{ "id": 571673, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA PESTICIDE BOARD, FILE NOS. IR94-128, IR94-151, IR94-155, H. RAY MEADS, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND DRUG PROTECTION DIVISION, PESTICIDE SECTION, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Meads v. North Carolina Department of Agriculture", "decision_date": "1998-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 139A98", "first_page": "656", "last_page": "676", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "349 N.C. 656" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "498 S.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700-01", "parenthetical": "quoting Cheek, 273 N.C. at 298, 160 S.E.2d at 23" }, { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515293 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67", "parenthetical": "quoting Cheek, 273 N.C. at 298, 160 S.E.2d at 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" }, { "page": "23" }, { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575113 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4680774 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 N.C. 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Ed. 563", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572", "parenthetical": "\"the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 U.S. 483", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6931894 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487-88", "parenthetical": "\"the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/348/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "816 F.2d 907", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1677991 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/816/0907-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 F.3d 1252", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7415276 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/52/1252-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 194", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180936 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4730236 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8527932 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 U.S.C. \u00a7 136", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(gg)" }, { "page": "(gg)" }, { "page": "(e)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 C.F.R. \u00a7 156.200", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4756963 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. 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IR94-128, IR94-151, IR94-155, H. RAY MEADS, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND DRUG PROTECTION DIVISION, PESTICIDE SECTION, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Justice.\nWe are asked in this appeal to determine whether the North Carolina Pesticide Board properly penalized an aerial pesticide applicator for violating various North Carolina pesticide regulations. On initial review, our Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s reversal of the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision. Finding error, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision.\nOn 26 August 1994, petitioner H. Ray Meads (\u201cMeads\u201d) aerially sprayed the pesticide Pounce on James Duncan\u2019s (\u201cDuncan\u201d) soybean field located on S.R. 1148 in Currituck County. On that same day, Mary Jo Windley (\u201cWindley\u201d), a Currituck County resident whose property adjoins the Duncan field, exited her home and encountered a vapor that made her eyes bum and her lips tingle. Consequently, Windley complained to the North Carolina Department of Agriculture, Food and Drug Protection Division, Pesticide Section (\u201cNCDA\u201d).\nIn response, on 27 August 1994, an NCDA inspector collected vegetation samples from the east and west sides of S.R. 1148, the Windley yard, and the target soybean field. Analysis of the samples revealed varying levels of Permethrin, an active ingredient in Pounce, ranging from 1.6 parts per million (\u201cppm\u201d) in the sprayed target field to . 10 ppm in the Windley yard. Permethrin traces were also discovered within twenty-five feet of S.R. 1148; one-hundred feet of Windley\u2019s residence; and three-hundred feet of Royster Clark, Inc., a nearby business open at the time of Meads\u2019 Pounce application.\nOn 28 November 1994, the NCDA issued Meads a notice violation citing his alleged violation of the North Carolina pesticide law and regulations. Subsequently, the Pesticide Board held a hearing and concluded that Meads violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 143-443(b); 143-469(b)(2); and 143-456(a)(2), (4), and (5) by applying Pounce in a manner inconsistent with its label. The Pesticide Board also concluded that Meads violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-456(a)(4) by applying Pounce in a faulty, careless, or negligent manner. Lastly, the Pesticide Board concluded that Meads violated North Carolina Administrative Rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005(b), (c), and (e), respectively, by aerially depositing pesticide within three-hundred feet of the nearby business Royster Clark, Inc.; twenty-five feet of S.R. 1148; and one-hundred feet of the Windley residence. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 143-469(a)(2) and 143-456(a)(5), the Pesticide Board assessed Meads a $1,000 fine and revoked his aerial pesticide license for one year. Thereafter, Meads sought judicial review of the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision in Superior Court, Wake County.\nIn an order entered 7 February 1997, the trial court concluded that the Pesticide Board improperly interpreted rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005 and erred in its application of obsolete labeling restrictions. Additionally, the court concluded that the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. Lastly, the court concluded that the buffer-zone regulations set forth in rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005 violated Meads\u2019 constitutional due process and equal protection rights. Accordingly, the trial court reversed the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision.\nOur Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court\u2019s ruling that the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. See Meads v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 128 N.C. App. 750, 498 S.E.2d 210 (1998). Because this issue was determinative of the case, the Court of Appeals did not address the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the regulations and accompanying penalties violated Meads\u2019 constitutional due process and equal protection rights. In dissent, Judge Greene concluded that \u201cthe whole record contains substantial evidence to support the [Pesticide] Board\u2019s determination.