{ "id": 1155931, "name": "SARA LEE CORPORATION v. STEPHEN DOWELL CARTER", "name_abbreviation": "Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter", "decision_date": "1999-10-08", "docket_number": "No. 271PA98", "first_page": "27", "last_page": "37", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "351 N.C. 27" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11651029 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867707 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 S.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21", "parenthetical": "quoting 50 Am. Jur. Statutes \u00a7 432, at 453 (1944)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571966 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "quoting 50 Am. Jur. Statutes \u00a7 432, at 453 (1944)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567220 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796111 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "quoting Poole v. Miller, 342 N.C. 349, 351, 464 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867649 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409", "parenthetical": "quoting Poole v. Miller, 342 N.C. 349, 351, 464 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E.2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600024 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795-96", "parenthetical": "quoting Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 13-14, 84 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1954)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573491 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621-22", "parenthetical": "quoting Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 13-14, 84 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1954)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570254 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.E. 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "Cardozo, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.Y. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 1961344 ], "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386", "parenthetical": "Cardozo, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/225/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 S.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "quoting Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919) (Cardozo, J.)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562504 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "quoting Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919) (Cardozo, J.)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538399 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518481 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520555 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541708 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561020 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568140 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573251, 8573289, 8573226, 8573201, 8573274 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0759-03", "/nc/305/0759-05", "/nc/305/0759-02", "/nc/305/0759-01", "/nc/305/0759-04" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119-20" }, { "page": "119-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 N.C. App. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521757 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/56/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11651029 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0464-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 997, "char_count": 24553, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.981626697682735e-07, "percentile": 0.9734283736233271 }, "sha256": "21786e46a7c6ca48f0c44584d6f84ceac5db6dee1e9cd858f43c144d66531707", "simhash": "1:ad69d27e3d672072", "word_count": 3868 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:38:07.529951+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Freeman did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "SARA LEE CORPORATION v. STEPHEN DOWELL CARTER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Justice.\nThis action arises out of a suit brought by Sara Lee Corporation (\u201cSara Lee\u201d), alleging, inter alia, that defendant, plaintiff\u2019s former employee, committed fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair and deceptive practices. The trial court ruled in plaintiff\u2019s favor and awarded Sara Lee $322,729.20 in damages for defendant\u2019s self-dealing and fraudulent conduct; $170,036.30 for salary and benefits that defendant received during his employment with Sara Lee; treble damages on both of these amounts pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16; prejudgment interest; and Sara Lee\u2019s attorneys\u2019 fees and costs.\nThe record reflects the following events out of which this case arises.\nDefendant worked as a \u201cService Manager\u201d at ComputerLand in Winston-Salem, where he visited and serviced certain ComputerLand customers, including Sara Lee. In 1988, Mr. Gene Cain, defendant\u2019s contact at Sara Lee, approached defendant about servicing Sara Lee in an individual capacity. At that time, defendant was still employed by ComputerLand and, thus, initially declined this offer. However, at some point thereafter, defendant did perform the requested service work for Sara Lee.\nOn 2 January 1989, Sara Lee hired defendant to work as an \u201cInformation Center Service Administrator\u201d in the Sara Lee Knit Products Division. When defendant began working at Sara Lee, he signed a form indicating that he had received a copy of Sara Lee\u2019s code of conduct and that he would comply with the policies contained therein. Specifically, Sara Lee\u2019s code of conduct contained a provision prohibiting an employee from engaging in undisclosed self-dealing with another entity that supplied products or services to Sara Lee.