentlemen of the jury, the bailiff has informed me that you had a question on some of the law that I instructed you about. I asked you to have it reduced to writing. He handed me a slip of paper. It says the jury wants to know exactly what premeditation means and explain.\nI want to inquire: Is that the question?\nA. Yes, sir. (In unison.)\nThe Court: All of you agree that that\u2019s the question.\nA. Yes, sir. (In unison.)\nThe Court: All right. I\u2019m going to go over with you the instructions that I gave you earlier with regard to premeditation and deliberation. And I\u2019m going to try to [flesh] out for you only briefly the time element for premeditation and deliberation. I assume that .was your concern; is that correct?\nA. Yes, sir. (In unison.)\nAfter the trial court was satisfied it understood the jury\u2019s concern, the trial court repeated its previous instructions concerning premeditation and deliberation. In addition to these instructions, the trial court stated:\nNow, there is no specific time element required for the formation of the intent to kill, not in hours, not in minutes, not in seconds. The requirement is that he acted after premeditation; that is, he formed the intent to kill the victim over some period of time, however short, before he acted.\nDefendant now contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court failed to answer the jury\u2019s question as written, and instead only answered the question that the bailiff claimed the jurors intended to ask. We do not agree.\nThe record reveals that the trial court did not rely exclusively on the bailiff\u2019s explanation in responding to the jury\u2019s written question. The trial court personally addressed the jury in order to confirm that it wanted to know \u201cwhat premeditation means.\u201d The trial court then continued its inquiry in order to confirm that the jury\u2019s main concern related to time limits associated with premeditation. Only after the trial court was satisfied that it correctly understood the jury\u2019s question did the trial court proceed with its instructions. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court addressed only the bailiff\u2019s interpretation and ignored the jurors\u2019 written inquiry. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting victim-impact evidence at the penalty phase of defendant\u2019s trial. The prosecutor examined Letha Marie Jones and Sabrina Joan Pugh, the mothers of each of defendant\u2019s victims. Defendant failed to object when each of these witnesses testified as to how their sons\u2019 murders affected them and their families. Since defendant failed to object during the victims\u2019 mothers\u2019 testimony, we must limit our review to whether admission of this victim-impact evidence constitutes plain error. State v. Moody, 345 N.C. 563, 572, 481 S.E.2d 629, 633, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 139 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1997). \u201cIn order to prevail under a plain error analysis, defendant must establish not only that the trial court committed error, but that \u2018absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\u2019 \u201d State v. Sierra, 335 N.C. 753, 761, 440 S.E.2d 791, 796 (1994) (quoting State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993)).\nThe United States Supreme Court has held that a victim-impact statement may be admitted during a capital sentencing proceeding unless that evidence \u201cis so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.\u201d Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 735 (1991). In addition, this Court has stated that \u201cthe State should be given some latitude in fleshing out the humanity of the victim so long as it does not go too far.\u201d State v. Reeves, 337 N.C. 700, 723, 448 S.E.2d 802, 812 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1114, 131 L. Ed. 2d 860 (1995). Defendant points out that the key to this Court\u2019s approval of victim-impact evidence in recent cases is the de minimus nature of that evidence. In contrast to those prior cases, defendant argues that in the instant case the State made the victim-impact evidence the \u201ccenterpiece\u201d of its sentencing-phase presentation. Defendant contends that he is thus entitled to a new sentencing proceeding. We disagree.\nThere is no evidence in the record which suggests that the jury based its decision for the death penalty on this victim-impact evidence. The sole aggravating circumstance that the prosecution submitted and the jury found was that defendant committed the murders as part of a course of conduct in committing another crime of violence. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(11) (1997). Nowhere in his closing argument did the prosecutor argue for the jury to impose the death penalty based on the impact the murders had on the victims\u2019 families. Therefore, we cannot conclude that this evidence served any purpose other than \u201c \u2018to remind the jury that the victims were sentient beings with close family ties before they were murdered by defendant.\u2019 \u201d State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 37, 478 S.E.2d 163, 182 (1996) (quoting State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 528, 453 S.E.2d 824, 850, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995)), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997).\nDefendant also argues that the trial court increased the severity of the victim-impact evidence when it precluded defendant from questioning the victims\u2019 mothers about their feelings toward the death sentences in this case. During the cross-examination of Mrs. Pugh, defense counsel asked if she had any feelings about the death penalty in this case. The State objected to this question, and the trial court sustained the objection. Outside of the jury\u2019s presence, defendant made an offer of proof showing that Mrs. Pugh had conflicting feelings as to punishment. During voir dire, Mrs. Pugh stated that she wanted to see defendant \u201close his life the same way he took my son\u2019s life.\u201d Mrs. Pugh then went on to explain:\n[B]ut before that, I want him to be able to tell me why he took my son\u2019s life. And I want him to tell his two-year-old daughter why she\u2019s never going to see her daddy again, because every night she\u2019s asking me to see her daddy. And there\u2019s no way I can tell this two-year-old why she\u2019s never going to see her daddy again.\nDefendant argues that the trial court should have admitted this portion of Mrs. Pugh\u2019s testimony into evidence since it constitutes a reason as to why defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death. Defendant further contends that since Mrs. Pugh\u2019s statement offers a reason as to why defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment, then it falls within the definition of \u201cmitigating circumstance.\u201d Thus, defendant asserts, the trial court erred in excluding evidence that could mitigate defendant\u2019s sentence. This argument is without merit.