\u201d\nWe are now asked to determine: (1) whether the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision was supported by substantial evidence, (2) whether the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision was based upon errors of law, and (3) whether the buffer-zone regulations set forth in rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005 violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. We address each issue seriatim.\nI. WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE PESTICIDE BOARD\u2019S DECISION\nAs an administrative agency, the Pesticide Board is subject to the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d), codified at chapter 150B of the General Statutes. See Amanini v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Human Resources, 114 N.C. App. 668, 673, 443 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1994). Under the APA, a reviewing court may reverse or modify an agency\u2019s decision if the petitioner\u2019s substantial rights may have been prejudiced by findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions which are arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-51(b) (1991).\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-51(b), the proper standard of review \u201cdepends upon the issues presented on appeal.\u201d In re Appeal by McCrary, 112 N.C. App. 161, 165, 435 S.E.2d 359, 363 (1993). When the reviewing court is determining whether an agency\u2019s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence, as we are in the instant case, it must apply the \u201cwhole record\u201d test. See Amanini, 114 N.C. App. at 674, 443 S.E.2d at 118.\n\u201cThe \u2018whole record\u2019 test requires the reviewing court to examine all competent evidence (the \u2018whole record\u2019) in order to determine whether the agency decision is supported by \u2018substantial evidence.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Rector v. N.C. Sheriffs\u2019 Educ. & Training Standards Comm\u2019n, 103 N.C. App. 527, 532, 406 S.E.2d 613, 616 (1991)). \u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State ex rel. Comm\u2019r of Ins. v. N.C. Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70, 80, 231 S.E.2d 882, 888 (1977). Therefore, if we conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board\u2019s decision, we must uphold it. See McCrary, 112 N.C. App. at 168, 435 S.E.2d at 365. We note that while the whole-record test \u201c \u2018does require the court to take into account both the evidence justifying the agency\u2019s decision and the contradictory evidence from which a different result could be reached,\u2019 \u201d id. at 167-68, 435 S.E.2d at 364 (quoting Lackey v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 238, 293 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1982)), the test \u201cdoes not allow the reviewing court to replace the Pesticide Board\u2019s judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo,\u201d Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977).\nAs stated, the Pesticide Board concluded that Meads violated 2 NCAC 9L .1005(b), (c), and (e) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 143-443(b)(3), 143-456(a)(2), and 143-469(b)(2). We address each violation respectively.\nUnder 2 NCAC 9L .1005(b), it is unlawful to aerially apply a pesticide within three-hundred feet of an occupied business. The Pesticide Board, in concluding that Meads violated this rule, initially noted that Meads aerially applied Pounce on Duncan\u2019s soybean field at some point between 9:30 and 11:00 a.m. \u2014 a time during which the nearby business Royster Clark, Inc., was occupied. The Pesticide Board found that vegetation samples collected approximately 234 feet from Royster Clark, Inc., contained .10 ppm of Permethrin. From these facts, the Pesticide Board concluded that Meads improperly applied pesticide within three-hundred feet of an occupied business in violation of 2 NCAC 9L .1005(b). We conclude that this evidence provides sufficient support for the Pesticide Board\u2019s ruling. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision that the Pesticide Board\u2019s holding with respect to this issue was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence.\nUnder 2 NCAC 9L .1005(c), pesticide may not be aerially applied within twenty-five feet of a roadway. The Pesticide Board, in determining that Meads violated this rule, found that a vegetation sample taken four feet from the pavement along the east side of S.R. 1148 contained . 17 ppm of Permethrin, while a vegetation sample taken three feet from the pavement along the west side of S.R. 1148 contained .54 ppm of that same substance. This evidence constitutes substantial evidence to support the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision that Meads violated this rule. Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision to the extent that it found that the Pesticide Board\u2019s holding with respect to this rule was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence.\nUnder 2 NCAC 9L .1005(e), pesticide may not be aerially applied within one-hundred feet of a residence. In ruling that Meads violated this rule, the Pesticide Board noted that two vegetation samples collected within forty-seven and sixty feet of Ms. Windley\u2019s residence contained .10 ppm and .44 ppm of Permethrin, respectively. Moreover, the Pesticide Board noted that the Pounce label provides that the product \u201c[c]auses moderate eye irritation.\u201d The Pesticide Board concluded that the evidence showing that Ms. Windley\u2019s eyes burned and her lips tingled showed that there were traces of Pounce within the restricted area. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision that the Pesticide Board\u2019s holding with respect to this rule was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence.\nWe next address the Court of Appeals\u2019 holding that the Pesticide Board\u2019s conclusion that Meads violated certain statutes was unsupported by substantial evidence. The Pesticide Board found that Meads violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 143-443(b)(3), 143-456(a)(2), and 143-469(b)(2), which make it unlawful for any person to use any pesticide inconsistent with its label. At the time of Meads\u2019 aerial application, the Pounce label read in pertinent part: \u201cDo not apply this product in such a manner as to directly or through drift expose workers or other persons.\u201d As stated, the Pesticide Board concluded that Ms. Windley was exposed to Pounce upon exiting her home, as evidenced by her irritated eyes and tingling lips \u2014 symptoms associated with Pounce exposure. This evidence, combined with the undisputed fact that Meads aerially applied Pounce to land adjoining Ms. Windley\u2019s lot, provides substantial evidence to support the Pesticide Board\u2019s conclusion that Meads violated these statutes. Therefore, to the extent that the Court of Appeals overturned the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision with respect to these statutory sections, we reverse.