\nAt Sara Lee, defendant was responsible for the maintenance and repair of personal computers. Defendant\u2019s job description specifically provided that he would \u201cdevelop [] and maintain[] relationships with vendors to provide [Sara Lee Knit Products] with the best possible pricing, availability, and support of hardware and services.\u201d Defendant was authorized and entrusted to order and purchase computer parts at the lowest possible prices.\nDuring his employment with Sara Lee, but unknown to his employer, defendant developed four separate businesses (referred to by the trial court as \u201cthe Carter Enterprises\u201d and consisting of C Square Consulting, Computer Care, Micro Computer Services, and PC Technologies) through which he engaged in self-dealing by supplying Sara Lee with computer parts and services at allegedly excessive cost while concealing his interest in these businesses. Sara Lee paid a total of $495,431.54 to defendant\u2019s businesses for parts and services.\nSeparate from and unrelated to defendant\u2019s self-dealing enterprises, defendant suffered a closed head injury when he fell at work on 8 July 1992. He subsequently filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim with the Industrial Commission. On 25 September 1992, Sara Lee terminated defendant\u2019s employment, after investigating his self-dealing transactions. On 13 January 1993, the North Carolina Industrial Commission approved a Form 21 agreement for compensation for disability entered into by plaintiff Sara Lee and defendant. Pursuant to the Form 21 agreement, the parties stipulated that defendant sustained a closed head injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment and was, thus, disabled. Sara Lee agreed to pay temporary total disability benefits to defendant. The Industrial Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing on 20-21 May 1996 wherein Sara Lee asserted, in part, that the Commission should set aside the Form 21 award because of defendant\u2019s alleged misrepresentation or fraud. Sara Lee also submitted that it was \u201centitled to a credit for any benefits paid and to be paid against any amount [defendant] is determined to owe [Sara Lee] in any criminal or civil proceeding.\u201d As of the date of the original appeal of this case before the Court of Appeals, the Industrial Commission had not issued a ruling regarding defendant\u2019s receipt of workers\u2019 compensation benefits.\nAfter discovering defendant\u2019s fraudulent acts, plaintiff Sara Lee filed this action against defendant on 14 February 1995 in Superior Court, Forsyth County, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive fraud, conversion, and unfair and deceptive practices. Plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages, treble damages under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1, the imposition of a constructive trust, and attorneys\u2019 fees.\nAfter the presentation of extensive evidence, the trial court made findings that \u201c[t]he transactions between Sara Lee and the Carter Enterprises were not open, fair and honest. In fact, the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is, to the contrary, that [defendant] used his position of trust at Sara Lee to make profits on transactions involving the Carter Enterprises without disclosing his financial interest in the Carter Enterprises to his superiors at Sara Lee.\u201d\nThe Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s conclusion that \u201c[defendant breached his fiduciary duty by selling computer parts to Sara Lee without disclosing his interest in the companies supplying these parts.\u201d Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 129 N.C. App. 464, 471, 500 S.E.2d 732, 737 (1998). In addition, the trial court found that \u201c[t]he representations made by [defendant] were false, intentional, made with the intent that they be relied upon by Sara Lee, were in fact relied upon by Sara Lee and resulted in damage and injury being sustained by Sara Lee.\u201d Thus, the trial court determined that Sara Lee sustained damages in the amount of $322,729.20 as a result of defendant\u2019s fraudulent acts.\nIn its judgment, the trial court concluded that defendant \u201cengaged in actual fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices prior to, and actual fraud, constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and unfair and deceptive trade practices throughout, the time that he was employed by ... Sara Lee Corporation from January 2, 1989 until September 25, 1992.\u201d In addition, the trial court concluded that defendant owed a fiduciary duty to Sara Lee with respect to his role in recommending the purchase and ordering of computer parts and related services for Sara Lee and that defendant breached that fiduciary duty and engaged in constructive fraud throughout the time that he was employed by Sara Lee. The trial court ordered that a constructive trust for the benefit of Sara Lee be imposed over any workers\u2019 compensation benefits that defendant receives or has received for the closed head injury.\nThe Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant had breached his duty to plaintiff and had engaged in fraud against plaintiff, but held that defendant\u2019s conduct did not fall within the scope of unfair and deceptive acts or practices under chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes (chapter 75) because defendant was an employee at the time he defrauded Sara Lee. In its reasoning, the Court of Appeals relied on the proposition articulated in Buie v. Daniel Int\u2019l Corp., 56 N.C. App. 445, 289 S.E.2d 118, disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 759, 292 S.E.2d 574 (1982), that \u201cemployer-employee relationships do not fall within the intended scope of G.S. 75-1.1.\u201d Id. at 448, 289 S.E.2d at 119-20. Thus, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court\u2019s award of treble damages and attorneys\u2019 fees which were granted pursuant to chapter 75. Moreover, the Court of Appeals ruled that the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-21, which provide in part that workers\u2019 compensation benefits are \u201cexempt from all claims of creditors,\u201d precluded the imposition of a constructive trust on defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-21 (Supp. 1998).