{ "id": 571692, "name": "VICKIE ANN BROWN, Administratrix of the Estate for Mary Louise Brown v. KENNETH MICHAEL FLOWE, M.D.", "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. Flowe", "decision_date": "1998-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 110PA98", "first_page": "520", "last_page": "527", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "349 N.C. 520" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656452 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 F.3d 126", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10503084 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/18/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798947, 798789, 798922, 798795, 798942 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0749-01", "/nc/343/0749-04", "/nc/343/0749-02", "/nc/343/0749-03", "/nc/343/0749-05" ] }, { "cite": "470 S.E.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656452 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 815, "char_count": 17940, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.594809957686512e-07, "percentile": 0.976894019689951 }, "sha256": "41eb9691009abaef07585383508a8ca0707f6acb8a4cc3a18ce567a28f175eb7", "simhash": "1:0b71517c274f689c", "word_count": 2914 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:15:14.712587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "VICKIE ANN BROWN, Administratrix of the Estate for Mary Louise Brown v. KENNETH MICHAEL FLOWE, M.D." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nThis appeal arises from a medical malpractice action brought by Vickie Ann Brown, administratrix of the estate of Mary Louise Brown, against defendant Dr. Kenneth Flowe, a Pitt County Memorial Hospital emergency-room physician. Defendant and a medical resident performed surgery on the decedent, Mary Louise Brown, at Pitt County Memorial Hospital. Brown died while undergoing the surgery. Prior to filing suit, plaintiff entered a settlement agreement with the medical resident and the hospital, releasing them from liability in consideration of the payment of $178,486.76. On 15 July 1994 plaintiff filed the present action against defendant. The matter was tried before a jury at the 12 August 1996 Civil Session of Superior Court, Pitt County, and the jury returned a verdict finding defendant negligent and awarding compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b), the trial court applied prejudgment interest at the legal rate of eight percent to the jury\u2019s verdict, resulting in a compensatory damages award of $293,013.70. A portion of the award, $71,513.24, was to bear post-judgment interest as well. The trial court allowed plaintiff\u2019s motion to tax costs to defendant in the amount of $42,104.44. Aggregating these numbers, the court entered a judgment in the amount of $335,115.14, to which it credited the settlement amount of $178,486.76. The trial court then ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $156,628.38.\nDefendant appealed, assigning error, inter alia, to this method of calculating prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and held that \u201cthe trial court erred in awarding plaintiff prejudgment interest on the full amount of the verdict, and we remand the case for prejudgment interest to be assessed after applying a credit in the amount of the $178,486.76 settlement to the verdict.\u201d Brown v. Flowe, 128 N.C. App. 668, 674, 496 S.E.2d 830, 834 (1998). On 8 July 1998 this Court allowed plaintiff\u2019s petition for discretionary review. The question presented is how to reduce a claim against a nonsettling tort-feasor under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1B-4 when prejudgment interest under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) applies.\nTwo statutes interact in this situation. First, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) provides:\n(b) Other Actions. \u2014 In an action other than contract, the portion of money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest from the date the action is instituted until the judgment is satisfied. Interest on an award in an action other than contract shall be at the legal rate.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) (1991) (emphasis added). Second, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1B-4 provides, in pertinent part:\n[A] release or a covenant not to sue... given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:\n(1) ... reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and,\n(2) It discharges the tort-feasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tort-feasor.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 1B-4 (1983) (emphasis added).\n\u201cLegislative intent controls the meaning of a statute.