\nLastly, we address the Pesticide Board\u2019s conclusion that Meads violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-456(a)(4), which provides that the Pesticide Board may revoke a license upon finding that the licensee has operated in a faulty, careless, or negligent manner. The preceding evidence, standing alone, provides substantial evidence that Meads\u2019 aerial application of Pounce was faulty, careless, or negligent. Additionally, we note that the Pesticide Board further supported its conclusion by pointing to the numerous traces of Permethrin found outside of the target area. Thus, these facts provide substantial evidence to support the Pesticide Board\u2019s conclusion regarding this issue.\nII. ERRORS OF LAW\nWe next consider whether the trial court correctly concluded that the Pesticide Board: (1) erroneously interpreted the buffer zone regulations set forth in rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005; and (2) erroneously applied an obsolete labeling restriction when concluding that Meads violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 143-443(b)(3), 143-456(a)(2), and 143-469(b)(2) by applying Pounce in a manner inconsistent with its label. Because this issue involves an error of law, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-51(b)(4) directs us to utilize de novo review. See Friends of Hatteras Island v. Coastal Resources Comm\u2019n, 117 N.C. App. 556, 567, 452 S.E.2d 337, 344 (1995).\nA. BUFFER-ZONE REGULATIONS\nInitially, we determine whether the Pesticide Board erroneously interpreted the term \u201cdeposited\u201d as it is used in rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005. Meads argues that the Pesticide Board improperly equated the term \u201cdeposited\u201d with the term \u201cdetected\u201d when concluding that he unlawfully \u201cdeposited\u201d Pounce within the restricted buffer zones.\nRule 2 NCAC 9L .1005 contains the term \u201cdeposited\u201d in three pertinent areas. First, 2 NCAC 9L .1005(b) provides that \u201c[n]o pesticide shall be deposited by aircraft within 300 feet of the premises of . . . any building (other than a residence) which is used for business or social activities if either the premises or the building is occupied by people.\u201d Further, 2 NCAC 9L .1005(c) provides that \u201c[n]o pesticide shall be deposited by aircraft on the right-of-way of a public road or within 25 feet of the road, whichever is the greater distance.\u201d Lastly, 2 NCAC 9L .1005(e) provides that \u201c[n]o pesticide shall be deposited within 100 feet of any residence.\u201d In conjunction, these areas constitute \u201cbuffer zones\u201d where it is unlawful to \u201cdeposit\u201d pesticides.\nMeads argues that the term \u201cdeposited,\u201d as utilized in the preceding rules, requires a finding that Meads himself \u201cdeposited\u201d Pounce within the restricted buffer zone. According to Meads, the only evidence that he \u201cdeposited\u201d Pounce within these zones was samples taken from those areas which indicated traces of Permethrin. Meads contends that this evidence shows that Pounce was \u201cdetected\u201d in those zones, not \u201cdeposited\u201d there.\nWhen a term is not defined or provided a technical meaning, this Court will construe it in accordance with its ordinary meaning. See State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 435, 323 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1984). According to Webster\u2019s Dictionary, the term \u201cdeposit\u201d is defined as \u201cto let fall (as sediment).\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 310 (10th ed. 1993). Using this definition in the context of aerial pesticide application, we conclude that the term \u201cdeposit\u201d refers to any action which results in either the direct or indirect (e.g., drift) falling or placement of pesticide within a restricted buffer zone.\nWe find further support for this conclusion by using the well-settled principle that provisions should be construed in a manner which tends to prevent them from being circumvented. See Friends of Hatteras, 117 N.C. App. at 573, 452 S.E.2d at 348. In the case sub judice, Meads argues that we should construe the term \u201cdeposited\u201d to include only intentional aerial applications of pesticides in a restricted buffer zone. Meads\u2019 construction, however, encourages contravention of this rule by allowing aerial applicators to defend their actions based upon an almost unascertainable mental intent. That is, an applicator can simply plead ignorance to a zone\u2019s restricted status or to the principles of drift. This, in turn, could allow aerial applicators to carelessly apply pesticides by granting them the \u201cI didn\u2019t mean for the pesticides to deposit there\u201d defense.\nIn summation, we conclude that the trial court correctly concluded that the term \u201cdeposited,\u201d as set forth in rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005, means \u201cto let fall.\u201d Accordingly, an aerial pesticide applicator violates this rule whenever he takes any action which results in either the direct or indirect (e.g., drift) falling or placement of pesticide within a restricted buffer zone.\nB. DID THE PESTICIDE BOARD RELY ON OBSOLETE LABELING\nWe now address Meads\u2019 contention that the Pesticide Board improperly relied upon an obsolete labeling restriction when it determined that he applied Pounce in a manner inconsistent with its labeling. Specifically, the Pesticide Board rested its decision upon a labeling restriction which states that Pounce should not be applied \u201cin such a manner as to directly or through drift expose workers or other persons.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The Environmental Protection Agency (\u201cEPA\u201d) requires this warning on every pesticide label. See 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 136v(b) (1992). The warning itself, however, was changed by the EPA on 20 October 1992 to read: \u201cDo not apply this product in a way that will contact workers or other persons, either directly or through drift.\u201d 40 C.ER. \u00a7 156.206(a) (1993). Meads argues that there is a significant difference between the terms \u201cexpose\u201d and \u201ccontact\u201d and that the Pesticide Board erred in relying upon the old label and its use of the word \u201cexpose.\u201d\nAs stated, on 20 October 1992, the EPA changed its pesticide-labeling restriction. Under 40 C.F.R. \u00a7 156.200, which governs the scope and applicability of the amended labeling restriction, \u201c[n]o product to which this subpart applies shall be distributed or sold without amended labeling by any registrant after April 21, 1994\u201d; and \u201c[n]o product to which this subpart applies shall be distributed or sold without the amended labeling by any person after October 23, 1995.