\nThe United States Supreme Court has held that a jury should \u201cnot be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant\u2019s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.\u201d Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 990 (1978). The Supreme Court also noted that this rule was not intended to \u201climit[] the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant\u2019s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.\u201d Id. at 604 n.12, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 990 n.12. We have adopted the Supreme Court\u2019s rule, and we have also stated that a mitigating circumstance may be defined as \u201ca fact or group of facts .. . which may be considered as extenuating, or reducing the moral culpability of the killing, or making it less deserving of the extreme punishment than other first-degree murders.\u201d State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 104, 282 S.E.2d 439, 446-47 (1981).\nIn the instant case, defendant contends that a victim\u2019s mother\u2019s opinion as to whether defendant should receive a sentence of death should come within the definition of \u201cmitigating circumstance.\u201d However, this evidence has no bearing as to \u201cdefendant\u2019s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.\u201d Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 990 n.12; Bond, 345 N.C. at 33, 478 S.E.2d at 180. It also fails to reduce the \u201cmoral culpability of the killing.\u201d Irwin, 304 N.C. at 104, 282 S.E.2d at 446-47. We cannot conclude that Mrs. Pugh\u2019s statement constituted mitigating evidence or that it could be fairly construed as offering a reason why defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding this evidence. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in the capital sentencing proceeding by allowing the prosecution to cross-examine him concerning the fact that he was on parole from a conviction in New York at the time he committed the murders in the instant case. Defendant asserts that, as a result, the prosecutor improperly injected the issue of parole in the sentencing proceeding. However, during cross-examination, defendant failed to object to the prosecutor\u2019s questions which he now contends were improper. We must therefore determine whether the prosecution\u2019s questions constituted plain error. Sierra, 335 N.C. at 761, 440 S.E.2d at 796.\nThe record reveals that on direct examination defendant testified about his prior convictions for selling drugs and his early release on parole. Thus, defendant effectively opened the door to cross-examination on these issues. State v. Warren, 347 N.C. 309, 317, 492 S.E.2d 609, 613 (1997), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 140 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1998). In addition, there is no evidence suggesting that the prosecutor attempted to connect defendant\u2019s prior record to improper parole considerations with respect to sentencing. Conaway, 339 N.C. at 522, 453 S.E.2d at 846. Defendant has failed to show that a different result would have occurred had the trial court acted ex mero motu and prohibited the prosecution\u2019s cross-examination regarding his prior criminal record. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to intervene during defendant\u2019s cross-examination. This assignment of error is overruled.\nPRESERVATION ISSUES\nDefendant raises two additional issues which he concedes have been previously decided contrary to his position by this Court: (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could reject a submitted nonstatutory mitigating circumstance if it found that circumstance not to have mitigating value; and (2) the trial court erred in its penalty-phase charge to the jury by instructing that it may, rather than must, consider any mitigating circumstances that the jury determines to exist in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in Issues III and IV on the verdict sheet.\nDefendant raises these issues for the purpose of permitting this Court to reexamine its prior holdings and also for the purpose of preserving them for possible further judicial review of this case. We have considered defendant\u2019s arguments on these issues and find no compelling reason to depart from our prior holdings. These assignments of error are overruled.\nPROPORTIONALITY REVIEW\nHaving concluded that defendant\u2019s trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free from prejudicial error, we must now review the record and determine as to each murder: (1) whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstance found by the jury; (2) whether the sentence was entered under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; and (3) whether the sentence is \u201cexcessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2). We have thoroughly reviewed the record, transcript and briefs in this case. We conclude that the record fully supports the aggravating circumstance found by the jury. Further, we find no indication that the sentences of death in this case were imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. We therefore turn to our final statutory duty of proportionality review.\nIn the present case, defendant was found guilty of two counts of murder under the theory of premeditation and deliberation. Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury found the one aggravating circumstance submitted as to each murder: that \u201c[t]he murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part of a course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by the defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(11).\nThe trial court submitted, and the jury found, as to each murder, the statutory mitigating circumstance that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(1). The trial court also submitted the statutory \u201ccatchall\u201d circumstance, but the jury did not find \u201c[a]ny other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(9). Of the twenty-three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted as to each murder, the jury found two to exist.\nOne purpose of our proportionality review is to \u201celiminate the possibility that a sentence of death was imposed by the action of an aberrant jury.\u201d State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 294, 439 S.E.2d 547, 573, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994). Another is to guard \u201cagainst the capricious or random imposition of the death penalty.\u201d State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 354, 259 S.E.2d 510, 544 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1980). In conducting proportionality review, we compare the present case with other cases in which this Court has concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate. State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 162 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994). This Court has found the death penalty disproportionate in seven cases: State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, - U.S. \u2014, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); and State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).