{ "id": 1155827, "name": "CHARLIE STEVE SPRUILL v. LAKE PHELPS VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC. and CRESWELL VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Spruill v. Lake Phelps Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.", "decision_date": "2000-02-04", "docket_number": "No. 87PA99", "first_page": "318", "last_page": "324", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "351 N.C. 318" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237051 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 F. Supp. 492", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3939097 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" }, { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/668/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 S.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614614 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 S.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337", "parenthetical": "quoting 4 Strong's North Carolina Index Statutes \u00a7 5 (1st ed. 1961)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 N.C. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561989 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "quoting 4 Strong's North Carolina Index Statutes \u00a7 5 (1st ed. 1961)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/259/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567817 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 147", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796111 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "quoting Poole v. Miller, 342 N.C. 349, 351, 464 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867649 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409", "parenthetical": "quoting Poole v. Miller, 342 N.C. 349, 351, 464 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562923 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237051 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0104-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 651, "char_count": 16326, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.8175484587568584e-07, "percentile": 0.8380950009054582 }, "sha256": "f00d842c11bdd9a0aa76dc45cdc081ebfc4cd3283c807aa2ec3669c027fe8fbb", "simhash": "1:a77f4d7f7623831d", "word_count": 2687 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:38:07.529951+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Martin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "CHARLIE STEVE SPRUILL v. LAKE PHELPS VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC. and CRESWELL VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LAKE, Justice.\nThe question presented for review is whether the statute affording limited liability to firemen, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5, exempts a rural fire department from liability for ordinary negligence when a fire department performs acts which relate to the suppression of a reported fire, even though such acts do not occur at the scene of the fire. We conclude that it does. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nPlaintiff made the following basic allegations in the complaint initiating this action. Defendants are Lake Phelps Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. (Lake Phelps) and Creswell Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. (Creswell). On 10 March 1996, defendants responded to a fire in the vicinity of rural paved road 1149 in Washington County. While responding to this fire, defendants filled the tanks of their fire trucks from a hydrant approximately one-half mile from the fire, and in so doing, defendants spilled water on rural paved road 1149 from their vehicles or hoses. This spilled water then froze on the pavement of this road. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on 10 March 1996, plaintiff was operating a 1995 Chevrolet Corvette in this vicinity on rural paved road 1149. Plaintiffs car hit this ice, skidded and ran off the roadway, and collided with a ditch bank on the side of the road. Plaintiff sustained personal injuries and property damage as a result of this accident.\nOn 19 February 1997, plaintiff instituted this action against defendants Lake Phelps and Creswell to recover damages for his resulting personal injuries and property damage. On or about 25 March 1997, defendant Creswell filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, asserting immunity. On 1 April 1997, defendant Lake Phelps filed its answer in which it denied all pertinent allegations. On 8 April 1997, defendant Lake Phelps filed an amendment to its answer in which it added the defenses of immunity and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On 8 April 1997, defendant Lake Phelps also filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. On or about 16 April 1997, defendant Creswell filed an amended motion to dismiss. On 16 April 1997, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint.\nPlaintiff\u2019s motion to amend and defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss were heard on 10 July 1997 in Superior Court, Washington County. The trial court allowed plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend his complaint, and the amendment was filed 11 July 1997. On 23 July 1997, the trial court entered an order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s action against defendant Lake Phelps, and on 4 August 1997, the trial court entered an order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s action against defendant Creswell. The trial court then entered an amended order on 10 December 1997 which superseded its two prior orders of dismissal and granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.\nThe Court of Appeals reversed the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment. Spruill v. Lake Phelps Vol. Fire Dep\u2019t, Inc., 132 N.C. App. 104, 510 S.E.2d 405 (1999). Defendant Lake Phelps and defendant Creswell each petitioned this Court, for discretionary review. On 8 April 1999, this Court entered orders allowing discretionary review as to both defendants. Defendants contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court\u2019s order of summary judgment for defendants which was entered on the ground that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b) provides immunity to rural fire departments. We agree.\nThe issue presented is thus one of statutory construction. When confronting an issue involving statutory interpretation, this Court\u2019s \u201cprimary task is to determine legislative intent while giving the language of the statute its natural and ordinary meaning unless the context requires otherwise.