\u201d 40 C.F.R. \u00a7 156.200(c)(3), (4) (1993) (emphasis added). Therefore, 40 C.F.R. \u00a7 156.200 contained a grace period during which the affected parties could sell or distribute their products without the amended label. Further, the length of this grace period was based upon the seller or distributor\u2019s status \u2014 that is, whether the affected party was a registrant or person.\nIn the case sub judice, Meads was not a registrant, and therefore the labeling restriction was inapplicable until 23 October 1995. Because the alleged improper application occurred in August 1994, the amended labeling restriction did not apply.\nMoreover, 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 136(gg) defines the phrase \u201cto distribute or sell\u201d as to distribute, sell, offer for sale, hold for distribution, hold for sale, hold for shipment, ship, deliver for shipment, release for shipment, or receive and (having so received) deliver or offer to deliver. Under this definition, so long as a pesticide applicator does not deliver unapplied pesticide to an individual, the applicator does not \u201cdistribute or sell\u201d it by simply holding or applying it as part of a pest removal service. 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 136(gg) (1992). Indeed, any applicator who holds or applies registered pesticides or who uses dilutions of registered pesticides only to provide a service of controlling pests without delivering any unapplied pesticide to any person so served is not deemed to be a seller or distributor of pesticides. 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 136(e)(1).\nIn the case sub judice, Meads was a \u201ccertified applicator\u201d of pesticides whose sole service involved the control of pests. Meads never provided any individual with unapplied pesticide. Accordingly, because Meads was not a distributor or seller of pesticides, he was not subject to the EPA\u2019s amended labeling restrictions.\nAlthough Meads was not bound by the EPA\u2019s amended labeling restrictions, the Board was nonetheless permitted to apply the Pounce label restrictions as they existed at the time of Meads application. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 143-443(b)(3), 143-456(a)(2), and 143-469(b)(2), an applicator may not apply a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its label. \u201cThe term \u2018label\u2019 means the written, printed, or graphic matter on, or attached to, the pesticide (or device) or the immediate container thereof, and the outside container or wrapper of the retail package, if any there be, of the pesticide (or device).\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-460(19) (1993). Further, the term \u201clabeling\u201d means all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter which, at any time, were placed upon or accompanied the pesticide, its wrappers, or containers. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-460(20). Accordingly, Meads was forbidden to apply the pesticide in a manner inconsistent with any written, printed, or graphic material located upon Pounce and its accompanying materials at or before the time of application.\nIn August 1994, the time of Meads\u2019 alleged improper application, the Pounce label stated in pertinent part: \u201cDo not- apply this product in such a manner as to directly or through drift expose workers or other persons.\u201d Indeed, the Pounce label, which was not required to be changed until 23 October 1995, still contained the old label at the time of Meads\u2019 application. Therefore, the Pesticide Board was correct in relying on that label.\nWith respect to whether Meads applied the pesticide in a manner inconsistent with the label, we note that the term \u201cexpose,\u201d as used in this context, is defined as \u201csubject to risk from a harmful action or condition.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 410. In the case sub judice, drift from Meads\u2019 aerial application of Pounce entered upon the Windley property. Moreover, Ms. Windley encountered the drift, as evidenced by her irritated eyes and tingling lips. This encounter subjected Ms. Windley to risk from a harmful condition and therefore exposed her to the product in violation of N.C.G.S. \u2022\u00a7\u00a7 143-44300(3), 143-456(a)(2), and 143-469(b)(2). Accordingly, the Pesticide Board correctly determined that Meads applied Pounce in a manner inconsistent with its label. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals to the extent that it concluded that the Pesticide Board relied upon an obsolete labeling restriction.\nIII. CONSTITUTIONALITY\nWe now reach the issue of whether the buffer-zone regulations set forth in rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005 violate the constitutional rights of due process and equal protection.\nInitially, we address the NCDA\u2019s contention that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this issue as a result of Meads\u2019 alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The NCDA contends that Meads, before arguing the constitutionality of the regulations in the trial court, was required to pursue one of two options: (1) petition the Pesticide Board to amend or repeal the regulation pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-20, or (2) request a declaratory ruling from the Pesticide Board pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-4. We conclude that the NCDA\u2019s argument is without merit.\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-43:\nAny person who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case, and who has exhausted all administrative remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of the decision under this Article, unless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by another statute ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-43 (1991). Accordingly, that statute sets forth five requirements that a party must satisfy before seeking review of an adverse administrative determination: \u201c(1) the person must be aggrieved; (2) there must be a contested case; (3) there must be a final agency decision; (4) administrative remedies must be exhausted; and (5) no other adequate procedure for judicial review can be provided by another statute.\u201d Huang v. N.C. State Univ., 107 N.C. App. 710, 713, 421 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1992).\nIn the case sub judice, Meads has satisfied all five requirements. First, the fine and revocation levied against Meads clearly make him an aggrieved party. Second, this case is \u201ccontested\u201d because it involves an administrative proceeding to resolve a dispute between an agency and another person with respect to licensing and the levying of a monetary fine. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-2(2) (1991) (a \u201ccontested case\u201d is one which involves \u201can administrative proceeding ... to resolve a dispute between an agency and another person that involves the rights, duties, or privileges, including licensing or the levy of a monetary penalty\u201d). Further, the final three requirements are met because the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision constituted a final agency decision which left Meads without an administrative remedy or other adequate statutory procedure for judicial review.