\nIn this appeal, plaintiff contends (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in not applying N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 to defendant\u2019s conduct in this case even though an \u201cemployee\u201d may have participated in the transactions, and (2) that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-21 in holding that a constructive trust may not be imposed on workers\u2019 compensation benefits. We shall address each of these arguments in turn.\nAlthough the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion addressed only the question of whether an employer-employee relationship removes the case from the scope of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1, defendant\u2019s assignment of error to the Court of Appeals challenges the trial court\u2019s conclusion of law that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 applied to the defendant\u2019s acts at issue. Therefore, it is necessary for us to determine if defendant\u2019s fraudulent acts and his breach of fiduciary duty constitute unfair and deceptive acts or practices under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 (the Act), which provides, in pertinent part: \u201cUnfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1(a) (1994). In analyzing an allegedly unfair and deceptive act or practice under the Act, we must first determine whether the act or practice falls within the purview of section 75-1.1 as the legislature intended. Because defendant does not dispute the trial court\u2019s finding that his actions were fraudulent, defendant\u2019s acts were conclusively \u201cunfair or deceptive.\u201d See Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975). Thus, in the present case, we must next decide whether the activities and transactions between defendant and Sara Lee giving rise to this cause of action were \u201cin or affecting commerce.\u201d See Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980).\nIn Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 400 S.E.2d 440 (1991), we quoted with approval a decision by our Court of Appeals: \u201c \u2018The purpose of G.S. 75-1.1 is to provide a civil means to maintain ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business and the consuming public within this State[,] and [it] applies to dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 245, 400 S.E.2d at 443-44 (quoting United Va. Bank v. Air-Lift Assocs., 79 N.C. App. 315, 319-20, 339 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1986)) (alterations in original). However, \u201cwe have not limited the applicability of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 to cases involving consumers only. After all, unfair trade practices involving only businesses affect the consumer as well.\u201d United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988) (citation omitted).\n\u201c \u2018Commerce\u2019 in its broadest sense comprehends intercourse for the purposes of trade in any form.\u201d Johnson, 300 N.C. at 261, 266 S.E.2d at 620. In the context of unfair and deceptive acts or practices, this Court has provided additional guidance by stating that \u201c \u2018[business activities\u2019 is a term which connotes the manner in which businesses conduct their regular, day-to-day activities, or affairs, such as the purchase and sale of goods, or whatever other activities the business regularly engages in and for which it is organized.\u201d HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 594, 403 S.E.2d 483, 493 (1991).\nAlthough the Act is subject to a reasonably broad interpretation in determining its scope, some exceptions have been carved out. For example, the Act provides that \u201c[f]or purposes of this section, \u2018commerce\u2019 includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1(b).\nIn the case sub judice, defendant engaged in self-dealing business activities wherein he sold computer parts and services to his employer from companies owned by him. Moreover, the trial court found that \u201cSara Lee employees were not adequately and properly informed that [defendant] had any interest in or was receiving any payments from C Square Consulting, Computer Care, Micro Computer Services or PC Technologies (\u2018Carter Enterprises\u2019) on an on-going basis.\u201d\nThe trial court specifically found that \u201c[t]he parts sales and computer and cable service transactions between [plaintiff] and the Carter Enterprises were unethical and fraudulent, and they affected commerce,\u201d and that \u201c[defendant\u2019s] self-dealing conduct and receipt of compensation and benefits from Sara Lee while engaged in this egregious breach of his fiduciary duty and fraud was unethical and fraudulent and affected commerce.\u201d\nAfter thoroughly reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude that the transactions at issue were \u201cin or affecting commerce\u201d and thus fall within the scope of the Act. There is uncontradicted evidence in this case that defendant sold computer parts and services, through his various enterprises, to plaintiff. Trusting that these were legitimate transactions secured at competitive prices in the marketplace, plaintiff regularly conducted business with the companies in which defendant had an interest. In this case, defendant and plaintiff clearly engaged in buyer-seller relations in a business setting, and thus, we hold that defendant\u2019s fraudulent actions fall within the ambit of the statutory prohibition of unfair and deceptive acts or practices as determined by the trial court.