\u201d Shelton v. Morehead Mem\u2019l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 81, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986). To determine legislative intent, a court must analyze the statute as a whole, considering the chosen words themselves, the spirit of the act, and the objectives the statute seeks to accomplish. See id. at 81-82, 347 S.E.2d at 828. First among these considerations, however, is the plain meaning of the words chosen by the legislature; if they are clear and unambiguous within the context of the statute, they are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings. Hyler v. GTE Prods. Co., 333 N.C. 258, 262, 425 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1993). The Court\u2019s analysis therefore properly begins with the words themselves. Correll v. Division of Soc. Servs., 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992).\nThis Court previously has determined \u201cjudgment\u201d to be unambiguous and has given that word its plain meaning when interpreting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-10.2 and Rule 68 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. We held that \u201cjudgment\u201d indicates the final amount of money due to the plaintiff, consisting of the verdict, costs, fees, and interest. See Hieb v. Lowery, 344 N.C. 403, 410, 474 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1996); Poole v. Miller, 342 N.C. 349, 352-53, 464 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1995). A judgment is rendered by the court and is therefore a judicial act, in contrast to a verdict that is rendered by a jury. Hieb, 344 N.C. at 410, 474 S.E.2d at 327; Poole, 342 N.C. at 352, 464 S.E.2d at 411. Therefore, the judgment was the final verdict, $250,000, plus costs, fees, and interest, for a total of $335,115.14.\nUnder section 24-5, the \u201cportion of money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b). The jury found $250,000 to be \u201cdamages . . . the estate of Mary Louise Brown, Vickie Brown, Administratrix, [was] entitled to recover by reason of the injury to and death of Mary Louise Brown.\u201d Therefore, the trial court properly calculated interest, from the date the action was instituted, on $250,000, the portion of the judgment which the jury found to be compensatory damages. There is no indication in the statute that the compensatory portion minus settlements bears interest; rather, the statute says simply that the \u201ccompensatory damages\u201d portion of the judgment bears interest. Id. The statutory language is clear, and this Court therefore must not engage injudicial construction. Poole, 342 N.C. at 351, 464 S.E.2d at 410.\nWe must, though, determine the application of section IB-4 to section 24-5. The release at issue was executed before this suit was filed. The hospital and the surgical resident paid $178,486.76 to plaintiff in return for being released from liability for plaintiffs decedent\u2019s injury and death. This release \u201creduces the claim against the others\u201d by the amount of the payment. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 IB-4.\nWhile \u201cjudgment\u201d as used in section 24-5 has a plain meaning under the decisions of this Court, \u201cclaim\u201d as used in section IB-4 does not. The section itself is silent as to when or how to reduce the \u201cclaim\u201d against the remaining tort-feasors, and this Court has not previously decided when or how to reduce a claim under section IB-4 when prejudgment interest under section 24-5 applies.\n\u201c[W]here a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction must be used to ascertain the legislative will. The primary rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest extent.\u201d Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (1990) (citation omitted). A question of statutory interpretation is ultimately a question of law for the courts. See Wood, v. J.P Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 642, 256 S.E.2d 692, 696 (1979). Although sections 1B-4 and 24-5 both apply in tort actions, they neither refer to each other nor use the same terminology. When multiple statutes address a single subject, this Court construes them in pari materia to determine and effectuate the legislative intent. See Board of Adjust. v. Town of Swansboro, 334 N.C. 421, 427, 432 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1993). Our task is to give effect, if possible, to all sections of each statute and to harmonize them into one law on the subject. See Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180-81, 261 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1980). We have held that the probable intent of the prejudgment interest statute, section 24-5, is threefold: (1) to compensate plaintiffs for loss of the use of their money, (2) to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant by having money he should not have, and (3) to promote settlement. See Powe v. Odell, 312 N.C. 410, 413, 322 S.E.2d 762, 764 (1984) (interpreting the 1983 version of section 24-5). We now must decide what method of calculation best implements the provisions of each statute as well as effectuates the legislative intent.\nBoth parties cite case law assertedly consistent with their respective positions. In support of her contention that the settlement sum should be subtracted after the prejudgment interest is calculated, plaintiff notes two cases from this Court decided before the prejudgment-interest statute was enacted. First, this Court has said that the amount paid for a covenant not to sue is \u201ca credit to be entered on the total recovery.