\nIn the NCDA\u2019s exhaustion argument, it contends that the two administrative options stated above constituted adequate alternative procedures for judicial review. Therefore, the NCDA argues that Meads was required to exhaust them pursuant to our fourth and fifth requirements. The NCDA\u2019s argument, however, ignores our well-settled rule that a statute\u2019s constitutionality shall be determined by the judiciary, not an administrative board. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gold, 254 N.C. 168, 118 S.E.2d 792 (1961); see also Johnston v. Gaston County, 71 N.C. App. 707, 323 S.E.2d 381 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 508, 329 N.C. 392 (1985). Because it is the province of the judiciary to make constitutional determinations, any effort made by Meads to have the constitutionality of the buffer-zone regulations determined by the Pesticide Board would have been in vain. Accordingly, given the constitutional nature of this issue, the NCDA options were inadequate, and therefore Meads was not required to exhaust them. Thus, Meads satisfied the aforementioned requirements and was entitled to judicial review.\nWith respect to the pertinent question of whether rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005 is constitutional, we note that our scope of review is governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-51(b)(1). Under that statute, this Court, when reviewing an agency decision, may reverse or modify the decision if the petitioner\u2019s substantial rights may have been prejudiced by findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions which violate the North Carolina or United States Constitution. Further, when a petitioner alleges that an agency violated his constitutional rights, this Court will undertake de novo review. See Air-A-Plane Corp. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Envir., Health & Natural Resources, 118 N.C. App. 118, 124, 454 S.E.2d 297, 301, disc. rev. denied, 340 N.C. 358, 458 S.E.2d 184 (1995).\nA. DUE PROCESS\nUnder federal due process jurisprudence, legislation is presumed constitutional unless it involves a suspect classification or impinges upon a fundamental personal right. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 49 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1976) (per curiam); Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1978); Kennedy v. Hughes, 596 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Del. 1984). Further, legislation which is presumed constitutional passes federal constitutional muster so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 10 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1963).\nUnder North Carolina jurisprudence, state \u201cdue process\u201d is governed by Section 19 of the Constitution of North Carolina, which provides that \u201c[n]o person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.\u201d N.C. Const. art. I, \u00a7 19. Although this Court often considers the \u201claw of the land\u201d synonymous with \u201cdue process of law,\u201d see A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979), we have reserved the right to grant Section 19 relief against unreasonable and arbitrary state statutes in circumstances where relief might not be obtainable under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 329 S.E.2d 648 (1985). Nonetheless, the twofold constitutional inquiry under both the North Carolina and United States Constitutions is the same: (1) Does the regulation have a legitimate objective; and (2) if so, are the means chosen to implement that objective reasonable? See A-S-P Assocs., 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444; Treants Enters. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (1986), aff'd, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987).\nThe objectives underlying North Carolina\u2019s pesticide regulations are set forth in the preamble to the pesticide law. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-435 (1993). According to that section, pesticide regulations were adopted \u201cto regulate in the public interest the use, application, sale, disposal and registration of insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, defoliants, desiccants, plant growth regulators, nematicides, rodenticides, and any other pesticides designated by the North Carolina Pesticide Board.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-435(b). The preamble to the pesticide law provides that\npesticides . . . may seriously injure health, property, or wildlife if not properly used. Pesticides may injure man or animals, either by direct poisoning or by gradual accumulation of poisons in the tissues. Crops or other plants may also be injured by their improper use. The drifting or washing of pesticides into streams or lakes can cause appreciable danger to aquatic life. A pesticide applied for the purpose of killing pests in a crop, which is not itself injured by the pesticide, may drift and injure other crops or nontarget organisms with which it comes in contact.\nId.\nThe buffer-zone regulations questioned by Meads concern the aerial application of pesticides. Specifically, the buffer-zone regulations prohibit depositing pesticide within enumerated distances of schools, hospitals, nursing homes, churches, occupied businesses, roadways, and areas where aquatic life may be harmed. See 2 NCAC 9L .1005 (July 1988). A plain reading of these regulations, in conjunction with the preamble to the pesticide law, convincingly demonstrates that the overriding objective behind our pesticide law is to protect both people and the environment from the harmful risks accompanying pesticide application. Undoubtedly, this is a legitimate objective.\nGiven our determination that the regulations were created to achieve a legitimate objective, we must now determine whether they utilize a reasonable means of accomplishing it. In making this determination, we note that the Pesticide Board\u2019s rule \u201cis endowed with a presumption of legislative validity, and the burden is on [the party challenging the rule] to show that there is no rational connection between the Board\u2019s action and its conceded interest.\u201d Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198, 59 L. Ed. 2d 248, 254 (1979). Further, the party challenging the rule must prove that the state agency\u2019s action is so irrational that no reasonable conception could justify it. See Chambers Med. Techs, of S.C., Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1263 (4th Cir. 1995).