\nHaving determined that defendant\u2019s conduct is covered by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1, we must now consider whether the reasoning in Buie precludes the applicability of the Act to this case, as the Court of Appeals concluded. The facts of Buie are distinguishable from the facts at bar in that the plaintiff in Buie attempted to recover punitive damages under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 based on the allegedly retaliatory termination of plaintiff for his pursuit of workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Buie, 56 N.C. App. 445, 289 S.E.2d 118. The Court of Appeals held:\nUnlike buyer-seller relationships, we find that employer-employee relationships do not fall within the intended scope of G.S. 75-1.1 .... Employment practices fall within the purview of other statutes adopted for that express purpose.\nId. at 448, 289 S.E.2d at 119-20.\nAlthough this Court is not bound by the decision in Buie, we find Buie neither applicable nor instructive in deciding the case before us. The Court of Appeals erred in relying on Buie and holding that because defendant was an employee at the time he committed the unfair and deceptive acts or practices, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 does not apply to this case. To the contrary, having already characterized defendant\u2019s conduct as buyer-seller transactions that fall squarely within the Act\u2019s intended reach, we conclude that defendant\u2019s relationship to plaintiff as an employee, under these facts, does not preclude applicability of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 to this case. Even though defendant was an employee, he nevertheless engaged in self-dealing conduct and \u201cbusiness activities.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1(b). On these facts, defendant\u2019s mere employee status at the time he committed these acts does not safeguard him from liability under the Act. Therefore, because the trial court correctly applied N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 to the facts at hand, we reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue.\nTurning to the second issue before this Court, plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-21 in holding that the trial court could not impose a constructive trust on any workers\u2019 compensation benefits received by defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-21 provides, in pertinent part:\nNo claim for compensation under this Article shall be assignable, and all compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and from taxes. 1\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-21, para. 1 (Supp. 1998). The Court of Appeals reasoned that this statutory language precluded the court from using the equitable device of imposing a constructive trust on defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits. We disagree.\nIn this case, the overwhelming evidence presented at trial led the trial court to conclude, inter alia, that defendant engaged in fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair and deceptive acts or practices. The trial court then ordered that \u201ca constructive trust for the benefit of [plaintiff] is hereby imposed over any and all workers[\u2019] compensation benefits that [defendant] is or shall be entitled to receive\u201d and that \u201ca constructive trust for the benefit of [plaintiff] is hereby imposed over any and all long term disability benefits that [defendant] is or shall be entitled to receive.\u201d\n\u201c \u2018A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee.\u2019 \u201d Johnson v. Stevenson, 269 N.C. 200, 203, 152 S.E.2d 214, 217 (1967) (quoting Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919) (Cardozo, J.)). \u201cCourts of equity will impose a constructive trust to prevent the unjust enrichment of the holder of the legal title to property acquired through a breach of duty, fraud, or other circumstances which make it inequitable for him to retain it against the claim of the beneficiary of the constructive trust.\u201d Cline v. Cline, 297 N.C. 336, 343-44, 255 S.E.2d 399, 404 (1979). \u201c \u2018[A] constructive trust ordinarily arises out of the existence of fraud, actual or presumptive \u2014 usually involving the violation of a confidential or fiduciary relation \u2014 in view of which equity transfers the beneficial title to some person other than the holder of the legal title.\u2019 \u201d Leatherman v. Leatherman, 297 N.C. 618, 621-22, 256 S.E.2d 793, 795-96 (1979) (quoting Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 13-14, 84 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1954)).\nIn this case, the Court of Appeals held that a constructive trust was not available because of the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-21 declaring that workers\u2019 compensation benefits are \u201cexempt from all claims of creditors.\u201d However, we find that such language does not preclude the trial court from imposing the equitable remedy of a constructive trust to the specific facts of this case.\nWhen interpreting the meaning of a statute, we must first look to the language of the statute itself. This Court has stated that \u201c \u2018[w]hen language used in the statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must refrain from judicial construction and accord words undefined in the statute their plain and definite meaning.\u2019 \u201d Hieb v. Lowery, 344 N.C. 403, 409, 474 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1996) (quoting Poole v. Miller, 342 N.C. 349, 351, 464 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1995)). Here, the plain language of the statute does not give rise to an interpretation exempting benefits from being held in a constructive trust. The statute merely provides that creditors may not reach the workers\u2019 compensation benefits. We do not consider plaintiff, a holder of beneficial title of a constructive trust, to be a \u201ccreditor\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-21. Had the legislature intended to exclude equitable processes from the statute, it would have said so; \u201cthe absence of any express intent and the strained interpretation necessary to reach the result urged upon us by [defendant] indicate that such was not [the legislature\u2019s] intent.