\u201d Slade v. Sherrod, 175 N.C. 346, 348, 95 S.E. 557, 558 (1918). Later, the Court stated that \u201cthe weight of both authority and reason is . . . that any amount paid by anybody, whether they be joint tort-feasors or otherwise, for and on account of any injury or damage^] should be held for a credit on the total recovery in any action for the same injury or damage.\u201d Holland v. Southern Pub. Utils. Co., 208 N.C. 289, 292, 180 S.E. 592, 593-94 (1935). Plaintiff also cites a decision in which the Court of Appeals held that a defendant \u201cwas entitled to a credit against the judgment in the amount of $2,000, the sum paid by the \u2018joint-tort-feasor.\u2019 \u201d Ryder v. Benfield, 43 N.C. App. 278, 287, 258 S.E.2d 849, 855 (1979). None of these cases, however, deal with the issue of prejudgment interest and the interaction between sections 24-5(b) and 1B-4.\nOne case plaintiff cites seems to use \u201ctotal recovery\u201d and \u201cverdict\u201d interchangeably. See Ryals v. Hall-Lane Moving & Storage Co., 122 N.C. App. 134, 468 S.E.2d 69 (1996). In Ryals the trial court reduced a $25,000 jury verdict to $15,000 because of a $10,000 settlement between the plaintiff and a codefendant. Although the Court of Appeals said the settlement amount applies to the \u201ctotal recovery,\u201d citing Holland, the jury\u2019s damages award was reduced to $15,000. See id. at 141-42, 468 S.E.2d at 74-75. There was no mention of prejudgment interest, and the Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court\u2019s calculation. Again, this case gives us no guidance as to the proper interaction between 24-5(b) and 1B-4.\nDefendant cites numerous cases in which our courts implicitly have approved his position, which calls for a subtraction of settlement amounts from the compensatory damages verdict before prejudgment interest is calculated. In Baxley v. Nationwide this Court addressed the definition of \u201cdamages\u201d in the context of an auto accident in which one insurer had tendered its policy limits of $25,000 to the clerk of court while the other went to trial on its underinsuredmotorist coverage. In defining damages, the Court had to determine what amount the insured was \u201clegally entitled to recover\u201d from the tort-feasor. The Court stated: \u201cWe believe the insured is legally entitled to recover the total amount of money that the judgment says she is entitled to recover from the tort-feasor. In this case, the judgment awarded the insured $100,000 in compensatory damages and prejudgment interest on $75,000.\u201d Baxley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 334 N.C. 1, 7, 430 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1993). Defendant also points to this Court\u2019s per curiam opinion affirming the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision in Beaver v. Hampton, 106 N.C. App. 172, 416 S.E.2d 8 (1992), aff\u2019d in part and vacated in part, 333 N.C. 455, 427 S.E.2d 317 (1993) (per curiam). In Beaver the jury returned a $30,000 compensatory damages verdict in an auto accident case. One insurer had tendered $25,000 after the claim was filed but prior to trial. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court should have awarded prejudgment interest on the entire $30,000, including the $25,000 paid by the liability carrier. However, the $25,000 bore prejudgment interest only from the filing date until it actually was paid; prejudgment interest continued for the entire trial only on the remaining $5,000. See id. at 179, 416 S.E.2d at 12. This Court explicitly affirmed the Court of Appeals\u2019 determination that prejudgment interest should be awarded on the full amount of the judgment. See Beaver, 333 N.C. at 457, 427 S.E.2d at 318. Again, though, Baxley and Beaver did not speak directly to the proper interaction between sections 24-5(b) and IB-4.\nThe Court of Appeals did not address any prejudgment interest issue in Braddy v. Nationwide, but the recitation of the damages and judgment computations there reveals that the trial court subtracted the amount of the settlement before calculating prejudgment interest. See Braddy v. Nationwide Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 122 N.C. App. 402, 405, 470 S.E.2d 820, 821, appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 343 N.C. 749, 473 S.E.2d 610 (1996). It appears, therefore, that some trial courts are applying the statutes as defendant urges. Again, Braddy did not specifically present the issue of harmonizing sections 24-5(b) and 1B-4.\nAs noted, one legislative purpose in enacting the prejudgment interest provision of the statute was to compensate plaintiffs for loss of the use of their money between the filing of the suit and the entry of the judgment. Powe, 312 N.C. at 413, 322 S.E.2d at 764. We do not believe, however, that the legislature intended to overcompensate plaintiffs. Here, plaintiffs preferred method of calculation would do that by awarding interest on money the use of which she has had since the time of the codefendants\u2019 settlement. \u201cBoth reason and justice decree that there should be collected no double compensation, for any injury, however many sources of compensation there may be.