\u201d Turlington v. McLeod, 323 N.C. 591, 594, 374 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1988). The limited liability section of the Authority and Liability of Firemen Act provides:\nA rural fire department or a fireman who belongs to the department shall not be liable for damages to persons or property alleged to have been sustained and alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or omission, either of the rural fire department or of the fireman at the scene of a reported fire, when that act or omission relates to the suppression of the reported fire or to the direction of traffic or enforcement of traffic laws or ordinances at the scene of or in connection with a fire, accident, or other hazard by the department or the fireman unless it is established that the damage occurred because of gross negligence, wanton conduct or intentional wrongdoing of the rural fire department or the fireman.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b) (1999). It is apparent that in enacting this statute, the overall purpose of the General Assembly was to protect rural volunteer fire departments from liability for ordinary negligence when responding to a fire.\nIn the decision below, the Court of Appeals observed with respect to the wording of this section that the General Assembly failed to define \u201cwhat constitutes \u2018the scene\u2019 of a reported fire.\u201d Spruill, 132 N.C. App. at 106, 510 S.E.2d at 407. The Court of Appeals then reasoned that \u201c[t]he words \u2018at the scene\u2019 provide immunity for defendants for acts and omissions only in a specific place\u201d (i.e., at the precise location of the fire), and that a \u201cbroader reading of the statute would be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.\u201d Id at 108, 510 S.E.2d at 408. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that \u201c[t]he fact that plaintiff\u2019s wreck occurred where defendants had filled their fire trucks with water from a fire hydrant, one-half mile away from the reported fire, is insufficient for defendants to claim immunity.\u201d Id Under the Court of Appeals\u2019 interpretation, the words \u201cat the scene of a reported fire\u201d apply not just to individual firemen but to fire departments as well. The Court of Appeals thus determined that defendant fire departments were not immune from liability in this case by virtue of this statute. For the reasons stated below, we disagree with this interpretation.\nAlthough the Court of Appeals focused on the phrase within this statutory section which specifies \u201cthe scene\u201d of the fire, it is clear that the underlying premise of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b) is that \u201c[a] rural fire department... shall not be liable ... by reason of an act or omission . . . when that act or omission relates to the suppression of the reported fire____\u201d This is the overall thrust of this statute, as it relates to rural fire departments, and this should be the focus. In this case, plaintiff sued only the fire departments.\nConsidering this statute as a whole, it establishes immunity for the ordinary negligence of either a rural fire department or a fireman of the department \u201cat the scene.\u201d In order for immunity to attach to either of these entities, the act or omission must be related to \u201csuppression of the reported fire or to the direction of traffic.\u201d The alternative conduct involving direction of traffic may occur either \u201cat the scene\u201d of or \u201cin connection with\u201d a fire. When viewed in this context, it clearly appears that immunity would attach to a rural fire department if its acts or omissions complained of were either (1) related to the suppression of a reported fire, or (2) related to direction of traffic in connection with a fire. This Court must always \u201c \u2018accord words undefined in [a] statute their plain and definite meaning\u2019 \u201d when the statutory language at issue is \u201c \u2018clear and unambiguous.\u2019 \u201d Hieb v. Lowery, 344 N.C. 403, 409, 474 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1996) (quoting Poole v. Miller, 342 N.C. 349, 351, 464 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1995)). In the case sub judice, plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the acts or omissions occurred while defendants were responding to a fire and arose from defendants\u2019 alleged failure to warn plaintiff of a traffic hazard. It would thus appear that both alternatives for immunity as set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b) are met and apply in this case.\nFurther, we do not find persuasive the contention that the fire departments\u2019 acts or omissions must take place at \u201cthe scene\u201d simply by virtue of the phrase \u201ceither of the rural fire department or of the fireman at the scene of a reported fire.\u201d Considering the language and grammar of this statutory phrase, the word \u201cor\u201d separates the terms \u201crural fire department\u201d and \u201cfireman at the scene of a reported fire.\u201d The phrase \u201cat the scene of a reported fire\u201d modifies the word \u201cfireman,\u201d thus providing the single descriptive phrase, \u201cfireman at the scene of a reported fire.\u201d If the General Assembly in enacting this statute had intended for rural fire departments to be protected from liability only for negligent acts occurring at the scene of a reported fire, it logically and more appropriately would have applied this modifying phrase directly to the fire department just as it did to the firemen actually working \u201cat the scene.\u201d Because \u201cor\u201d separates the terms \u201crural fire department\u201d from the phrase \u201cfireman at the scene of a reported fire,\u201d it follows in the normal grammatical sense that only individual firemen have the limited immunity which is restricted to negligent acts or omissions occurring \u201cat the scene\u201d of a fire.\nIn further reflection of its intent, the legislature amended the original immunity statute in 1987 in order to expand the immunities allowed for rural fire departments and their members. Pursuant to this amendment, the General Assembly inserted the following underlined language into the statute\u2019s text:\nA rural fire department or a fireman who belongs to the department shall not be liable .... by reason of an act or omission .... when that act or omission relates to the suppression of the reported fire or to the direction of traffic or enforcement of traffic laws or ordinances at the scene of or in connection with a fire-accident. or other hazard by the department or the fireman unless it is established that the damage occurred because of gross negligence, wanton conduct or intentional wrongdoing of the rural fire department or the fireman.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b); see also Act of May 7, 1987, ch. 146, sec. 2, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 147, 147. This underlined language, as we have noted above, provides immunity for negligent acts or omissions that relate to the suppression of a fire or to the direction of traffic either \u201cat the scene of or in connection with a fire.