\nAs stated, the underlying purpose behind the pesticide regulations is to reduce or eliminate the risk harmful pesticides place upon humans and the environment. The Pesticide Board determined that the best way to achieve this purpose was to flatly prohibit the depositing of pesticides in certain areas. The logic is simple: If the source of the harm is eliminated, so is the harm itself. This logical connection demonstrates that the Pesticide Board chose a means which is rationally related to its legitimate objective.\nIn concluding that the buffer-zone regulations violated due process, the trial court based its decision upon two factors: (1) the regulations failed to distinguish between harmless and harmful deposit levels; and (2) the regulations do not involve a determination of whether the \u201cdeposit\u201d was intentional, purposeful, or willfully negligent. We conclude that the trial court\u2019s reliance on these factors was misplaced.\nWith respect to the trial court\u2019s finding that the regulations do not discriminate between harmless and harmful pesticide deposit levels, we conclude that the trial court improperly considered this factor. In the case sub judice, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Meads\u2019 deposit was significant enough to constitute a harmful deposit. Indeed, Meads\u2019 own expert testified that the levels found within the rights-of-way and around the Windley home were sufficient to kill beneficial insects and possibly cause Ms. Windley harm. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s reliance upon harmless versus harmful levels had no place in the present case.\nAdditionally, we note that a restriction which prohibits some activities that are harmful as well as some that are safe is not per se unconstitutional. See, e.g., Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hallowell, 816 F.2d 907, 913 (3d Cir. 1987) (geographical perimeters of the quarantine zone bore a rational connection to the objective sought; indeed, these \u201cboundaries were selected to cover areas of known infection and to include a five-mile buffer zone so that they could be readily identifiable, thereby avoiding poultry being inadvertently shipped through or out of the quarantine areas\u201d). For example, numerous drugs and pesticides like DDT have been banned from this country even though they may be beneficial for certain uses at specified levels. Further, under the rational-relation test, the means utilized to achieve a legitimate objective need not be narrowly tailored and can be constitutional even though they may be broader than necessary. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572 (1955) (\u201cthe law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional\u201d).\nTurning to the trial court\u2019s second basis for concluding that the buffer-zone regulations violate due process \u2014 the regulations do not involve a determination of whether the deposit was intentional, purposeful, or willfully negligent \u2014 we again find the trial court\u2019s conclusion misplaced. Simply stated, due process does not require every regulatory provision to contain a state-of-mind element. See, e.g., State v. Sumner, 232 N.C. 386, 61 S.E.2d 84 (1950) (holding that a warrant was sufficient to support a conviction of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway at a speed of ninety miles an hour). For example, we have held that proof of a speeding violation requires nothing more than a showing that the vehicle was traveling above the speed limit. Id. Similarly, we have held that statutory rape, as a strict-liability crime, requires nothing more than proof that the defendant committed the act, see, e.g., State v. Murry, 277 N.C. 197, 203, 176 S.E.2d 738, 742 (1970) (\u201c[n]either force[] nor intent [is an] element[] of this offense\u201d); the fact that the defendant failed to act purposefully, intentionally, or with willful negligence is of no consequence.\nIn the case sub judice, the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision not to include an intent element in rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005 is rationally related to its legitimate objective of protecting humans and the environment from the risks associated with pesticide application. Specifically, the risk and harm to humans and the environment are the same regardless of whether the pesticide was intentionally deposited in a buffer zone. The only effect an intent element would have upon the rule would be to place an undue burden on the rule\u2019s enforcement. Indeed, numerous cases would end up focusing upon the applicator\u2019s intent, a focus having no relationship to the regulation\u2019s overriding goal.\nAccordingly, we conclude that the buffer-zone regulations set forth in rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005 are rationally related to the legislative goal of protecting people and the environment from the risks associated with pesticide use. Moreover, we conclude that the means taken to achieve this goal are reasonable. Therefore, the buffer-zone regulations do not violate due process.\nB. EQUAL PROTECTION\nThe trial court determined that the buffer-zone regulations violate both the state and federal constitutional Equal Protection Clauses because they treat aerial pesticide applicators differently from ground pesticide applicators. In so ruling, the trial court held that there should be no difference in the restrictions placed upon these methods because the resulting harm is the same regardless of which method is used. We disagree.\nAlthough statutes are void as denying equal protection whenever similarly situated persons are subject to different restrictions or are given different privileges under the same conditions, see State v. McCleary, 65 N.C. App. 174, 186, 308 S.E.2d 883, 891-92 (1983), aff'd per curiam, 311 N.C. 397, 317 S.E.2d 870 (1984), inequalities and classifications do not per se render a legislative enactment unconstitutional, see Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 298, 160 S.E.2d 18, 23 (1968). Moreover, \u201c[classifications are not offensive to the Constitution \u2018when the classification is based on a reasonable distinction and the law is made to apply uniformly to all the members of the class affected.\u2019 \u201d Poor Richard\u2019s, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 67, 366 S.E.2d 697, 700-01 (1988) (quoting Cheek, 273 N.C. at 298, 160 S.E.2d at 23). Therefore, \u201c[classification is permitted when (1) it is based on differences between the business to be regulated and other businesses and (2) when these differences are rationally related to the purpose of the legislation.\u201d Id. at 67, 366 S.E.2d at 701.\nIn the case sub judice, we must determine whether aerial pesticide applicators, as a class regulated under rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005, are treated differently than the allegedly similarly situated class of ground pesticide applicators. Determinative of this issue is the fact that aerial applicators are indeed different from ground applicators.