\nWe conclude that this case is not substantially similar to any case in which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate. First, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. This Court has never found a sentence of death disproportionate in a case where the jury has found defendant guilty of murdering more than one victim. State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 552, 461 S.E.2d 631, 654 (1995). In addition, the jury convicted defendant under the theory of premeditation and deliberation. This Court has stated that \u201c[t]he finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a more cold-blooded and calculated crime.\u201d State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 341, 384 S.E.2d 470, 506 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990). Finally, the jury found the only aggravating circumstance submitted: \u201cThe murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part of a course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by the defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(11). There are four statutory aggravating circumstances which, standing alone, this Court has held sufficient to support a sentence of death. State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 110 n.8, 446 S.E.2d 542, 566 n.8 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1159, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1083 (1995). The (e)(11) circumstance, which the jury found here, is among them. Id.\nIt is also proper for this Court to \u201ccompare this case with the cases in which we have found the death penalty to be proportionate.\u201d McCollum, 334 N.C. at 244, 433 S.E.2d at 164. Although this Court reviews all of the cases in the pool when engaging in our duty of proportionality review, we have repeatedly stated that \u201cwe will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each time we carry out that duty.\u201d Id. It suffices to say here that we conclude the present case is more similar to certain cases in which we have found the sentence of death proportionate than to those in which we have found the sentence of death disproportionate or to those in which juries have consistently returned recommendations of life imprisonment.\nFinally, this Court has noted that similarity of cases is not the last word on the subject of proportionality. State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 287, 446 S.E.2d 298, 325 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995). Similarity \u201cmerely serves as an initial point of inquiry.\u201d Id. Whether the death penalty is disproportionate \u201cultimately rest[s] upon the \u2018experienced judgments\u2019 of the members of this Court.\u201d State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 198, 443 S.E.2d 14, 47, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994).\nBased on the foregoing and the entire record in this case, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the sentences of death were excessive or disproportionate. We hold that defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free of prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "LAKE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Ralf F. Haskell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Marshall L. Dayan for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRENCE DION BOWMAN a/k/a TERRENCE TAYLOR\nNo. 142A97\n(Filed 31 December 1998)\n1. Jury \u00a7 50 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 jury venire\u2014 racial composition\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by denying defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to quash the jury venire based on an underrepresentation of African-American citizens in the jury pool. The State does not dispute that the first prong of the test under Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, for establishing a prima facie case of disproportionate representation has been satisfied; as to the second prong, it cannot be concluded that the disparity between the percentage of African-Americans in the county\u2019s population and those in the jury pool established a prima facie case of disproportionate representation because, under Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, merely showing a disparity will not alone establish aprima facie case of disproportionate representation; and, under the third prong of the Duren analysis, defendant failed to present any evidence showing that the jury selection process was tainted by the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the jury pool. Statistics concerning one jury pool, standing alone, are insufficient to meet the third prong of Duren.\n2. Jury \u00a7 227 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital first-degree murder \u2014 jury selection \u2014 excusal of juror for cause \u2014 difficulty voting for death sentence\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion during jury selection in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by allowing the State\u2019s challenge for cause of a prospective juror who indicated that she might have difficulty voting in favor of a death sentence. The juror first indicated that she could not recommend a death sentence; after questioning by defendant, she replied that she could; and the trial court inquired further and allowed the prosecutor\u2019s for-cause challenge, finding that the prospective juror\u2019s views concerning the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair her performance as a juror. It has previously been noted that a prospective juror\u2019s bias for or against the death penalty cannot always be proven with clarity and, absent an abuse of discretion, it is the trial court\u2019s decision as to whether the prospective juror\u2019s beliefs would affect her performance as a juror. In light of the questioning and responses here, it cannot be concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by excusing this juror.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 550 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital first-degree murder \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s leading questions \u2014 impermissible statements by witnesses \u2014 no mistrial\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial ex mero mo tu in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder where defendant contended that the prosecutor repeatedly asked the State\u2019s witnesses leading questions and that the State\u2019s witnesses made impermissible and prejudicial statements. A review of the record reveals that the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objections and issued curative instructions and it cannot be concluded that the questions or statements, or their cumulative effect, amounted to such serious impropriety that it was impossible for defendant to obtain a fair trial.