\u201d Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 425, 276 S.E.2d 422, 436 (1981).\nFor example, in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-24-85, concerning general regulations of business and fraternal benefit societies, the legislature provided:\nNo money or other benefit, charity, relief or aid to be paid, provided or rendered by any society, shall be liable to attachment, garnishment or other process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated or applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability of a member or beneficiary....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-24-85 (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, the legislature has drafted statutes expressly exempting equitable remedies from the powers of the court when that is its intention. The legislature did not do so in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-21. \u201c \u2018Where the legislature has made no exception to the positive terms of a statute, the presumption is that it intended to make none, and it is a general rule of construction that the courts have no authority to create, and will not create, exceptions to the provisions of a statute not made by the act itself.\u2019 \u201d Upchurch v. Hudson Funeral Home, Inc., 263 N.C. 560, 565, 140 S.E.2d 17, 21 (1965) (quoting 50 Am. Jur. Statutes \u00a7 432, at 453 (1944)). Therefore, we hold that in the absence of clear and specific language precluding the trial court from imposing an equitable remedy, we will not assume that the legislature intended to do so.\nWe note, however, in reaching this result that the Industrial Commission, at least prior to this suit, had not decided whether to set aside the Form 21 agreement entered into by Sara Lee and defendant and approved by the Industrial Commission. Further, defendant argued before this Court that Sara Lee knew about defendant\u2019s fraudulent activities at the time it agreed to the Form 21 terms. However, under this extraordinary and unique set of facts, we cannot say that the trial court erred. Although the injury sustained by defendant was unrelated to his fraudulent conduct, his employment, from which his right to compensation arises, was tainted in its entirety by the extensive fraudulent abuse of his fiduciary relationship with his employer, Sara Lee. As such, the trial court had the authority to determine that the financial benefit to which defendant was entitled under his workers\u2019 compensation claim should be placed in a constructive trust for the benefit of the employer whom he defrauded.\nIt is a long-standing principle that \u201c[w]hen equitable relief is sought, courts claim the power to grant, deny, limit, or shape that relief as a matter of discretion.\u201d Roberts v. Madison County Realtors Ass\u2019n, 344 N.C. 394, 399, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996). In the case sub judice, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering that defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits be placed in a constructive trust for the benefit of plaintiff Sara Lee.\nWe therefore reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 rulings.\nREVERSED.\nJustice Freeman did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, by Daniel R. Taylor, Jr., and Louis W. Doherty, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Elliot, Pishko, Gelbin & Morgan, P.A., by David C. Pishko, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SARA LEE CORPORATION v. STEPHEN DOWELL CARTER\nNo. 271PA98\n(Filed 8 October 1999)\n1. Unfair Trade Practices\u2014 self-dealing by employee\nDefendant\u2019s fraudulent acts and breach of fiduciary duty by self-dealing business activities wherein he sold computer parts and services to his employer from companies owned by him without disclosing his interest in those companies constituted unfair or deceptive acts \u201cin or affecting commerce\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1(a). Defendant\u2019s mere employee status at the time he committed these acts does not safeguard him from liability under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 constructive trust on benefits\u2014 employee\u2019s self-dealing\nWhere defendant employee engaged in fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and deceptive acts or practices by his self-dealing business activities wherein he sold computer parts and services to plaintiff employer from companies owned by him without disclosing his interest in those companies, the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-21 declaring that workers\u2019 compensation benefits are \u201cexempt from all claims of creditors\u201d did not prohibit the trial court from imposing a constructive trust in favor of plaintiff on defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits, since the holder of beneficial title of a constructive trust is not a \u201ccreditor\u201d within the meaning of that statute. Although the injury sustained by plaintiff was unrelated to defendant\u2019s fraudulent conduct, his employment, from which his right to compensation arises, was tainted in its entirety by the extensive fraudulent abuse of his fiduciary relationship with plaintiff employer, and the trial court had the authority to determine that the financial benefit to which defendant was entitled under his workers\u2019 compensation claim should be placed in a constructive trust in favor of the employer whom he defrauded.\nJustice Freeman did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 129 N.C. App. 464, 500 S.E.2d 732 (1998), affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding a judgment entered by DeRamus, J., on 12 December 1996 in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Supreme Court 8 February 1999.\nKilpatrick Stockton LLP, by Daniel R. Taylor, Jr., and Louis W. Doherty, for plaintiff-appellant.\nElliot, Pishko, Gelbin & Morgan, P.A., by David C. Pishko, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0027-01", "first_page_order": 77, "last_page_order": 87 }