\nFirst, aerial applicators are subject to different licensing requirements under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-452(d). Under that section, separate classifications or subclassifications are specified for ground and aerial methods of application including the requirement that aerial applicator contractors, as well as pilots, obtain a license. Moreover, rule 2 NCAC 9L .0505 distinguishes aerial and ground classifications as evidenced by comparing subsection (1), which applies to \u201cpesticide applicators and public operators utilizing ground equipment,\u201d with subsection (2), which applies to \u201cpesticide applicators and public operators utilizing aerial equipment.\u201d 2 NCAC 9L .0505(1), (2) (Nov. 1984) (emphasis added). Thus, the laws and regulations recognize a distinction between aerial and ground applicators and treat each accordingly.\nSignificantly, this distinction is necessary to congeal the regulations with the pesticide law\u2019s overriding goal of protecting people and the environment. Specifically, the distinction is needed because of the increased risk of drift and other sources of nontarget deposit associated with aerial application. See G.W. Ware et al., Pesticide Drift: Deposit Efficiency from Ground Sprays on Cotton, 68 J. Econ. Entomology 549, 549-50 (1975). Indeed, Meads\u2019 own expert testified that an aerial applicator is ten times more likely to miss a targeted spraying zone than a ground applicator. Therefore, the increased risk of harm to people and the environment associated with aerial applications mandates treating aerial applicators in a distinct manner. Accordingly, this distinction is rationally related to the pesticide regulations\u2019 underlying purpose and therefore is constitutionally permissible.\nIn summation, the different treatment accorded aerial and ground applicators is not arbitrary; rather, it is reasonable and rests upon the differences in licensing requirements and qualifications associated with each method of application. Moreover, the differences are rationally related to the increased likelihood of an off-target occurrence associated with aerial application. Accordingly, we conclude that the buffer-zone regulations in rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005 comply with both the state and federal constitutional Equal Protection Clauses.\nIV. CONCLUSION\nWe conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was not substantial evidence to support the Pesticide Board\u2019s decision to assess a civil penalty and revoke Meads\u2019 license. We further conclude that the Pesticide Board did not commit any errors of law in reaching its decision. Lastly, we conclude that rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005 does not violate the constitutional rights of due process or equal protection.\nAccordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for further remand to the Superior Court, Wake County, to issue an order affirming the decision of the North Carolina Pesticide Board.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\n. S.R. 1148 is also known as North Gregory Road.\n. NCDA issued two other notice violations to Meads on 28 November 1994 for violations of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-456(a)(5) and 2 NCAC 9L .1005(c). The North Carolina Pesticide Board, however, did not assess a penalty for these violations. Additionally, Meads did not contest the Board\u2019s findings regarding these cases.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hatch, Little & Bunn, L.L.P., by David H. Permar and Tina L. Frazier, for petitioner-appellant and -appellee.", "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Melissa H. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent-appellant and -appellee.", "Southern Environmental Law Center, by Donnell Van Noppen III, Senior Attorney, on behalf of Agricultural Resources Center, Inc., amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA PESTICIDE BOARD, FILE NOS. IR94-128, IR94-151, IR94-155, H. RAY MEADS, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND DRUG PROTECTION DIVISION, PESTICIDE SECTION, Respondent\nNo. 139A98\n(Filed 31 Dec. 1998)\n1. Agriculture \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 aerial spraying of pesticide\u2014 application within three hundred feet of business \u2014 violation of regulation\nSubstantial evidence supported a decision by the Pesticide Board that petitioner, an aerial pesticide applicator, violated a pesticide regulation prohibiting the aerial application of a pesticide within three hundred feet of an occupied business where the evidence showed that petitioner aerially applied a pesticide to a soybean field during morning hours when a nearby business was occupied, and vegetation samples collected 234 feet from the business contained .10 ppm of Permethrin.\n2. Agriculture \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 aerial spraying of pesticide\u2014 application within twenty-five feet of roadway \u2014 violation of regulation\nSubstantial evidence supported a decision by the Pesticide Board that petitioner violated a pesticide regulation prohibiting the aerial application of a pesticide within twenty-five feet of a roadway where the evidence tended to show that vegetation samples taken within four feet of a road the day after petitioner sprayed a soybean field with a pesticide contained .17 ppm of Permethrin on the east side of the road and .54 ppm of that substance on the west side of the road.\n3. Agriculture \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 aerial spraying of pesticide\u2014 application within one hundred feet of residence \u2014 violation of regulation\nSubstantial evidence supported a decision by the Pesticide Board that petitioner violated a pesticide regulation prohibiting the application of a pesticide within one hundred feet of a residence where the evidence tended to show that the day after petitioner aerially applied a pesticide to a soybean field, two vegetation samples collected within forty-seven and sixty feet of a nearby residence contained .10 ppm and .44 ppm of Permethrin; the pesticide label states that the product causes moderate eye irritation; and the person living in the residence encountered a vapor that made her eyes burn and her lips tingle.\n4. Agriculture \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 aerial spraying of pesticide\u2014 use inconsistent with label \u2014 sufficient evidence\nSubstantial evidence supported a conclusion by the Pesticide Board that petitioner violated statutes making it unlawful to use any pesticide inconsistent with its label where the evidence tended to show that petitioner aerially applied a pesticide to a soybean field; the pesticide label stated that the pesticide should not be applied so as to directly and through drift expose workers or other persons; a resident of land adjoining the soybean field was exposed to a vapor containing the pesticide; and the pesticide was found on vegetation on the land adjoining the soybean field. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 143443(b)(3), 143456(a)(2), and 143469(b)(2).\n5. Agriculture \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 aerial pesticide applicator\u2014 operation in careless or negligent manner\nSubstantial evidence supported a conclusion by the Pesticide Board that petitioner aerial pesticide applicator violated the statute providing that the Board may revoke a license upon finding that the licensee has operated in a faulty, careless or negligent manner where the evidence showed that petitioner aerially applied a pesticide to a soybean field; a person living on adjoining land exited her home and encountered vapor that made her eyes bum and her lips tingle; and numerous traces of the pesticide were found on vegetation outside the target area.\n6. Agriculture \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 aerial pesticide regulations\u2014 buffer zones \u2014 meaning of \u201cdeposit\u201d\nAs used in the pesticide regulation creating buffer zones where it is unlawful to \u201cdeposit\u201d pesticides, two NCAC 9L .1005(e), the term \u201cdeposit\u201d means \u201cto let fall.\u201d Accordingly, an aerial pesticide applicator violates this regulation whenever he takes any action which results in either the direct or indirect (e.g., drift) falling or placement of a pesticide within a restricted buffer zone.\n7. Agriculture \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 aerial pesticide application\u2014 inconsistency with label \u2014 no reliance on obsolete labeling restriction\nThe Pesticide Board did not improperly rely upon an obsolete labeling restriction when it determined that petitioner aerially applied a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling in violation of state statutes where the Board relied upon a labeling restriction stating that the pesticide should not be applied \u201cin such a manner as to directly or through drift expose workers or other persons,\u201d although the EPA had changed the required warning to state that the pesticide should not be distributed or sold \u201cin a way that will contact workers or other persons, either directly or through drift,\u201d where a grace period applied so that the new warning label was not required at the time petitioner applied the pesticide in question, and petitioner was not subject to the EPA\u2019s amended labeling restrictions because he was not a distributor or seller of pesticides. Therefore, the Pesticide Board was permitted to apply the pesticide label restrictions as they existed at the time of petitioner\u2019s application of the pesticide.\n8. Agriculture \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 aerial pesticide application\u2014 inconsistency with label \u2014 statutory violations \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 143-443(b)(3), 143-456(a)(2), and 143-469(b)(2), an aerial pesticide applicator was forbidden to apply a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with any written, printed, or graphic material located upon its container and its accompanying materials at or before the time of application. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient for the Pesticide Board to find that the applicator applied a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its label warning that it should not be applied in a manner \u201cas to directly or through drift expose workers or other persons\u201d where it tended to show that the applicator aerially sprayed a soybean field, and when the resident of property adjoining the soybean field exited her home on that day, she encountered a vapor that made her eyes burn and her lips tingle.\n9. Administrative Law and Procedure \u00a7 52 (NCI4th)\u2014 constitutionality of pesticide regulations \u2014 jurisdiction of trial court \u2014 exhaustion of administrative remedies not required\nAn aerial pesticide applicator who was fined and had his aerial pesticide license revoked by the Pesticide Board was not required, in order to argue before the trial court the constitutionality of aerial pesticide regulations creating certain buffer zones, to exhaust administrative remedies by (1) petitioning the Pesticide Board to amend or appeal the regulation pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-20, or (2) requesting a declaratory ruling from the Pesticide Board pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-4, since it is in the province of the judiciary to make constitutional determinations, and any effort made by the applicator to have the constitutionality of the regulations determined by the Pesticide Board would have been in vain.\n10. Agriculture \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 aerial pesticide regulations\u2014 buffer zones \u2014 not due process violation\nAerial pesticide buffer-zone regulations that prohibit depositing a pesticide within specified distances of schools, hospitals, nursing homes, churches, occupied businesses, roadways, and areas where aquatic life may be harmed do not violate due process under the United States or North Carolina Constitutions because they have the legitimate objective of protecting both people and the environment from the harmful risks accompanying pesticide application, and they utilize a reasonable means of accomplishing this objective. These regulations do not violate due process because they fail to distinguish between harmless and harmful deposit levels or because they do not involve a determination of whether the deposit was intentional, purposeful, or willfully negligent.\n11. Agriculture \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 aerial pesticide regulations\u2014 buffer zones \u2014 not equal protection violation\nBuffer-zone pesticide regulations do not violate equal protection under the United States or North Carolina Constitutions because they treat aerial pesticide applicators differently from ground pesticide applicators since the increased risk of harm to people and the environment associated with aerial applications mandates treating aerial applicators in a distinct manner.\nAppeal by respondent pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) of an unpublished decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 128 N.C. App. 750, 498 S.E.2d 210 (1998), affirming an order entered by Farmer, J., on 7 February 1997 in Superior Court, Wake County. On 8 July 1998, the Supreme Court allowed petitioner\u2019s petition for discretionary review of additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court 18 November 1998.\nHatch, Little & Bunn, L.L.P., by David H. Permar and Tina L. Frazier, for petitioner-appellant and -appellee.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Melissa H. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent-appellant and -appellee.\nSouthern Environmental Law Center, by Donnell Van Noppen III, Senior Attorney, on behalf of Agricultural Resources Center, Inc., amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0656-01", "first_page_order": 694, "last_page_order": 714 }