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 820 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 instructions \u2014 defendant\u2019s failure to testify \u2014 not required\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by instructing the jury on defendant\u2019s right not to testify when defendant did not request such an instruction. It has been consistently held that, while it is the better practice not to give the instruction absent a request, giving such an instruction does not constitute prejudicial error.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 473 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 first-degree murder\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 comments regarding defense counsel\nThere was no misconduct so improper as to deprive defendant of his due process right to a fair trial in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder where the prosecutor argued that \u201creasonable doubt is not created or manufactured by lawyers getting up here and arguing to you and trying to do those lawyer trick things.\u201d The comment was not directed clearly and specifically toward the defense counsel in this case, the prosecutor did not use abusive, vituperative, or opprobrious language, and the statement was isolated and not a repeated attempt to diminish defense counsel before the jury.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 472 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 first-degree murder\u2014 defense arguments \u2014 reasonable doubt definition\nThere was no prejudicial error in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder where the trial court sustained the prosecutor\u2019s objection to defense counsel\u2019s argument defining reasonable doubt with \u201cmoral certainty\u201d language. After this argument was made during the guilt phase, the trial court recommended that, in their final argument, defense counsel clarify for the jurors that they must be convinced to an evidentiary certainty rather than to a moral certainty, but defense counsel then argued to the jury that reasonable doubt is an evidentiary standard and that a shorthand way of saying it would be \u201cif you can look in the mirror after you make a decision.\u201d Considered in context, defense counsel\u2019s statement served to reassert the concept of moral conscience and to disassociate this from the sufficiency of the evidence; since the trial court had previously instructed defense counsel not to define reasonable doubt with moral certainty language, the court did not err by sustaining the prosecutor\u2019s objection. However, assuming that the court erred in sustaining the objection, the error was cured because the court thereafter correctly instructed the jury as to reasonable doubt in accordance with the pattern jury instruction.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 882 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 first-degree murder\u2014 jury deliberation \u2014 question by jury \u2014 interpretation by bailiff\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder where, during the guilt phase deliberations, the trial court received a written inquiry from the jury seeking an explanation of premeditation, the bailiff asked if he might address the court, the court gave the bailiff permission to speak and the bailiff indicated that what the jury wanted to know was if there is a time limit on premeditation, the court informed counsel that he would respond by repeating only the relevant portions of the jury charge, and the court repeated its previous instructions regarding premeditation and deliberation. The record reveals that the trial court did not rely exclusively on the bailiff\u2019s explanation, personally addressed the jury, and proceeded with its instructions only after it was satisfied that it correctly understood the jury\u2019s question. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court addressed only the bailiff\u2019s interpretation and ignored the jurors\u2019 written inquiry.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 1077 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 penalty phase \u2014 evidence\u2014victim impact statements\nThere was no plain error in a capital sentencing proceeding where the trial court admitted victim impact evidence. There is no evidence in the record which suggests that the jury based its decision for the death penalty on this evidence and nowhere in the closing argument did the prosecutor argue for the jury to impose the death penalty based on the impact the murders had on the victims\u2019 families. It cannot be concluded that this evidence served any purpose other than to remind the jury that the victims were sentient beings with close family ties before they were murdered by defendant.\n9.Criminal Law \u00a7 1077 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing\u2014 victim impact evidence \u2014 victims\u2019 mothers\u2019 feelings toward death sentences \u2014 questioning not allowed\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by precluding defendant from questioning the victims\u2019 mothers about their feelings toward the death sentences in this case after they gave victim impact evidence. This evidence has no bearing as to defendant\u2019s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.\n10. Criminal Law \u00a7 1342 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 capital sentencing \u2014 cross-examination of defendant \u2014 parole from prior conviction\nThere was no plain error in a capital sentencing proceeding where the court allowed the prosecution to cross-examine defendant concerning the fact that he was on parole from a conviction in New York at the time he committed these murders. Defendant opened the door by testifying on direct examination about his prior convictions and his early release on parole; additionally, there is no evidence suggesting that the prosecutor attempted to connect defendant\u2019s prior record to improper parole considerations with respect to sentencing.\n11. Criminal Law \u00a7 1402 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 death sentence \u2014 not arbitrary\nThe record fully supported the aggravating circumstance found by a jury which sentenced defendant to death and there was no indication that the sentences were imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.\n12. Criminal Law \u00a7 1402 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 death sentence\u2014 proportionate\nA sentence of death was not disproportionate where defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder under the theory of premeditation and deliberation and the aggravating circumstance found by the jury is one of four statutory circumstances which have been held sufficient standing alone to support a sentence of death.\nAppeal as of right by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from judgments imposing sentences of death entered by Meyer, J., at the 3 February 1997 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Lenoir County, upon jury verdicts finding defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 28 September 1998.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Ralf F. Haskell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nMarshall L. Dayan for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0459-01", "first_page_order": 497, "last_page_order": 521 }