\u201d Holland, 208 N.C. at 292, 180 S.E. at 594. Defendant\u2019s preferred method, however \u2014 subtracting the settlement amount from the compensatory damages verdict before calculating prejudgment interest\u2014 is prohibited by the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5, which requires calculation of prejudgment interest on the entire compensatory-damages verdict. We do not believe the General Assembly intended either result, and we thus decline to adopt either method.\nThe trial court calculated the prejudgment interest as the General Assembly has directed, that is, on the entire compensatory damages award without subtracting settlements. To effectively, accurately, and fairly reduce the \u201cclaim\u201d against a nonsettling tort-feasor as section IB-4 of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act requires, the changing value of that claim over time must be considered. The scheme adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in interpreting similar New York statutes does this effectively by converting the settlement amount to judgment-time dollars, using the same legal rate of interest that is used in calculating prejudgment interest on the compensatory damages verdict, then subtracting the adjusted settlement figure from the adjusted compensatory damages figure. See In re Joint E. Dist. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 18 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1994). Calculation under this method consistently results in a plaintiff being compensated for the loss of use of his or her money at, rather than below or above, the legal rate of interest. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants are unjustly enriched, and defendants are not unfairly penalized for exercising their legal right to defend against a claim. This method harmonizes sections 1B-4 and 24-5(b) by giving effect, fairly to both parties, to the legislative intent to both compensate plaintiffs with prejudgment interest on their compensatory damage awards and give defendants the benefit of an appropriate setoff for the portion of that award already paid by a settling codefendant. See id. at 133; Williams, 299 N.C. at 180-81, 261 S.E.2d at 854.\nAccordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court, Pitt County, for recalculation of the judgment by (1) adding prejudgment interest at the legal rate to the entire compensatory damages award as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) requires, (2) adding interest at the legal rate to the settlement sum from the date of settlement until the date of judgment, and (3) subtracting the second calculation from the first to determine the amount of compensatory damages defendant owes to plaintiff.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\nJustice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Faison & Gillespie, by O. William Faison and John W. Jensen, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Walker, Barwick, Clark & Allen, L.L.P., by Thomas E. Barwick, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VICKIE ANN BROWN, Administratrix of the Estate for Mary Louise Brown v. KENNETH MICHAEL FLOWE, M.D.\nNo. 110PA98\n(Filed 31 December 1998)\nJudgments \u00a7 652 (NCI4th)\u2014 prejudgment interest \u2014 settlement and verdict \u2014 calculation\nA medical malpractice action which was settled against some parties and which reached a verdict against this defendant was remanded for recalculation of the judgment by adding prejudgment interest at the legal rate to the entire compensatory damages award as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) requires; adding interest at the legal rate to the settlement sum from the date of settlement until the date of judgment; and subtracting the second calculation from the first to determine the amount of compensatory damages defendant owes to plaintiff. This method harmonizes N.C.G.S. \u00a7 IB-4 and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) by giving effect, fairly to both parties, to a legislative intent to both compensate plaintiffs with prejudgment interest on their compensatory damage awards and give defendants the benefit of an appropriate setoff for the portion of that award already paid by a settling codefendant.\nJustice Wynn did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 128 N.C. App. 668, 496 S.E.2d 830 (1998), affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding a judgment entered by Everett, J., on 30 September 1996 in Superior Court, Pitt County. Heard in the Supreme Court 16 November 1998.\nFaison & Gillespie, by O. William Faison and John W. Jensen, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWalker, Barwick, Clark & Allen, L.L.P., by Thomas E. Barwick, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0520-01", "first_page_order": 558, "last_page_order": 565 }