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b). The addition of the phrase \u201cat the scene of or in connection with a fire\u201d suggests that the General Assembly intended to provide statutory immunity for the ordinary negligence of a rural fire department\u2019s acts or omissions which relate to the suppression of a fire, and not merely for those acts occurring at the scene of the fire.\nThe 1987 statutory amendment also creates another set of circumstances in which immunity would apply; thus, the General Assembly expanded the scope of the statute. \u201cIn construing a statute with reference to an amendment, it is presumed that the Legislature intended either (1) to change the substance of the original act or (2) to clarify the meaning of it.\u201d Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Neill, 296 N.C. 503, 509, 251 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1979). Here, the amendment adds an \u201cor\u201d and then describes the additional situations in which a rural fire department would receive immunity. \u201c \u2018Where a statute contains two clauses which prescribe its applicability, and the clauses are connected by a disjunctive (e.g. \u201cor\u201d), the application of the statute is not limited to cases falling within both clauses, but will apply to cases falling within either of them.\u2019 \u201d Davis v. N.C. Granite Corp., 259 N.C. 672, 675, 131 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1963) (quoting 4 Strong\u2019s North Carolina Index Statutes \u00a7 5 (1st ed. 1961)). Additionally, the Act which amended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b) in 1987 was merely part of \u201cAn Act to Expand the Traffic Control Authority of Firemen and Rescue Squad Members in Emergency Situations.\u201d This Court has previously ruled that the title of a statute may be used as an aid in determining legislative intent. Equipment Fin. Corp. v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 334, 340, 106 S.E.2d 555, 560 (1959). Accordingly, we conclude that the General Assembly intended to expand the scope of the statute, including the immunity options within it, when it passed the 1987 amendment. However, the Court of Appeals\u2019 interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b) contravenes this indicated intent because it limits, rather than expands, the scope of the statute. The Court of Appeals\u2019 construction results in a much narrower interpretation of the statute which would restrict immunity and thus frustrate the indicated intent to expand the statute\u2019s scope.\nFinally, in the decision below, the Court of Appeals relied on Geiger v. Guilford College Community Vol. Firemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, 668 F. Supp. 492 (M.D.N.C. 1987), in concluding that defendants are not protected from liability under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b). The Court of Appeals\u2019 reliance on Geiger is misplaced because the facts in Geiger involve the rescue of two men trapped in a gasoline tanker. See id. at 493. The court in Geiger concluded that the fire department was not responding to a fire, and thus no immunity applied under the statute. Id. at 494. However, defendant fire departments in the case sub judice were performing acts that were \u201cin connection with a reported fire\u201d as required under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b).\nBased on the foregoing, we conclude that in order for immunity to apply to a rural fire department, the statute requires merely that the fire department\u2019s negligent act or omission must relate to the \u201csuppression of the reported fire.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b). Therefore, so long as the fire department\u2019s actions are related to the suppression of a fire, it is irrelevant whether the fire department\u2019s negligent act or omission occurs precisely \u201cat the scene\u201d of the fire. Because defendants\u2019 alleged negligence occurred while defendant fire departments were filling their tanks with water in response to a fire, defendants\u2019 alleged negligence constituted an \u201cact or omission [that] relat[ed] to the suppression of [a] reported fire.\u201d Id. Since the legislature intended to provide immunity to rural fire departments for ordinary negligence when responding to a fire, we conclude that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.\nREVERSED.\nJustice Martin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "LAKE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hardee & Hardee, by G. Wayne Hardee and Charles R. Hardee, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Baker, Jenkins, Jones & Daly, RA., by Kevin N. Lewis and Ronald G. Baker, for defendant-appellant Lake Phelps Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.", "Yates, McLamb & Weyher, L.L.P., by Barry S. Cobb, for defendant-appellant Creswell Volunteer Fire Department, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLIE STEVE SPRUILL v. LAKE PHELPS VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC. and CRESWELL VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC.\nNo. 87PA99\n(Filed 4 February 2000)\nImmunity\u2014 rural fire department \u2014 negligence\u2014statutory immunity\nThe statute affording limited liability to firemen, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-82-5(b), exempts a rural fire department from liability for ordinary negligence when the fire department performs acts which relate to the suppression of a reported fire, even though such acts do not occur at the scene of the fire. Therefore, two volunteer rural fire departments were immune from liability under the statute for alleged negligence in failing to warn plaintiff motorist of a traffic hazard created when water spilled on the roadway by the fire departments while filling the tanks of their fire trucks at a hydrant one-half mile from the fire to which they were responding froze on the roadway, and this ice caused the vehicle driven by plaintiff to skid off the roadway into a ditch bank.\nJustice Martin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 132 N.C. App. 104, 510 S.E.2d 405 (1999), reversing an amended order of summary judgment entered 10 December 1997 by Griffin, J., in Superior Court, Washington County, and remanding for trial on the remaining issues. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 September 1999.\nHardee & Hardee, by G. Wayne Hardee and Charles R. Hardee, for plaintiff-appellee.\nBaker, Jenkins, Jones & Daly, RA., by Kevin N. Lewis and Ronald G. Baker, for defendant-appellant Lake Phelps Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.\nYates, McLamb & Weyher, L.L.P., by Barry S. Cobb, for defendant-appellant Creswell Volunteer Fire Department, Inc." }, "file_name": "0318-01", "first_page_order": 368, "last_page_order": 374 }